Filed 5/31/22 Conservatorship of D.W. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Conservatorship of the Person of D.W. | H048658 (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 19MH00102)
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SANTA CRUZ COUNTY PUBLIC GUARDIAN,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
D.W.,
Objector and Appellant.
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D.W. appeals from an order reappointing the Santa Cruz County Public Guardian as conservator of his person under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350 et seq.)[1] after the trial court found him to be gravely disabled as defined under section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(B).
While his appeal was pending, D.W.’s conservatorship expired. Having considered the parties’ supplemental briefing on whether the appeal is now moot, we dismiss the appeal.
- BACKGROUND
During the pendency of a felony prosecution for a June 2017 assault, D.W. was conserved under section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(B) (commonly known as a Murphy conservatorship). In October 2020, as D.W.’s latest conservatorship term was set to expire, the public guardian filed a petition seeking to be reappointed as conservator of D.W.’s person on the basis that D.W. remained gravely disabled under the LPS Act.
D.W. waived his right to a jury trial on the public guardian’s petition. In December 2020, the parties proceeded to a court trial but submitted on the admission into evidence of reports by two court-appointed psychologists and on the arguments of counsel. The trial court granted the petition, finding that D.W. was gravely disabled within the meaning of section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(B). The trial court’s written order specified that the conservatorship term would expire November 6, 2021.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, D.W. argues that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding of grave disability and that he was entitled to a less restrictive placement. We do not reach the merits of his claims because his appeal became moot when his conservatorship ended, prior to D.W.’s filing of his reply brief.
D.W. in a supplemental brief acknowledges that we “may” be unable to grant him effective relief and that his appeal “may” therefore be moot. D.W. does not address the effect of the conservatorship’s expiration but represents that he was committed to jail on new felony charges on February 20, 2022, superseding his LPS placement in the community.[2] The Attorney General argues that the matter should be dismissed on the ground that D.W.’s conservatorship expired by operation of law.[3]
Whether or not D.W. is in law enforcement custody, the expiration of the conservatorship he had asked us to review deprives us of the ability to provide him with effectual relief. (See § 5361 [Murphy conservatorship automatically terminates one year after appointment of the conservator]; Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574 [cases are moot if reviewing court cannot grant effective relief].) The appeal is therefore moot.
We have discretion to overlook the expiration of the conservatorship and decide the appeal on the merits. (See Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 161, fn. 2.) “Even if a conservatorship terminates prior to appellate review, the appeal is not moot if it raises issues that are capable of repetition yet avoiding review. [Citation.] In addition, the continuing stigma of wrongful commitment which continues even after the commitment has ceased, is grounds for entertaining an appeal.” (Conservatorship of Carol K. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 123, 133.) It may also be appropriate to decide a moot case on the merits when it is a question of general public interest that is likely to reappear in the future. (Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645,647, fn. 1.)
D.W., however, does not argue that any of these exceptions to mootness apply, and we conclude that none of them are applicable, given the particular claims he had raised on appeal.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
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LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________
GREENWOOD, P.J.
_________________________________
GROVER, J.
Santa Cruz Public Guardian v. D.W.
H048658
[1] Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
[2] In an exhibit attached to the Attorney General’s Supplemental brief, the district attorney who represented the public guardian in the proceedings below case stated in an email that D.W. was presently facing “fresh felony charges.”
[3] The Attorney General further represented that the public guardian had taken no action to seek further reappointment, a representation which D.W. has not disputed.