Filed 5/21/18 5 Avalon Vista, LLC v. Tajik CA4/3





NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


5 AVALON VISTA, LLC et al.,

Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants, and
Appellants,

v.

AHMAD TAJIK et al.,

Defendants, Cross-complainants, and
Respondents.


G053413

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2012-00619397)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Richard W. Luesebrink, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Kasai Law Group, Wayne T. Kasai and Kristin E. Reynolds, for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants, and Appellants.
Samini Scheinberg, Bobby Samini and Nicole C. Prado, for Defendants, Cross-complainants, and Respondents.
5 Avalon Vista, LLC (Avalon Vista), and 16 Skyridge, LLC (Skyridge) (collectively referred to as AVS, unless the context requires otherwise), appeal from a judgment in favor of Ahmad Tajik (Tajik) and Tajik & Associates, Inc. (TA) (collectively referred to as TA, unless the context requires otherwise) on its cross-complaints and AVS’s complaints. AVS argues the following: (1) the statement of decision was inadequate; (2) insufficient evidence supports the judgment; and (3) the trial court unduly limited its right to cross-examine witnesses. None of its contentions have merit, and we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
I. Substantive History
This case arises out of a dispute between a residential homeowner of Avalon Vista and Skyridge, Joe Wen, and his former contractor, Tajik, in connection with the remodeling of the two properties. Avalon Vista and Skyridge, both limited liability companies, have the same two members, Wen and Linda Wen. Tajik is a California licensed general contractor.
On October 1, 2010, Avalon Vista and TA entered into a written agreement to construct and remodel Avalon Vista for the sum of $800,000 to be completed by July 2011. The agreement did not include a schedule of payments. Wen subsequently made numerous change orders. Beginning in July 2011, Wen routinely short-paid or failed to pay TA.
In January 2012, Wen and Tajik entered into an oral agreement through
e-mails to construct and remodel Skyridge for $1,370,000. The amount did not include the cost of creating architectural plans. Some of the e-mails included discussion of the Avalon Vista project. TA performed substantial work at Skyridge, including architectural plans, engineering reports, pulling of permits, obtaining subcontractor services, demolition, and structural steel work.
Four months later, TA requested Wen pay outstanding bills after many months of non-payment or short payment. On July 24, 2012, Wen made his last payment to TA for $10,498.
The following month, problems arose about the cost of the work on Skyridge. Wen and Tajik agreed Tajik would no longer be the general contractor and would become the project administrator. Wen would become an owner-builder.
On August 11, 2012, Wen offered to settle with TA for $134,695.56 for all work completed on Skyridge prior to that date. The next month, TA sent Wen an invoice for $163,359.49 for the Skyridge project.
On September 10, 2012, Tajik sent Wen a letter regarding his progress on the two projects, unpaid invoices, and the impact of his non-payment on Tajik’s business and his personal finances. That evening Wen sent Tajik two e-mails. In the first e-mail, Wen explained his concerns about shoddy work, change orders, and billing disputes. In the second e-mail, Wen fired TA from both projects and prohibited Tajik from returning to Avalon Vista or Skyridge, which prevented him from recovering tools with an estimated value of about $40,000.
When Wen fired TA, Robert Rothfuss was TA’s project superintendent and the Avalon Vista project was 95 percent complete. After Wen fired TA, Wen hired Rothfuss to continue as project superintendent for Avalon Vista and Skyridge. Wen also continued to use TA’s subcontractors for both projects. Wen’s target date to move into Avalon Vista was October 7, 2012. On October 12, 2012, Wen and his family moved into Avalon Vista. At the time of litigation, Skyridge was not complete.
TA subsequently sent Wen an invoice for Avalon Vista for $451,229.38. Tajik later recorded mechanic’s liens against Avalon Vista for $451,229.38 and Skyridge for $195,575.08.
