Filed 9/17/18 Alemu v. Oakland Housing Authority CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
| THOMAS ALEMU, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. OAKLAND HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant and Respondent. |
A146941
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG 14741537)
|
Appellant Thomas Alemu, appearing in propria persona, appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying a petition for a writ of mandate filed by his parents, which sought to overturn a decision by the Oakland Housing Authority (Authority) to terminate his housing voucher. Because Alemu has failed to offer any cogent legal arguments for why the court’s ruling was incorrect, we must affirm.
I.
Factual and Procedural
Background
Under a federal housing program referred to as Section 8,[1] local public housing agencies can award housing vouchers to low-income tenants. (Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 925.) Under the program, an approved tenant finds a unit rented by a private landlord and, if the unit is approved, the agency contracts with the landlord to use the tenant’s voucher to subsidize the rent. (Id. at pp. 925-926.)
The Authority awarded a voucher to Alemu, and he agreed to a number of terms, including that he would “[a]llow [the Authority] to inspect [his] unit at reasonable times and after reasonable notice.” (See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551(d), 982.552(c)(i).) In June 2014, however, the Authority terminated the voucher because on at least five different occasions Alemu refused to allow access to his unit for a scheduled inspection. We need not describe the events surrounding these occasions in detail because they are not pertinent to our decision. Briefly, however, Alemu never allowed an inspector to access his unit even though the Authority continued the scheduled inspection dates several times to accommodate Alemu’s disability, which he describes as “a period of extreme psychosis.”
Alemu’s parents challenged the Authority’s decision to terminate the voucher by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in the trial court. The petition was unverified, and it was not signed by Alemu. Alemu did not participate in the early proceedings, but his parents did. In addition to signing the petition, they appeared at hearings, including a hearing to consider the court’s tentative decision denying the petition. Throughout the administrative and trial court proceedings, Alemu’s parents asserted they could represent him because he had signed a written power of attorney authorizing them to act on his behalf in certain matters.
After the hearing on the tentative ruling, the trial court entered a final order denying the petition (the ruling). The ruling was based on three separate grounds. First, the court held that the petition was not verified as required. Second, the court held that the petition lacked merit because it did “not allege[] that [the Authority] breached a mandatory duty.” Third, the court held that any ruling on the merits “would be a nullity,” because Alemu had not signed the petition and his parents could not act as his attorneys at law.
Alemu then appeared in the case for the first time by filing an application for reconsideration of the ruling, which the trial court denied. The court entered judgment in favor of the Authority, and Alemu filed a notice of appeal.
II.
Discussion
Alemu argues that the Authority wrongfully terminated his voucher, essentially asserting that it should have accommodated him more in light of his disability and caused him a “great wrong” by not doing so. For the most part, however, he does not attempt to show any legal error in the three bases of the trial court’s ruling, requiring us to affirm.
As to the first basis for the ruling—that the petition was not verified—Alemu states that he tried to verify the petition in seeking reconsideration of the ruling. But he does not assert, much less provide any authority to suggest, that the trial court erred in denying the petition based on a lack of verification or in declining to accept his after-the-fact verification. As to the third basis—his parents’ invalid attempt to represent him—he states that his parents appeared on his behalf because he was hospitalized for six months after the petition’s filing. He also claims that his parents were told at the “last moment” they had no standing, but he does not argue or provide any authority for the notion that the court erred by concluding that the power of attorney did not confer on his parents the ability to represent him as attorneys at law. (See Drake v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830.)
Alemu’s remarks regarding the first and third bases of the ruling fall far short of providing us with a basis for reversal. “ ‘Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken. “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) As a result, we need not address the correctness of these two bases for the ruling.
Furthermore, Alemu does not even mention the second basis of the ruling—that the petition lacked merit for its failure to allege the Authority breached a mandatory duty. By failing to do so, he has forfeited his contention that the ruling was erroneous.[2] (See, e.g., Lafferty v. Wells Fargo Bank (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 545, 571-572; Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 125-126.) “ ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.” ’ ” (Lafferty, at p. 571.) Thus, even if Alemu’s arguments addressing the other two bases for the ruling had merit, “we would nonetheless be compelled to affirm.” (Ibid.)
III.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. The Authority is awarded its costs on appeal.
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Humes, P.J.
We concur:
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Margulies, J.
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Banke, J.
[1] The legislation enacting the program was contained in section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 and is codified as title 42 United States Code section 1437f.
[2] Although we need not determine whether the trial court’s ruling was correct on this point either, we question whether Alemu needed to allege a breach of a mandatory duty since his petition appears to have been one for administrative, rather than ordinary, mandate. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1094.5.)
