Cochran-McKinney v. County of Los Angeles

Filed 5/10/07 Cochran-McKinney v. County of Los Angeles CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Gary Brown and Gary Brown for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Pollak, Vida & Fisher; Daniel P. Barer; Monroy, Averbuck & Gysler, Jon Monroy and Jennifer E. Gysler for Defendants and Respondents.

____________________

Following her display of curious behavior on a military air force base, appellant Sheila Cochran-McKinney was detained for just more than 72 hours by respondent County of Los Angeles (County) pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code sections 5150[1]and 5250.[2] She later sued, under title 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983), the County and the individual medical personnel[3]who attended to her while she was detained. The trial court granted respondents motion for summary judgment, finding that the individual respondents had probable cause to detain, restrain, and administer drugs to appellant, and that the County does not have any policy, custom, or practice with respect to how the individuals handled appellants situation. Appellant challenges that order in the instant appeal.

After review, we conclude that the trial court properly awarded summary judgment to respondents. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Factual Background

Appellant moved to California in April 2002, and lived with a relative until June 19, 2002. At that time, her coworker, Will Killens (Killens) helped her obtain temporary housing accommodations at the MacArthur Air Force Base, until she could locate permanent housing for herself and her husband, who was planning to follow her to California.

On June 21, 2002, appellant drove her vehicle on the air force base for the first time. According to appellant, she became disoriented and sought help from air force base guards. In order to leave the roadway open to through traffic, appellant parked her vehicle upon a sidewalk, abutting a barricade. When guards approached her vehicle, the window on appellants car kept going up and down.[4] The guards became alarmed and questioned appellant as to how she gained access to the base. According to appellant, she explained that Killens had obtained a pass for her; she also showed a host of identification to the guards. According to respondents, appellant verbally threatened officers.[5]

Regardless of the reason, it is undisputed that air force base guards telephoned the Los Angeles Police Department, and a System Mental Assessment Response Team (SMART team) was dispatched to the scene. The SMART team was composed of an officer and Fesagaiga, a licensed clinician, certified by the Department of Mental Health as one who can apply for admission of a patient on an involuntary, 72-hour hold, at a designated facility, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. Fesagaiga was advised that appellant had been driving a vehicle on a pedestrian sidewalk and that she had verbally threatened police officers; she also was confused and disoriented. Fesagaigas own evaluation of appellant revealed that she was agitated, uncooperative, nonsensical, and unable to care for her own safety. Based upon Fesagaigas assessment and information given to him, Fesagaiga determined that there was probable cause to believe that appellant was a gravely disabled adult and a danger to others due to a mental disorder. Consequently, he completed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 application. Appellant was then taken to Harbor UCLA Medical Center.

Upon presentation to Harbor UCLA Medical Center by the SMART team, appellant was assessed by the staff at the Psychiatric Emergency Room, including Ditu (a nurse), Hinds (the attending physician), and Gurpreet Chopra (a resident). In her initial assessment notes, Ditu described appellant as agitated, overly sarcastic, verbally abusive to hospital staff, with rapid and loud speech, resistant to directions, and hostile.[6]

Later, Hinds noted that appellant had entered the nurses station and doctors area, speaking loudly and yelling. Fifteen minutes later, Ditu noted that appellant had verbally and physically threatened staff, and attempted to scratch people with her fingernails. Efforts to deescalate appellants behavior were unsuccessful, prompting Hinds to make orders for behavioral restraints and medication. Shortly thereafter, appellant was placed in four point restraints; medications (to improve appellants psychosis, to improve her thinking so that it was not disorganized, to decrease her agitation, and to sedate her) were administered to appellant by intramuscular injection.

Chopra then conducted a mental status examination.

Following the assessment and examination of appellant, Hinds determined that appellant met the Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold criteria for danger to others and grave disability due to a mental disorder. Appellant was admitted to Harbor UCLA Medical Center for further assessment and treatment.

Appellant was evaluated and assessed the following day by Tan, a senior resident. After Tan reviewed appellants medical chart, he attempted to interview her; his efforts failed as appellant met him with yelling and hostility.[7] Later in the day, appellant was more cooperative, and Tan was able to interview her. She informed Tan that she had recently moved to California, and that she had been residing with her husbands relative, but she moved out when the relative started turning on her, treating her badly; she felt like the relatives wanted to do her harm. Based upon this information, as well as his mental status examination, brief physical examination, and neurological examination of appellant, Tan determined that appellant met the criteria of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 and continued the hold order.