II. Procedural History
Avalon Vista filed a complaint against Tajik alleging causes of action for breach of a written contract, fraud by intentional misrepresentation, and deceit by negligent misrepresentation. Skyridge filed a complaint alleging the same causes of action, except the first was for breach of an oral contract. Avalon Vista and Skyridge later dismissed the fraud causes of action at trial and proceeded only on the breach of contract causes of action.
Tajik first filed a cross-complaint against Avalon Vista alleging the following causes of action: breach of written contract; foreclosure on mechanic’s lien; fraud-intentional misrepresentation; negligent misrepresentation; common counts; and open book account. Tajik later filed a cross-complaint against Skyridge alleging the following causes of action: breach of oral contract, foreclosure on mechanic’s lien; intentional misrepresentation; negligent misrepresentation; common counts; and open book account.
After the trial court ordered the cases consolidated, Tajik filed a first amended cross-complaint against Skyridge alleging the same causes of action, plus two others, rescission of oral contract and quantum meruit. Later, Tajik & Associates, but not Tajik individually, voluntarily dismissed itself from the cross-complaints against Avalon Vista and Skyridge.
The jury was selected and sworn, and counsel made opening statements. The next day, counsel informed the trial court they had settled the case. At a hearing five months later, Tajik stated the settlement was not viable and requested the case be set for trial. AVS asserted Tajik was “dragging it out” and does not want trial. The trial court set the matter for trial in June 2015. Before the date set for trial, AVS filed a motion to enforce the settlement, which Tajik opposed. The court denied AVS’s motion to enforce the settlement and set the matter for trial.
At a bench trial, numerous witnesses testified including Wen, various project professionals and workers, Tajik, and his wife Carolyn Tajik (Carolyn).
At trial, Wen testified concerning his education, business, and real estate development history. He earned a bachelor of science in business economics from UCLA and a master of business administration from USC. Wen helped establish a joint venture in the paper mill industry worth $350 million. Over the years Wen had purchased numerous homes worth millions of dollars and worked with numerous contractors before he hired TA.
Wen testified he did not make any false statements to Tajik while negotiating the Skyridge project. Wen also testified he never received any bids for the Skyridge project in the sum of $1 million. However, at his March 24, 2014, deposition, Wen made conflicting statements. He initially said that “if” he had discussions with Roohani & Associates (Roohani) and WF Construction (WFC) to complete the Skyridge project for $1 million they were “brief” and he could have spoken with someone other than the principals.
Tajik’s counsel confronted Wen with an e-mail he sent to Tajik on January 10, 2012, which stated, “[B]oth WFC and Roohani came back with their best and final numbers yesterday and both came in at 1M as requested.” When counsel asserted neither WFC nor Roohani had submitted a final bid for Skyridge, Wen answered, “Correct.” Counsel asked whether what Wen told Tajik was untrue, and Wen replied, “I wouldn’t say it’s not true, because we would have gone out to them to get a bid.” Wen stated he made these misrepresentations as “negotiating tactics” in order “to achieve a million dollars in costs.”
In his deposition on March 27, 2014, Wen stated making false representations was lawful and an acceptable business practice. Wen admitted he would rather cheat his own brother than lose money because “[t]his is a business.”
At trial, Roohani testified he never provided Wen with a bid. Roohani added that he did all the bidding and it was impossible for anyone else to have bid the Skyridge project, contrary to Wen’s claim otherwise.
During direct examination pursuant to Evidence Code 776, Tajik testified he relied on Wen’s representations he had two bids each in the amount of $1 million. Tajik relied on the fact Wen was honest with him about the bids and he needed to also bid $1 million “[a]nd if there is anything different from that, [they would] work together and . . . [Wen would] take care of [Tajik].”
AVS’s counsel questioned Tajik about the total price for Avalon Vista when Wen terminated him. Tajik answered he did not know. After Tajik’s counsel stated it was Tajik’s wife, Carolyn, who did the accounting and counsel would call her to testify, the trial court asked Tajik whether he agreed Carolyn was more familiar with the accounting. Tajik replied, “Yes, I do, your honor.”
