Filed 1/31/18 A.Y. v. Superior Court CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


A.Y.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA,
Respondent.
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU,
Real Party in Interest.



A152800

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J17-00088)


Petitioner A.Y. (Mother), mother of one-year-old A.Y. (Minor), challenges the juvenile court’s orders terminating reunification services, continuing Minor in out-of-home care, and setting a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26 (366.26 hearing). She contends the court: (1) violated her right to due process by failing to provide adequate notice of the six-month review hearing; (2) erred in terminating reunification services; and (3) abused its discretion by denying her request for a continuance. We deny Mother’s petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2017, the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) filed a dependency petition on behalf of then-one-week-old Minor, alleging Mother had a chronic substance abuse problem that impaired her ability to care for Minor. The juvenile court sustained the petition.
Mother said she did not know she was pregnant with Minor until she was five and a half months pregnant. She used methamphetamines about once a week before realizing she was pregnant, and about three times a week after realizing she was. She was not sure who the father was. She said she began abusing drugs in about 2001 and participated in three substance abuse programs between 2008 and 2010 but was discharged each time for relapsing or being incarcerated. She was sober from 2012 to 2015 when she attended a non-residential program but relapsed after leaving the program.
Mother had two older children who were taken into protective custody in 2008 after she was arrested while attempting to rob someone with a knife. Police found drugs, needles, and drug paraphernalia in her car; her children were also in the car, unrestrained, and wearing filthy diapers. Mother received reunification services but never regained custody of the children.
Mother entered inpatient treatment in February 2017 and did well, earning awards and a 30-day extension to remain in the program. At the time the Bureau filed its disposition report on April 24, 2017, she was looking for sober living housing. Mother was visiting with Minor and the visits had progressed from two hours to seven hours to an overnight visit.
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court granted reunification services and visits to Mother and ordered her to, among other things, attend counseling and parenting classes and comply with random drug testing. The court advised Mother that if she was unable to resume custody of Minor within six months, a permanent plan, including termination of parental rights and adoption, could be made for Minor. The court scheduled a six-month review hearing for October 2, 2017. The location of the six-month review hearing was subsequently changed, and Mother was mailed notice of the change to her address on file.
Mother did not appear at the six-month review hearing. The Bureau reported that Mother had failed to complete the inpatient program extension because she left after having a verbal and physical altercation with another client. The Bureau was unable to contact Mother from June to August 2017. On August 18, 2017, Mother called the Bureau, apologized for being difficult to reach, and said she had begun using heroin again. Between April 13 and September 22, 2017, Mother missed 19 random drug tests. The Bureau reported there were two potential adoptive homes for Minor. Mother’s counsel objected to the Bureau’s recommendation to terminate reunification services, and the juvenile court scheduled a contested hearing for October 30, 2017.
At the contested hearing, Mother’s counsel said he had just been informed by “the parent partner” that Mother was “in detox” and “unable to appear today because that would be a violation of her detox program.” Counsel requested a short continuance for Mother to complete detoxification and obtain a pass to attend the hearing. The Bureau and Minor’s attorneys objected. The juvenile court commended Mother’s efforts to address her substance abuse but found it was not in Minor’s best interests to delay the proceedings. The court noted the matter had already been put over for nearly a month, and also expressed some doubt—based on Mother’s prior failure to appear—as to whether she truly intended to participate in the proceedings. Mother’s counsel objected to the Bureau’s recommendations but declined to cross-examine the social worker.
The juvenile court stated the Bureau had “more than met its burden” in showing Mother had not engaged in “any meaningful way with the services,” and that the evidence did not support a finding to extend services to the 12-month date. The court adopted the Bureau’s recommendations as amended and scheduled a 366.26 hearing for February 26, 2018. The court also granted de facto parent status to Minor’s caregiver. Thereafter, Mother filed a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition. The parties completed briefing in this court on December 29, 2017, and waived oral argument.
DISCUSSION
Notice
Mother contends the juvenile court violated her right to due process by failing to give her adequate notice of the October 2 and 30, 2017 six-month review hearings. We reject the contention.
In dependency matters, parents are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard at every stage of the proceedings in order to protect their fundamental interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of their children. (In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688–689.) The notice must comport with due process, which means it must be “ ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” (In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1418.) Notice of review hearings may be provided by “first-class mail addressed to the last known address of the person to be noticed.” (§ 293, subd. (e).)
Here, Mother was present in court on April 24, 2017, when the October 2, 2017 hearing was scheduled. The juvenile court advised Mother that if she was unable to resume custody of Minor within six months, a permanent plan, including termination of parental rights and adoption, could be made. When the location of the October 2, 2017 hearing was changed, the court mailed her a notice of the location change, which Mother does not dispute that she received. Mother was represented by counsel at both the October 2 and October 30, 2017 hearings.
Although the record does not contain any information regarding whether proper notice of the continued October 30, 2017 hearing was given, neither Mother nor her counsel raised an objection based on notice at any time. In fact, when counsel appeared on behalf of Mother on October 30, 2017, he said the “parent partner” had called to inform him that Mother could not attend the hearing without violating the rules of her detoxification program. Counsel did not indicate she had not received proper notice; in fact, his explanation regarding her inability to attend the hearing suggests she had actual notice of the hearing.
