County of San Diego v. Griffin

Filed 8/4/06 County of San Diego v. Griffin CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jeannie Lowe, Commissioner. Reversed.

The family court commissioner interpreted a plea agreement the superior court approved in separate criminal proceedings brought against James Earl Griffin for failure to pay child support. Griffin contends the trial court's interpretation of the plea agreement is erroneous and that he is entitled to specific enforcement of the plea agreement. We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

The Griffins were married and had four children before they separated in 1984. In 1985 the superior court ordered Griffin to pay $600 in monthly child support payable to the County of San Diego (the County) because his wife, Anne Griffin, was receiving public benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children, which requires recipients to assign their rights to support payments and arrearages to the County. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 11477, subd. (a)(1).) In 1988, after the divorce was finalized, Griffin was ordered to pay $1000 in monthly child support to the County.

By September 1992, Griffin's arrears were approximately $60,000. The district attorney filed a criminal complaint alleging Griffin failed to support his children in violation of Penal Code section 270. (Mun. Ct. S.D. County, 1992, No. FSD 191973.) The parties agreed the criminal charges would be suspended provided Griffin paid $500 monthly in support obligations. However, Griffin defaulted on these payments and therefore the charges were reinstated.

On February 21, 1996, Griffin entered into a plea bargain under which he pled guilty to the charges, agreed to pay $300 monthly in child support, and received a stayed jail sentence of 180 days. Although the record contains no transcript of the plea agreement proceedings in municipal court, the minute order incorporated the parties' agreement and stated: "Arrears are deleted. After two years of successful probation, [Deputy District Attorney] will not oppose expungement." Municipal Court Judge Michael B. Orfield approved the plea agreement and entered Griffin's guilty plea.

Griffin met the terms of the agreement but in December 1998 the County insisted he owed $97,535.65 and rejected his claim the plea bargain eliminated all arrears. In late 2002, Griffin filed a motion in family court requesting specific enforcement of the criminal plea agreement, establishment of arrears, release of his real estate license, and a finding the County was estopped from seeking arrearages. A Title IV-D child support trial was conducted under Family Code section 4251, subdivision (a).^[1] The commissioner ruled the agreement did not delete Griffin's arrearages and specific enforcement was inappropriate.

DISCUSSION

I. The Commissioner Had Jurisdiction to Rule on Griffin's Motion

We reject Griffin's contention the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant specific enforcement of the plea agreement. The purpose of Griffin's motion in family court was to determine arrearages owed on his child support order. Under Family Code section 4251, subdivision (a) the court may "establish, modify, or enforce" child support orders. Thus, by hearing Griffin's motion to apply the plea agreement, the court was acting within its statutory powers to "establish" and "enforce" child support orders.

II. The Language of the Plea Agreement is Not Ambiguous

A plea agreement is a form of contract and is interpreted in line with general contract principles. (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.) "The application of contract law to plea agreements is premised on the 'notion that the negotiated plea represents a bargained-for quid pro quo.' " (People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1069.) "All contracts, whether public or private, are to be interpreted by the same rules" and the elementary objective of contractual interpretation is to implement the mutual intentions of the parties. (Civ. Code §§ 1635, 1636.) In interpreting a contract, the court looks to the plain meaning of the written language and, if that language is explicit and clear, it shall govern. (Civ. Code §§ 1638, 1639, 1644; Shelton, at p. 767.) Parole evidence may not alter the writing's meaning where the contractual language is "plain and unambiguous." (People v. Toscano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 340, 345.) In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence, interpretations of contractual instruments are subject to de novo review. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865.)

Here, the minute order explicitly states: "Arrears are deleted. After 2 years of successful probation, DDA will not oppose expungement." Webster's Tenth Collegiate Dictionary (1993) at page 64 defines "arrears" as either (1) "the state of being behind in the discharge of obligations" or (2) "an unpaid and overdue debt." "Delete" means "to eliminate especially by blotting out, cutting out, or erasing." (Id. at p. 305.) "Expunge" means "to strike out, obliterate, or mark for deletion." (Id. at p. 411.) These definitions are clear and, given the complete absence of any limiting terms, the plea agreement totally erased Griffin's arrearages when it became effective on February 21, 1996.

This interpretation is buttressed by additional language in the minute order. First, it states: "Custody stayed . . . as long as payments stay current." (Emphasis added.) This statement elucidates the meaning of "successful probation." Second, although the minute order form included designated spaces to be filled in regarding the total amount of arrearages and the requisite monthly payments, those spaces were conspicuously left blank. We conclude, based on the whole of the contract, and giving effect to every part, that arrearages were not part of this bargain. (Civ. Code § 1641.) We would apply the rule of lenity and reach the same outcome even if the language "arrears are deleted" was ambiguous, "because plea agreements are interpreted according to the general rule 'that ambiguities are construed in favor of the defendant.' " (People v. Toscano supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 345; accord, Civ. Code § 1649.)