AVS’s counsel invited Tajik to review an exhibit, an e-mail Wen sent to Tajik, about 30 entries for invoices and credits, and a grand total for the Avalon Vista project. The e-mail included responses in bold that either Tajik or Carolyn typed into the e-mail. Before Tajik’s counsel could complete his objection, Tajik said he was not familiar with it “[a]nd [he] would rather [she] answer this question regarding this.” AVS’s counsel said, “Well, I’m sure you would. But there are some things on here --” After the trial court sustained the objection, it said the following: “You could have deposed him and deposed [Carolyn] rather than taking up court time. So under [Evidence Code section] 352 I will sustain the objection to [Tajik]. It’s clear that he was secondarily responsible for the figures compared to [Carolyn].” AVS’s counsel said he wished to question Tajik about more than the figures, and the court directed counsel to “be more specific in [his] questions.” Counsel proceeded to question Tajik about a series of credits he issued Wen. Tajik testified the correct amount of the mechanic’s lien for Skyridge was $163,359.49, not the recorded amount of $195,575.05.
During Carolyn’s cross-examination, AVS’s counsel questioned her about two invoices for Skyridge. Each invoice had 17 charges and four credits but the totals were different. Carolyn testified she made an error in the Excel spreadsheet and the lower amount was correct. After a brief exchange between the trial court and AVS’s counsel, AVS’s counsel stated he was trying to ascertain Carolyn’s accounting process and how she arrived at the different numbers. The court stated it had spent enough time on the matter. AVS’s counsel replied, “Yes. I’ll move on, your honor.”
Tajik supported his claims with voluminous exhibits, including detailed billing records, receipts, and statements reflecting the unpaid amounts concerning Avalon Vista and Skyridge. After the close of evidence, the parties filed closing briefs, and the trial court took the matter under submission.
The trial court issued its tentative decision, finding for Tajik on AVS’s claims. The court found significant the stipulated facts, which it stated were attached as exhibit No. 1 along with the written agreement for Avalon Vista attached as exhibit No. 2; the exhibits were not attached. The court also found compelling Wen’s conduct. Citing to Wen’s March 27, 2014, deposition testimony, it stated, “The essence of the [t]entative [d]ecision in favor of [Tajik] is related to the ethics and business practices followed by . . . Wen . . . .” The court opined that based on all the evidence Wen’s conduct, including his intentional misrepresentations, violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and constituted fraud in the inducement. After citing to the stipulated facts and Wen’s deposition testimony, the court concluded “Wen might have planned the separation between him and . . . Tajik to best serve his financial interests as opposed to sincere dissatisfaction with . . . Tajik’s work product.” The court ordered Tajik to prepare a proposed statement of decision, including damage proposals on the cross-complaints.
Tajik filed a 27-page proposed statement of decision. It detailed the procedural history, stipulated facts, and evidence establishing Wen’s lack of credibility. It also explained AVS failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing Tajik breached its contracts with Avalon Vista and Skyridge. The proposed statement of decision explained Tajik provided sufficient evidence on each of its six causes of action against Avalon Vista and eight causes of action against Skyridge. It also included a summary of the damages.
AVS filed an objection to the proposed statement of decision on two grounds. First, citing to the trial court’s conclusion Wen’s termination of Tajik was the result of his financial interests and not TA’s work, AVS asserted the proposed statement of decision “makes numerous assertions beyond that . . . Wen . . . ‘might have planned the separation . . . .” Without specifying which assertions it was referring to, AVS contended the court should not include these assertions in its statement of decision. Second, AVS stated that in its tentative decision the trial court cited only to Wen’s March 27, 2014, deposition, and certain stipulated facts regarding Avalon Vista and Skyridge. AVS argued the proposed statement of decision went beyond this evidence and “support[ed] assertions that d[id] not reflect the [c]ourt’s finding in its [t]entative [d]ecision.”
