Filed 11/29/18 Conservatorship of James V. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kings County. James T. LaPorte, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Kings Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)

Linda J. Zachritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.

Colleen Carlson, County Counsel, Risé A. Donlon, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.

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Appellant James V. appeals from a jury verdict and subsequent order finding he is gravely disabled due to a mental disorder and reappointing a conservator under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5355. Appellant contends the record lacks substantial evidence to support one aspect of the conservatorship order, that appellant “shall not have the right to refuse medical treatment that is not related to his grave disability but is necessary for the treatment of an existing or continuing medical condition.” For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

factUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant has been subject to an annual conservatorship since at least 2013. In August 2017, the Public Guardian of the County of Kings petitioned to renew the conservatorship on allegations appellant is gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder. The declaration submitted with the petition alleged appellant was schizophrenic, unwilling to accept treatment voluntarily, and unable to provide for his personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter due to active delusions interfering with his judgment and daily living, gross denial of his illness, and poor judgment. The petition requested, among other things, the power to consent to treatment related to appellant’s disability as well as the power to consent to medical treatment necessary for the treatment of existing or continuing medical conditions not related to appellant’s disability on the assertion appellant is not able to participate in treatment decisions by means of a rational thought process.

Appellant requested and received a jury trial on the petition. Appellant testified at his trial. In his testimony, despite several digressions related to his perception of the environment around him, his medication, or his medical history, appellant admitted to having a mental illness and to recognizing the need for treatment. He stated his belief that he needed cognitive behavior therapy and hypnotherapy and discussed his view of his need for medication. In the course of his testimony, appellant shared his perspective on the people he is housed with, problems he has had with staff, including his belief a staff member had been stealing his clothing, an injury he alleged arose because he was shot with a pellet gun or small firearm, and his belief he was in a helicopter accident and had served in some capacity in the military with his father near Midway Island. Appellant testified he was capable of taking care of himself, finding a place to sleep or live, making his own food, and washing his own clothing.

Dr. Murray Weiss also testified as an expert witness about appellant’s condition. Dr. Weiss provided his expert opinion that appellant does, in fact, suffer from undifferentiated schizophrenia. Dr. Weiss opined that symptoms of appellant’s mental illness were apparent during his testimony, such as the delusional beliefs he had been shot in the leg, had been in a helicopter crash, and had served in the military. Dr. Weiss opined appellant had little insight into his condition based on his lack of understanding regarding the effects and need for medication and his reliance on cognitive behavioral therapy and hypnotherapy for treatment, neither of which are established practices for treating schizophrenia. Dr. Weiss recognized signs of progress in appellant’s recent behavior but noted that he also showed increased signs of agitation as his trial neared, resulting in weekly aggressive behaviors.

Dr. Weiss opined appellant both needed and would benefit from continuing his conservatorship. He noted that appellant’s mental illness appeared to prevent him from providing for his own needs with respect to food, clothing, and shelter. In particular, Dr. Weiss opined that all of appellant’s plans to care for himself were lacking in coherence or follow-through and that appellant generally failed to understand where he would obtain money to care for himself. On cross-examination, Dr. Weiss conceded it was plausible appellant could cook for himself and that appellant might be able to handle his own laundry. While Dr. Weiss further opined that appellant cannot give informed consent relative to his mental illness, would be a danger if he drove a vehicle or had a firearm, and was incapable of entering into a contract, he expressed his belief “with a degree of reservation” that appellant was capable of giving informed consent for routine medical treatment. This opinion was based on Dr. Weiss’s strong belief in a patient’s right to refuse treatment for routine medical issues.

Following trial, all twelve jurors found appellant was presently gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. The contested conservatorship order, stating appellant “shall not have the right to refuse medical treatment that is not related to his grave disability but is necessary for the treatment of an existing or continuing medical condition” was subsequently entered and this appeal timely followed.

Discussion

The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s order preventing appellant from refusing medical treatment for existing or continuing medical conditions.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

“ ‘If a person is found gravely disabled and a conservatorship is established, the conservatee does not forfeit legal rights or suffer legal disabilities merely by virtue of the disability. [Citations.] The court must separately determine the duties and powers of the conservator, the disabilities imposed on the conservatee, and the level of placement appropriate for the conservatee. [Citations.] The party seeking conservatorship has the burden of producing evidence to support the disabilities sought, the placement, and the powers of the conservator, and the conservatee may produce evidence in rebuttal.’ ” (Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 165.)

We review the order for substantial evidence. (See Conservatorship of Amanda B. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 342, 347.) Under the usual rules on appeal, we “ ‘presume in favor of the judgment every finding of fact necessary to support it warranted by the evidence.’ ” (Conservatorship of George H., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 165.)

Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Order

Appellant contends that the evidence presented in support of his conservatorship focused almost exclusively on the effect his mental illness has on his ability to make medical decisions surrounding treatment of that disability. According to appellant, the only evidence regarding his ability to make general medical decisions demonstrated he was capable of participating in such decisions and, accordingly, supported Dr. Weiss’s opinion appellant should be permitted to reject routine medical care. We do not agree.

The petition seeking a conservatorship alleged appellant’s mental illness made him unable to participate in treatment decisions of all types due to his irrational thought process. The evidence presented, while generally discussing appellant’s care of his mental illness, included substantial evidence that appellant’s mental condition presented itself in delusional beliefs, even as to routine medical care. As one example, appellant’s injury to his leg, apparently brought on by a bug bite, was seen by appellant as resulting from a gunshot wound. Similarly, in all areas of appellant’s life, absent routine medical decisions, Dr. Weiss opined that appellant’s medical condition affected his decision-making ability or ability to care for himself. Such evidence is both directly and circumstantially relevant to the conclusion that appellant’s condition could sufficiently interfere with existing and continuing medical care such that a conservator should have the authority to order medical treatment “necessary for the treatment of an existing or continuing medical condition.”[1] We therefore see no error in the trial court’s order.

disposition

The order is affirmed.