Filed 8/11/22 Allen v. Amazon.com CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.

Devra Allen, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Perkins Coie and Jill L. Ripke for Defendant and Respondent.

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Devra Allen (plaintiff) sued Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) for a variety of torts arising out of her brief employment in an Amazon warehouse. Two years after the case was filed, the trial court ordered terminating sanctions against plaintiff for refusing to submit to her deposition, which Amazon had repeatedly noticed. Plaintiff appeals from the resulting judgment, asserting that the terminating sanctions were an abuse of discretion because she had not received some of the deposition notices, the trial court relied on evidence not provided to plaintiff, and Amazon engaged in abusive discovery tactics. Plaintiff also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on her motion to compel discovery and by dismissing an individual defendant. We find no abuse of discretion, and thus we will affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Background

On February 19, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint against Amazon, Golden State FC LLC, and Roy Cripps asserting claims for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, negligence, negligence per se, assault, and battery.^[1] Amazon answered the complaint in July 2019. Cripps was not served with the summons and complaint and did not appear in the action.

In July 2019, Amazon served plaintiff with discovery requests and a notice that Amazon would take plaintiff’s deposition on August 23, 2019. The documents were served by overnight mail to plaintiff’s address on Redondo Beach Boulevard.

On about August 5, 2019, plaintiff purportedly faxed a letter to Amazon’s counsel, Lindsay Holloman, which stated in pertinent part as follows:[2]

“This is to inform you that I will not be available to respond to your propounded discovery request and or appear for any depositions and or production of documents in this matter. I have a family emergency that required me to leave town immediately.

“I am presently in the State of Georgia. My mother is in the ICU unit fighting for her life. . . .

“I had also propounded . . . discovery and set depositions for Mr. Bezos and his wife, . . . Mr. Cripps and the [person most knowledgeable] and others. Those deposition dates will also have to be reset as well as my deposition. . . .

“. . . I have started on my objections and answers to the propounded discovery. I did bring some of the discovery material with me. Hopefully I will able to finish all of the propounded discovery responses along with my objections. But as I’m sure you understand things here are touch and go. . . . [B]ased on the foregoing I am requesting 30 days extension to answer the propounded discovery with my objection(s). . . .

“I will not have email access based on my location in Atlanta[,] Georgia. If you need to reach me please send me [a] letter via U.S. Mail.”

Holloman did not receive plaintiff’s facsimile.[3] She stated in her declaration: “It remains unclear to me why I did not receive [plaintiff’s] letter on August 5. [Plaintiff’s] letter referenced a fax number that does not exist. However, the purported transmission receipt included the main fax number for my firm’s Los Angeles office. . . . I have been unable to determine whether the fax was never sent or there was an administrative problem within our firm.”

On August 2, 7, and 15, 2019, Holloman emailed plaintiff and asked her to confirm that she would appear at her August 23 deposition and for her availability to meet and confer in advance of a motion to compel. Plaintiff did not respond and failed to appear for her deposition.

On October 7, 2019, Holloman sent plaintiff a letter by email and certified mail asking for her preferred email address, phone number, and residential address, and asked plaintiff to cease sending communications by facsimile. Plaintiff did not respond.

On November 1, 2019, Holloman served by U.S. mail a notice of deposition, requests for admission, and form interrogatories. The same day, Holloman sent by mail and email a request to meet and confer regarding plaintiff’s failure to respond to the July discovery requests and asked plaintiff to confirm her appearance at her deposition on November 22, 2019. On November 20, 2019, Holloway sent a follow-up letter by mail and email asking plaintiff to confirm her appearance at her deposition. She did not receive a response to any of these communications. Plaintiff failed to appear at her scheduled deposition.

On December 5, 2019, plaintiff faxed a letter to Holloman, stating that she had just returned to Los Angeles after spending four months out of town caring for her ill mother. Plaintiff stated that she wished to depose Amazon’s witnesses and “would like to reschedule all the depositions to run concurrently prior to the status conference set for early January 2020.” She continued: “You are aware that I have been out of town due to [a] family emergency and did not have access to my mail, email or cell phone given the area I was located. Also, the email that you are using was hacked months ago and I no longer have any access to that or any other email. [¶] For the record I do not use any email whatsoever. I use[] regular United States mail service to the address I have provided to you. [¶] Also, in an attempt to resolve all of the outstanding issues, [w]e should have a telephone conversation tomorrow and touch base to put this litigation back on track. So, I will call you . . . tomorrow 12/6/19 at 1:30. If I don’t reach you at 1:30 p.m., I will re-attempt to call you at 2:30 p.m., 3:30 p.m., 4:30 p.m. and or 5:30 p.m. to make sure that we speak tomorrow.” According to Holloman, she did not receive the December 5 fax until December 13, 2019.

