Filed 12/5/18 Cal. Dept. of State Hospitals at Coalinga v. D.H. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Hilary A. Chittick, Judge.

John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Appointed counsel for appellant D.H. asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) D.H. was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from D.H. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to D.H., we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On December 14, 2011, D.H. was committed to the Department of State Hospitals at Coalinga (DSH) as a sexually violent predator (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600 et seq.).

On January 2, 2018, DSH filed a petition for an order to compel involuntary treatment of D.H. with antipsychotic medication for one year.

On March 5, 2018, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the petition. At the hearing, the following evidence was elicited.

D.H.’s treating psychiatrist, Jaspinder Tahim, testified that D.H. had been diagnosed with sexual sadism disorder, bipolar one disorder, and borderline personality disorder. He required treatment with antipsychotic medication. In the past, the medication had helped him, but then he refused to take them until he was placed on involuntary treatment. The medication caused a remission of his symptoms. D.H. denied having any illness and disagreed with his diagnoses. Tahim testified to many examples of D.H.’s violent and aggressive behavior during 2017. D.H., however, told Tahim his last act of aggression was in 2012. Tahim opined that D.H. lacked an understanding of his mental illness and was unable to intelligently and rationally make decisions about participating in mental health treatment. Tahim did not believe D.H. was competent.

D.H. testified that his diagnoses were recent and the only illness he had been diagnosed with in the past was bipolar disorder. He believed the medication he took helped him reason and focus, but it made him drowsy. The staff told him he had been doing remarkably well in the past several months. Other patients had attacked him.

DISCUSSION

The Sexually Violent Predators Act “ ‘provides a court process by which certain convicted violent sex offenders, whose current mental disorders make them likely to reoffend if free, may be committed, at the end of their prison terms, for successive two-year [now indeterminate] periods of state hospital confinement and treatment as long as the disorder-related danger persists.’ [Citation.] … [T]he Legislature declared that the purpose of the Act is to confine and treat ‘a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders’ until ‘they no longer present a threat to society.’ ” (In re Calhoun (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1323; see People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127, fn. 9.)

A competent adult has a common law and constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, including the administration of antipsychotic drugs. (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14.) However, an involuntarily committed patient may be forcibly treated with antipsychotic medication if a court has determined that he or she is not competent to refuse treatment. (Id. at pp. 15-16; In re Calhoun, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354.) A judicial determination of competency to refuse treatment involves consideration of three primary factors: (1) whether the patient is aware of his or her situation and acknowledges the existence of his or her condition; (2) whether he or she is able to understand the benefits and risks of, and alternatives to, treatment; and (3) whether he or she is able to understand and intelligently evaluate the information required to be given to patients whose informed consent is sought, and to participate in the treatment decision by rational thought processes. (Riese v. St. Mary’s Hospital & Medical Center (1987) 209 Cal.App.3d 1303, 1322-1323.)

The superior court must determine competence to refuse treatment by clear and convincing evidence, “so clear as to leave no substantial doubt, [and] sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” (Conservatorship of Waltz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 722, 733 & fn. 14.) An order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication is reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Fisher (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016.)

Here, the evidence established that D.H. required antipsychotic medication to control his symptoms and he refused to take it until it was given involuntarily. D.H. lacked understanding of his mental illness and his need for medication. The evidence supported the conclusion that D.H. did not acknowledge the existence of his mental illness beyond his bipolar disorder, did not understand the benefits of his treatment such that he could weigh the risks and benefits of treatment options, and could not rationally process and evaluate information required for his consent to treatment. We conclude substantial evidence supported the superior court’s determination that appellant lacked capacity to refuse treatment of his mental illness.

After independent review of the record, we find that no reasonably arguable factual or legal issues exist.

DISPOSITION

The order granting the petition is affirmed.