CASSEL v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
Filed 1/13/11
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
MICHAEL CASSEL, )
)
Petitioner, )
) S178914
v. )
) Ct.App. 2/7 B215215
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS )
ANGELES COUNTY, )
) Los Angeles County
Respondent; ) Super. Ct. No. LC070478
)
WASSERMAN, COMDEN, )
CASSELMAN & PEARSON, L.L.P., )
et al., )
)
Real Parties in Interest. )
__________________________________ )
STORY CONTINUE FROM PART I….
The obvious purpose of the expanded language is to ensure that the statutory protection extends beyond discussions carried out directly between the opposing parties to the dispute, or with the mediator, during the mediation proceedings themselves. All oral or written communications are covered, if they are made “for the purpose of” or “pursuant to” a mediation. (§ 1119, subds. (a), (b).) It follows that, absent an express statutory exception, all discussions conducted in preparation for a mediation, as well as all mediation-related communications that take place during the mediation itself, are protected from disclosure. Plainly, such communications include those between a mediation disputant and his or her own counsel, even if these do not occur in the presence of the mediator or other disputants.[1]
This conclusion is reinforced by examination of section 1122, subdivision (a)(2), which sets forth the circumstances under which fewer than all of the participants in a mediation may stipulate to the disclosure of otherwise confidential mediation-related communications. Under this statute, those mediation participants “by or on [whose] behalf” a mediation-related communication, document, or writing was prepared may agree, under specified statutory procedures, to its disclosure, but only insofar as the communication in question “does not [reveal] anything said or done . . . in the course of the mediation.” (Italics added.) Section 1122, subdivision (a)(2) thus presupposes there are mediation-related communications that (1) are prepared “by or on behalf of fewer than all the mediation participants,” and (2) do not “disclose anything said or done . . . in the course of the mediation,” but (3) are nonetheless protected by mediation confidentiality unless the affected participants otherwise agree. (Ibid.) Logically, these must include communications that are made or prepared outside a mediation, but are “for the purpose of” or “pursuant to” the mediation. (§ 1119, subds. (a), (b).) Such mediation-related communications plainly encompass those between a mediation disputant and the disputant’s counsel, even though these occur away from other mediation participants and reveal nothing about the mediation proceedings themselves.
Agreeing with petitioner’s contrary contention, the Court of Appeal majority noted that mediation is defined as “a process in which a neutral person or persons facilitate communication between the disputants to assist them in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.” (§ 1115, subd. (a), italics added.) The majority thus reasoned that the “[l]egislative intent and policy behind mediation confidentiality are to facilitate communication by a party that otherwise the party would not provide, given the potential for another party to the mediation to use the information against the revealing party; they are not to facilitate communication between a party and his own attorney.” (Italics added.) Focusing on our statement in Foxgate that the frank exchange essential to a successful mediation “ ‘is achieved only if the participants know that what is said in the mediation will not be used to their detriment through later court proceedings and other adjudicatory processes’ ” (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1, 14, italics added), the majority concluded that a party to mediation, and the party’s attorney, are a single mediation “participant” whose communications inter se are not within the intended purview of the mediation confidentiality statutes.
But there is no persuasive basis to equate mediation “parties” or “disputants” with mediation “participants,” and thus to restrict confidentiality to potentially damaging mediation-related exchanges between disputing parties. In the first place, section 1119, subdivisions (a) and (b), do not restrict confidentiality to communications between mediation “participants.” They provide more broadly that “[n]o evidence of anything said” (§ 1119, subd. (a), italics added), and “[n]o writing” (id., subd. (b)), is discoverable or admissible in a legal proceeding if the utterance or writing was “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .” (Id., subds. (a), (b).) The protection afforded by these statutes is not limited by the identity of the communicator, by his or her status as a “party,” “disputant,” or “participant” in the mediation itself, by the communication’s nature, or by its specific potential for damage to a disputing party.
Second, the Court of Appeal majority’s assumption that the mediation “disputants” are the only “participants” in the mediation, and that a disputant and his or her counsel are thus a single “participant,” does not bear scrutiny. “Participants” are not defined in the statutory text, but they are mentioned at several points in the statutory scheme, under circumstances making clear that the term “participants” includes more than the mediation parties or disputants.