On December 6, 2019, plaintiff called Holloman from a blocked phone number. Holloman received plaintiff’s voicemails, but she could not call plaintiff back because plaintiff had not provided Holloman with her phone number. According to Holloman, those were the first voicemails she had ever received from plaintiff.

On December 9, 2019, Holloman sent an email to plaintiff asking for her phone number, advising that she had not received a facsimile from plaintiff, and reminding plaintiff that she would not accept facsimile communications. The following day, Holloman received another voicemail from plaintiff, but again could not call her back.

On December 11, 2019, Holloman sent plaintiff a letter by U.S. mail and email attempting to initiate a meet and confer and advising that in the absence of any response, Amazon intended to file motions to compel discovery responses. Holloman also again asked plaintiff to provide a phone number where she could be reached; plaintiff did not respond.

II. Amazon’s motion to compel deposition; plaintiff’s motion for a protective order; trial court’s August 25, 2020 order.

On December 27, 2019, Amazon filed a motion to compel plaintiff’s deposition and for an award of sanctions. The motion was continued several times, ultimately to August 25, 2020. Meanwhile, Amazon re-noticed plaintiff’s deposition for February 20, 2020; a few days prior, plaintiff sent counsel a letter saying she would not appear.

During a February 24, 2020 status conference, the court advised plaintiff that “your deposition has to be taken” and that if plaintiff did not appear for her deposition by March 6, the court would sanction her. The deposition was re-noticed for February 27, 2020, at which time plaintiff appeared with a non-attorney, Ivan Rene Moore. When building security did not permit Moore to enter the building because he was not on Holloman’s law firm’s security list, plaintiff and Moore left.

Plaintiff filed a motion for a protective order on July 31, 2020. She asked that her deposition “not take place at all” or, alternatively, take place in the courthouse or by Zoom because plaintiff “is in great fear[] for her personal life and personal safety.” In an unverified declaration, plaintiff stated that Holloman had “assaulted,” “grabbed,” “threatened,” and “bullied” her, and a security guard had been “aggressive,” “hostile,” and “belligerent” when she attempted to attend her deposition in February. Further, plaintiff said she needed to be accompanied by Moore “for my personal safety” and because she took medication that made it unsafe for her to drive.

On August 25, 2020, the court granted Amazon’s motion to compel plaintiff’s deposition and imposed sanctions against plaintiff in the amount of $5,835 for her failure to attend two properly noticed depositions. The court noted that although plaintiff claimed to have served an objection to the August 23, 2019 deposition notice on August 4, 2019, she did not provide a proof of service of the objection, and service by facsimile is permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure only if both parties agree. Further, while plaintiff claimed she was unable to attend her deposition in August and November 2019 because she was caring for her mother out of state, “this unsupported argument does not relieve Plaintiff of her duties to either properly object to the notice, or attend her deposition.” Further, the court found that Amazon was excused from the statutory meet-and-confer requirement because Amazon’s counsel had attempted unsuccessfully to reach plaintiff on numerous occasions. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff’s contention that the deposition notices had not been properly served because they had been sent to an address to which plaintiff did not return until December 2019.

The court therefore ordered plaintiff to attend her deposition on September 18, 2020, at 10:00 a.m. Because plaintiff had expressed concerns about her physical safety at Holloman’s law firm, the court requested that counsel find an alternative location. The court further ordered that plaintiff was to attend her deposition alone or with counsel, and it warned plaintiff that if she failed to appear, “there are going to be serious, serious sanctions.”

On September 3, 2020, Holloman served notice that Amazon would take plaintiff’s deposition on September 18, 2020.

On September 16, 2020, plaintiff filed an ex parte application asking that her deposition occur at the court reporter’s office or by Zoom. After a hearing, the trial court denied the ex parte application but modified its prior order to accommodate some of plaintiff’s concerns. The court noted that plaintiff claimed to have been assaulted by defendant’s counsel in the courthouse, and “[w]hile the court absolutely accepts defense counsel’s denials, Plaintiff’s feelings and perceptions of her safety and well-being can only lead to a more equitable outcome.” The court therefore ordered that the deposition take place at Premier Workspaces and be videotaped. The court noted that the Premier Workspaces conference room had a glass door, “and Plaintiff’s ‘driver’ (presumably Ivan Rene Moore) will be provided a chair to sit [on] outside the conference room but with a partial view of Plaintiff through the glass door so Plaintiff can have the security of knowing he is there i[n] the event she needs physical protection.” Further, Moore “will be given login information so he can watch the video feed (without audio) if he wishes to bring a cell phone, tablet, or laptop.” The court denied plaintiff’s request that the deposition take place via Zoom, noting that the request was not timely, and “with the limited view of a laptop camera, the technical problems inherent to video conferencing (i.e., drop-outs), and Plaintiff’s tendency to continually lower the volume of her voice, any video deposition would be a fiasco and a waste of time and resources.”