We also reject the county's unsupported contention the district attorney, but not the present department of child support services, is bound by the plea agreement because the department was non-existent at the time of the agreement in 1996. Under the law then in effect, the family support division was "a single organizational unit located in the office of the district attorney" and statutorily authorized to "take appropriate action, both civil and criminal, to establish, modify, and enforce child support . . . when the child is receiving public assistance." (Welf. & Inst. Code § 11475.1, subd. (a).) Although the county restructured its child support agencies in 1999,^[2] the county's outstanding contractual obligations to Griffin under the plea agreement were unaffected because "[a]ll assets of the family support division in the district attorney's office [became] the assets of the local child support agency" (Fam. Code § 17304, subd. (d).) Further, Griffin complied with the plea agreement by February 1998. The county's obligation to delete his arrearages became due at that time, well before the county shifted its local child support agency from the district attorney to the new department of child support services.^[3] The county is bound by the agreement the district attorney negotiated on the county's behalf.

III. The County is Estopped from Claiming Illegality of the Plea Agreement

The county now argues the plea agreement is contrary to law "because no modification or elimination of accrued arrearages is permitted" under Family Code section 3651, subdivision (c).^[4] We need not determine the general applicability of this code section to plea agreements because in this specific case the county is equitably estopped from now relying on it to disavow the plea bargain.^[5]

Equitable estoppel acts defensively to inhibit one party from unjustly and improperly disadvantaging another party. (In re Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 647, 658.) "Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it." (Evid. Code § 623.) For estoppel to operate, "[t]here must be: (1) a representation or concealment of material fact (2) made with actual or virtual knowledge of the facts, (3) to a party unaware, actually or permissibly, of the truth, (4) with actual or virtual intent that the latter act upon it, and (5) the party must have been induced to act upon it." (San Diego Mun. Credit Union v. Smith, (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 919, 923.)

Applying the above elements here, the county, in negotiating the plea agreement, materially represented not merely a willingness to delete Griffin's arrearages, but also the requisite ability to do so. Griffin accepted the county's inducement and fulfilled his end of the bargain. Even assuming Family Code section 3651, subdivision (c) is applicable to plea agreements, it is immaterial whether the county actually knew it was statutorily barred from deleting Griffin's arrears when it agreed to the plea bargain because virtual knowledge of this bar suffices for purposes of estoppel. (San Diego Mun. Credit Union v. Smith, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 923.) This code section has remained substantively intact since 1970^[6] and the county and district attorney are reasonably presumed to have known of it in 1996.^[7] The county need not have been motivated by a fraudulent intent in making its affirmative representation to Griffin; instead, it suffices that "some affirmative representation or acts by the public agency or its representatives induc[ed] reliance by the claimant." (In re Marriage of Mena (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 12, 20; Seymour v. Oelrichs (1909) 156 Cal. 782, 796-97.) Finally, the record is devoid of any indication Griffin knew the county was statutorily barred from modifying the original civil order and forgive the arrearages.

In estopping a governmental agency, there is a fundamental tension at play between "avoidance of manifest injustice, and . . . seeking to preserve the public interest." (Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 496.) Courts generally are unwilling to estop a county "when to do so would defeat a policy adopted for the benefit of the public, namely, a county which provides public assistance to a custodial parent and children shall have the right to reimbursement from the primary obligor."^[8] (In re Marriage of Mena, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 20.) Although the public good must often prevail in the face of comparatively minor private injustices, this case presents "exceptional circumstances" that justify estopping the county despite the community interest in public reimbursement. (Mansell, at p. 496.)

Here, the county voluntarily agreed to forego its entitlement to arrears in order to avoid trial and induce Griffin's guilty plea. Were the county allowed to prevail on its claim that the agreement was invalid, the resulting injustice would be "of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel [against the county]." (Long Beach v. Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 496.) An important public policy is served by granting the county reimbursement rights over child support payments; nonetheless, in this case, any adverse impact estoppel may have on that policy and the public fisc is directly attributable to the conduct of the county itself. Furthermore, our conclusion does not render the public policy favoring reimbursement susceptible to widespread future attack because the county can avoid similar predicaments by simply following the statutory mandate of Family Code section 3651, subdivision (c). Finally, "[t]he right of the county to reimbursement is subject to any limitation otherwise imposed by the law of this state," (Fam. Code § 4002, subd. (b)), and "justice and right" require the county be equitably estopped from claiming Griffin's plea bargain is illegal. (Mansell, supra, at p. 496.)

