Filed 5/25/17 A.P. v. Superior Court CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR


A.P.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,
Respondent;
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.



A150892

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J1600688)


After four-month-old R.M. suffered a broken leg under suspicious circumstances indicating the injury was not an accident, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over her, found her to be a dependent child, and set a permanency plan hearing pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26, bypassing reunification services to her mother, A.P. (Mother), pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) and (b)(6). In these writ proceedings, Mother seeks to stay the section 366.26 hearing and challenges the court’s findings under section 361.5. She contends the court abused its discretion in failing to grant her services under section 361.5, subdivision (c), which provides an exception to bypass if certain factual findings are made. The Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) argues there was more than sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings. We agree with the Bureau, find no error, and will affirm.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Original Dependency Petition and the Detention Hearing
The Bureau filed its dependency petition for R.M. and R.M.’s two-year-old half-sister, H.S., on July 11, 2016. The Bureau had detained both children and removed them from Mother’s custody on July 7, 2016, because of troubling revelations from R.M.’s visit to the emergency room that morning. On July 7, Mother and G.M. (Father) brought R.M. to the emergency room at the UCSF Benioff Children’s Hospital in Oakland (CHO), because earlier that morning she suffered what appeared to be a broken leg. While tending to R.M.’s broken leg bone, doctors saw that X-rays revealed additional broken bones to both legs, the collarbone, and ribs—all in various stages in healing and all believed to be non-accidental. Based on these injuries, the Bureau alleged, pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (e) and (i), that Mother (and Father) caused R.M. to suffer, or otherwise failed to protect R.M. from suffering, these bone fractures.
At a July 12, 2016, detention hearing, the juvenile court found there was “substantial danger to the physical health of [R.M.],” ordered her detained, and allowed Mother (and Father) to visit her once a week with professional supervision. The court ordered reunification services for Mother (and Father): specifically, parenting education courses, counseling services, and sexual abuse counseling.
B. The November 15, 2016, Contested Jurisdiction Hearing, the Police Report, and the Bureau’s Detention/Jurisdiction Report