On June 24, 2002, appellant was evaluated by Chung, the attending physician who had assumed appellants care. After her review of appellants chart and her evaluation of appellant, Chung determined that appellant was gravely disabled due to a mental illness and needed to be held for psychiatric treatment. Accordingly, at 11:20 a.m., Chung and/or Hoang, a resident under Chungs supervision, made a physician order to notify the Mental Health Court that appellant was being placed on a 14-day hold, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5250.

Throughout that day, appellant was evaluated by Chung and Hoang. Hoang even spoke with appellants husband, who verified that he was joining appellant in California on July 4, 2002. Also, a plan for appellants self-care was developed; she had a place to stay, she had a job, and she had sufficient funds to pay for her room and board. By approximately 4:30 p.m., Chung opined that appellant no longer met the hold criteria for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 5250 hold and discharged appellant, providing her with outpatient referrals and a prescription.

Appellants chart indicates that all of her personal belongings were returned to her.

Procedural Background

On June 17, 2003, appellant filed the instant action against the County.[8] Although the complaint alleges a single cause of action for violation of civil rights, the complaint is based upon three distinct acts of purported wrongdoing: involuntary hospitalization, forced administration of medication, and the taking of a gold bracelet. Respondents answered.

On October 29, 2004, respondents filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication of appellants individual claims. They argued that Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5150 and 5250 are constitutional, and that respondents followed state law and complied with constitutional safeguards in connection with their restraint of appellant. As for appellants bracelet, respondents asserted that the loss of her personal property does not rise to the level of a constitutional tort. Finally, respondents averred that they were protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Appellant opposed respondents motion, arguing that the Countys training program regarding the detention of allegedly dangerous or gravely disabled persons is infirm and that respondents improperly restrained appellant, and that respondents unnecessarily administered antipsychotic drugs to appellant.

On August 31, 2005, the trial court granted respondents motion for summary judgment. After summarizing the allegations of appellants complaint and the parties opposing legal arguments, the trial court set forth the applicable law. It then considered each argument as it pertained to each respondent, finding no triable issue of material fact and that respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Judgment was entered, and this timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Appellants complaint sets forth a single cause of action for violation of civil rights against all defendants. That cause of action contains three separate claims: involuntary hospitalization, of being restrained and medicated against her will, and loss of property. Because these claims, albeit captioned under a single cause of action, actually embody three separate claims against different defendants, we can consider each claim separately. (Skrbina v. Fleming Companies (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364 [plaintiff who alleges defendants single wrongful act invaded two different rights has stated two causes of action even though pleaded in a single count of the complaint]; Mathieu v. Norrell Corp. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1188; Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848, 18541855.)

Ordinarily, we review a trial courts order granting summary judgment de novo. (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) However, as set forth below, the standard of review is not as straightforward in section 1983 actions.

II. Appellants Claim against the County

Appellant asserts a claim for violation of her civil rights, pursuant to section 1983, against the County. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. Certainly, confinement in a mental hospital constitutes a deprivation of liberty, and a plaintiff may pursue a section 1983 claim if he or she is wrongfully detained in such a facility. (Zinermon v. Burch (1990) 494 U.S. 113, 131.)

There is no vicarious liability or respondeat superior liability under section 1983. (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 691 (Monell); Meehan v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1988) 856 F.2d 102, 106.) Thus, the County is not liable for any individuals allegedly wrongful conduct; the County only is liable to appellant by establishing that County employees violated her constitutional rights by executing a formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom constituting the Countys standard operating procedure, and by proving that that policy, practice, or custom was the moving force behind the alleged violation of her rights. (Monell, supra, at pp. 690691; Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 349.)

Appellants civil rights claim is based upon the theory that the County improperly trains and supervises its employees. Under Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 387 (Harris), there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a failure to train can be the basis for liability under [section] 1983. Only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the employee will come into contactand reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by the municipalitycan such a shortcoming be a policy or custom that is actionable under section 1983. (Canton v. Harris, supra, at pp. 388389.)

And, importantly, the plaintiff must prove that an employee violated his or her constitutional rights based upon the inadequate training. If no employee violated the plaintiffs rights, the municipality cannot be liable. (Los Angeles v. Heller (1986) 475 U.S. 796, 799.)

Here, there is no evidence that the County violated appellants civil rights. There is no evidence whatsoever of any inadequate training or supervision. Absent evidence of this essential element of appellants claim, the County is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subds. (o)(1), (p)(2).)

