Collins v. Dept. of Parks and Recreation

Filed 9/27/06 Collins v. Dept. of Parks and Recreation CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Terry B. Friedman, Judge. Affirmed.

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Harris & Ruble, Alan Harris and David Zelinski for Plaintiffs and Appellants Craig Collins, Jinyou Collins, Andrew Copeland, Jeannie Copeland, Ginger Kershner, and Christopher Murray.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Tom Greene, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht and Gary Tavetian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

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Craig and Jinyou Collins, Andrew and Jeannie Copeland, Ginger Kershner, and Christopher Murray (plaintiffs) rented houses in Topanga Canyon owned by the State of California, Department of Parks and Recreation. When the Department decided to expand a nearby state park by converting the area in which the houses were located to parkland, it offered plaintiffs statutorily-required relocation expenses. (Gov. Code, § 7260 et seq.; Health & Saf. Code, § 50460; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 25, § 6000 et seq.; all further undesignated section references are to the Cal. Code Regs.) Plaintiffs filed administrative challenges seeking higher relocation payments. After contested hearings an administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded some of the plaintiffs greater amounts than, and some others the same amounts as, the Department’s original offers. Plaintiffs then filed administrative mandamus petitions in the trial court challenging the awards. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The court denied the petitions and entered judgment for the Department.

Plaintiffs appeal, contending that the court erred because (I) as to each house, the Department based its initial relocation expense calculation on rent comparisons with only one, rather than the required three, “comparable dwellings;” and (II) the awards should have been increased to reflect appreciation in the real estate market from the filing of the original administrative challenges to the date the ALJ entered the awards.

We reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.^[1]

FACTS

In 2001, the Department conducted two housing surveys to evaluate the relocation needs of the renters who would be dislocated by the conversion of the area to parkland, met with the affected residents, and searched for comparable housing which the residents could rent. The governing regulations require that displaced residents be offered relocation benefits covering 42 months of rent in comparable replacement housing up to a maximum of $5,250 per household, unless comparable replacement housing cannot be found for that amount, in which case the residents must be offered an amount to compensate them for the increased rent for comparable housing. (§§ 6104, 6122-6139.) Plaintiffs then were paying monthly rents ranging from $652 to $1,050 for houses containing from 1,591 to 1,978 square feet and from 9 to 12 rooms. Beginning in February 2002, the Department initially offered plaintiffs relocation benefits ranging from $142,212 to $182,616, based on a comparison of each home with one comparable replacement house which ranged in monthly rent from $4,200 to $5,200 and contained from 1,900 to 3,000 square feet and from 9.5 to 12 rooms. Within a few months, the Department presented plaintiffs with information regarding from two to nine additional referral homes with rentals, square footage, and number of rooms comparable to or greater than the original comparable replacement houses.

Plaintiffs filed grievances challenging the offered relocation payments. After contested hearings at which the ALJ considered all the comparable units provided by the Department, the ALJ increased the two lower payments and kept the highest payment the same, entering awards for amounts ranging from $161,700 to $182,616. Plaintiffs then filed these petitions for administrative mandamus, challenging the awards. The court denied the petitions and entered judgment for the Department.

DISCUSSION

I. The Awards Were Based on Comparisons With at Least Three Comparable Dwellings.

Plaintiffs contend the court erred in denying their petitions because the applicable regulations required that the Department calculate its original relocation expense figure using three rather than one comparable dwellings. Plaintiffs argue that although the Department later gave each plaintiff at least two additional comparable referrals, doing so did not satisfy the requirement because the Department did not consider the additional dwellings in making its initial calculation. In support of their position, plaintiffs point out that at an earlier time the Department argued that as renters they were not entitled to have their calculations based on three comparable dwellings. Plaintiffs do not claim that any of the houses the Department identified as comparable dwellings were not so, nor do they challenge the computation of the amounts awarded by the ALJ.

When a trial court reviews an agency’s administrative decision in ruling on an administrative mandamus petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, it applies either the independent judgment or substantial evidence test depending on the decision being reviewed. Even where the trial court exercises its independent judgment it must give a strong presumption of correctness to the agency’s decision and assign to petitioner the burden of proving the administrative decision incorrect. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 808, 817.) Regardless of which test governs the trial court’s decision, “the standard of review on appeal of the trial court’s determination is the substantial evidence test. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 824.) If the facts are uncontradicted and not susceptible to opposing inferences, however, the appellate court independently reviews the ruling. (Lozano v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 749, 754.)

Here, it is undisputed that the Department based its original calculation of relocation expenses for each rented house on one comparable dwelling, but within a few months submitted to the renters information regarding at least two additional comparable dwellings for each house. It also is undisputed that, despite the Department’s argument that only one comparable dwelling need be considered, the ALJ considered those additional comparable dwellings in determining the award for each rented house. Thus, each plaintiff’s award was based on a comparison with at least three comparable dwellings. Because the ALJ corrected any error by the Department in initially calculating plaintiffs’ relocation expense based on one comparable dwelling by considering all comparable dwellings, plaintiffs suffered no prejudice. Thus the court did not err in confirming the ALJ’s awards.^[2]

II. Plaintiffs Failed to Present Evidence of Appreciation in the Relevant Housing Market.

Plaintiffs contend that the ALJ should have increased their awards to reflect appreciation in the real estate market between 2002, when the Department made its initial calculation of relocation benefits, and 2004 when the ALJ entered their awards. They rely on a regulation that requires the Department, in calculating relocation benefits, to update rental costs to within three months of the date of rental of the replacement housing. The Department responds that that regulation is inapplicable because plaintiffs continued to live in the Department-owned houses at the same rents during the grievance process, and because another regulation prohibited it from submitting adjusted figures while a grievance was pending. The parties also make competing policy arguments about why including such an appreciation adjustment would be good or bad policy and would encourage or discourage gamesmanship by displaced renters or public agencies.

We need not, however, address these competing arguments. Without contradiction from plaintiffs, the Department points out that plaintiffs presented no evidence of 2004 rental prices of comparable dwellings at the administrative hearing and do not claim that they were prevented from doing so. Thus, there was no evidence to support a higher award. The mere fact that the general real estate market may have appreciated from 2002 to 2004 alone could not support an increase in the awards, which could be justified only by evidence of specific appreciation in rentals for comparable houses in that particular area during the relevant two years. Thus, we reject this contention.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The Department is entitled to its costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, J.

We concur:

MALLANO, Acting P.J.

VOGEL, J.

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^[1] Plaintiffs were part of a group of people renting houses from the Department located in the area to be converted to parkland. Some of the other renters also filed administrative grievances challenging the Department’s calculation of relocation expenses. A smaller group, including plaintiffs, filed administrative mandamus petitions challenging the amounts awarded by the ALJ, all of which were consolidated under a single trial court case number. The trial court denied the petitions. Although all the renters who filed administrative mandamus petitions joined in the notice of appeal, only the named plaintiffs chose to pursue the appeal.

In its response brief, the Attorney General did not address the facts concerning the Copelands’ grievance. Since the issues are common to all the plaintiffs and result in the same conclusions, however, we do not interpret the Attorney General’s omission as a concession regarding the Copelands’ appeal.

^[2] Without contradiction from plaintiffs, the Department argues that the regulations require a comparison with three comparable dwellings only if possible, and that plaintiffs’ rented houses were priced so far below current rental values and were so unusual in their ratio of rooms to square footage that the Department acted within the regulations in initially using only one comparable dwelling, and likewise did so by quickly supplying additional larger and more expensive comparable listings. Because of our conclusion, we need not address these arguments.