Filed 9/6/18 County of San Bernardino Flood Control Dist. v. Superior Court CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Gilbert G. Ochoa, Judge. Petition is granted.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, James C. Packer and Amy Wong, for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

The Puccio Law Firm, Domenic Puccio II, for Real Party in Interest.

In this matter we have reviewed and considered the petition and the record. Real party in interest has filed an informal response at this court’s invitation. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)

I.

DISCUSSION

This case involves a lawsuit against the County of San Bernardino (County) and the San Bernardino Flood Control District (Flood Control District), (collectively, petitioners), filed by real party in interest Cynthia Gamache (Gamache). Gamache was riding her bicycle along the paved bike path of the Santa Ana River Trail (the trail) when she hit a raised crack in the pavement and crashed, sustaining injuries. The trail stretches over 50 miles from San Bernardino through Orange County to Huntington Beach, with various exits along the way. It is situated along a public easement granted by the Flood Control District to the County. Gamache’s complaint against petitioners contained causes of action for negligence and dangerous condition on public property.

Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming absolute immunity under Government Code[1] section 831.4, subdivision (b). In her opposition to the motion, Gamache argued that the trail is on an easement, so section 831.4, subdivision (c) applies. Under that subdivision, the County would only be immune if it reasonably attempted to provide adequate warnings of known dangerous conditions. Issues of fact existed as to the County’s knowledge of the crack in the trail’s bike path and attempts to provide notice.[2] Gamache did not address the applicability of subdivision (b). The trial court denied the County’s motion, finding issues of fact existed as to whether the County was immune under subdivision (c). Petitioners now seek a writ of mandate from this court vacating the court’s ruling, because they contend the court ignored the applicability of subdivision (b), which provides absolute immunity in this case. We agree.

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (m)(1), provides for review of a denial of summary judgment through a petition for writ of mandate. We review the trial court’s ruling de novo. (Intrieri v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 72, 81.) Summary judgment must be granted when “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.)

As a general rule, a public entity is liable for injuries from substantial, known dangerous conditions of its property. (§§ 830, 835; Mercer v. State of California (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 158, 164.) However, section 831.4 provides a specific exception for certain roads and trails. It states:

“A public entity, public employee, or a grantor of a public easement to a public entity for any of the following purposes, is not liable for an injury caused by a condition of: (a) Any unpaved road which provides access to fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding, including animal and all types of vehicular riding, water sports, recreational or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city street or highway or (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) public street or highway of a joint highway district, boulevard district, bridge and highway district or similar district formed for the improvement or building of public streets or highways. [¶] (b) Any trail used for the above purposes. [¶] (c) Any paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk on an easement of way which has been granted to a public entity, which easement provides access to any unimproved property, so long as such public entity shall reasonably attempt to provide adequate warnings of the existence of any condition of the paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk which constitutes a hazard to health or safety. Warnings required by this subdivision shall only be required where pathways are paved, and such requirement shall not be construed to be a standard of care for any unpaved pathways or roads.” (§ 831.4.)

By its express language, section 831.4, subdivision (b), provides absolute immunity against liability for injury occurring on a trail used for recreational purposes. Case law establishes that a paved bike path used for recreation is a trail within the meaning of subdivision (b). (Prokop v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1338, 1342 (Prokop) (citing, inter alia, Carroll v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 606, 609 (Carroll) [paved bicycle path qualifies as a “trail” under the immunity provisions of section 831.4].) Gamache does not dispute that she was injured while riding her bicycle on the trail, or that the trail is used for a variety of recreational activities, such as bicycling, running, skating, hiking, walking, and horseback riding. This case therefore falls squarely within the purview of Carroll and Prokop, and petitioners are absolutely immune under section 831.4, subdivision (b), as a matter of law.

Gamache, however, suggests that section 831.4, when read as a whole, creates a duty to warn under subdivision (c) where the trail is located on an easement. The trial court apparently agreed, because it concluded that the easement created a question of fact as to the County’s duty to warn. It distinguished the instant case from Carroll because Carroll did not involve an easement. However, no party addressed the closely analogous case of Prokop, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at page 1342. In Prokop, a bicyclist was injured when he hit a chain link fence as he exited a bikeway along the Los Angeles River. The bike path was on a “ ‘recreational easement’ ” granted by the City. (Prokop, at pp. 1335, 1342.) Plaintiffs argued, as Gamache does here, that the existence of an easement created a duty to warn under section 831.4, subdivision (c). The Prokop court rejected this argument, finding subdivision (c) to apply to easements over private property whose purpose was to provide access to unimproved property, and not paved bike paths used predominantly for recreation. (Prokop, at pp. 1338, 1342.) The same is true here. It is undisputed that the trail is mainly used for recreation, and provides access not only to parks and Huntington Beach’s “busy municipal beach and pier,” but to multiple entry and exit points throughout Orange County. Thus, as in Prokop, immunity is granted under subdivision (b), and any issue of fact regarding the easement is immaterial, because subdivision (c) does not apply. (Prokop, at p. 1339.)

In her informal response, Gamache attempted to distinguish Prokop on the grounds that questions of fact existed regarding whether Huntington Beach’s pier and beaches are unimproved. This argument misses the mark. Prokop’s holding focused on the difference between easements whose main purpose was recreation (and are governed by § 831.4, subd. (b)), from “ ‘easements over private property,’ ” which are granted to public entities for the exclusive use of providing access to unimproved property (subd. (c)). (Prokop, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342.) There is no question that the main purpose of the trail is recreation, and not simply to provide access to unimproved property. It is unnecessary to determine whether the beaches, pier, and parks accessible by the trail are unimproved for purposes of subdivision (c), because liability is foreclosed under subdivision (b).

Further, we decline to hold that section 831.4, subdivision (c), creates a duty on public entities to warn of dangerous conditions on recreational trails covered under subdivision (b) merely because the property was obtained through a grant of easement. Neither the plain language of the statute nor any existing case law requires such a construction. Moreover, this position is inconsistent with purpose behind the grant of immunity for recreational activities on public land, which is “ ‘to encourage public entities to open their property for public recreational use,’ ” (Prokop, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339) because the “ ‘ “burden and expense of putting such property in a safe condition and the expense of defending claims for injuries would probably cause many public entities to close such areas to public use.” ’ (Armenio[ v. County of San Mateo (1994)] 28 Cal.App.4th [413, ]417, quoting Legis. Com. com., 32 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (1980 ed.) foll. § 831.2, p. 293.)” (Prokop, at p. 1339, fn. 7.)

Petitioners have absolute immunity under section 831.4, subdivision (b), and any issue of fact regarding applicability of subdivision (c) or the issue of dangerous condition liability is immaterial. (See Prokop, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.) As such, the trial court erred when it denied summary judgment.

II.

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the Superior Court for the County of San Bernardino to vacate its order of April 23, 2018, in San Bernardino Superior Court case No. CIVDS1714290, denying petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, and to enter a new and different order granting the motion in its entirety.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), petitioners are entitled to costs.

Petitioners are directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

FIELDS

J.