The court held a contested jurisdiction hearing on November 15, 2016. In addition to hearing testimony from a child abuse pediatrician at CHO, the court admitted the Bureau’s detention/jurisdiction report and the Antioch Police Department’s combined case report into evidence. The police report was prepared in connection to the July 7 hospital visit; the report was forwarded to the district attorney’s office with a recommendation that Father be charged with a violation of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a) (willful child abuse). The report noted that although both parents “claimed not to know how [most of] the injuries [to R.M.] occurred,” and they claimed the fractured leg occurred while Father was changing her on the morning of July 7. Essentially, the parents stated that, while Mother was bathing H.P. in another room, Father was trying to change R.M.’s diaper. While Father tried to change her diapers, R.M. was apparently “squirming and [Father] went to put her [legs] down and he said he heard a crack. . . . [H]e noticed [R.M.’s] leg was inflamed.” Father then called Mother over to show her what looked like a knot on R.M.’s leg, and the parents claimed they next rushed her to the hospital where she was born; along the way, R.M. reportedly slept. Father admitted he “felt like [he] was a little bit too rough,” explaining, “Like I said it’s my first baby and I don’t know my strength to grab her. I have rough hands myself.’ ” After examining R.M., doctors at CHO found the parents’ story did not match the injury, and did not explain the other multiple injuries; thus, they suspected child abuse.
During their separate interviews with police and the CHO social worker on July 7, both parents claimed they, separately and together, were gentle with R.M.; they claimed not to know how she suffered the other injuries. Father thought any recent increases in R.M.’s fussiness was due either to the family’s change in routine (i.e., Mother returning to school and Father working longer hours) or to her new diet. No domestic violence is suspected or alleged between Mother and Father. Other potential sources of injury came to light, as both parents noted Father’s two young nephews (whom Mother and Father sometimes watch on some weekends) handle R.M., acknowledged she may have suffered injuries during birth, and suggested she may have inherited a brittle bone disorder from Father’s family. The doctors at CHO later ruled out R.M.’s birth and a bone disorder as causes for the injuries, and further confirmed the injuries were non-accidental. Mother also noted Father’s sister often watches R.M., but “did not suspect her of doing anything.” His sister, though, has a young but large baby who “sometimes bother[s] [R.M.] and may scratch [her].” In addition, Father’s mother has watched R.M. at least once, “but there was never anything suspicious.” Mother claimed she has not been “overwhelmed by having two small children,” of whom she was the primary caretaker since Father recently worked from about 5 a.m. until past 7 p.m., and stated R.M. seemed to be upset or fussy only when hungry or when “she had a really hard poop.” Father rarely watches R.M. alone, as Mother is usually nearby. In addition, Father has noted R.M. often sleeps with him and Mother in the same bed, and sometimes at night he might “smoosh[ ]” her when “trying to get up out of the bed because it’s dark.” Father has admitted “sometimes when he picks [R.M.] up he hears cracks that he thinks is her back” repositioning itself.
Furthermore, Mother has been diagnosed with anxiety and ADHD, noting she was then seeing a therapist. She described her background as being “in and out of foster homes until she was adopted” at the age of seven. For his part, Father was raised mainly by his older sister and mother, because his father was mostly out of his life. Father’s background may contribute to some of his anger issues.
The Bureau filed its detention/jurisdiction report on November 15, 2016. The report specifically alleged, based on the CHO medical diagnoses, Father had committed severe physical abuse against R.M., Mother had generally neglected R.M., and H.P. was at risk of sibling abuse. The report recounted the parents’ story of what they posited caused at least one of R.M.’s injuries, as told to the police (described above). The report did note the possibility of Father’s sister’s baby injuring R.M., because the baby crawls on R.M., as well as the possibility of his nephews doing so, since they pick R.M. up sometimes. But the CHO doctors ruled out any accidental physical abuse, as would be caused by small children, and Father had admitted he may have on occasion squeezed R.M. too hard while holding her, thus causing her fractured ribs. Hence, the report concluded Father “admits to causing at least two of [R.M.’s] current injuries,” i.e., the fractured ribs and leg. Nonetheless, the report stated “[n]either parent is able to provide a reasonable explanation for how R.M. sustained multiple fractures in different stages of healing,” since the doctors disbelieved the parents’ stories.
At the end of the hearing, the court amended the original petition according to proof, and then sustained only two allegations made under subdivision (e) of section 300, against Mother (and Father), based on the July 7 CHO visit: (1) R.M. suffered from “acute mid-shaft femur fracture and presented to the emergency room at [CHO] with elevated liver enzymes and urine in her blood, indicative of blunt force abdominal trauma, all injuries which have been identified as non-accidental”; and (2) R.M. “was diagnosed with multiple non-accidental injuries including, a distal left femur fracture, mid-shaft left clavicle fracture, distal right femur fracture and bilateral rib fractures.” Thus, the court found it had jurisdiction over R.M. and set a disposition hearing for January 11, 2017.