Thus, section 1119, subdivision (c) provides that “[a]ll communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation . . . shall remain confidential.” The California Law Revision Commission comment following section 1119 states, as to subdivision (c), that “[a] mediation is confidential notwithstanding the presence of an observer, such as a person evaluating or training the mediator or studying the mediation process.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3B West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1119, p. 391.) The implication is that such an observer is to be considered a “participant” in the mediation, who is obliged to maintain the confidentiality of communications in the course of a mediation.
An even clearer indication of the correct concept of “participants” arises in connection with section 1122. As noted above, section 1122, subdivision (a) states the conditions under which agreement can be reached for the disclosure and admission in evidence of otherwise confidential materials. Subdivision (a)(1) states that mediation-related communications and writings are not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, if “[a]ll persons who conduct or otherwise participate in the mediation” expressly agree to such disclosure by the prescribed statutory means. Subdivision (a)(2) provides that a communication or writing prepared “by or on behalf of fewer than all the mediation participants” is not protected from disclosure, or made inadmissible, if “those participants” agree to permit disclosure, and the communication or writing “does not disclose anything said or done . . . in the course of the mediation.”
The California Law Revision Commission comment following section 1122 states, in its analysis of subdivision (a)(1), that “mediation documents and communications may be admitted or disclosed only upon agreement of all participants, including not only parties but also the mediator and other nonparties attending the mediation (e.g., a disputant not involved in litigation, a spouse, an accountant, an insurance representative, or an employee of a corporate affiliate).” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3B West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1122, p. 409, italics added.) The list provided by the Commission is, by its terms, not all-inclusive (note the “e.g.” preceding the examples given), and no reason appears why other persons attending and assisting in the mediation on behalf of the disputants, such as their counsel, are not themselves distinct “participants” who must agree to the disclosure of confidential mediation-related communications they made or received.[2] Though petitioner urges us to do so, we therefore decline to accept the Court of Appeal’s “single participant” characterization, which contradicts the plain import of the statutes.[3]
The Court of Appeal majority also implied that the mediation confidentiality statutes, in their role as protectors of frank exchanges between the parties to a mediation, were not intended to trump section 958, which eliminates the confidentiality protections otherwise afforded by the attorney-client privilege (§ 950 et seq.) in suits between clients and their own lawyers. But the mediation confidentiality statutes include no exception for legal malpractice actions by mediation disputants against their own counsel. Moreover, though both statutory schemes involve the shielding of confidential communications, they serve separate and unrelated purposes.
A legal client’s personal statutory privilege of confidentiality (§§ 953, 954), applicable to all communications between client and counsel (§ 952), allows the client to consult frankly with counsel on any matter, without fear that others may later discover and introduce against the client confidences exchanged in the attorney-client relationship. The exception to the privilege set forth in section 958 simply acknowledges that, in litigation between lawyer and client, the client should not be able to use the privilege to bar otherwise relevant and admissible evidence which supports the lawyer’s claim, or undermines the client’s.
By contrast, the mediation confidentiality statutes do not create a “privilege” in favor of any particular person. (See, e.g., Wimsatt, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 137, 150, fn. 4; Eisendrath, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 351, 362-363; but see, e.g., Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1572, fn. 5 [referring to a “mediation privilege”].) Instead, they serve the public policy of encouraging the resolution of disputes by means short of litigation. The mediation confidentiality statutes govern only the narrow category of mediation-related communications, but they apply broadly within that category, and are designed to provide maximum protection for the privacy of communications in the mediation context. A principal purpose is to assure prospective participants that their interests will not be damaged, first, by attempting this alternative means of resolution, and then, once mediation is chosen, by making and communicating the candid disclosures and assessments that are most likely to produce a fair and reasonable mediation settlement. To assure this maximum privacy protection, the Legislature has specified that all mediation participants involved in a mediation-related communication must agree to its disclosure.