An appellate court ordinarily will not consider challenges based on procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection was not made in the trial court. (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184–185, fn. 1.) Dependency cases are not exempt from this forfeiture doctrine. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502.) Although an appellate court has discretion to excuse a party’s failure to properly raise an issue in a timely fashion (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6), in dependency proceedings, where the well-being of the child and stability of placement is of paramount importance, that discretion “should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.)
A defect in notice is a most serious issue, potentially jeopardizing the integrity of the entire judicial process. However, when a parent had the opportunity to present an issue to the juvenile court and failed to do so, appellate courts routinely refuse to exercise their limited discretion to consider the matter on appeal. This is because defective notice and the consequences flowing from it may easily be corrected if promptly raised below. (In re B.G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 689; Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149 [mother waived lack of notice argument by not objecting below]; In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152 [same].) For example, here, any issues regarding notice, including whether Mother received proper notice, could have been clarified if counsel had raised the issue. If adequate notice had not been provided, the court could have promptly corrected it. Under these circumstances, we conclude Mother forfeited the issue.
Moreover, even assuming there was no forfeiture, we would reject the contention on the basis that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re A.D. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1325 [failure to give notice in dependency proceedings is subject to harmless error analysis].) After engaging in services for only a few months, Mother prematurely terminated her extended stay at the inpatient treatment program by getting into an altercation with another client. She missed 19 drug tests, started reusing heroin, stopped visiting Minor regularly, and lost contact with the Bureau for almost three months. She had a long substance abuse history and had lost custody of two older children despite receiving reunification services.
Mother argues that if she had appeared at the hearing, she would have been able to demonstrate that she was “once again engaged in treatment following her relapse” and “could have offered the court a greater perspective on her visits with her daughter.” Neither a showing that she was engaged in treatment at that moment, nor a showing that she had some positive visits with her daughter, however, would have been sufficient to show she had made progress in changing her 15-year-long pattern of addiction, treatment, and relapse. Given these facts, there is no reason to believe that Mother would have obtained a more favorable result had she received proper notice and appeared at the hearing. Accordingly, any error relating to notice was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reunification Services
Mother contends the juvenile court failed to make the requisite findings for terminating reunification services and that any implied findings were not supported by substantial evidence. We reject the contention.
Reunification services may be terminated at a 366.26 hearing if the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).) For a child Minor’s age, the juvenile court shall continue reunification services at the six-month hearing if it finds a substantial probability of returning the child to the parent by the date of the 12-month hearing. (Ibid.) When the juvenile court fails to make express findings required by statute, we may imply such findings where the evidence is clear. (In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 464, fn. 5, citing In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1825.)
Here, there was ample evidence to support a finding that Mother had failed to make substantive progress in her case plan, and that there was no substantial likelihood of Minor being returned to Mother’s care by the 12-month date. Mother participated in her plan for only three months—from February through April 2017—before she left her substance abuse program and missed 19 drug tests. She lost touch with the Bureau, stopped regularly visiting Minor, and began using heroin again. There was no evidence she had any stable housing and no evidence to show that she had made progress in breaking her long-standing pattern of being addicted, being treated, and achieving some success for a limited period of time before relapsing. Given this record, the juvenile court did not err in declining to extend reunification services to Mother.
Continuance
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her request for a continuance of the six-month review hearing. We disagree.
A juvenile court may, upon the request of a party and a showing of good cause, continue a hearing, “provided that no continuance shall be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor. In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a).) We review a request for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. (In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 811.)
Here, the matter had already been continued from October 2 to October 30, 2017 for a contested hearing. Mother had been warned on April 24, 2017 that her parental rights to Minor could be terminated if she could not take custody of Minor within six months. She was in a detoxification program at the time of the October 30, 2017 hearing but in light of her history, it was unclear whether she would complete the program or whether she would be able to—or make the effort to—attend a continued hearing. Moreover, both the Bureau and Minor’s counsel objected to any continuance, and the juvenile court found that any further delays would be contrary to Minor’s best interests. At the time of the contested six-month hearing, Minor was approximately nine months old. She had not lived with Mother since she was a newborn, and Mother had been absent for nearly half her life. Under these circumstances, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. Our decision is immediately final as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)



_________________________
McGuiness, Acting P.J.*


We concur:


_________________________
Siggins, J.


_________________________
Jenkins, J.










A152800