III. Amazon’s motion for terminating sanctions.

In September and November 2020, plaintiff purported to propound discovery on Cripps, who had not appeared in the action, and to propound document and deposition requests on Amazon. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for an order deeming requests for admission propounded on Cripps admitted.

On November 17, 2020, Amazon filed a motion for terminating sanctions, evidentiary sanctions, and/or monetary sanctions, in support of which it lodged a videotape of plaintiff’s deposition. Amazon asserted that plaintiff had insisted that the door to the conference room remain open so Moore could see and hear the deposition, and Moore had twice walked into the conference room and interrupted the proceedings. Further, plaintiff “was evasive and combative from the beginning,” saying Holloman had been “in a porn flick[],” is “a lesbian,” and is “not a real attorney.” Plaintiff repeatedly refused to answer counsel’s questions (or said “I don’t recall”), including when asked where she lived, whether she had ever been sued, when she last held a job, and whether she had ever changed her legal name. Thus, Amazon urged: “Terminating sanctions are the only appropriate remedy. The Court has tried lesser sanctions, including admonitions, warnings, and even monetary sanctions. Nothing has been effective in curbing Plaintiff’s outrageous behavior, and Plaintiff has shown no intent to modify her conduct going forward.”

Plaintiff opposed Amazon’s motion. She said she had never refused to sit for her deposition; instead, she had not received the first two deposition notices because she was caring for her ill mother in Georgia, she had not been permitted to enter the deposition room in February, and she “attempted in good faith” to follow the court’s orders when sitting for her deposition in September. However, Amazon had “employed the services of a White man to appear at the deposition with a gun to intimidate Plaintiff” and “Plaintiff was indeed intimidated.” As a result, “the intimidation of the Plaintiff by Ms. Holloman and Defendants continued, and Ms. Holloman’s unauthorized purported assistant had a GUN OR LETHAL WEAPON and was overly aggressive and intimidating to create an impossible deposition environment for the Plaintiff.”[4] Further, plaintiff said, defense counsel “prevented me from lodging any objections, and from speaking at my deposition at times,” “tried to shame Plaintiff . . . for wearing a mask,” and “had her ‘assistant . . . come close to Plaintiff without identifying who he was,” “ma[d]e fun of the Plaintiff,” and “intimidate[d] the Plaintiff by repeatedly asking if she took ‘drugs.’ ” Accordingly, plaintiff urged, she had fully complied with the court’s orders, and terminating sanctions were not warranted.

The court continued the January 13, 2021 hearing when it learned that Amazon had not served plaintiff with a copy of her videotaped deposition it had lodged with the court.[5] The hearing resumed on February 23, 2021, at which time the court granted Amazon’s motion for terminating sanctions. It explained as follows:

“On August 25, 2020, the Court ordered Plaintiff to appear for her deposition on September 18, 2020, and pay monetary sanctions of $5,835.30 for four (4) prior non-appearances. Numerous accommodations were extended to Plaintiff to address her perceived safety concerns. . . . Specifically, the Court ordered that the video-recorded deposition be conducted at a neutral location, Premier Workspace, in a conference room with a glass door to provide visibility. Plaintiff’s driver and security person, Mr. Ivan Moore, was to be provided a chair to sit outside the room, with a partial view of Plaintiff in the event Plaintiff needed protection.

“On September 18, 2020, Plaintiff appeared for her deposition. According to Amazon: (1) Mr. Moore interrupted the proceedings at least twice by walking into the conference room, despite the clear language of the Court Order placing him outside the door; (2) Plaintiff was combative during the deposition and made several offensive and inappropriate comments to Amazon’s counsel including [regarding] her sexuality; (3) Less than 90 minutes into her testimony, Plaintiff took a third break and refused to return to the deposition. She insisted on taking a lunch break. (4) Despite stating that she would return from her lunch break in an hour, she returned after an hour and a half; (5) After returning from her lunch break, Plaintiff refused to answer any questions; and (6) Within twelve minutes of returning from her lunch break, Plaintiff walked out of the deposition and refused to return.

