Filed 3/3/22 Conrad D. v. Dana D. CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

Conrad D., appearing in propria persona, appeals an order renewing a domestic violence restraining order protecting his ex-wife Dana D.[1] under Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a).[2] Conrad, who was represented by counsel in the trial court, contends that the trial court improperly limited his ability to present witnesses and demonstrated an impermissible bias towards his attorney at the hearing. We find no error and affirm the order.

Background

In July 2019, Dana obtained a one-year domestic violence restraining against Conrad. The order was based on the trial court’s finding that Conrad “financially isolated” Dana during their marriage causing her to feel “an unease at her ability to leave the marriage,” and on one occasion in May 2019, he barricaded her from their home in an attempt to intimidate and control her. The court found that Conrad “engaged in events of controlling behavior that would leave [Dana] to feel she is unsafe, and her sense of peace and tranquility has been disturbed by [Conrad].”

Prior to the expiration of that order, Dana filed a request to extend the restraining order for an additional five years. At the hearing on her request, Dana offered testimony that while still living together, she found letters and other documents suggesting that Conrad had previously harassed a prior ex-girlfriend after they broke up. That ex-girlfriend testified at the hearing that she and Conrad dated briefly in 2010 or 2011. After they broke up, Conrad contacted her “a lot in the beginning” about money he believed she owed him and then “he just stopped doing it.” She described Conrad’s conduct as “borderline” harassment. She explained that “he constantly for, like three, maybe four years would send [her] letters and [they] would come in weird ways. He would send them from other stationary — from like businesses. It was just bizarre.” The letters would include “a breakdown of every little thing that he thought I still owed him financially.” At the time of the hearing, it had been several years since she had heard from Conrad.

The trial court issued an order extending the restraining order for an additional five years.[3] The court concluded that Conrad’s conduct towards his ex-girlfriend “provides an objectively reasonable basis for [Dana’s] fear of reasonable apprehension of future abuse” by Conrad. Conrad timely filed a notice of appeal.[4]

Discussion

The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (§ 6200 et seq.) “permits the trial court to issue a protective order ‘to restrain any person for the purpose’ of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved; the petitioner must present ‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’ ” (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820.) Abuse is “not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) As relevant here, it may include “disturbing the peace of the other party” by, among other things, “solating the other party from friends, relatives, or other sources of support” and “[c]ontrolling, regulating, or monitoring the other party’s . . . finances [and] economic resources.” (§§ 6203, subd. (a)(4), 6320, subd. (c)(1) & (c)(3).)

Upon the request of a party, the court may renew a domestic violence restraining order permanently or for a period of five years. (§ 6345, subd. (a).) To obtain a renewal, a protected party need not establish that there has been “further abuse since the issuance of the original order.” ([i]Ibid.) Rather, the party must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she has a “ ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future abuse.” (Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.) “[T]his does not mean the court must find it is more likely than not future abuse will occur if the protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.” (Ibid.)

Conrad does not challenge the trial court’s finding that Dana had reasonable apprehension of future abuse sufficient to support renewal of the restraining order. Accordingly, we offer no opinion on the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this regard. Nor could we, given the record before us, containing neither the original restraining order nor Dana’s declarations.

Conrad contends, however, that the trial court violated his due process rights by imposing an arbitrary time-limit on the hearing. He argues that because of the court’s insistence that the hearing end by noon, only two of the six witnesses he intended to call were able to testify and his attorney was unable to address all of the allegations Dana had made against him.

Trial courts, however, “retain great power to prevent civil trials from taking more time than necessary” in order to avoid “wasting public resources on the back end (too much time) rather than the front (via a mistrial).” (Blumenthal v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 672, 683.) Our review of the record indicates that the trial court acted well within the bounds of reason in limiting the duration of the hearing.

At the outset of the hearing, Conrad’s attorney indicated that she intended to call Conrad and five additional witnesses. Conrad and two of his witnesses testified. Following testimony by Dana, Conrad and Conrad’s neighbor, the court stated, “It’s 11:27. We need to be done . . . [and] you need to give me time to also render a decision.” The court then added, “In terms of the reasonable apprehension of future abuse . . . in terms of the [restraining order] renewal, you should focus on the allegations with respect to [the ex-girlfriend,] and if you have her as a witness, why don’t we jump to that.” After the ex-girlfriend testified, Conrad’s attorney briefly recalled Dana, before indicating that she had no additional witnesses and would like to make a quick closing argument. Throughout the hearing, the trial court repeatedly made clear that the critical allegation regarding renewal of the restraining order was the allegation that Conrad harassed his ex-girlfriend following their break up. Nothing in the record suggests that Conrad was unable to challenge that allegation fully. Conrad did not request permission to call additional witnesses nor does he explain how testimony by any other witness would have been relevant to this issue.

Conrad also suggests that the judge displayed an “implicit bias” towards his attorney. We disagree. What Conrad perceives as bias was no more than reasonable courtroom management. For example, during the course of Dana’s testimony, the court cautioned Conrad’s attorney that she had “used [her] time very inefficiently trying to nitpick [Dana’s] credibility on very marginal issues.” After permitting a few more minutes of cross examination, the court terminated Dana’s testimony. The court explained that counsel had been questioning Dana for over an hour and again noted that she was not using her time efficiently. The court added that “some of the questions were excessively nit-picking of a pro per” and indicated that the court has an interest in protecting Dana, as a victim of domestic violence, “from excessive interrogation.” The court’s attempts to focus counsel on the relevant issues and limit questioning on marginal issues does not reflect bias; in any event, the limitations were not prejudicial.

Accordingly, we find no prejudicial error and shall affirm the order renewing the restraining order.

Disposition

The order is affirmed.

POLLAK, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.

BROWN, J.

[1] Dana has not filed a respondent’s brief or otherwise appeared in these appellate proceedings.

[2] All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise noted. We refer to the parties by their first names to protect the identities of the litigants in this domestic violence proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1).)

[3] The court’s order also addresses Conrad’s request for modification of the prior custody and visitation order, which was heard at the same time as the request to extend the restraining order. Conrad does not challenge the custody and visitation order on appeal.

[4] Conrad has provided a barely adequate record on appeal. Notably, he failed to designate a clerk’s transcript or submit an appendix containing the original restraining order. In addition, his opening brief fails to provide required citations to the record or appropriate legal authority. Nonetheless, we have attempted to address Conrad’s arguments on the merits as we understand them.