BALBOA ISLAND VILLAGE INN, INC v. LEMEN

Filed 4/26/07 (Reposted same date to reflect additional signatories to conc. opn. of Baxter, J., omitted by clerical error.)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

BALBOA ISLAND VILLAGE INN, INC., )

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) S127904

v. )

) Ct.App. 4/3 G031636

ANNE LEMEN, )

) Orange County

Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. 01CC13243

__________________________________ )

Story Continued from Part I

Lemen argues that damages are the sole remedy available for defamation, stating: The traditional rule of Anglo-American law is that equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin defamation.^[1] But, as Lemen acknowledges, this general rule was established in eighteenth-century England. At that time, the courts of law and the courts of equity were separate.^[2]This long-since-abandoned separation of the courts of law and equity accounts for the general rule that equity will not enjoin defamation. As one commentator has explained: By the end of the Fifteenth Century, complaints against defamation were heard in two different courts, the Star Chamber and the common-law courts. . . . [] . . . [] When the Star Chamber was abolished in 1641, the common-law courts assumed its former jurisdiction over defamation . . . . [] The courts of equity, accordingly, were denied authority to hear claims for defamation. As early as 1742, it was ruled in the St. Jamess Evening Post Case, that the courts of equity had no jurisdiction over claims of libel and slander: For whether it is a libel against the publick or private persons, the only method is to proceed at law. Since the common-law courts then had no power at all to grant injunctions, the resultant ruling meant that, in England, defamation could not be enjoined; the only permissible remedy was money damages at law. . . . [] Thus, an extraordinarily important rule was created more as an offshoot of a jurisdictional dispute than as a calculated understanding of the needs of a free press. In fact, the creation of the rule that equity will not enjoin a libel parallels the almost anti-climatic ending of licensing of the press. These were both historical accidents . . . . (Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and Separation of Powers (2001) 34 Ind. L. Rev. 295, 309-311, fns. omitted.)^[3]

Further, as some of the authorities cited by Lemen acknowledge, the general rule that a defamation may not be enjoined does not apply in a circumstance such as that in the present case in which an injunction is issued to prevent a defendant from repeating statements that have been judicially determined to be defamatory. For example, after stating that [a]s a general rule, an injunction will not lie to restrain a libel or slander (43A C.J.S. (2004) Injunctions,  255, p. 283), Corpus Juris Secundum clarifies that this general rule does not apply in circumstances like those in the present case: After an action at law in which there is a verdict finding the statements published to be false, the plaintiff on a proper showing may have an injunction restraining any further publication of the matter which the jury has found to be acts of libel or slander . . . . (Id. at  255, p. 284.) To the same effect, the annotation written by W. E. Shipley and cited by Lemen states as a general rule that equity will not grant an injunction against publication of a personal libel or slander (Annot., Injunction as Remedy Against Defamation of Person, supra, 47 A.L.R. 715, 716) but also acknowledges: It may be argued that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of free speech and trial by jury are not infringed by equitable interference with the right of publication where the defamatory nature of the publications complained of has once been established by a trial at law, and the plaintiff seeks to restrain further similar statements. (Id. at p. 728.)^[4]

In determining whether an injunction restraining defamation may be issued, therefore, it is crucial to distinguish requests for preventive relief prior to trial and post-trial remedies to prevent repetition of statements judicially determined to be defamatory. As one commentator aptly recognized: There are two stages at which it would be in the plaintiffs interest to enjoin publication of a defamation firstly to preclude the initial public distribution, and secondly to bar continued distributions after a matter has been adjudged defamatory. [] The attempt to enjoin the initial distribution of a defamatory matter meets several barriers, the most impervious being the constitutional prohibitions against prior restraints on free speech and press. . . . [] In addition, such an injunction may be denied on the ground that equitable jurisdiction extends only to property rights and not personalty . . . . [] In a few states the requirement that criminal libels be tried by a jury has been applied to civil cases as well, thus providing a third objection to the granting of an injunction against the initial distribution of defamatory matter. [] In contrast, an injunction against continued distribution of a publication which a jury has determined to be defamatory may be more readily granted. The simplest procedure is to add a prayer for injunctive relief to the action for damages. . . . Since the constitutional problems of a prior restraint are not present in this situation, and the defendant has not been deprived of a jury determination, injunctions should be available as ancillary relief for . . . personal and political defamations. (1 Hanson, Libel and Related Torts (1969)  170, pp. 139-140, italics added.)

