ALCALA v. SUPERIORCOURTOFORANGECOUNTY

Filed 2/27/07

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

STORY CONTINUED FROM PART I..

2. Effect of Cross-Admissibility Changes

Although the trial court correctly consolidated the pleadings, we must continue to inquire whether severance was mandated by due process concerns. Alcala argues that, at the time these offenses were committed, due process mandated severance if the defendant showed he would be prejudiced by the joint trial. (Walker v. Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 938, 940-942.) Such a showing was met when none of the evidence of one charge could be relevant or admissible in the other and evidence of a prior convictionpotentially prejudicial informationwas required as proof of one of those charges. (Id. at pp. 941-942 & fn. 1.) In other words, unless the evidence of one charge was cross-admissible in separate trials for all other charges, Alcala argues that a trial court in 1979 would have had to sever each and every crime. Thus, he argues he is entitled to a severance now: His due process rights cannot be negatively modified simply because he has not been brought to trial in the last 20 years.

Initially, we note that we have already established that changes in the laws concerning the conduct of trials do not trigger ex post facto concerns. Nonetheless, we review Alcalas particularized arguments to see if the application of 954.1 to his situation prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

In Aydelott v. Superior Court (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 718, two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and two counts of lewd acts on those minors could not constitutionally be paired with a count of illegally prescribing a narcotic to another person because the potential prejudice was shown adequately to mandate severance of the narcotic count. (Id. at pp. 722-724.) Although the counts of contributing to delinquency were merely misdemeanors, they were properly charged with the serious counts of lewd acts on minors because common elements of substantial importance underlying [all four counts] were the alleged circumstances that petitioners home was used by him to commit [all four] crimes . . . and, as to each count, a male juvenile was the victim. (Id. at p. 722.) However, no common element, characteristic, or attribute connects [the prescription] count . . . with any of the other counts. (Id. at p. 724.) Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the joint trial on the four counts, but abuse was shown in its denial of severance of the prescription count. (Ibid.)

In another case, however, no prejudice was shown by the joinder of one robbery when its supporting evidence was much stronger than that supporting the other count of robbery, even though the defendant feared a spilling over from the former would prejudice him. (People v. Fulton (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 777, 782.) The court noted that evidence of the perpetrators identity shown by the one would logically and permissibly be used to prove the same persons guilt on the other. (Ibid.) Such was deemed appropriate because the two offenses shared certain characteristics: The first incident involved a daytime robbery of a couple in an apartment. It was committed by two armed men, one of whom was identified as Fulton. The second incident involved a daytime residential robbery of a man and his childrens babysitter in the mans residence. It was likewise committed by two armed males. Those circumstancesand those circumstances alonewere held sufficient to dispel any claim of prejudice by their joint trial, irrespective of decided dissimilarities between the two incidents. (Ibid.)

Alcala argues that we should review the trial courts ruling, but apply the law on the subject as it was at the time of the offenses. He refers us to Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441 at page 452 (citing Coleman v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 129, 137-140). However, we observe that this was not the test for prejudice employed in 1979 when the crimes were committed.

The test in effect during 1977-1979 to test potential prejudice of joined offenses was that enunciated in People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35 at pages 39-41. In Matson, it was held that if the grounds for joinder were metsuch as the charges were shown to share a common element of substantial importanceseverance was permitted ifprejudice from a denial of that severance was clearly shown. Matson noted that where the consolidation meets the test of joinder, . . . the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that the courts almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion. [Citations.] (Id. at p. 39, italics added.) Matson alleged that the prosecution had paired a rape charge with a burglary charge, which had as its sole dispute the defendants intent at the moment of entry. In contrast, there was no conflict as to the evidence proving the intent necessary for the rape charge; Matson merely argued he was not the perpetrator. Thus, a rape count with weak evidence of identification was paired with a burglary count where identity was undeniable but the evidentiary sufficiency to prove intent was in dispute. (Ibid.)

The court accepted that doubts over the rapists identity may have been dispelled by evidence that defendant used the same modus operandi in the burglary, just as doubts over defendants intent in entering . . . [the victims] apartment may have been dispelled by evidence that he raped [the other victim]. (People v. Matson, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 40.) Nonetheless, the evidence of each was properly admitted in a joint trial because all the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b): Evidence of other crimes would have been admissible to prove identity and intent anyway. (Ibid.) The court noted that in both the rape and burglary counts, women were accosted while loading or unloading their cars near their apartments. (Id. at p. 39.) One woman was raped but the other was not. Nonetheless, those facts alone were sufficient for the court to find a common modus operandi, making each crimes facts admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), in the trial of the other. (Id. at pp. 40-41.)