Appellant attempts to support her claim by directing us to the Countys study guide, the booklet that highlights legal issues relevant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 holds. She contends that the study guide sets forth improper standards for determining probable cause. She is mistaken. The study guide cites People v. Triplett (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 283, and defines probable cause in accordance with that seminal case. Moreover, appellants challenge to the use of the word bizarre in the study guide lacks merit. In People v. Triplett, supra, at page 288, the Court of Appeal noted that a mental disorder might be exhibited if a persons thought processes, as evidenced by words or actions or emotional affect, are bizarre or inappropriate for the circumstances. Thus, the fact that the booklet provides that some evidence of bizarre or inappropriate thought processes is required to initiate a 72-hour hold does not support appellants assertion that the County improperly trains its personnel on the requirements of such a hold.

In her opening brief, appellant identifies several Harbor UCLA internal policies that she contends respondents did not follow. Other than claiming that respondents did not adhere to those policies, appellant argues nothing else. She offers no legal authority or argument as to why respondents violated appellants civil rights by failing to comply with these policies. She does not argue that the County has a policy or custom of ignoring its policies. She does not even identify which respondents allegedly committed the acts of wrongdoing. Absent the citation of legal authority and the presentation of adequate legal argument, any claim based upon the violation of internal policies, to the extent one exists, has been waived. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19; In re David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1661; Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6 [Although our review of a summary judgment is de novo, it is limited to issues which have been adequately raised and supported in [appellants] brief].)

III. Appellants Claims against the Individual Respondents

As set forth above, there is no vicarious liability or respondeat superior liability under section 1983. It follows that no individual defendant can be liable for the acts of any other party or nonparty, unless that defendant acted affirmatively, participated in the others affirmative acts, or omitted to perform an act that he was legally required to do; the act or omission must have caused the deprivation of appellants constitutional rights. (Leer v. Murphy (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 628, 633.) We therefore look at each individual defendants allegedly wrongful acts or omissions separately.

A. Legal Principles Governing Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff seeking to recover from a government official under section 1983 must show that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right. (Saucier v. Katz (2001) 533 U.S. 194, 201 (Saucier); see also Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 840 (Venegas).) Otherwise, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields the official[9]from civil liability if that official could reasonably have believed that his or her actions were lawful. (Saucier, supra, at p. 201; Venegas, supra, at p. 840.)

In Saucier, the United States Supreme Court held, in a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, that the threshold question in ruling on the qualified immunity defense must be whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the officers conduct violated a constitutional right. (Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 201.) If no constitutional right has been violated, then the inquiry ends, and the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. (Ibid.; see also Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 144.)

If, however, a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties submissions, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. (Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 201.) The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. [Citation.] (Id. at p. 202; Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 840.) This issue presents a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. (Elder v. Holloway (1994) 510 U.S. 510, 516.)

If the constitutional right was clearly established, we turn to the next inquiry: whether the employee made a reasonable mistake. (Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at pp. 205206.) Saucier confirmed that, despite a possible Fourth Amendment violation, officers still must be granted immunity for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions. [Citation.] (Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 840; see also Saucier, at p. 208 [The question is what the officer reasonably understood his powers and responsibilities to be, when he acted, under clearly established standards].) Reasonableness must be judged from the on-scene perspective, not with 20/20 hindsight. (Saucier, supra, at p. 205; see also Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 396.) Whether the employees mistake was reasonable is a question of law, which we review de novo. (Hunter v. Bryant (1991) 502 U.S. 224, 228.)

B. Appellants Claim Against Fesagaiga

Although unclear from her complaint, it appears that appellant asserts that Fesagaiga violated her civil rights by detaining her under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. Undisputed evidence confirms that Fesagaiga properly was awarded summary judgment.

Based upon information provided to him by the base guards and the Los Angeles Police Department, as well as based upon his own observations of appellant, Fesagaiga determined that appellant met the criteria for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold. It is undisputed that appellant was driving on the air force base, lost and confused, and drove onto a sidewalk near a guard kiosk. Her car window went up and down repeatedly. She yelled and was upset. Moreover, military base guards told Fesagaiga that appellant had threatened to kill police officers.

These undisputed facts establish that the information Fesagaiga had would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or to entertain a strong suspicion, that appellant suffered a mental disorder and was a danger to herself or gravely disabled. (People v. Triplett, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at pp. 287288.) In other words, he had probable cause to detain appellant.

As noted above, appellant largely denies the allegations of wrongdoing and/or attempts to offer innocent explanations for her conduct. Appellants subjective reasons and excuses for her behavior are irrelevant for purposes of probable cause. Fesagaiga was permitted to rely upon appellants behavior, words, and emotional affect in determining whether she met the criteria for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold. And, appellants denial of the information that the Los Angeles Police Department and the military base guards relayed to Fesagaiga is irrelevant. Fesagaiga was allowed to rely upon the information provided to him by the police and the military base guards. (Giannis v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 219, 223224.)