Neither the language nor the purpose of the mediation confidentiality statutes supports a conclusion that they are subject to an exception, similar to that provided for the attorney-client privilege, for lawsuits between attorney and client.[4] The instant Court of Appeal’s contrary conclusion is nothing more or less than a judicially crafted exception to the unambiguous language of the mediation confidentiality statutes in order to accommodate a competing policy concern — here, protection of a client’s right to sue his or her attorney. We and the Courts of Appeal have consistently disallowed such exceptions, even where the equities appeared to favor them.
Of particular interest in this regard is the Court of Appeal’s decision in Wimsatt. There, the court held that mediations briefs and attorney e-mails written and sent in connection with the mediation were protected from disclosure by the mediation confidentiality statutes, even when one of the mediation disputants sought these materials in support of his legal malpractice action against his own attorneys. Confirming that there is no “attorney malpractice” exception to mediation confidentiality, the Wimsatt court explained: “Our Supreme Court has clearly and [unequivocally] stated that we may not craft exceptions to mediation confidentiality. [Citation.] The Court has also stated that if an exception is to be made for legal misconduct, it is for the Legislature to do, and not the courts. [Citation.]” (Wimsatt, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 137, 163.) As the court in Wimsatt acknowledged, “[t]he stringent result we reach here means that when clients, such as [the malpractice plaintiff in that case], participate in mediation they are, in effect, relinquishing all claims for new and independent torts arising from mediation, including legal malpractice causes of action against their own counsel.” (Ibid.)
The instant Court of Appeal majority reasoned that Wimsatt’s facts were distinguishable, because there, communications between counsel for the disputants were at issue, whereas here, the communications sought occurred only between petitioner and his own counsel. However, as we have explained, the language of the mediation confidentiality statutes extends beyond the narrow circumstances at issue in Wimsatt; it plainly includes every oral or written communication by any person that occurs “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation.” (§ 1119, subds. (a), (b).) As Wimsatt correctly determined, that broad rule does not become inapplicable in cases where a client seeks disclosure of the confidential communication as evidence in a legal malpractice action against his or her attorneys.
A United States District Court case, Benesch v. Green (N.D.Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 4885215 (Benesch), more recent than the Court of Appeal decision in this case, supports our analysis even more closely than does Wimsatt. In Benesch, a mediation disputant sued her attorney, claiming counsel committed malpractice by inducing her, in the mediation, to sign an enforceable “Term Sheet” that failed to meet her aim of ensuring her daughter’s inheritance rights. Defendant attorney sought summary judgment, asserting that the client had no case without introducing evidence protected by the mediation confidentiality statutes, including “the legal advice that [counsel] gave to [the client], and the circumstances in which the Term Sheet was executed.” (Id., at p. *5.)
The district court denied summary judgment, ruling that it was not absolutely clear the mediation confidentiality statutes left the client without evidence sufficient to prove her case. Nonetheless, the court agreed that the multiple California cases construing the mediation confidentiality statutes, including Wimsatt, “generally support Defendant’s position” that mediation-related communications, including those only between client and counsel, are not subject to disclosure, even when this may inhibit a client’s claim that her lawyer committed malpractice. (Benesch, supra, 2009 WL 4885215, *5.)
In particular, Benesch criticized the instant Court of Appeal majority’s decision as at odds with section 1119, subdivision (a), contrary to the rule against implied exceptions to mediation confidentiality, and “in significant tension with the large majority of California appellate decisions” construing the mediation confidentiality statutes. (Benesch, supra, 2009 WL 4885215, *7.) As the district court observed, even if a private attorney-client conversation did not occur “in the course of” a mediation, this circumstance is not enough to exempt the communication from confidentiality, because the statutory “protections also encompass communications made ‘for the purpose of’ or ‘pursuant to’ mediation . . . .” (Ibid.) The latter phrases, the court explained, “must necessarily include statements that were not made in the course of the mediation itself, or those additional provisions would be superfluous.” (Ibid.)
As pertinent here, the Benesch court declared, “Communications between counsel and client that are materially related to the mediation, even if they are not made to another party or the mediator, are ‘for the purpose of’ or ‘pursuant to’ mediation.” (Benesch, supra, 2009 WL 4885215, *7.) Indeed, the court noted, if protected communications did not include those outside the mediation proceedings, it would be unnecessary and useless for section 1122, subdivision (a)(2) to provide that communications by and between fewer than all participants in a mediation may be disclosed if all such participants agree and “ ‘the communication . . . does not disclose anything said or done . . . in the course of mediation.’ ” (Benesch, supra, at p. *7.)