C. The Bureau’s Disposition Report
The Bureau’s disposition report detailed the “rough” upbringing of both Mother and Father, which included referrals for them, as juveniles, to child welfare agencies. The report also stated Father was often stressed because he worked long shifts with a lengthy commute, and was at risk of being fired. Plus, Father felt like Mother was always watching and nagging him (“hovering”) when he took care of R.M. In addition to acknowledging his own anger issues which may “stem[ ] from his childhood,” Father “can recall squeezing [R.M.’s] ribs too tight or holding her thigh and shins and squeezing her legs during diaper changes to alleviate his stress, but never realizing he was hurting R.M. as she never seemed to complain of pain, bruis[ing], or swelling as a direct contact of those incidents.” Still, Father was willing to attend anger management classes, and both Father and Mother wanted to attend additional parenting education classes.
Regarding R.M.’s health, both parents admitted to “fail[ing] to seek medical attention for R.M. for well-child exams” following her birth, thus not “really knowing if [R.M.] had physical signs of abuse.” Mother explained this was due to Father working all day during the week, and Mother did not have her own car and was unable to use public transit due to a combination of her anxiety and traveling alone with two small children. Moreover, the family lacked health insurance. Although the CHO doctors had earlier ruled out R.M. having a bone disorder, the disposition report did note R.M.’s vitamin D deficiency found in September 2016, although it is questionable whether such a diagnosis could have caused the multiple bone injuries she had suffered.
The report described the parents’ separate visits with the children since their detention, from about August to December 2016. For her part, Mother consistently showed up for visits with both R.M. and H.P., devoting about equal time to both children. Based on the supervisor’s evaluations of Mother’s interactions with both children, “there [were] no concerns noted at this time.” For his part, Father showed up slightly less regularly, and “clearly show[ed] the lack of parenting skills he has during his visits.” The report listed a few areas where Father could benefit to learn new parenting skills, including how to feed and properly hold R.M., and “learning the basic developmental milestones for children so that he can appropriately play with [R.M.].”
Based on these findings, the report recommended the juvenile court not offer reunification services to Mother (or Father) pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) and (6). The report disbelieved any source of R.M.’s injuries save for her parents, and found it “implausible” the parents had failed to notice her injuries before July 7, discounting Father’s belief she may have inherited his pain tolerance. Mother’s recounting of what happened on July 7 also seemed to change, as instead of claiming Father called her over to see R.M.’s inflamed leg, Mother now stated during her interview with the Bureau social worker that she “noticed [R.M.’s] cry became a different cry causing [her] great concern for [R.M.’s] wellbeing.”
In sum, the Bureau was “very worried with the significant amount of force used by [R.M.’s] parents when handling the simple act of changing a diaper. . . . [Father’s] care and handling of [R.M.] was something that parents both report arguing about and being an issue; however, [Mother] continued to not only allow [him] to provide care to [R.M.], but encouraged it.” The report also found it “implausible that [Mother] was not aware of the level of abuse [R.M.] was suffering from her father.” Although Mother did not confirm her nearly constant “hovering,” she did concede Father’s “anger issues,” stating he “ ‘can go from 0–100 real quick.’ ” Mother also noted some times when Father “would roughly yank [R.M.] from [her or Father’s sister].” Thus, the Bureau was “worrie[d] . . . [R.M.] [would] continue to be in substantial risk of harm due to [Father’s] anger issues and [Mother’s] inability to protect [R.M.]”
D. Contested Disposition Hearings
Following dispositional hearings held on February 8 and 28, and March 3, 2017, the juvenile court modified and adopted the findings and recommendations from the Bureau’s disposition report. In addition to the investigatory findings in the Bureau’s report, the court considered the police report previously submitted, and testimony presented at the dispositional hearings. Bureau social worker Yecenia Parra testified at the February 8 and March 3 hearings, and Mother, who was nineteen years old at that time, testified at the February 28 hearing.
Parra testified she was assigned to this case on October 26, 2016, and first mailed Mother and Father referrals for services on November 3. Parra wanted Mother to complete a parenting education class and counseling sessions. Mother showed Parra her completed parenting class certificate in January 2017, but she could no longer afford to visit the private therapist she had been seeing. Further, Parra discussed Mother’s reports of a few incidents where Father would “roughly yank” R.M. from her, including one specific incident in April 2016. And Parra repeated Father’s assertion Mother would “hover” over him while he watched R.M.