Accepting Lemens argument that the only remedy for defamation is an action for damages would mean that a defendant harmed by a continuing pattern of defamation would be required to bring a succession of lawsuits if an award of damages was insufficient to deter the defendant from continuing the tortuous behavior. This could occur if the defendant either was so impecunious as to be judgment proof, or so wealthy as to be willing to pay any resulting judgments. Thus, a judgment for money damages will not always give the defendant effective relief from a continuing pattern of defamation. The present case provides an apt example. The Village Inn did not seek money damages in its amended complaint. The Inn did not want money from Lemen; it just wanted her to stop.^[5]

We recognize, of course, that a court must tread lightly and carefully when issuing an order that prohibits speech. In Carroll v. Princess Anne (1968) 393 U.S. 175, the high court invalidated a restraining order prohibiting the continuation of a public rally conducted by a white supremacist organization that had been issued ex parte without notice to the enjoined parties. In explaining the importance of giving the enjoined parties an opportunity to be heard, the high court in Princess Anne stressed the importance of limiting any order restraining speech: An order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin‑pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order. In this sensitive field, the State may not employ means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. [Citation.] In other words, the order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case. (Carroll v. Princess Anne, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 183-184; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Commn, supra, 413 U.S. 376, 390 [upholding an order that is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary]; Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 21 Cal.4th 121, 140-141 (plur. opn. of George, C. J.).)

The court in Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc., supra, 512 U.S. at page 765, held that review of an injunction, as opposed to an ordinance, that restricted the time, place, and manner of protected expression require[s] a somewhat more stringent application of general First Amendment principles. The high court explained: In past cases evaluating injunctions restricting speech, [citations], we have relied upon such general principles while also seeking to ensure that the injunction was no broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals. [Citations.] Our close attention to the fit between the objectives of an injunction and the restrictions it imposes on speech is consistent with the general rule, quite apart from First Amendment considerations, that injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. [Citations.] (Ibid.)

The same result obtains under the California Constitution. Article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution states: Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. In Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, this court overturned an order issued prior to a plays opening performance that prohibited the performance or advertising of the play because it was based upon the facts of a pending criminal trial. Concluding that the order constituted a prohibited prior restraint of expression, this court observed that the wording of the above-quoted constitution provision is terse and vigorous, and its meaning so plain that construction is not needed. . . . It is patent that this right to speak, write, and publish, cannot be abused until it is exercised, and before it is exercised there can be no responsibility. (Id. at p. 97.) In Wilson v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 652, 658, we held that a preliminary injunction issued prior to trial that prohibited the distribution of a political campaign leaflet was unconstitutional because it constituted a prior restraint on publication.

Despite the broad language in the California Constitution protecting speech, we have recognized that a court may enjoin further distribution of a publication that was found at trial to be unlawful, stating: [I]f the trial court finds the subject matter obscene under prevailing law an injunctive order may be fashioned . . . . It is entirely permissible from a constitutional standpoint to enjoin further exhibition of specific magazines or films which have been finally adjudged to be obscene following a full adversary hearing. [Citations.] (People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater (1976) 17 Cal.3d 42, 57; see Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 21 Cal.4th 121, 144-145 (plur. opn. of George, C. J.) [Under the California Constitution, as under its federal counterpart, the injunction in the present case thus does not constitute a prohibited prior restraint of speech, because defendants simply were enjoined from continuing a course of repetitive speech that had been judicially determined to constitute unlawful harassment in violation of the FEHA.].)