Finally, the Matson court noted that cross-admissibility was merely one way of testing for prejudice. The trial court could have still denied severance without any analysis of cross-admissibility because the judges discretion in refusing severance is broader than his discretion in admitting evidence of uncharged offenses. The requirements of similarity that apply to the admission of evidence of uncharged offenses[citation] are not applicable when all offenses are charged. [Citation.] In both cases the probative value of considering one alleged offense in light of another must be weighed against the prejudicial effect, but additional factors favor joinder. . . . (Id. at p. 41, original italics.)

Thus, we must reject Alcalas argument that the law at the time of the commission of the crimes must control the present cases admission of evidence and consolidation of offenses. Not only is the present law the appropriate one for issues concerning how trials are conducted, but it is not less advantageous to his position than the state of the law in 1979. We continue to review the trial courts ruling, however, to determine if due process requires severance of any of the counts.

In this case, all five victims were young, White, thin, single females who were brutally murdered, with two of the victimsParenteau and Robin Samsoehaving met their deaths within a week of each other. All of them had evidence of extreme neck ligature: Robin Samsoe had her head partially severed, as seen by Crappa a few days after the murder while Wixteds neck cartilage was actually furrowed by garroting and Lambs neck cartilage had been fractured with a garrote. Both Robin Samsoe and Barcomb had their teeth smashed in while the other three women suffered severe facial injuries due to blunt force trauma. In the Parenteau case, her jewelry box had been opened by the culprit and rifled. In the Lamb case, an earring had been removed from the victimand later found in Alcalas souvenir pouchjust as an earring had allegedly been removed from Robin Samsoe and kept as a memento in Alcalas pouch alongside Lambs earring.

Alcala says one cannot group murders of sexually-assaulted women with a murder of a 12-year-old girl. Moreover, he contends, Samsoes body was so disturbed and decomposed that her cause of death could not be determined, thus eliminating any inference that she had died of blunt force trauma or strangulation or suffered any sexual assault. As the other four women had been violently sexually abused, and there was no evidence of sexual assault in Samsoes case, this dissimilarity alone should bar the admission of the evidence proving the four Los Angeles cases in the Robin Samsoe trial, he contends.

A single dissimilarityshould not be the sine qua non of exclusion under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) or severance under 954. (See People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 758 [Probative value is not significantly diminished by the presence of certain marks of dissimilarity . . . .].) We note that a single dissimilarity between offenses has been specifically rejected as the test for admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 1108[1] (1108). (See People v. Isom (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1381-1383.) However, that holding rested on the distinct differences between an analysis under 1108 and the comparison required for admission pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), which, Alcala argues, is controlling here. (Id. at pp. 1382-1383.) We do not suggest the legal issue in Isom is analogous to that here; we merely note that the trial courts factual finding was upheld that a sexually mature 15-year-old was not dissimilar to the other victims in the case, who were 12 and 10.

Alcala presses forward, arguing that no judicial efficiency is accomplished by joining these unrelated crimes, necessitating long drives for prosecution witnesses and the general inconvenience to defense witnesses. But witnesses are not the only ones for whom the laws of joinder and consolidation benefit: As Matson noted, the defendant is benefited by a single prompt trial of all issues. And as the legislative history of section 790(b) notes, the trials of notorious serial killers are usually circumstantial in nature and evidence from one prosecution is invariably admitted in the guilt or penalty phase of the other prosecution, resulting in a never ending series of appearances by citizens unfortunate enough to be witnesses. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 469, (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.), as amended May 5, 1997, p. 2; italics added.) Thus, it is advantageous for both the witnesses and the defendant to have a single trial in which all the different murders are proved in one proceeding,[2] because the evidence of one case will inevitably be admitted in the penalty phase of the others.

Under Bradford, Mendoza, Gutierrez, Catlin, and Cunningham, the factors to be considered in a review of a consolidation are: (1) [T]he cross-admissibility of the evidence in separate trials; (2) whether some of the charges are likely to unusually inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence may alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) whether one of the charges is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case. (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 161.) On review, we must limit our examination to the evidence available to the trial court at the time of the severance motion, bearing in mind that Alcala bore the burden of proving a clear showing of prejudice. (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 409; see also Frank v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 632, 636.)