IV. Griffin Detrimentally Relied on the Plea Agreement and is Entitled to Specific Enforcement of the Bargain

Once the judge accepts defendant's plea, the terms of the contractual agreement become fixed and the parties "are entitled to the benefits for which they have bargained." (People v. Daugherty (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 314, 321.) A prosecutor may not withdraw from a plea agreement after a defendant pleads guilty or detrimentally relies on that bargain. (People v. Rhoden (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1353-54.) Detrimental reliance may be shown where the defendant "[pled] guilty, partially perform[ed] the plea bargain, provid[ed] any information or other benefit to the government based on the plea bargain, or otherwise detrimentally rel[ied] on the plea bargain." (Id. at p. 1355.) The county does not contend Griffin failed to fulfill his obligations under the plea agreement. Griffin, induced by and in reliance on the bargain, surrendered his right to trial, pled guilty to criminal charges, received a stayed jail sentence, and was placed on probation. He is entitled to fulfillment of his bargain because where a "plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." (Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 262.)

We retain wide discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy and, though specific enforcement is limited to "very special circumstances," it is nonetheless applicable here due to the prosecutorial breach of the plea agreement. (People v. Calloway (1981) 29 Cal.3d 666, 673; People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 13-14; People v. Daugherty, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 321.) Allowing Griffin to withdraw his plea is an inadequate remedy in this instance because it would inappropriately reward the county for its breach by providing it an unwarranted exit from the agreement. There is little reason to discourage specific enforcement here because the court's power "to reject the bargain is not curtailed." (Daugherty, at p. 322.) Moreover, "there is substantial possibility that enforcement will completely repair the harm caused by the breach." (People v. Toscano, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 345; Kaanehe, at p. 13-14.) Griffin performed under the terms of the agreement and therefore should receive his bargained-for benefit -- deletion of arrearages amassed prior to the February 21, 1996 plea agreement. (People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 216.)

The county seeks $97,535.65 in arrearages and it is unclear from the record whether this amount includes any arrearages incurred after Griffin entered into the plea agreement. Upon remand, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether any of the amount falls outside the terms of the plea agreement as interpreted herein.

DISPOSITION

The order of the family court commissioner is reversed and the matter is remanded for further hearing. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

O'ROURKE, J.

I CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

IRION, J.

Publication Courtesy of San Diego County Legal Resource Directory.

Analysis and review provided by El Cajon Real Estate Attorney.

^[1] Family Code § 4251, subdivision (a) states in pertinent part: "[E]ach superior court shall provide sufficient commissioners to hear Title IV-D child support cases . . . All actions or proceedings . . . in a support action or proceeding in which enforcement services are being provided . . . for an order to establish, modify, or enforce child or spousal support . . . shall be referred for hearing to a child support commissioner . . . ."

^[2] Family Code section 17304 required each county to create a new child county department of child support services.

^[3] Family Code section 17304 was not enacted until 1999. (Stats. 1999, ch. 478, § 1, p. 2628.) Additionally, Family Code section 17305, subdivision (a) states in pertinent part: " . . . the director shall begin the transition from the office of the district attorney to the local child support agencies pursuant to Section 17304, commencing January 1, 2001. The director shall transfer the appropriate number of counties, equaling at least 50 percent of the statewide caseload into the new system by January 1, 2002."

^[4] Family Code section 3651, subdivision (c) states in pertinent part: " . . . a [child] support order may not be modified or terminated as to an amount that accrued before the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate."

^[5] The county makes this argument for the first time on appeal. Although we have discretion to reach the issue because it involves a pure question of law, there is no rule that we must consider it. (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 24; Souza v. Westlands Water Dist. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 879, 898-99.) Instead, it is

" 'largely a question of the appellate court's discretion.' " (Souza v. Westlands Water Dist., supra, at p. 899.)

^[6] The below statutes eventually were codified in Family Code section 3651, subdivision (b), enacted in 1992 and operative in 1994, (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 3, p. 567), which is the direct predecessor of the current Family Code section 3651, subdivision (c).

Former Civil Code section 4700, enacted in 1969, (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8,

p. 3331 and repealed by Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 3, p. 567), stated: "Any order for child support may be modified or revoked as the court may deem necessary, except as to any amount that may have accrued prior to the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause therefore . . . ."

Additionally, former Civil Code section 4801, enacted in 1969, (Stats. 1969,

ch. 1608 § 8, p. 3333 and repealed by Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 3, p. 567), and former Civil Code section 4811, subdivision (a), enacted in 1969 (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608 § 8, p. 3336 and repealed by Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 3, p. 567), use language virtually identical to former Civil Code section 4700.

^[7] Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475.1, subdivision (a), enacted in 1975, (Stats. 1975, ch. 924, § 10, p. 2035 and repealed by Stats. 1999, ch. 478, § 25, p. 2679), stated: "the district attorney . . . shall have the responsibility for promptly and effectively establishing modifying, and enforcing child support obligations . . . enforcing spousal support orders . . . The district attorney shall take appropriate action, both civil and criminal, to establish, modify, and enforce child support and when appropriate enforce spousal support orders when the child is receiving public assistance . . . ."

^[8] Family Code section 4002, subdivision (b) states: "If the county furnishes support to a child, the county has the same right as the child to secure reimbursement and obtain continuing support."