The injunction in the present case is broader than necessary to provide relief to plaintiff while minimizing the restriction of expression. (Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc., supra, 512 U.S. 753, 765.) The injunction applies not just to Lemen but to her agents, all persons acting on her behalf or purporting to act on her behalf and all other persons in active concert and participation with her. There is no evidence in the record, however, to support a finding that anyone other than Lemen herself defamed defendant, or that it is likely that Lemen will induce others to do so in the future. Therefore, the injunction, to be valid, must be limited to prohibiting Lemen personally from repeating her defamatory statements.^[6]

Further, the injunction must not prevent Lemen from presenting her grievances to government officials. The right to petition the government for redress of grievances is among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. (Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn. (1967) 389 U.S. 217, 222.) Accordingly, paragraph 4B, which prohibits Lemen from making the following defamatory statements about Plaintiff to third persons must be modified to prohibit Lemen from making the following defamatory statements about Plaintiff to third persons other than governmental officials with relevant enforcement responsibilities.

The injunction prohibits Lemen from initiating contact with individuals known to Defendant to be employees of Plaintiff. We agree with the Court of Appeal that this restriction sweeps more broadly than necessary because it includes no time, place, and manner restrictions but prohibits Lemen from initiating any type of contact with a known Village Inn employee anywhere, at any time, regarding any subject.^[7]

Lemen argues that she cannot be enjoined from repeating the same statements found to be defamatory, because a change in circumstances might render permissible a statement that was defamatory, stating: A statement that was once false may become true later in time. If such a change in circumstances occurs, defendant may move the court to modify or dissolve the injunction. Civil Code section 3424, subdivision (a) states: Upon notice and motion, the court may modify or dissolve a final injunction upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction was granted . . . . This statute codifies a long-settled judicial recognition of the inherent power of the court to amend an injunction in the interest of justice when . . . there has been a change in the controlling facts upon which the injunction rested . . . . [Citations.] (Swan Magnetics, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1509.) By the same token, the Village Inn could move to modify the injunction if Lemen repeated her defamatory statements in a manner not expressly covered by the injunction.^[8]

If it chose to, the trial court could retain jurisdiction to monitor the enforcement of the injunction. The jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce its decrees is coextensive with its jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties, and it has power to enforce its decrees as a necessary incident to its jurisdiction. Except where the decree is self-executing, jurisdiction of the cause continues for this purpose, or leave may be expressly reserved to reinstate the cause for the purpose of enforcing the decree, or to make such further orders as may be necessary. [Citations.] (Klinker v. Klinker (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 687, 694.)

Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the injunction issued by the trial court must be reversed in part, but we reach that conclusion based on different reasoning than that relied upon by the Court of Appeal. As explained above, the injunction must be reversed in part because it is overly broad, but a properly limited injunction prohibiting defendant from repeating statements about plaintiff that were determined at trial to be defamatory would not violate defendants right to free speech.

Disposition

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed, and the matter remanded for proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

MORENO, J.

WE CONCUR: George, C. J.

Baxter, J.

Chin, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J.

I join fully in the majority opinion. I write separately only to point out that if a defendant were to be enjoined from repeating statements already determined to be defamatory, such a defendant may not only move the court to modify or dissolve the injunction based on a change in circumstances or context, as the majority notes, but may also speak out, notwithstanding the injunction, and assert the present truth of those statements as a defense in any subsequent prosecution for violation of the injunction. (People v. Gonzalez (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 818 [this court has firmly established that a person subject to a courts injunction may elect whether to challenge the constitutional validity of the injunction when it is issued, or to reserve that claim until a violation of the injunction is charged as a contempt of court]; In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 149-150.)

Our decision thus does not require a citizen to obtain government permission before speaking truthfully. In this respect, California law is considerably more consistent with the exercise of First Amendment freedoms than that of other jurisdictions that have adopted the so-called collateral bar rule barring collateral attack on injunctive orders. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 819, quoting In re Berry, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 150.)