Even if Fesagaiga did not have probable cause to detain appellant, he nevertheless is entitled to judgment pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity. Based upon his observations and the information he was given, summarized above, Fesagaiga reasonably determined appellant was a danger to others or gravely disabled.

C. Appellants Claim Against Hinds, Ditu, Tan, Hoang, and Chung

Appellant asserts a claim against the medical personnel who attended to her while she was at Harbor UCLA Medical Center. That claim centers upon her involuntary hospitalization, the use of physical restraints, and the forced administration of drugs.

As set forth above, the Harbor UCLA medical staff had sufficient reason to restrain and administer medications to appellant. When she was presented to the emergency room, appellant was anxious, angry, uncooperative, verbally abusive, and combative. She physically threatened others. Only when attempts to deescalate appellants behavior proved unsuccessful did Hinds make orders for physical restraints and the administration of medication. Under these circumstances, the Harbor UCLA medical staff had probable cause to restrain appellant and administer medications to her.

In her opposition to respondents motion for summary judgment, appellant attempted to create a triable issue of material fact by denying that she engaged in inappropriate behavior and by denying that she was examined by medical staff at the time the Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold was ordered. Her efforts fail. Although appellant claims that she did nothing wrong and that the doctors and nurses fabricated evidence of their examinations of her, she also concedes that her memory was blank until June 21, 2002, a day after her detention. Her inability to recollect the events on June 20, 2002, defeats her efforts to create a triable issue of fact by denying the allegedly inappropriate conduct. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 525.)

For the same reasons set forth above, to the extent appellant contends that individual respondents violated particular Harbor UCLA internal policies, she does not adequately support or argue this theory of liability.

IV. Appellants Missing Bracelet

Appellant alleges in her complaint, and contends in her opening brief, that she was wearing an expensive bracelet at the time of her detention and that the bracelet was never returned to her. However, she offers no legal argument whatsoever to support her apparent theory that the alleged taking of this piece of personal property amounts to a violation of her civil rights. Absent the citation of legal authority, this claim has been waived. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1050; People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 214, fn. 19; In re David L., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1661; Reyes v. Kosha, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 466, fn. 6.)

DISPOSITION

The order and judgment of the trial court are affirmed. Respondents are entitled to costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

_____________________, Acting P. J.

DOI TODD

_____________________, J.

CHAVEZ

Publication Courtesy of California free legal resources.

Analysis and review provided by Spring Valley Property line Lawyers.

[1] Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 provides, in relevant part: When any person, as a result of a mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer, member of the attending staff, as defined by regulation, of an evaluation facility designated by the county, designated members of a mobile crisis team provided by Section 5651.7, or other professional person designated by the county may, upon probable cause, take or cause to be taken, the person into custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county and approved by the State Department of Mental Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation. [] Such facility shall require an application in writing stating the circumstances under which the persons condition was called to the attention of the officer, member of the attending staff, or professional person, and stating that the officer, member of the attending staff, or professional person has probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result of a mental disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled.

[2] Welfare and Institutions Code section 5250 provides, in relevant part: If a person is detained for 72 hours . . . and has received an evaluation, he or she may be certified for not more than 14 days of intensive treatment related to the mental disorder . . . under the following conditions: [] (a) The professional staff of the agency or facility providing evaluation services has analyzed the persons condition and has found the person is, as a result of mental disorder . . . a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled.

[3] The individuals include respondents Benjamin N. Fesagaiga (Fesagaiga), Stuart Hinds (Hinds), Eugenia Ditu (Ditu), Anthony Tan (Tan), Robert Hoang (Hoang), and Julia Chung (Chung). They sometimes are referred to as the individual respondents.

[4] According to appellant, she accidentally activated the electric window button, causing the window to move up and down.

[5] Appellant denies the accusation that she verbally threatened the officers.

[6] Appellant purports to deny these descriptions through her explanation that she was very annoyed that she was wrongfully detained and because no one would listen to her.

[7] Appellant denies that she ever met with Tan.

[8] She later added Chung, Ditu, Hoang, Tan, and Fesagaiga as Doe defendants. Although the appellate record does not indicate when Hinds was added as a defendant, he was a moving defendant in respondents motion for summary judgment, and no one contests that he was properly named and served in this action.

[9] The protection afforded by qualified immunity applies to only individuals, and not to the County. (See Owen v. City of Independence (1980) 445 U.S. 622, 656.)