Carson v. Carson CA3
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Calaveras)
----
MICHAEL J. CARSON, JR.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL J. CARSON, SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
C079862
(Super. Ct. No. 11CV37865)
Michael Carson, Jr., (the son) sued Michael Carson, Sr., (the father) to quiet title on a cabin in Arnold, California. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the son, concluding that the father’s parents (the grandparents) deeded the cabin to the son. Although the father claimed ownership of the cabin based on a modified 1996 quitclaim deed, the trial court determined the modified deed was invalid.
The father, representing himself, now contends (1) the modified 1996 quitclaim deed was valid, (2) the trial court should have continued the trial until the father’s sister was available to testify, and (3) the judgment was erroneous. The son did not file a respondent’s brief.
We will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Around 1980 the grandparents and the father built and shared ownership of the cabin. But after the father divorced in 1992, he transferred his ownership interest in the cabin to the grandparents. The grandparents gave the father approximately $48,000 at the time, but the father said the money was not consideration for the transfer of ownership.
Later, in 1996, the grandparents executed a quitclaim deed specifying that the grandparents would have a controlling interest in the cabin until they both passed away, at which time the son would own the cabin. But the 1996 quitclaim deed was placed in a file cabinet and was not recorded at the time.
One month before the grandfather died, the father prepared, and the grandparents executed, a 2003 gift deed granting the cabin to the son. The father arranged to have the 2003 gift deed recorded.
By the time of the grandmother’s death in 2006, the son and the father were not speaking to each other. The father was living at the cabin and at some point the son initiated an action to evict the father.
Professing ownership of the cabin, the father asserted that roughly 30 days before the grandparents executed the 2003 gift deed to the son, the grandfather removed the 1996 quitclaim deed from the file cabinet and gave it to the father. Although the original 1996 quitclaim deed said it deeded the cabin to “Michael James Carson, Jr.,” the father claimed the grandparents removed the suffix “Jr.” from the quitclaim deed and directed the father to remove the language in the quitclaim deed specifying that the grandparents would have a controlling interest in the cabin until they both passed away.
According to the father, the cabin had only been given to the son so the son could borrow money against it to care for the grandmother. The father said the son was fully aware it was not his cabin; in 2004, after the son obtained a restraining order against him, the father sent a copy of the modified 1996 quitclaim deed to the son and to the father’s sister, informing them he would record the quitclaim deed “if this keeps up.” The son testified he did not recall receiving the quitclaim deed but the father might have mailed it in 2004 and the son might have tossed it aside because he already owned the cabin. The father retained the modified 1996 quitclaim deed for seven years but recorded it in 2010 in response to the eviction action.
In the eviction proceeding, the trial court declined to evict the father, noting that complicated ownership disputes were beyond the scope of the unlawful detainer action, but could be the subject of a quiet title action. Accordingly, the son filed the instant action to quiet title and the father cross-complained against his sister and the son. The sister was not present at the bench trial but was represented by counsel.
The trial court found for the son on all the causes of action, ruling the 2003 gift deed transferred the cabin to the son. The trial court said, “[i]t defies common sense to believe that [the grandparents], in September or October 2003, altered the acknowledged but undelivered 1996 deed to [the son] by erasing ‘Jr.’ from the grantee’s name (and intending to convey title to [the father]) when one or two months later they unquestionably executed and delivered the November 25, 2003 gift deed to [the son].” According to the trial court, “[i]t is too convenient that [the father] produced and recorded the altered deed days before the eviction trial.”
DISCUSSION
I
The father contends the modified 1996 quitclaim deed was valid. He argues the modifications were directed by his parents, they were made to protect his true ownership, and his sister and the son had personal knowledge of the modified deed.
We will uphold the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence (Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109), and absent proof to the contrary, we presume the findings are supported by substantial evidence; it is appellant’s burden to show they are not. (Ibid.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings. The record shows that the 2003 gift deed (prepared and recorded by the father) transferred ownership of the cabin to the son. Moreover, the trial court’s finding that the modified 1996 quitclaim deed was invalid is also supported by the evidence. We will not second-guess the credibility determinations made by the trial court, because the trial court was in the best position to assess the evidence.
II
The father next argues the trial court should have continued the trial until the father’s sister was available to testify. He appears to claim that because there was evidence that his sister gave altered evidence to the son, and because there were discrepancies between the original 1996 quitclaim deed and the modified 1996 quitclaim deed, the trial court should have continued the trial until the sister was available to testify.
Although we review a trial court’s denial of a request to continue trial for abuse of discretion (Cottini v. Enloe Medical Center (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 401, 418), here there was no request to continue the trial and no subpoena compelling the sister to appear as a witness. Under the circumstances, the father’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion lacks merit.
III
Finally, the father claims the judgment was erroneous. But the totality of his contention in his opening brief reads as follows: “Please review Arguments I. and II. Prior to reading Tentative Judgment/Judgment. Totally incomprehensible assumptions, opinions and conclusions drawn by the Trial Judge. (CT 124-133)”
Because the father’s argument does not specify with particularity any asserted errors, and because it lacks sufficient citation to authority or to the record, we decline to address it (People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1068, fn. 10), other than noting that nothing in the record indicates the trial court’s findings were erroneous.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
/S/
MURRAY, J.
Description | Michael Carson, Jr., (the son) sued Michael Carson, Sr., (the father) to quiet title on a cabin in Arnold, California. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the son, concluding that the father’s parents (the grandparents) deeded the cabin to the son. Although the father claimed ownership of the cabin based on a modified 1996 quitclaim deed, the trial court determined the modified deed was invalid. The father, representing himself, now contends (1) the modified 1996 quitclaim deed was valid, (2) the trial court should have continued the trial until the father’s sister was available to testify, and (3) the judgment was erroneous. The son did not file a respondent’s brief. We will affirm the judgment. |
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