The trial court entered judgment for Tajik, adopting its tentative decision as it statement of decision with minimal changes. With respect to Avalon Vista, the court ruled for Tajik on Avalon Vista’s breach of contract claim. Additionally, the court ruled for him on each of his six causes of action against Avalon Vista for the reasons stated in its statement of decision. The court awarded Tajik $504,867.85 in damages, $165,845.68 in prejudgment interest, and attorney fees and costs subject to proof. As to Skyridge, the court ruled for Tajik on Skyridge’s breach of contract claim. Additionally, the court ruled for him on each of his eight causes of action against Skyridge for the reasons stated in its statement of decision. The court awarded Tajik $163,359.49 in damages, $53,667.24 in prejudgment interest, and attorney fees and costs subject to proof. The attached statement of decision was identical in substance to the court’s tentative decision except the court crossed out the language ordering Tajik to prepare a proposed statement of decision and handwrote the following statement at the end: “As a result of the above, the court’s conclusion was that . . . Wen was not a credible witness and . . . [Tajik] was a highly credible witness.” Again, the statement of decision did not have attached exhibit No. 1, the stipulated facts, or exhibit No. 2, the written agreement for Avalon Vista.
AVS filed a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment, arguing the statement of decision was insufficient because it failed to discuss most of the causes of action and did not include a discussion of damages. Tajik filed opposition, and AVS filed a reply. The trial court denied AVS’s motion to set aside and vacate the judgment. AVS appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Statement of Decision
AVS argues the trial court’s statement of decision was insufficient. We agree but conclude AVS invited the error and the doctrine of implied findings applies.
“Together, sections 632 and 634, as implemented by rule 3.1590(d)-(g) of the California Rules of Court, establish a two-step procedure for requesting a statement of decision and preserving objections for pursuit on appeal. First, following the court’s announcement of its tentative decision, section 632 requires a party to specify, in timely fashion and in proper form, ‘those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision. After a party has requested the statement, any party may make proposals as to the content of the statement of decision.’ This initial step serves the function of advising the trial court of exactly what issues the parties view as materially controverted at the close of the evidence . . . . Second, section 634 requires that any omissions or ambiguities in the statement of decision must be ‘brought to the attention of the trial court either prior to entry of judgment or in conjunction with’ a new trial motion (§ 657) or a motion to vacate the judgment (§ 663), thus allowing the court to respond to objections before the taking of an appeal. The second step is not a substitute for the first. Objections are germane only as to issues framed as materially controverted under section 632.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 982, fns. omitted (Thompson).)
“For the doctrine of implied findings to be disabled on appeal, both steps of the two-step procedure under section 632 and 634 must be followed. [Citation.] Where a party fails to ‘specify . . . controverted issues’ or otherwise ‘make proposals as to the content’ of a statement of decision under section 632 (forcing the trial court to guess at what issues remain live during preparation of the statement of decision), or where a party complies with section 632 but fails to object under section 634 (depriving the trial court of the opportunity to clarify or supplement its statement of decision before losing jurisdiction), objections to the adequacy of a statement of decision may be deemed waived on appeal. [Citation.] Because either procedural defect impedes the trial court’s ability to fulfill its duty under section 632 and potentially undermines the effectiveness of any statement of decision it prepares as a tool of appellate review, strict adherence to both steps of the process is necessary before we will reverse the presumption of correctness generally accorded trial court judgments on appeal.” (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.)
Here, the trial court ordered Tajik to prepare a proposed statement of decision, including proposals on damages. After he filed his comprehensive proposed statement of decision addressing each of the 14 causes of action, AVS filed an objection, within the 15-day time limit. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(g).) But AVS’s objection was deficient. It stated in its entirety as follows:
“1. The [c]ourt’s [t]entative [d]ecision concludes with ‘the [c]ourt finds that . . . Wen might have planned the separation between him and . . . Tajik to best serve his financial interests as opposed to sincere dissatisfaction with . . . Tajik’s work.’ [Citation.] However, the [s]tatement of [d]ecision makes numerous assertions beyond that . . . Wen and or plaintiffs/cross-defendants ‘might have planned the separation between him and . . . Tajik’ as stated in the [t]entative [d]ecision. Therefore, such assertions do not reflect the [c]ourt’s finding in the [t]entative [d]ecision and should not be contained in the [s]tatement of [d]ecision.