“This is the second time Amazon has requested terminating sanctions, and its fifth attempt to take plaintiff’s deposition. This Court has tried a number of strategies to coax Plaintiff to appear for her deposition. These included ordering unique accommodations for her, declining Amazon’s prior requests for terminating sanctions to afford Plaintiff additional chances, and imposing monetary sanctions, all with the hope this matter could be tried on the merits. All attempts have apparently failed.

“In opposition, Plaintiff argues that her conduct at the deposition was the result of hostile and aggressive behavior by Amazon’s counsel, including the presence of an ‘unauthorized’ assistant (security guard Andy Gastelum) [who] had a ‘gun or lethal weapon’ which was used in [an] overly aggressive and intimidating way that made it an ‘impossible deposition environment.’ [Citation.]

“The story of this person with a gun has escalated. Plaintiff represents to the Court today she saw him with a gun; she actually saw a gun in a holster. When this hearing started on January 13, 2021, she said Mr. Moore saw a gun. In her declaration dated December 9, 2020, . . . Plaintiff described it as a ‘gun or lethal weapon which was . . . very intimidating and harassing.’ [Citation.]

“However, during the actual September 18, 2020 deposition itself, Plaintiff failed to object to Mr. Gastelum’s presence or in any way indicate her concern over his potentially having a weapon. No reference to this ‘gun or lethal weapon[]’ appears anywhere in the deposition video . . .

“Furthermore, this Court, having allowed Mr. Moore to provide security reassurances to Plaintiff, has no problem with Defendant’s counsel, Ms. Holloman, having a state license[d] security guard for herself. Additionally, prior to the start of the deposition, Mr. Moore asked him to step outside of the conference room and open his suit coat, and Mr. Gastelum complied . . . . In a declaration signed January 2, 2021, . . . Mr. Gastelum detailed his state licensure and swore he was not carrying a ‘gun or any other weapon.’

“Plaintiff has used other unsubstantiated claims to explain each of her prior failures to complete depositions. Plaintiff’s repeated refusals to sit for deposition, despite every effort by this Court to accommodate her, amounts to a misuse of the discovery process and a flagrant refusal to comply with a Court Order.

“[Code of Civil Procedure] section 2025.450, subdivision (h) provides that the Court may impose terminating sanctions where a party deponent fails to obey an order compelling attendance, testimony, and production. There can be no doubt that Plaintiff’s deposition is essential discovery in this action.

“Prior to the deposition, the Court issued extremely strong warnings to Plaintiff during the hearings on September 16, 2020, and August 25, 2020. After review of the entire videotaped deposition, the Court is convinced Plaintiff is either unable or defiantly unwilling to participate in any meaningful deposition. Plaintiff was hostile, evasive, and absurdly answered ‘I can’t remember’ to questions such as her telephone number and whether she owns or rents her residence.

“The Court is absolutely convinced if it further admonishes Plaintiff, orders a sixth or even a dozen more depositions, or imposes the requested $12,090.00 in additional monetary sanctions, Plaintiff will still not complete a deposition. To do so would be an exercise in futility and prolong the inevitable.

“Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that terminating sanctions are warranted. ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 2025.450, subd. (h).)”

Notice of entry of judgment was served on April 26, 2022. Plaintiff timely appealed.[6]

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing terminating sanctions, failing to rule on plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and to deem plaintiff’s requests for admission admitted, and dismissing Cripps as a defendant. For the reasons that follow, these contentions lack merit.

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding terminating sanctions.

A. Legal standards.

The Code of Civil Procedure[7] provides: “If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action . . . , without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, . . . the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony.” (§ 2025.450, subd. (a).) If a court orders a party to submit to her deposition and the party fails to obey that order, “the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction.” (§ 2025.450, subd. (h); see also § 2023.030 [sanctions for misuse of the discovery process].)

“ ‘The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. “Discovery sanctions ‘should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery.’ ” [Citation.] If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse. “A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.” ’ [Citations.]” (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 701–702 (Creed-21).)

The trial court may order a terminating sanction for discovery abuse “ ‘after considering the totality of the circumstances: [the] conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to the propounding party; and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the discovery.’ ” (Creed-21, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 702, quoting Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.)

In reviewing an appeal from the imposition of a terminating sanction, “ ‘[w]e review the trial court’s order under the abuse of discretion standard and resolve all evidentiary conflicts most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. We will reverse only if the trial court’s order was arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical. It is appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error and where the evidence is in conflict, we will affirm the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We presume the trial court’s order was correct and indulge all presumptions and intendments in its favor on matters as to which it is silent.’ (Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1224.)” (Creed-21, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 702.) Further, we defer to the trial court’s credibility decisions and draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s ruling. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604.)