BAXTER, J.

WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.

CHIN, J.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.

In this defamatory speech action, the Court of Appeal invalidated the trial courts permanent injunction against defendant. The majority here affirms the Court of Appeals judgment. So would I.

Unlike the majority, however, I would not remand the matter for issuance of a narrower injunction. Rather, I agree with the Court of Appeal that an injunction permanently prohibiting defendants future speech is an unconstitutional prior restraint. And, unlike the majority, I would hold that the remedy for defamation is to award monetary damages. To forever gag the speakerthe remedy approved by the majoritygoes beyond chilling speech; it freezes speech.

The majority acknowledges that the statements the trial court has prohibited defendant from uttering may in the future become true. In that event, the majority concludes, defendant has an adequate remedy because she may apply to the trial court for modification of the injunction. I disagree. To require a judges permission before defendant may speak truthfully is the essence of government censorship of speech and in my view is constitutionally impermissible.

I

Plaintiff Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc., owns the Balboa Island Village Inn (Village Inn), a bar and restaurant on Balboa Island in Newport Beach, Southern California. The Village Inn has live music, and on weekends it stays open until 2:00 a.m. Defendant Anne Lemen (Lemen) has since 1989 owned a cottage across an alley from the Village Inn. Lemen lives in the cottage part of the time and rents it out as a vacation home part of the time.

Like the previous owners of her home, Lemen became embroiled in a dispute with plaintiff about noise at the Village Inn. She also complained about the inebriation and boisterousness of departing customers. Lemen circulated a petition on Balboa Island, which has about 1100 residents, and obtained, as plaintiffs counsel acknowledged at oral argument, 400 signatures. While circulating the petition, and at other times, Lemen orally accused plaintiff of, among other things, having child pornography and prostitution at the Village Inn, selling drugs and alcohol to minors there, and being involved with the Mafia.

Plaintiff sued Lemen, alleging causes of action for nuisance, interference with business, and defamation. Although plaintiff claimed that the Village Inn experienced a 20 percent drop in business after Lemen circulated her petition and made her oral accusations (maj. opn., ante, at p. 3), it sought no monetary damages whatsoever. The sole remedy it sought, and obtained, was a permanent injunction ordering Lemen to stop making disparaging statements about the Village Inn. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.)

The trial court prohibited Lemen from contacting Village Inn employees, an order that the Court of Appeal invalidated as an overbroad restriction. The trial court also permanently enjoined Lemen from making the following statements about plaintiff to third persons: Plaintiff sells alcohol to minors; Plaintiff stays open until 6:00 a.m.; Plaintiff makes sex videos; Plaintiff is involved in child pornography; Plaintiff distributes illegal drugs; Plaintiff has mafia connections; Plaintiff encourages lesbian activities; Plaintiff participates in prostitution and acts as a whorehouse; Plaintiff serves tainted food. The Court of Appeal held that these restrictions on Lemens future speech are a constitutionally impermissible prior restraint of speech.

The majority agrees with the Court of Appeal that the trial courts permanent injunction is unconstitutional. But it does so based only on the overbreadth of the injunction in applying to persons other than Lemen herself; in restricting Lemens contacts with plaintiffs employees regardless of time, place, or manner; and in prohibiting Lemen from making the specified statements even to government officials. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 24-25.) The majority, however, rejects the Court of Appeals holding that the injunction is an unconstitutional prior restraint. (Id. at p. 18.) It holds: (1) After a trial court has once found a defendants statement to be defamatory, it may order the defendant never to repeat that statement (ibid.); (2) future speech may be enjoined irrespective of whether monetary damages would have been an adequate remedy (id. at p. 22); and (3) a defendants truthful future speech may be subjected to judicial censorship (id. at pp. 25-26).