“2. The [c]ourt’s [t]entative [d]ecision cites deposition testimony of . . . Wen given on March 27, 2014, Avalon [Vista] stipulated facts numbers 10 - 17 and . . . Skyridge stipulated facts numbers 3 - 7 and no other specific evidence as evidence in support of its [t]entative [d]ecision. The evidence cited in the proposed [s]tatement of [d]ecision supports assertions that do not reflect the [c]ourt’s finding in its [t]entative [d]ecision. Therefore, plaintiffs and cross-defendants object to the citation of all evidence in the proposed [s]tatement of [d]ecision beyond that cited or specifically referred to in the [c]ourt’s [t]entative [d]ecision.” (Italics added.)
AVS objected to Tajik’s proposed statement of decision because it contained too much. In its first objection, AVS, citing to the trial court’s conclusion Wen’s termination of Tajik was the result of his financial interests and not Tajik’s work, asserted the proposed statement of decision “ma[de] numerous assertions beyond that . . . Wen . . . ‘might have planned the separation . . . .” AVS contended the court should not have included these assertions in its statement of decision¸ without specifying which assertions it was referring to. In its second objection, AVS stated that in its tentative decision the trial court cited only to Wen’s March 27, 2014, deposition, and specified stipulated facts concerning the two projects. AVS argued the proposed statement of decision went beyond this evidence, and it objected to mention of any additional evidence. Essentially, AVS objected to Tajik’s proposed statement of decision because it contained too much evidence. Additionally, in making its objection, AVS did not “specify” what evidence should be excluded.
The trial court adopted its tentative decision as its statement of decision, which it was permitted to do. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(c).) Contrary to AVS’s claim otherwise, the trial court did intend to make its tentative decision its statement of decision—the court crossed out “announcement of tentative” and handwrote “statement of” before the word decision. After the court entered judgment for Tajik and adopted its tentative decision as its statement of decision, AVS filed a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment, arguing the statement of decision was insufficient because it failed to discuss most of the causes of action and included no discussion of damages. This was proper pursuant to section 634. (§ 663.) However, AVS switched gears and complained the statement of decision did not say enough. It said, “The facts and finding in the [s]tatement of [d]ecision are insufficient to establish that any party prevailed on any cause of action in issue in the case or to calculate any amount of damages.” It made similar statements throughout the written motion.
Although AVS properly followed the two-step procedure and first objected to Tajik’s proposed statement of decision (§ 632; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(g)), and second filed a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment (§ 663), AVS cannot now complain the trial court’s statement of decision was deficient because it invited the error. Without specifying what evidence should be omitted, AVS objected to Tajik’s proposed statement of decision because it referenced too much evidence. After the trial court adopted its tentative decision as its statement of decision, AVS objected because it did not include enough evidence. AVS cannot have it both ways.
We agree the trial court’s statement of decision was inadequate. Tajik asserted a total of 14 causes of action in its cross-complaints, six against Avalon Vista and eight against Skyridge. The statement of decision did not include a detailed recitation of the facts as to each project or address each cause of action individually. Instead, the court made three broad findings relating to Wen’s credibility that were the basis of all 14 causes of action. AVS complains about the court’s conclusion it breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Tajik did not state such a cause of action and the court misapplied the stipulated facts. Again, the court’s conclusion went to Wen’s credibility.
Any error by the trial court in issuing an inadequate statement of decision was invited by AVS because it essentially requested the trial court limit its statement of decision to the evidence recited in the court’s tentative decision. AVS may not rely on an invited error as the basis for a reversal on appeal. (Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1555 [under the doctrine of invited error, “[w]here a party by his conduct induces the commission of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal”].) Thus, the doctrine of implied findings is applicable here, and we will discuss the causes of action below.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
AVS asserts the trial court’s statement of decision fails to adequately address each cause of action and that many are not supported by substantial evidence.