Full cross-admissibility is not the sine qua non of joinder, just as a single point of dissimilarity should not mandate severance per se. However, if the evidence of one case is admissible in another case, any potential for prejudice is dispelled. (See People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 161.) For this reason, the parties are most divergent in their positions on this point. Alcala argues that under People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414 and People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, evidence from none of the Los Angeles cases could be used in any way in the Robin Samsoe murder case. He argues that as to the Robin Samsoe case, intent is not and cannot be the issue;[3] only the identity of the perpetrator is relevant. Thus, he concludes, the degree of similarity between the Samsoe case and any of the Los Angeles cases must be of the very highest before admission is warranted under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).

Alcala emphasizes that all of the Los Angeles cases dealt with brutal sex crimes perpetrated on adult women in which they were tortured through sexual abuse. Nothing of that nature was present in the Samsoe case, he argues, which dealt with the kidnapping and simple murder of a little girl. This clear deviation from the other cases mandates severance, he argues. He also notes that the four Los Angeles cases are very strong cases in which DNA evidence links him inextricably to the crimes,[4] and there is nothing that links him to the Samsoe case but the very weak circumstance that eyewitnesses tentatively identified him walking and talking with her earlier in the afternoon of her disappearance. Finally, he crowns his position with the point that he faces the special circumstance allegation of multiple murders by the consolidation of all the charges.

Alcala overlooks the impact of 790(b), and consequently, the murders need only be connected together in their commission, as that is used in section 954. Moreover, the burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried. (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1120.) We review the evidence, comparing and contrasting the details, with great care, as severance must be ordered if the joinder of the . . . charges actually resulted in gross unfairness amounting to a denial of due process. [Citations.] (People v. Valdez(2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 120.)

Under section 954, the offenses need only share some element of substantial importance to be connected in their commission. (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 119.) That element was met when Alcala kept a trophy bag of jewelry items taken from his victims: Earrings from Robin Samsoe were found in the same bag as an earring from Lamb, thus connoting both were his victims[;] and Parenteaus jewelry box had been rifled. The importance of that connection was heightened by an entry in a book written by Alcala while imprisoned, expressing his ownership of all the jewelry items found in the pouch.[5] It also highlights how the facts of the Lamb case would inevitably become relevant in the Samsoe trial: To contradict Alcalas denial that he possessed the souvenirs from the crimes and had a habit of keeping such souvenirs from sadistic murders.

Irrespective of its status as a common element of substantial importance, the earring held other evidentiary potential. As already noted, cross-admissibility tests emerge from the authority in Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to admit or exclude evidence of other uncharged crimes in a trial for a charged crime. Both Ewoldt and Balcom discuss the highly sensitive nature of such evidence (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404; People v. Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 422), particularly when it need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence before the trier of fact can use it for one of the enumerated purposes. (See Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 382.)

Before the facts relevant to one charge can be considered in relation to the proof of another charge, those facts must be shown to be relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (Evid. Code,  1101, subd. (b).) The District Attorney asserts that the evidence of the Los Angeles crimes is relevant to prove motive or common plan. Alcala responds that those factors are not pertinent in the Samsoe case as he does not contest that the crime occurred or that the perpetrator did so with the specific intent required for the special circumstances as alleged. He only contests the identity of the perpetrator. If evidence of another crime is used to prove his identity, that evidence must show the other incident to be almost identical with the charged offense, reflecting a signature method of the perpetrator, or both incidents must carry such unique characteristics as to be a form of identification. (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 402-405.) Alcala contends none of the Los Angeles cases are even similar to the Robin Samsoe case, much less identical, and that their dissimilarities are numerous.

Dissimilarity is not necessarily the issue; it is the marks of similarity that are most relevant. We do not look for characteristics not [] shared by a particular offense and thereby disqualify that offense from consideration . . . . (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1061 [pinpoint instructions demanding similarity and no dissimilarity for offenses to be of the same modus operandi properly rejected].) It is a mark of commonality that we note in our task of determining the degree of distinctiveness and the number of such circumstances necessary to establish defendants identity as the perpetrator . . . . (Id. at p. 1062.)