We agree with this analysis. We further emphasize that application of the mediation confidentiality statutes to legal malpractice actions does not implicate due process concerns so fundamental that they might warrant an exception on constitutional grounds. Implicit in our decisions in Foxgate, Rojas, Fair, and Simmons is the premise that the mere loss of evidence pertinent to the prosecution of a lawsuit for civil damages does not implicate such a fundamental interest.
The Court of Appeal in Wimsatt expressly reached this very conclusion. There, the trial court had found that the mediation briefs and e-mails sought by the legal malpractice plaintiff were subject to disclosure notwithstanding the mediation confidentiality statutes. The court had relied on Rinaker, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 155, which held that, under the circumstances of that case, the statutes governing mediation confidentiality were outweighed by juveniles’ constitutional right to obtain evidence crucial to their defense against allegations of criminal conduct.
However, in Wimsatt, the Court of Appeal rejected the analogy to Rinaker, explaining that “in Rinaker the information sought to be introduced was in delinquency proceedings where the minors were being charged with criminal activity. In Rinaker, the information to be elicited (admissions made by the victim) could have exonerated the minors. To deny the minors access to the information would have denied them their constitutionally protected rights. In contrast, the proceedings before us involve a civil legal malpractice action where money damages are sought. The present case is no different from the thousands of civil cases routinely resolved through mediation.” (Wimsatt, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 137, 162.)[5]
Finally, while we pass no judgment on the wisdom of the mediation confidentiality statutes, we cannot say that applying the plain terms of those statutes to the circumstances of this case produces a result that is either absurd or clearly contrary to legislative intent. The Legislature decided that the encouragement of mediation to resolve disputes requires broad protection for the confidentiality of communications exchanged in relation to that process, even where this protection may sometimes result in the unavailability of valuable civil evidence. To this end, the Legislature could further reasonably conclude that confidentiality should extend to “anything” said or written “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to” a mediation (§ 1119, subds. (a), (b)), including mediation-related discussions between a mediation disputant and his own counsel, subject only to express waiver by all mediation “participants” involved in the communication (§ 1122), including such attorneys.
Inclusion of private attorney-client discussions in the mediation confidentiality scheme addresses several issues about which the Legislature could rationally be concerned. At the outset, the Legislature might determine, such an inclusion gives maximum assurance that disclosure of an ancillary mediation-related communication will not, perhaps inadvertently, breach the confidentiality of the mediation proceedings themselves, to the damage of one of the mediation disputants.
Moreover, as real parties observe, the Legislature might reasonably believe that protecting attorney-client conversations in this context facilitates the use of mediation as a means of dispute resolution by allowing frank discussions between a mediation disputant and the disputant’s counsel about the strengths and weaknesses of the case, the progress of negotiations, and the terms of a fair settlement, without concern that the things said by either the client or the lawyers will become the subjects of later litigation against either. The Legislature also could rationally decide that it would not be fair to allow a client to support a malpractice claim with excerpts from private discussions with counsel concerning the mediation, while barring the attorneys from placing such discussions in context by citing communications within the mediation proceedings themselves.
We express no view about whether the statutory language, thus applied, ideally balances the competing concerns or represents the soundest public policy. Such is not our responsibility or our province. We simply conclude, as a matter of statutory construction, that application of the statutes’ plain terms to the circumstances of this case does not produce absurd results that are clearly contrary to the Legislature’s intent. Of course, the Legislature is free to reconsider whether the mediation confidentiality statutes should preclude the use of mediation-related attorney-client discussions to support a client’s civil claims of malpractice against his or her attorneys.