I do not and cannot join those majority holdings, which I view as restraints on the right of free speech that are impermissible under both the federal and the California Constitutions. The majority orders the matter remanded so that the trial court may prepare and file a new permanent injunction against Lemen that avoids the overbreadth problems that the majority has identified. I do not agree with the remand. Even as so limited, the injunction operates as an impermissible prior restraint of Lemens future speech.

II

To speak openly and freely, one of our most cherished freedoms, is a right guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., 1st Amend. [Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .].) This fundamental right operates as a restriction on both state and federal governments (Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 732) including the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of those governments (Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, 764).

Injunctions pose a greater threat to freedom of speech than do statutes, as injunctions carry a greater risk of censorship and discriminatory application than do general laws. (Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc., supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 764-765.) An injunction is issued not by the collective action of a legislature but by an individual judgea single man or woman controlling someones future utterances of speech. Because the power to enjoin speech resides in an individual judge, injunctions deserve greater scrutiny than statutes. (See id. at p. 793 (conc. & dis. opn. of Scalia, J.).) An injunction restricting future speech is a prior restraint (id. at p. 797 (conc. & dis. opn. of Scalia, J.)) and thus, presumptively unconstitutional (Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad (1975) 420 U.S. 546, 558).

The majoritys insistence to the contrary notwithstanding (maj. opn., ante, at p. 6), the injunction here is a prior restraint because it prohibits Lemen from making specified statements (ante at p. 2) anywhere and at any time in the future. A prohibition targeting speech that has not yet occurred is a prior restraint. (Alexander v. United States (1993) 509 U.S. 544, 550 [court orders that actually forbid speech activities are classic examples of prior restraints]; see Tory v. Cochran (2005) 544 U.S. 734, 736 [125 S.Ct. 2108, 2110] [injunction against orally uttering statements is a prior restraint].)

The pertinent inquiry is whether the presumptively unconstitutional prior restraint (Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,supra, 420 U.S. at p. 558; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan (1963) 372 U.S. 58, 70) on Lemens future speech is legally proper. A heavy burden of justification rests on anyone seeking a prior restraint on the right of free speech. (Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971) 402 U.S. 415, 419.) Here, plaintiff has not carried that burden. Plaintiffs argument, adopted by the majority, consists in essence of this syllogism: (1) Defamation is not constitutionally protected speech; (2) it has been judicially determined that Lemen defamed plaintiff by making certain statements; therefore (3) defendant may be enjoined from ever again making those statements. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.) Like many a syllogism, the argument has superficial appeal. Like many a syllogism, it is flawed.

Its flaw is the failure to appreciate that whether a statement is defamatory cannot be determined by viewing the statement in isolation from the context in which it is made, the facts to which it refers, and the precise wording used. A statement previously adjudged to be defamatory, and thus not protected by the First Amendment, may, when spoken in the future at a particular time and in a particular context, not be defamatory for a number of reasons, and thus be entitled to constitutional protection.

The underlying facts to which the statement refers may change. Here, for example, the trial court enjoined Lemen from ever saying that plaintiff sells alcohol to minors at the Village Inn. If in the future the Village Inn were ever to serve alcohol to minors, and Lemen accurately reported that fact to a neighbor, Lemen could be charged with contempt of court for violating the trial courts injunction, even though her statement was not defamatory (because true) and thus entitled to full constitutional protection.

And, the context in which the words are spoken may be different. For an audience member to falsely yell fire in a crowded theater is quite different than for an actor to yell the same word in the same crowded theater while reciting the lines of a dramatic production. Similarly, if a newspaper reporter were to ask Lemen what sorts of things the trial courts injunction prohibited her from saying, and if Lemen were to reply, Plaintiff sells alcohol to minors, the statement would not be defamatory because a reasonable person hearing the conversation would understand that Lemen was describing the contents of the injunction and not the activities at the Village Inn. (See Couch v. San Juan Unified School Dist. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1501 [whether an oral statement is defamatory depends on how a reasonable hearer would understand it in the context in which it was spoken].) In other words, whether the First Amendment protects speech depends on the setting in which the speech occurs. (Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (1976) 427 U.S. 50, 66; Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 260 [statement must be examined in light of the totality of the circumstances].) Because the injunction here makes no allowance for context, it muzzles nondefamatory speech entitled to full constitutional protection.