As we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the breach of contract causes of action.
“‘A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘[U]nder the doctrine of implied findings, the reviewing court must infer, following a bench trial, that the trial court impliedly made every factual finding necessary to support its decision.’ [Citation.]” (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) When a case has been presented on alternate theories, it will be upheld against a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence if the evidence supports the verdict on any one of the causes of action or theories of liability. (Continental Dairy Equip. Co. v. Lawrence (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 378, 383 (Continental).)
A. Avalon Vista—Breach of Written Contract
“‘A cause of action for breach of contract requires proof of the following elements: (1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach.’ [Citation.]” (Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402.)
Here, the parties stipulated there was a written contract for Avalon Vista. And there was overwhelming evidence Tajik performed the contract. In his September 10, 2012, letter to Wen, Tajik stated he was performing “final touch-ups and the punch list at Avalon Vista” and requested Wen pay delinquent invoices. The parties stipulated Avalon Vista was 95 percent complete at this time; Wen and his family moved in one month later. On the evening of September 10, 2012, Wen sent Tajik an e-mail terminating him from the Avalon Vista project. Wen offered no justification for the termination. He couldn’t. The project was near complete and he was clearly satisfied with work because he continued to use the same project superintendent and subcontractors. The documentary evidence at trial demonstrated Wen owed Tajik $504,867.85 for Avalon Vista.
Finally, the evidence established Wen was not a credible witness, a basis weighing in Tajik’s favor on each of his causes of action. In his March 27, 2014, deposition, Wen admitted he would rather cheat his own brother than lose money. Wen’s admission tends to establish he had no justification for terminating Tajik from the Avalon Vista project other than to save money. Thus, there was sufficient evidence Wen breached the written contract with Tajik for Avalon Vista. Because the damages were the same for each cause of action concerning Avalon Vista, and sufficient evidence supports the breach of contract cause of action, we need not address the remaining five claims regarding Avalon Vista. (Continental, supra, 17 Cal.App.3d at p. 383.)
B. Skyridge—Breach of Oral Contract
“The elements of a breach of oral contract claim are the same as those for a breach of written contract: a contract; its performance or excuse for nonperformance; breach; and damages. [Citation]” (Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v. Tope (2014)
233 Cal.App.4th 437, 453.)
We must first determine whether there was a valid contract for the Skyridge project. Business and Professions Code section 7159 requires home improvement contracts to be in writing and signed by both parties. Contracts made in violation of Business and Professions Code section 7159 are voidable not void. (Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 291-292 (Asdourian).)
To determine whether the contract was voidable we consider the following factors: (1) defendants were real estate investors, rather than homeowners, and thus “not members of the group primarily in need of the statute’s protection”; (2) “[t]here was nothing ‘intrinsically illegal’ about the agreements between plaintiff and defendant to repair and remodel the residential property,” and thus the contracts were not void but merely “voidable depending on the factual context and the public policies involved”;
(3) “plaintiff and defendants were friends, who had had business dealings in the past, the failure to comply with the strict statutory formalities is, perhaps, understandable”; and
(4) “[p]laintiff fully performed according to the oral agreements[, and d]efendants accepted the benefits of the oral agreements,” meaning that “[i]f defendants are allowed to retain the value of the benefits bestowed by plaintiff without compensating him, they will be unjustly enriched.” (Asdourian, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 292-293.)
Here, substantial evidence supports an exception to the rule that a contract failing to comply with Business and Professions Code section 7159 is voidable. Wen is a highly educated, successful international businessman. Wen helped establish a joint venture worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Wen had purchased numerous homes worth millions of dollars and hired numerous contractors to improve those properties before hiring Tajik.
