Filed 6/28/17 Cardosa v. B.G. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO


ANDREA CARDOSA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

B.G.,

Defendant and Respondent.


E067333

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1600689)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed.
Andrea Cardosa, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
A minor whom we will call B.G. reported to Andrea Cardosa that she had been the victim of a sexual offense by a male. Cardosa, in turn, reported B.G.’s allegation to the local child welfare agency. The agency concluded that the allegation was unfounded.
Later, Cardosa herself pleaded guilty to a sexual offense against B.G..
In this proceeding, Cardosa seeks the confidential official records regarding B.G.’s allegation against the male. In her view, these would tend to exonerate her by showing that B.G is not credible.
We will hold that the trial court properly denied Cardosa’s request for the records.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the trial court, Cardosa stated the following under penalty of perjury.
In or about April 2011, when B.G. was 15, she told Cardosa about a sexual offense perpetrated against her by a male acquaintance. At the time, Cardosa was a mandated reporter (see Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.), so she submitted a written report of B.G.’s allegation to the local child welfare agency. That agency subsequently sent Cardosa a document stating that it had concluded that the allegation was unfounded.
Thereafter, Cardosa pleaded guilty to a sexual offense against B.G., allegedly committed in 2009 or 2010, plus sexual offenses against a second child victim.
Cardosa has filed a habeas corpus petition. In addition, a related civil action has been filed against Cardosa.
II
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, Cardosa filed a request for disclosure of juvenile case file records relating to B.G. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 827. In it, she sought her written report to the child welfare agency and the agency’s written finding that B.G.’s allegation was unfounded. She argued that the records sought would support her position, in both the habeas proceeding and the civil action, by impeaching B.G. and by showing that she was innocent.
B.G. filed an objection. Her objection has not been included in the record on appeal.
The trial court denied the petition.
III
CARDOSA HAS NOT SHOWN THAT SHE IS ENTITLED TO DISCLOSURE
B.G. has not filed a respondent’s brief. Nevertheless, Cardosa is not automatically entitled to prevail. Even when no respondent’s brief has been filed, the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error. (Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1078; County of Lake v. Palla (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 418, 420.)
Cardosa’s claim stumbles at the threshold, because she has not given us an adequate record. “It is well settled, of course, that a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record. [Citations.]” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575.) As mentioned in part II, ante, the record on appeal shows that B.G. filed an objection to disclosure; however, it does not include that objection. The objection may have included evidence and/or argument supporting the trial court’s decision. At a minimum, on this record, Cardosa cannot show that it did not. “In the absence of a proper record on appeal, the trial court’s ruling is presumed correct and must be affirmed. [Citation.]” (Baranchik v. Fizulich (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1210, 1217.)
Separately and alternatively, we reject Cardosa’s claim on the merits, for two reasons.
First, Cardosa has overlooked the significance of Penal Code section 11167.5. Her petition invoked Welfare and Institutions Code section 827. That section provides that a juvenile case file is confidential, and that only the parties to the juvenile proceeding and certain other persons have a right to inspect it. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) However, it also provides that persons who do not have a categorical right to inspect the file may petition for leave of court to inspect it. (Id., subd. (a)(1)(P), (a)(3).)
Penal Code section 11167.5, however, provides that reports by mandated reporters are confidential and may be disclosed only to certain specified persons and agencies. (Id., subds. (a), (b).) It even prohibits disclosure by the mandated reporter him or herself. (Cuff v. Grossmont Union High School District (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 582, 591.) Unlike Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, it does not provide for a court to order disclosure based on need.
“Our Supreme Court has explained that ‘[W]he[n] the same subject matter is covered by inconsistent provisions, one of which is special and the other general, the special one, whether or not enacted first, is an exception to the general statute and controls unless an intent to the contrary clearly appears.’ [Citation.]” (Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corporation (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.) Here, Penal Code section 11167.5 is the more specific statute. Hence, we may assume, without deciding, that the records that Cardosa was seeking were otherwise within the scope of Welfare and Institutions Code section 827. Even if so, they were not subject to disclosure based solely on need, and Cardosa has never asserted that she is entitled to disclosure under Penal Code section 11167.5. Accordingly, the trial court was required to deny her petition.
Second, Cardosa is not entitled to disclosure because she has not shown sufficient good cause.
“In determining whether to authorize inspection or release of juvenile case files, . . . the court must balance the interests of the child and other parties to the juvenile court proceedings, the interests of the petitioner, and the interests of the public.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.552(e)(4).) “The court may permit disclosure of juvenile case files . . . only if petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the records requested are necessary and have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of the petitioner.” (Id., rule 5.552(e)(6).) It must also “find that the need for discovery outweighs the policy considerations favoring confidentiality of juvenile case files. (Id., rule 5.552(e)(5).)
It must be remembered that the records sought do not relate to Cardosa’s molestation of B.G.; rather, they relate to the male’s alleged molestation of B.G. Nevertheless, Cardosa argues that they tend to impeach B.G., because the agency ultimately labeled B.G.’s allegation unfounded.
It does not appear that Cardosa needed the records to prove this, however, because she could make the same point using other evidence. She could testify herself that B.G. told her about an incident involving the male; she could also testify that she notified the agency. Finally, either she or B.G. could presumably testify that the agency never took any action against the male. While Cardosa might like to have the records to corroborate her testimony, the trial court could reasonably find that her need for them was not so great as to outweigh the individual and societal interest in confidentiality.
Moreover, with regard to the habeas proceeding, it does not appear that the records are even relevant. Cardosa pleaded guilty. To obtain habeas relief, she would have to show some error affecting the validity of the plea — e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel or misadvisement by the court. Factual innocence alone would not be enough. (People v. Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 126-127.) A fortiori, evidence that merely impeaches a witness, and thus raises an issue of fact suitable for a jury, is not grounds for habeas relief from a guilty plea.
Similarly, with regard to the civil action, it does not appear that the records would be admissible. In a civil case, a specific instance of prior dishonesty (other than a felony conviction) is inadmissible to impeach a witness. (Evid. Code, § 787; Hernandez v. Paicius (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 452, 460-461, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1006, fn. 4.) Accordingly, evidence that B.G. lied about being molested by a man would not be admissible to prove that she lied about being molested by defendant.
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the petition for disclosure.
IV
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.

We concur:
McKINSTER
J.

SLOUGH
J.