Also, the words in which a statement is formulated may vary. Subtle differences in wording can make it exceptionally difficult to determine whether a particular utterance falls within an injunctions prohibition. As the United States Supreme Court has aptly observed: It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable. (Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 559; accord, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, 427 U.S. at p. 66.) For example, should in this case Lemen express in the future her opinion that bars such as the Village Inn contribute to the social problems arising from alcoholic consumption by minors, has Lemen violated the injunction? Does that assertion imply that the Village Inn sells alcohol to minors or only that the general availability of alcohol in all bars, including the Village Inn, contributes to the social problems caused by alcohol? If Lemen were to tell a friend that the food at the Village Inn is bad, would that statement imply that the food is tainted (a statement that the injunction forbids) or only that it is unappetizing or ill-flavored (statements that the injunction does not forbid)?

Story Continues as Part III

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^[1] The general rule upon which Lemen relies is not universally accepted. As one commentator has observed: Upon the question of relief by injunction against the publication of defamatory statements affecting the character or business of persons, the authorities both in England and America present a noticeable want of uniformity, and are indeed wholly irreconcilable. (Newell, Libel and Slander (2d ed. 1898) p. 246a.)

^[2] English equity as a system administered by a tribunal apart from the established courts made its first appearance in the reign of Edward I . . . . (30A C.J.S. (1992) Equity,  3, p. 162.) For centuries law and equity were administered in England by two separate and distinct sets of courts, each applying exclusively its own system of jurisprudence, and following its own system of procedure, but, by statute and constitutional provision, this dual system of administration was abolished and provision was made for the administration of equity in a consolidated court. (Id.,  4, p. 163.) Separate courts of equity were abolished in England in 1873. (27A Am.Jur.2d (1996) Equity,  3, p. 521.)

^[3] Prior to the Common-Law Procedure Act 1854, no court could grant any injunction in a case of libel. The Court of Chancery could grant no injunction in such a case, because it could not try a libel. Neither could courts of common law until the Common-Law Procedure Act of 1854, because they had no power to grant injunctions. (American Malting Co. v. Keitel (2d Cir. 1913) 209 F. 351, 354.)

^[4] Consistently, American Jurisprudence Second observes that while it is true that equity will not normally restrain a libel, the rule is not without exception . . . and an injunction properly issued to prohibit a defendant from reiterating statements which had been found in current and prior proceedings to be false and libelous . . . . (42 Am.Jur.2d (2000) Injunctions,  98, p. 693.)

^[5] Justice Kennards concurring and dissenting opinion states that the majority holds that future speech may be enjoined irrespective of whether monetary damages would have been an adequate remedy. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at pp. 3, 9.) We do not so hold. We hold that an injunction prohibiting the defendant from repeating a statement determined to be defamatory does not constitute a prohibited prior restraint of speech. We also hold that an award of damages is not the sole remedy available for defamation. We express no view on whether, in an individual case, an injunction prohibiting the defendant from repeating defamatory statements could, or should, be denied because an award of damages would be an adequate remedy.

^[6] We express no view regarding whether the scope of the injunction properly could be broader if people other than Lemen purported to act on her behalf.

^[7] The Court of Appeal upheld the final paragraph of the injunction, which prohibits Lemen from filming . . . within 25 feet of the premises of the Village Inn, except on Lemens own property. Lemen did not seek review of this portion of the Court of Appeals decision and does not challenge it in this court.

^[8] Justice Kennards concurring and dissenting opinion states that the majority holds that a defendants truthful future speech may be subjected to judicial censorship. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at p. 3.) We do not so hold. We hold only that the possibility that a change in circumstances could alter the nature of a statement found to be defamatory does not prohibit a court from issuing an injunction prohibiting the defendant from repeating that statement.