Finally, petitioner urges that application of the mediation confidentiality statutes to private attorney-client communications creates a difficult line-drawing problem because, when such discussions occur near the time of a mediation proceeding but in a broader litigation context, it may be “almost impossible” to determine whether the discussions were “exclusively” mediation related. But petitioner’s suggested alternative — that no private attorney-client communications, however closely related to a mediation, are covered by mediation confidentiality — ignores the plain language of the statutes. By their terms, “[n]o evidence of anything said,” and “[n]o writing . . . prepared” is subject to discovery or admission in evidence in any “civil action” if the utterance or writing was “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .” (§ 1119, subds. (a), (b), italics added.) The exclusion of all private attorney-client communications from that proviso would simply engraft an exception that does not appear in the mediation confidentiality statutes themselves.
Moreover, we need not decide in this case the precise parameters of the phrase “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation.” The communications the trial court excluded from discovery and evidence concerned the settlement strategy to be pursued at an immediately pending mediation. They were closely related to the mediation in time, context, and subject matter, and a number of them occurred during, and in direct pursuit of, the mediation proceeding itself. Petitioner raises no factual dispute about the relationship between the excluded communications, or any of them, and the mediation in which he was involved. There appears no basis to dispute that they were “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .” (§ 1119, subd. (a).)[6]
We therefore conclude that the evidence the trial court ruled nondiscoverable and inadmissible by reason of the mediation confidentiality statutes was not, as a matter of law, excluded from coverage by those statutes on the mere ground that they were private attorney-client communications which occurred outside the presence or hearing of the mediator or any other mediation participant. Instead, such attorney-client communications, like any other communications, were confidential, and therefore were neither discoverable nor admissible — even for purposes of proving a claim of legal malpractice — insofar as they were “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .” (§ 1119, subd. (a).) By holding otherwise, and thus overturning the trial court’s exclusionary order, the Court of Appeal erred. We must therefore reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:
KENNARD, Acting C.J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
GEORGE, J.*
_____________________________
* Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J.
I concur in the result, but reluctantly.
The court holds today that private communications between an attorney and a client related to mediation remain confidential even in a lawsuit between the two. This holding will effectively shield an attorney’s actions during mediation, including advising the client, from a malpractice action even if those actions are incompetent or even deceptive.[7] Attorneys participating in mediation will not be held accountable for any incompetent or fraudulent actions during that mediation unless the actions are so extreme as to engender a criminal prosecution against the attorney. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 28, fn. 11.) This is a high price to pay to preserve total confidentiality in the mediation process.
I greatly sympathize with the Court of Appeal majority’s attempt to interpret the statutory language as not mandating confidentiality in this situation. But, for the reasons the present majority gives, I do not believe the attempt quite succeeds.
Moreover, although we may sometimes depart from literal statutory language if a literal interpretation “would result in absurd consequences that the Legislature did not intend” (In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 606), I believe, just barely, that the result here does not so qualify. Plausible policies support a literal interpretation. Unlike the attorney-client privilege — which the client alone holds and may waive (Evid. Code, §§ 953, 954) — mediation confidentiality implicates interests beyond those of the client. Other participants in the mediation also have an interest in confidentiality. This interest may extend to private communications between the attorney and the client because those communications themselves will often disclose what others have said during the mediation. Additionally, as the majority notes, it might “not be fair to allow a client to support a malpractice claim with excerpts from private discussions with counsel concerning the mediation, while barring the attorneys from placing such discussions in context by citing communications within the mediation proceedings themselves.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that we have to give effect to the literal statutory language. But I am not completely satisfied that the Legislature has fully considered whether attorneys should be shielded from accountability in this way. There may be better ways to balance the competing interests than simply providing that an attorney’s statements during mediation may never be disclosed. For example, it may be appropriate to provide that communications during mediation may be used in a malpractice action between an attorney and a client to the extent they are relevant to that action, but they may not be used by anyone for any other purpose. Such a provision might sufficiently protect other participants in the mediation and also make attorneys accountable for their actions. But this court cannot so hold in the guise of interpreting statutes that contain no such provision. As the majority notes, the Legislature remains free to reconsider this question. It may well wish to do so.
This case does not present the question of what happens if every participant in the mediation except the attorney waives confidentiality. Could the attorney even then prevent disclosure so as to be immune from a malpractice action I can imagine no valid policy reason for the Legislature to shield attorneys even in that situation. I doubt greatly that one of the Legislature’s purposes in mandating confidentiality was to permit attorneys to commit malpractice without accountability. Interpreting the statute to require confidentiality even when everyone but the attorney has waived it might well result in absurd consequences that the Legislature did not intend. That question will have to await another case. But the Legislature might also want to consider this point.