In addition, Parra reported Mother’s visits with R.M. had been “good,” with no concerns about Mother’s behavior. Although the Bureau’s report had stated Father probably caused all of R.M.’s injuries, Parra clarified she believed that, other than the broken leg that Father admitted to causing, the injuries could have been caused by either parent, and did not testify that any of the injuries could have been accidental in nature. In particular, Parra noted Mother had told her she noticed a significant change in R.M.’s cry while Father was changing her on July 7, contrary to Mother’s statements to the police on that day.
At the outset of her testimony, Mother acknowledged about three times when Father had “roughly yanked” R.M. from her arms, including the April 2016 incident mentioned by Parra, and the July incident which led to the CHO visit. Mother also acknowledged about two other times Father roughly pulled R.M. from his sister’s arms. Despite Father’s sister’s young children, Mother did not have concerns about her watching R.M. And contrary to the Bureau’s near or virtual certainty that R.M. sustained the injuries only because of Mother and/or Father, Mother herself did not know how R.M. sustained her multiple injuries, except for the July incident where Father broke R.M.’s leg. Indeed, Mother remarked that Father almost never took care of R.M. alone, and often R.M. was in the care of other adults, so she could not believe Father had caused those injuries.
In addition, Mother testified to the services she had already completed or planned to complete, such as a parenting education course she took, as Parra also noted, and another one she was planning to enroll in soon. She was also seeking out another therapist, but was running into difficulties with finding a provider who would accept Medi-Cal. Although Mother had started attending GED courses, her visitations with R.M. and H.P., among other factors, prevented her from doing so regularly. Finally, regarding any inconsistency between what Mother reported to the police and what she reported to the Bureau, Mother noted the officers at the hospital made her feel uncomfortable during a fast, chaotic situation.
E. The Juvenile Court’s Disposition Order: The Bypass Decision
Ultimately, the juvenile court found on March 3, 2017, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) R.M. was a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivision (e) (see § 361.5, subd. (b)(5)); and (2) R.M. would not benefit from reunification services with Mother (see § 361.5, subds. (b)(5), (b)(6), (c)(2), (c)(3) & (c)(4)). The court found that although the Bureau had made “reasonable efforts to return the child to a safe home”—presumably referring at least to the parenting education classes and counseling services ordered at the end of the detention hearing—“the extent of progress which the mother has made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care is minimal.” Thus, the court concluded Mother should be bypassed, i.e., the court would not provide reunification services to her, and set a 366.26 hearing for R.M. (See § 361.5, subds. (b) & (c)(1)–(c)(4).)
At the March 3 hearing, when the court explained its ruling from the bench, two comments are particularly worth noting. First, the court clearly disbelieved Mother’s explanations for why R.M. suffered injuries: “I did not find Mother’s testimony before the Court to be credible at all. She seems to be trying to walk this strange line, well, it was someone else because the child had been with other caregivers and family members, although that particular aunt is a really good parent and takes very good care of their children. So it couldn’t have been her. [¶] And it’s true, that Dad has been rough on occasion and played tug of war, but yet she tells the police he’s very gentle and caring and would not have caused these injuries to occur. [¶] So it just – it’s not believable at all. And it’s very tragic because I agree, these parents are very young, but they also have rather extraordinary issues that are kind of outlined in the disposition report based on their own histories and backgrounds.”
Second, the court concluded reunification services would not benefit R.M. under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (b)(6), and would actually “be highly detrimental because neither parent really acknowledges the extent of the abuse that went on to [R.M.] to have sustained all of those broken bones and the liver enzymes caused by a strike or a blow. [¶] So they’ve not even—even though Dad’s completed a parenting class, and neither one is anywhere near admitting what really went on in this household, but she’s such a tiny infant and is so helpless in her environment, and not verbal. And we could not keep this proceeding open long enough to ensure her safety and safe return under these circumstances.” The court did not make an express finding that reunification services would or would not prevent future reabuse.
Mother timely filed a petition for extraordinary writ to stay that hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.)
II. DISCUSSION
“There is a statutory presumption in favor of family preservation in juvenile dependency proceedings [(§ 361.5, subd. (a))], and family reunification services are an integral part of that process.” (In re E.G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1426.) To that end, “[s]ection 361.5, subdivision (a) generally provides that in dependency cases parents shall be entitled to reunification services ‘whenever a child is removed from a parent’s . . . custody,’ ‘[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (b).’ Section 361.5, subdivision (b) provides a detailed list of circumstances in which such services need not be provided, commonly known as ‘bypass’ provisions. The bypass provisions constitute a legislative acknowledgement that ‘ “it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances.” ’ ” (D.T. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1033.) These bypass provisions are specifically set forth in subdivision (b) of section 361.5, which “contains [17] exceptions that permit a court to deny reunification services to a parent. . . . If any one of the exceptions applies, a court may deny reunification services to a parent.” (In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1163 (G.L.).) We review bypass determinations under section 361.5 for substantial evidence, and in doing so “we presume ‘in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.’ ” (Id. at p. 1164.)