This evidence established Wen was a sophisticated businessman and real estate investor who was experienced in residential construction projects and was not in need of the statute’s protection. Numerous e-mail correspondences demonstrate Wen and Tajik were not just business partners but friends. Wen repeatedly referred to Tajik as a “friend” and a “father-figure to me.” Tajik had performed substantial work on the Skyridge project, including demolition, architectural plans, engineering, and structural steel in the amount of $163,359.49. If Wen were allowed to retain the value of this work without compensating Tajik, Wen would be unjustly enriched.
On a related issue, Business and Professions Code section 5536.22 requires an architect’s contract with a client to be in writing and to describe the architect’s services. Tajik was not a licensed architect but he was an architectural designer with significant design experience, including the Avalon Vista project. AVS states that “[p]resumably” there was a licensed architect employed on the Skyridge project. Because AVS essentially concedes there was no violation of Business and Professions Code section 5536.22, and it does not more fully develop this argument, we cannot conclude there was any error. (Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.) We will now address the issue of whether Wen breached the oral contract for the Skyridge project. We conclude he did.
The parties entered into an oral agreement through various e-mails to construct and remodel Skyridge for the sum of $1,370,000. Tajik performed substantial work at Skyridge including demolition, architectural plans, engineering reports, plan checks and pulling of permits, and obtaining subcontractor services. The fact that sometime in August Tajik became the project administrator rather than the general contractor did not satisfy the reasonable value of the services Tajik rendered and was more of an oral modification of an oral contract (Civ. Code, § 1697), and not a novation (Civ. Code, § 1531).
After Tajik sent Wen a letter about unpaid invoices that were preventing him from completing work on Skyridge, Wen fired Tajik from the Skyridge project. Additionally, Wen prohibited Tajik from returning to either property, which prevented him from recovering tools with an estimated value of about $40,000. Again, Wen hired the same project superintendent and subcontractors. This was evidence, along with Wen’s admission he would lie to his brother to save money, Wen terminated Tajik not for a legitimate reason but instead because he hoped to minimize his costs. On the Skyridge project, documentary evidence established Tajik suffered damages in the amount of $163,359.49 for labor, services, and materials. Thus, there was sufficient evidence Wen breached the oral contract with Tajik for Skyridge. Again, because the damages were the same for each cause of action regarding Skyridge, and sufficient evidence supports the breach of oral contract cause of action, we need not address the remaining seven claims concerning Skyridge. (Continental, supra, 17 Cal.App.3d at p. 383.)
III. Cross-Examination
AVS contends the trial court unduly limited its right to cross-examine Tajik and Carolyn. We disagree.
It is well settled parties in civil proceedings have a due process right to cross-examine and confront witnesses. (Dole Bakersfield, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1276.) “Whether or not an erroneous denial of the right to fully cross-examine a witness is a denial of due process depends on the facts of the particular case.” (McCarthy v. Mobile Cranes, Inc. (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 500, 506.)
With respect to Tajik’s testimony concerning the total for the Avalon Vista project, the trial court did not unduly restrict the cross-examination. Tajik testified he was not familiar with the accounting because Carolyn was more familiar with the figures. Tajik’s counsel represented to the trial court he would call Carolyn to testify and AVS’s counsel would have the opportunity to question her about the e-mail, which he did. Additionally, the court allowed AVS’s counsel to question Tajik regarding the exhibit and matters to which he did have knowledge. The court did not err by unduly restricting AVS’s counsel cross-examination of Tajik.
As to Carolyn’s testimony, the trial court did allow AVS’s counsel to question Carolyn about the discrepancy between the two invoices and she admitted she made an error and the lower amount was correct. When the court stated counsel had spent enough time on the issue, AVS’s counsel agreed and said he would move on. The court did not err by unduly restricting AVS’s counsel cross-examination of Carolyn on a matter that AVS’s counsel agreed had been fully addressed. Therefore, based on the particular facts of this case, the court did not unduly restrict AVS’s right to cross-examine witnesses, and its due process rights were not violated.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.



O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:



BEDSWORTH, J.



THOMPSON, J.