Filed 5/1/17 Cal. Dept. of State Hospitals at Coalinga v. Jones CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE
Court of Appeal of the State of California
IN AND FOR THE
Fifth Appellate District

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS AT COALINGA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TYRONE JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

F071590

(Super. Ct. No. 15CRAD682636)


MODIFICATION OF OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:

On April 26, 2017, we received appellant’s Petition for Rehearing or Reconsideration requesting that we grant rehearing or review, and consider the arguments raised in a reply brief submitted concurrently. The Clerk/Administrator is directed to file the appellant’s reply brief received on April 26, 2017. We have considered the contents of the reply brief, along with the argument appellant raises in the Petition, and order that the opinion herein filed on April 24, 2017, be modified as follows:

1. Delete footnote 2 from page 4 of the opinion.



This modification does not effect a change in the judgment. Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing is denied.




GOMES, Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR:



PEÑA, J.


SMITH, J.

Filed 4/24/17 Cal. Dept. of State Hospitals at Coalinga v. Jones CA5 (unmodified version)



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS AT COALINGA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TYRONE JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

F071590

(Super. Ct. No. 15CRAD682636)


OPINION

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan B. Conklin, Judge.
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Ismael A. Castro and Renu R. George, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Tyrone Jones appeals from an order that authorized the California Department of State Hospitals at Coalinga (Coalinga) to administer antipsychotic medication to him involuntarily while he was pending trial on whether he should be adjudged a sexually violent predator (SVP) and committed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). Jones contends the trial court lacked the authority to order that he be involuntarily medicated because, while the trial court found probable cause to hold him over for trial, that trial had not yet occurred and he had not been committed as an SVP. Jones further contends he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously permitted expert witnesses to offer hearsay testimony. The involuntary medication order, however, expired while this appeal was pending and therefore we dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jones was transferred to Coalinga on March 14, 2014, after completing a 15-year- sentence for sexual assaults on three females. Jones’s current diagnosis was delusional disorder and antisocial personality disorder. His psychiatric symptoms included a persistent belief staff and peers were conspiring against him and obstructing him from pursuing his goals. Jones expressed those beliefs in a very loud, aggressive, and hostile manner, such as by cornering people.
After Jones’s arrival at Coalinga, he was involved in numerous physical and verbal attacks on other patients and staff. In July 2014 he attempted to assault another patient after the patient reported a threat to staff. In August 2014, he threw hot coffee on a patient and made homicidal threats, and kicked another patient in the jaw. In November 2014, staff found a patient leaving the restroom with wounds to his face; Jones had blood on his hands and clothes. Jones also made verbal threats to harm patients and staff on seven occasions from June through December 2014.
On December 18, 2014, Coalinga began administering involuntary psychotropic medication following an in-house panel held pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 4210; the final day involuntary medications could be administered under that decision was June 16, 2015.
On March 19, 2015, Coalinga filed a petition for an order to involuntarily administer psychotropic medications to Jones pursuant to In re Calhoun (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1315 (Calhoun) and section 5300. An evidentiary hearing was held on the petition on May 4, 2015. Two psychiatrists, Dr. Dawnmarie Risley and Dr. Depak Kumar, testified on Coalinga’s behalf. Jones, who was represented by court appointed counsel, testified on his own behalf. At the time of the hearing, a probable cause hearing had been held concerning Jones’s commitment as a SVP, but he had not yet been committed.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that Jones was a court-adjudicated SVP who was unwilling to take psychotropic medication and found he (1) was a danger to others within the meaning of section 5300, and (2) lacked capacity to refuse treatment. The trial court granted the petition permitting involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for a period not to exceed one year from the date of the order.
DISCUSSION
Although Jones immediately filed a notice of appeal in this case following the May 4, 2015 hearing, appellate briefing in this case was not completed until February 2017.
In his opening brief filed in October 2015, Jones argued the trial court lacked authority to order he be involuntarily medicated under Calhoun, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1315, because he had not been committed as an SVP, and his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue below. Coalinga argued in its respondent’s brief, filed in February 2016, that Jones waived the argument because he did not object on this basis in the trial court, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not cognizable in civil proceedings such as this one. Coalinga further argued that Calhoun controlled and substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings.
In April and September 2016, we granted Jones’s applications to file a supplemental opening brief and a second supplemental opening brief, respectively. In the supplemental opening brief, filed in May 2016, Jones argued the order allowing his involuntary medication before he was adjudicated an SVP violated his due process and equal protection rights. In the second supplemental opening brief, filed in October 2016, Jones argued that because Coalinga’s experts’ testimony included case-specific facts, which purportedly constitutes inadmissible hearsay under the recently decided case of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, the entirety of their testimony must be disallowed and we must reverse the involuntary medication order.
Coalinga in turn filed a supplemental respondent’s brief in August 2016 and a second supplemental respondent’s brief in January 2017. In the later brief, Coalinga argued, inter alia, that the appeal should be dismissed as moot because the involuntary medication order had expired in May 2016 and we could no longer provide effective relief. Although Jones filed a supplemental reply brief in response to Coalinga’s August 2016 brief, he did not file a reply brief to Coalinga’s January 2017 brief.
We agree with Coalinga that the appeal is moot and conclude that no exception compels us to address it on the merits rather than follow the general rule requiring dismissal. “ ‘As a general rule, an appellate court only decides actual controversies. It is not the function of the appellate court to render opinions “ ‘ “ ‘upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or . . . declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” ’ ” [Citation.] “[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.” ’ ” (People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 321.) Here, we cannot provide Jones any effective relief because the order he challenges has already expired by its own terms.
It is true, of course, that an appellate court has discretion to address the merits of an otherwise moot appeal if there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties or the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur. (See, e.g., White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 537; Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 746–747; Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479–480.) Since Jones failed to file a reply brief addressing this issue, there is no argument that either of these exceptions applies. Jones’s assertion that the expert testimony offered at the hearing was inadmissible does not involve an issue of public interest, and we do not believe his other arguments are so urgent as to warrant exercising our discretion to decide the appeal, especially given the procedural posture of this case. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider this moot appeal.
DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.



GOMES, Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR:



PEÑA, J.



SMITH, J.