More importantly, identicality is not required to prove motive, as motive is more akin to intent than it is to identity. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Circumstantial Evidence, 87, pp. 426-427;[6] cf. People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402 [least degree of similarity required for admission to prove intent].) Although the identity of Robin Samsoes murderer is the ultimate issue at the trial for that offense, it is not the sole one. Clearly, the prosecution intends to prove the perpetrators identity circumstantially, a method that is no less valuable and potentially as strong as proof via direct evidence. (See People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 162.) And another crime that indicates a defendants motive, consistent with the alleged motive in the charged crime, can be admitted to clarify that point, irrespective of defendants primary dispute with the prosecutions case. (See e.g., People v. Butler (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 49, 59-61 [evidence of fight at party in which defendant was chased by group including later victim relevant to prove defendants motive in an otherwise unprovoked attack on victim two weeks later]; see also People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 171 [although crimes insufficiently similar to admit to prove identity, properly admitted to establish intent].) At the least, the Lamb murder clarifies Alcalas motive for changing his testimony: He testified and wrote a book espousing his personal ownership of all the jewelry found in the pouch to refute the prosecutions evidence that the gold ball earring belonged to Samsoe and her mother. Due to the newly developed connection of the rose earring to Lamb, he will be forced to deny his prior testimony and statements. Motive for changed testimony also permits evidence of other crimes to prove the point. (See e.g., People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 950-952 [evidence that Hawkins stabbed his brother relevant to explain brothers changed testimony, by supporting brothers expressed fear of Hawkins and that such fear was warranted].)

Certain similarities between at least three of the five cases are sufficient to prove motive. In the Parenteau, Lamb and Samsoe cases, all the victims were young, trim, White females. Moreover, Parenteau was a cyclist and Samsoe was a ballet dancer, both very lean and athletic. All three victims were taken away or isolated from all other persons, and all were brutalized. Although the actual cause of death was indiscernible in the Samsoe case, all three victims had received severe blunt force trauma injuries to the face and head; Samsoes severed head showed that her teeth had been bashed. In Lambs case, an earring had been removed from the victim; in Parenteaus case, her jewelry case had been ransacked, whereas Robin Samsoe had her earring stolen from her earlobe. Earrings from Lamb and Samsoe were found together in Alcalas possession in a locker that he had attempted to hide from the authorities. The Parenteau and Samsoe murders occurred within a week of each other, and all three occurred in adjacent counties. All the victims received severely brutalinjuries to the neck and throat, with Samsoes neck having been partially severed and Lambs throat cartilage having been fractured. Finally, both Parenteau and Samsoe, while in the company of girlfriends, had met and socialized with Alcala prior to their respective deaths.

Alcala characterizes the circumstantial evidence connecting him to the Samsoe case as weak, in contrast with the allegedly strong identification evidence in three of the Los Angeles cases: DNA evidence connected him to the Lamb, Wixted and Barcomb crimes. However, even DNA evidence can be less than convincing in all cases. (See Lee and Tirnady, Blood Evidence: How DNA is Revolutionizing the Way We Solve Crimes (2003), pp. 1-338 [even though DNA evidence was overwhelming, O.J Simpson was acquitted after lawyers cast doubt on the investigation and scientists].) Indeed, DNA evidence is circumstantial evidence, albeit highly convincing in most cases.

In contrast to the forensic evidence linking him to the Los Angeles cases, the prosecution case included Alcalas highly convincing confession to a fellow jail inmate. Alcala reputedly told him that Samsoe had fought, screamed and yelled to get away from him, and that he had committed the Samsoe crimes. Such self-incriminatory revelations can go far in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. (See e.g., People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1245 [confession to murder equally powerful as eyewitness identification by assault victim].)

Even if we were to assume that all five cases are not cross-admissible (see e.g., People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 424) in the guilt phase,[7] the trial courts order as to the Parenteau and Lamb cases must be affirmed because the remaining three factors listed in Mendoza clearly support the joint trial: Those two Los Angeles cases are no more inflammatory or inherently prejudicial than the highly publicized kidnapping and brutal murder of a preteen girl whose remains were so destroyed that the specifics of her death were indiscernible. Finally, Alcala argues the evidence of the Robin Samsoe case is weak, but that characterization is highly debatable. He contends it is weak because his conviction has been reversed twice for two different errors, errors which would not have compelled reversal unless the prosecutions case was so weak that conviction would not have been obtained but for those errors.

Notwithstanding Alcalas lament, the prosecutions case in the Samsoe murder appears to be growing in strength and persuasiveness. With the newly revealed evidence corroborating that the gold ball earring was Robin Samsoes, and, inferably, that Alcala kept it as a souvenir along with Lambs earring, the case cannot be honestly characterized as a weak one. The multiple witnesses who identified him as the man with Samsoe and Wilvert earlier in the day, Crappas tentative identification of him as the man pushing Samsoe into the wilderness, Alcalas taking and keeping her earring, and his confession to a fellow inmate, combine to make a seemingly strong case. (See e.g., People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1155 [marks of similarity were that all three separate victims were strangled and items belonging to them later found in defendants possession].)