B. Analysis.

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by ordering terminating sanctions because she did not receive notices of the depositions scheduled for August 23 and November 22, 2019, when she was out of state caring for her mother. Not so. The court did not order terminating sanctions after either of these nonappearances, but instead ordered plaintiff to appear at subsequently scheduled depositions in February and September 2020. It is undisputed that plaintiff had notice of those depositions––indeed, she appeared at two of them but did not meaningfully participate. Thus, plaintiff’s alleged failure to receive the August 22 and November 22 deposition notices manifestly did not excuse her failure to appear and testify meaningfully on February 20, February 27, and September 18, 2020.

Next, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by relying on evidence––namely, a copy of plaintiff’s videotaped deposition—with which she was not served. In fact, when the court learned that plaintiff had not been served with a copy of the videotaped deposition, it continued the January 13, 2021 hearing, ordered Amazon to serve plaintiff with a copy of the videotaped deposition, and gave plaintiff the opportunity to file a supplemental brief after she reviewed it. By the time the court issued terminating sanctions in February 2021, therefore, plaintiff had been served with the videotaped deposition and had the opportunity to address it with the court.

Third, plaintiff urges that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering terminating sanctions because defense counsel “engaged in repeated discovery abuse and vexatious deposition scheduling.” Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defense counsel repeatedly scheduled her deposition on dates counsel knew plaintiff was out of state and could not attend, and communicated with plaintiff by email despite having been informed plaintiff could not receive emails while in Georgia. But these assertions assume that Holloman received plaintiff’s August 5, 2019 facsimile––which Holloman stated under oath she had not received, and for which plaintiff provided no proof of service. Because Holloman therefore could not have known of plaintiff’s asserted four-month absence from California, her noticing of plaintiff’s deposition during this period was not vexatious.

Finally, plaintiff urges that the trial court erred by dismissing the case as to defendant Cripps because he had not joined Amazon’s motion for terminating sanctions. As Amazon correctly notes, however, plaintiff did not identify Cripps in her notice of appeal, and thus any issues as to Cripps are not properly before us. In any event, the trial court’s February 23, 2021 order states that Cripps was not a party to the action “given Plaintiff’s failure to establish valid service of the Summons and Complaint on him during the two years that this case has been pending,” and plaintiff does not establish on appeal that Cripps was properly served.[8] Accordingly, we perceive no error in the court’s dismissal of Cripps.

For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err by ordering terminating sanctions.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to plaintiff’s discovery requests.

Plaintiff also contends that the trial court abused its discretion with regard to her discovery requests. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by refusing to rule on her motions to compel discovery and to compel Amazon’s “ most knowledgeable person” to attend a deposition. No such motions to compel discovery are included in the appellate record, however, and thus the issue is not properly before us.

Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to deem admitted the requests for admission propounded on defendant Cripps. We disagree. As the trial court correctly noted, requests for admissions may be served only on parties to an action. (§ 2033.010 [“Any party may obtain discovery . . . by a written request that any other party to the action admit the genuineness of specified documents, or the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion relating to fact, or application of law to fact”], italics added.) Because Cripps was not properly served with the summons and complaint, he was not a party to the action, and he therefore could not be compelled to respond to requests for admission.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Amazon is awarded its appellate costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.*

[1] According to defendants, Amazon.com, Inc. and Golden State are one entity, Amazon.com Services Inc. We will refer to them collectively as “Amazon.”

[2] Plaintiff asserts that she also left Holloman a phone message communicating the same information, but she does not support her statement with a citation to the record. Holloman states in a declaration that the first phone message she received from plaintiff was on December 6, 2019.

[3] Plaintiff insists that Holloman must have received the facsimile because plaintiff received a facsimile transmission verification report. The transmission report, however, indicates only that the fax transmission was completed, not that Holloman received it.

[4] According to his declaration, security guard Andy Gastelum was not armed with a gun or any weapon when he provided security at plaintiff’s deposition.

[5] Amazon did not initially serve plaintiff with a copy of the videotaped deposition, but did so prior to the February 23, 2021 hearing.

[6] The court entered judgment after plaintiff filed a notice of appeal “from the August 25th, 2020 and February 21, 2021 order[s] of the Court.” We construe the notice of appeal as being from the subsequently rendered final judgment. (Dominguez v. Financial Indemnity Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 388, 391, fn. 1; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d); Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1223, fn. 11.)

[7] All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

[8] Roy Cripps stated in a declaration that he was not served with a summons or complaint in this action.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.