CHIN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Cassel v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 179 Cal.App.4th 152
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S178914
Date Filed: January 13, 2011
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: William A. MacLaughlin
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys:
Makarem & Associates, Ronald W. Makarem, Peter M. Kunstler, Jamie R. Greene; Mink Law Firm and Lyle R. Mink for Petitioner.
Sauer & Wagner, Gerald L. Sauer and Laurie B. Hiller for John Porter and Deborah Blair as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, Peter Q. Ezzel, Nancy E. Lucas and Stephen M. Caine for Real Parties in Interest.
Robie & Matthai, Kyle Kveton and Steven Fleischman for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Ronald W. Makarem
Makarem & Associates
11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2440
Los Angeles, CA 90025-1760
(310) 312-0299
Gerald L. Sauer
Sauer & Wagner
1801 Century Park East, Suite 1150
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 712-8100
Peter Q. Ezzel
Haight Brown & Bonesteel
6080 Center Drive, Suite 800
Los Angeles, CA 90045-1574
(310) 215-7100
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[1] At oral argument, petitioner’s counsel stressed that section 1119, subdivision (a) prohibits the discovery or admission in evidence “of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .” (Italics added.) Counsel seemed to suggest the italicized phrase “or any admission made” effectively narrows the plain meaning of “anything said” by limiting protection to mediation-related oral communications that are in the nature of damaging admissions. We find no evidence to support this construction. Similar disjunctive language has existed in the statute since the 1985 adoption of section 1119, subdivision (a)’s predecessor, former section 1152.5, subdivision (a) (Stats. 1985, ch. 731, p. 2379), and appeared in the original version of the 1985 bill (see Assem. Bill No. 1030 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 27, 1985, p. 1 (Assembly Bill No. 1030)). Portions of the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1030 declare that the protective purpose extends, interchangeably, to “disclosures,” “information,” and “communications.” (Recommendation relating to Protection of Mediation Communications, 11 Cal. L. Revision Com. Rep. (1985) pp. 241, 247-248, Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1030 as amended Apr. 8, 1985, pp. 1, 2; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1030 as amended July 1, 1985, pp. 1-3.) However, petitioner cites no document from this history, and we have found none, that indicates the phrase “or any admission made” was intended, in particular, to limit the plain meaning of “anything said.” Nor does the history of the 1997 legislation that was enacted as the current statutes suggest any such significance. On the contrary, as previously noted, the California Law Revision Commission comment to section 1119, subdivision (a) emphasizes that this provision was intended to broaden the protection for mediation-related discussions by extending it beyond utterances “in the course” of a mediation to include “oral communications made for the purpose of or pursuant to a mediation.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3B West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1119, p. 391, italics added.) In this context, the phrase “anything said or any admission made” seems intended, at most, to indicate that the protection applies not only to damaging admissions conveyed by any means in the context of a mediation, but also, in an abundance of caution, to all other things “said . . . for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .” (§ 1119, subd. (a), italics added.)
[2] As real parties observe, Judicial Council rules governing minimum standards of conduct for civil mediators define a “ ‘[p]articipant’ ” in mediation as “any individual, entity, or group, other than the mediator taking part in a mediation, including but not limited to attorneys for the parties.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.852(3), italics added.) The rules further provide that prior to the first mediation session, the mediator must provide the participants with a general explanation of mediation confidentiality. (Id., rule 3.854(c).) Under the rules, the mediator is further required to give all participants advance warning if he or she intends to speak with one or more participants outside the other participants’ presence, and is prohibited from disclosing information revealed in confidence “unless authorized to do so by the participant or participants who revealed the information.” (Ibid.) We do not rely directly on the definition of “participant” in the Judicial Council rules, however, because the definitions therein provided “are applicable only to these rules of conduct and do not limit or expand mediation confidentiality under the Evidence Code or other law.” (Advisory Com. com., 23 pt. 1A West’s Ann. Codes Court Rules (2006 ed.) foll. rule 3.852, p. 424.)