Finally, the joinder of the Parenteau and Lamb cases with that of Samsoe does not change a non-capital case into one with a capital penalty: Alcala already faces the death penalty irrespective of the joinder of any of the Los Angeles crimes. (Cf. Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 454 [it is the joinder itself which gives rise to the special circumstances allegation of multiple murder . . . .].) Those two additional murders merely trigger application of another special circumstance, not the death penalty itself which has always been present due to the nature of the Robin Samsoe crime.

In summation, Alcala argues that a fair trial is absolutely impossible if he is forced to face the glass mountain of evidence that all five murder cases would build. That point is hard to deny. The Barcomb and Wixted crimes do not share all the marks of similarity as do the Parenteau, Lamb and Samsoe murders; and they possess the DNA evidence Alcala argues is unfairly insurmountable. We accord weight to the argument that, instead of reviewing the facts of each murder carefully and individually, the trial court treated the issue as one of severing all four Los Angeles cases from the Samsoe murder, or severing none of them. Based on the plethora of case authority advancing a thorough and sensitive review of each case individually, we have followed that form. The record clearly supports the trial courts decision as to the Parenteau and Lamb cases. We find that it fails to do the same regarding the charges involving Wixted and Barcomb. In light of the monumental task Alcala would face in refuting all the evidence in the Wixted and Barcomb cases which bear far less similarity with the Samsoe facts and which might combine in a fashion potentially unfair,[8] we hold the trial court erred in properly exercising its discretion when it failed to individualize its analysis as to each of those two murders.

DISPOSITION

Alcalas petition is denied as it regards the consolidated pleadings of the Samsoe, Parenteau and Lamb cases. It is granted as it relates to the Wixted and Barcomb counts. The superior court is ordered to sever those latter two cases from the consolidated cases charging the murders and accompanying charges involving Samsoe, Parenteau and Lamb. The order to show cause, having served its purpose, is discharged. 

SILLS, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, J.

IKOLA, J.

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[1] Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) provides that evidence of the defendants commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by [Evidence Code s]ection 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352 and the defendant is presently accused of a sexual offense.

[2] As an example, see People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, at pages 1038-1039 (Carpenter III), in which a serial killer argued in his third capital appeal that he was denied procedural and constitutional rights because all murder charges throughout the state were not joined in a single trial. Instead, he faced prosecutions in two separate counties for multiple murders occurring in each, which inevitably led to duplication of testimony. (Id., at p. 1039.) He contended he had been denied due process by the successive prosecutions. (Ibid.) This argument was rejected, as the court noted Carpenter had originally complained in his secondcapital appeal that severance of two murder charges in Santa Cruz County should have been granted. The Supreme Court had rejected that argument. (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 361-362 [Carpenter II].)

[3] Alcala characterizes a case of intent as one in which the defendant concedes he committed the criminal act but disputes he had the requisite mental state for the offense. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 394, fn. 2.)

[4] The record reflects DNA evidence is present in three of the Los Angeles cases, but not all four. The Parenteau murder had serologicial evidence connecting Alcala to the crime, but not DNA evidence.

[5] This evidence contradicted his mothers testimony that the gold ball earring was hersnot either Robin Samsoes or her mothersand that she had modified it with her own nail clippers. Alcalas mother brought this up in the first trial, thus contradicting Robins mothers earlier testimony that the earring was one Robin often borrowed from her, and the prosecutions expert who opined the Samsoe nail clippers were consistent with the striations on the earring.

[6] Most of the exceptions specified in [Evidence Code section] 1101(b)motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accidentcan be lumped together in three categories: intent, common design or plan, and identity. (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra,  87, pp. 426-427.)

[7] At the previous penalty phase, Alcala testified that, as long as he was imprisoned away from children, he was absolutely harmless. (See fn. 4, ante.) Evidence of multiple brutal murders of adult women would inevitably be used to refute such a statement, and would thus become relevant in the penalty phase.

[8] Joinder of multiple cases which are arguably weak in an effort to overcome the evidentiary difficulties in one of the case has always been discouraged. (See generally Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at 452-454; see also People v. Smallwood (1986) 42 Cal.3d 415,427-433.)