In this case, the juvenile court relied on two bypass provisions, subdivision (b)(5) and (b)(6) of section 361.5. We need not address subdivision (b)(6) because we conclude the court’s bypass order here was correct under the more specific provision, subdivision (b)(5). Subdivision (b)(5) provides that “[r]eunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [t]hat the child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(5).) Subdivision (e) of section 300, in turn, provides in relevant part that a court may detain and declare jurisdiction over a child under that part if “[t]he child is under the age of five years and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child.” (See In re Joshua H. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1732 [“the Legislature intended subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5 to apply to the parent who, knowing the actual abuser, knows or reasonably should have known that the other person was physically mistreating the child, as well as to the parent who personally abuses his or her child”].)
Although the opening clause of section 361.5, subdivision (b) states the matter softly—“[r]eunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision”—subdivision (c) leaves no doubt as to legislative intent: “[T]he court shall not order reunification in any situation described in paragraph (5) of subdivision (b) . . .” unless a specified finding allowing for relief from bypass is made. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(3), italics added.) Bypass is thus mandatory in cases of severe physical abuse to children under five at the hands of “any person known by the parent” if the circumstances show that “the parent knew or reasonably should have known” of the abuse (§ 300, subd. (e)), unless, under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), the court, in its discretion, makes a finding that “reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (See In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157–1158 [“[I]n the ‘comparatively extreme situation[ ]’ when a child is the victim of severe abuse, the legislative presumption is that services are not to be provided to the parent.”].)
In making a “best interest of the child” determination under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), the juvenile court must consider a non-exclusive list of factors, including “[t]he failure of the parent to respond to previous services, the fact that the child was abused while the parent was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, a past history of violent behavior, or testimony by a competent professional that the parent’s behavior is unlikely to be changed by services . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(4).) But to except a case from reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), in particular—given the tender age of any child in the circumstances covered by that subdivision, and thus the heightened risk of abuse—there is the even more stringent requirement that, “[i]n addition,” the court must find “based on competent testimony, [that] services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(3).)
Mother does not directly challenge the juvenile court’s implied finding by clear and convincing evidence that R.M. fell within the scope of subdivision (e) of section 300, and thus, that subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5 applies. Nor does she have a basis to do so. The evidence shows that R.M., a child under five, suffered severe physical abuse at the hands of Father under circumstances in which Mother knew or should have known of the abuse. (See § 361.5, subd. (b)(5); § 300, subd. (e).) There was evidence of recent prior, similar abuse, and on the morning of July 7, Mother was in the next room while Father was changing R.M., with the door open, and heard the child’s cry. Rather than dispute the applicability of section 361.5, subdivision (b), Mother contends the court misapplied the criteria set out in subdivision (c)(3) and (c)(4) of the statute. We understand this argument to be that the juvenile court abused its discretion in making an implied finding against her under section 361.5, subdivision (c), and that, if the correct finding in her favor had been made, she would have been entitled to relief from bypass. We review any finding under subdivision (c), whether express or implied, for abuse of discretion. (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229).)