[3] Petitioner urges that even if the attorneys who represent a mediation disputant are themselves “participants” in the mediation, they should not be deemed separate “participants” who may thus unilaterally block the discovery and admission in evidence of mediation-related attorney-client communications pertinent to the client’s suit against them for legal malpractice. But we see no basis to reach this construction of the statutory language. Section 1122, subdivision (a)(2) clearly requires that when a communication was prepared “by or on behalf of fewer than all participants, those participants” must expressly agree to disclosure of the communication. (Italics added.) Any mediation-related communications from WCCP attorneys to petitioner were prepared “by” those “participant” lawyers, who, under the statutory language, must therefore consent by statutory procedures to the disclosure of such communications.
Indeed, other provisions of the statute undermine petitioner’s contention that a mediation disputant’s participating lawyers are bound, as the disputant’s agents, by the disputant’s unilateral decision to waive confidentiality. Section 1115, subdivision (b) defines a “mediator” to include not only the neutral person who conducts a mediation, but also “any person designated by [the] mediator either to assist in the mediation or to communicate with the participants in preparation for [the] mediation.” In turn, section 1122, subdivision (b) provides that whenever a mediator expressly agrees to disclosure of an otherwise confidential communication, that agreement also binds the persons described in section 1115, subdivision (b). Insofar as the statutory scheme expressly defines one mediation participant (the mediator) to include his or her assisting agents, and explicitly binds those agents to the mediator’s disclosure decision, we may assume the statute does not implicitly extend similar treatment to the relationship between another mediation participant (a disputant) and the disputant’s participating counsel.
[4] Petitioner urges that if mediation confidentiality applies to private conversations between lawyer and client, insofar as they relate to a mediation, the attorneys get the best of both worlds when sued by a client for malpractice in connection with the mediation — i.e., the suit waives the attorney-client privilege, allowing the lawyers to present confidential communications favorable to them, but the mediation confidentiality statutes prevent the client from presenting evidence of such private discussions insofar as they are damaging to the attorneys. Petitioner overlooks that the mediation confidentiality statutes work both ways; they prevent either party to the malpractice suit from disclosing the content of their private mediation-related communications unless (1) the other agrees by the statutory means, and (2) the disclosure reveals nothing said or done in the mediation proceedings themselves.
[5] Indeed, by their plain terms, section 1119, subdivisions (a) and (b), protect mediation-related communications from disclosure and admissibility only in “arbitration[s], administrative adjudication[s], civil action[s] [and] other noncriminal proceeding[s] . . . .” (Italics added.) Thus, we note, these statutes would afford no protection to an attorney who is criminally prosecuted for fraud on the basis of mediation-related oral communications.
[6] Petitioner suggests private attorney-client communications cannot be covered by the mediation confidentiality statutes, because they are not part of the “mediation process.” In support of this contention, petitioner cites Saeta v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 261 for the proposition that the concept of “mediation” has limits. Saeta held that the mediation confidentiality statutes did not apply to the proceedings of a “termination review board” before which a discharged employee had a contractual entitlement to review of the termination decision. The board was composed of an employer representative, an employee representative, and a “neutral” third member, and was empowered to take evidence, then report to the employer’s home office its view whether the termination should be upheld. (Id. at p. 265.) Applying the premise that “[statutory] privileges are narrowly construed . . . because they operate to prevent the admission of relevant evidence” (id., at p. 272), the Saeta court observed that the board there at issue, which included party representatives, and whose function was to review and recommend, lacked two minimum elements of the “broad” definition of mediation — “a neutral mediator or group of mediators” and an “aim to facilitate a mutually acceptable result” by the parties’ voluntary agreement (id., at p. 271). Nothing in Saeta is inconsistent with what we conclude here. No party disputes that the proceeding of August 4, 2004, was a mediation, within the meaning of section 1115, to attempt to settle the VDO suit. The only question presented is whether certain attorney-client communications were “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to,” that mediation. (§ 1119, subd. (a).)
[7] I emphasize that I am not suggesting there was any malpractice or deception in this case. The merits of the underlying lawsuit are not before us and, after today’s ruling, might never come before any court. I am speaking in general.