We do not agree that the court abused its discretion. Given the applicability of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), Mother had the burden to demonstrate that the presumption against services should not apply, and that instead, the juvenile court should make a “best interest of the child” finding under subdivision (c)(2), as enhanced by the specific requirements of subdivision (c)(3), thus entitling her to services despite the presumption against her. On this record, we cannot say the juvenile court’s implied determination that Mother failed to meet this burden was an abuse of discretion. In an effort to persuade us to the contrary, she argues “[t]here was substantial evidence to support the finding that services were likely to prevent re-abuse.” And in support of her argument, she insists “the trial court erroneously disregarded the facts that . . . [she] had successfully completed a parent education course, engaged in regular and consistent individual therapy, visited with the child on a regular and consistent basis, with no missed visits and all visits observed as appropriate and nurturing between mother and daughter, and that there was no prior history of domestic violence, child abuse, or substance abuse.” But this line of argument rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of our standard of review. The issue for us is not whether there is substantial evidence in the record favoring the subdivision (c)(3) finding she contends the court should have made; the issue, rather, is whether the trial court abused its discretion in opting not to relieve Mother of the presumptive outcome dictated by section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5)—which was bypass. If we were to use the standard Mother invites us to apply, we would be re-weighing the evidence.
We might have chosen differently, but are satisfied the choice made by the juvenile court was well within the range of its permissible discretion. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 [“ a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it”].) As the Bureau points out, even “[a]fter taking a parenting class and going to five counseling sessions, and even after and hearing the child abuse specialist testify about [R.M.’s] injuries, six months later, [Mother] still did not acknowledge the severity of [R.M.’s] injuries at this extremely young age. She did not take any responsibility for inflicting any of them herself, during the countless hours she was alone with her and stressed. And she still testified that the morning [R.M.] was taken to the emergency room, with multiple acute injuries, all that happened was that [Father] was rough when he was changing [R.M.] [Mother] was in the other room with the door open, where she could see [Father], heard [R.M.] cry, but all she saw was [Father] changing [R.M.] Despite being told the explanation could not account for all the injuries, [Mother] still testified at the disposition hearing that she did not believe that [Father] injured [R.M.] She continued to clearly state [R.M.’s] leg was broken because [Father] was changing her diaper. She continued to contend it was an accident.”
The crux of the matter for the trial court—which is reflected in its finding that it “did not find Mother’s testimony to be credible at all”—appears to have been Mother’s unwillingness to acknowledge fully the seriousness of the peril to which she had exposed R.M. In support of the court’s refusal to invoke section 361.5, subdivision (c) in these circumstances, the Bureau cites In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1077 (A.M.). We agree that that case is instructive. There, “two children of respondent K.B. . . . and her boyfriend . . . were detained by appellant Lake County Department of Social Services . . . after doctors found the younger child, a baby, [S.M.] to have several bone fractures. At a contested jurisdictional hearing, a physician testified that the baby’s injuries had been inflicted by a series of violent acts. Although the parents were the baby’s only caretakers, both of them professed bafflement as to the source of the injuries. After finding the jurisdictional allegations true, the juvenile court [initially] bypassed reunification services. (Id.at p. 1069.) But a few months later, K.B. successfully sought a modification order ordering reunification services under section 388, after persuading the juvenile court that circumstances had changed because she was attending parenting classes and had obtained a restraining order against her boyfriend. (Ibid.)
On appeal, our colleagues in Division One held that the juvenile court had been right the first time, and reversed the section 388 modification order granting reunification services. The A.M. panel explained that “there are no services that will prevent reabuse by a parent who refuses to acknowledge the abuse in the first place. Despite overwhelming evidence that S.M. had been brutally treated on more than one occasion and that either [K.B.] or [her boyfriend] had inflicted the injuries, [K.B.] was unwilling to acknowledge any source for S.M.’s injuries. Since [K.B.] knows which of the two of them must have inflicted the injuries, her refusal amounts to a willful denial of the injuries themselves. In those circumstances, there is no reason to believe further services will prevent her from inflicting or ignoring the infliction of similar injuries in the future.” (A.M., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1077–1078.) The circumstances here are strikingly similar.
III. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court’s bypass determination under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), and that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Mother relief from bypass under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3). Accordingly, Mother’s request for a stay of the permanency plan hearing is denied and the juvenile court’s order denying Mother reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing is affirmed. This decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)


 





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Streeter, J.


We concur:


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Ruvolo, P.J.


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Rivera, J.























A150892/A.P. v. Superior Court