COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA v. SUPERIOR COURT OF

SANTA CLARACOUNTY

Filed 4/8/08

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Story Continued From Part I ..

A. The ClancyDecision

The contingency fee agreement at issue in Clancy was between a private attorney, James Clancy, and the City of Corona (City). Included in Clancys employment contract with the City was a fee agreement providing that Clancy is to be paid $60 per hour, provided, however, that with respect to each and every suit undertaken by Attorney hereunder which results in a final judgment against City, said fee shall be reduced to $30.00 per hour . . . and provided further that said fee of $60.00 shall also be reduced to $30.00 per hour . . . in each and every suit undertaken by Attorney hereunder in which City is a successful party if and to the extent that the City does not recover its attorneys fees from the unsuccessful party or parties. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 745.)

After the City adopted a resolution declaring a business selling sexually explicit materials, known as the Book Store, to be a public nuisance, Clancy, on behalf of the City as its special attorney, filed a complaint against the Book Store and its owners for abatement of a public nuisance, declaratory judgment, and an injunction. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 743-744.) City later amended its complaint to substitute  City Attorney of Corona  as Clancys title in the action. (Id. at p. 744.) The trial court denied the defendants motion to disqualify Clancy as attorney for the City, and the defendants subsequently sought a writ of prohibition from the California Supreme Court to bar the People from proceeding with Clancy instead of the regular City Attorney of Corona as its representative . . . . (Ibid.) The defendants contended that it was improper for Clancy to have a financial stake in the outcome because an attorney prosecuting a public nuisance action must be neutral.

To determine whether Clancy should be disqualified, the California Supreme Court evaluated the propriety of a contingent fee agreement between a city government and a private attorney whom it hired to bring abatement actions under the citys nuisance ordinance. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 743.) The court began its evaluation by examining the requirement of neutrality for public prosecutors in criminal prosecutions and government attorneys in eminent domain actions. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 748-749.) Regarding criminal prosecutions, the Clancy court noted that [c]ontingent fee contracts for criminal prosecutors have been recognized to be unethical and potentially unconstitutional . . . . (Id. at p. 748.) The court then determined that [t]he justification for the prohibition against contingent fees in criminal actions extends to certain civil cases. (Ibid.) The certain civil cases included eminent domain actions, because the government attorney in an eminent domain action occupies a position analogous to a public prosecutor and is therefore  possessed . . . of important governmental powers that are pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice. [Citation.]  (Id. at pp. 748-749.)

The requirement of a neutral prosecuting attorney also extended to public nuisance abatement actions, the Clancy court reasoned, because a public nuisance abatement action is similar to an eminent domain action. Both types of actions involve a balancing of the interests of the public and the landowner. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 749.) Thus, as with an eminent domain action, the abatement of a public nuisance involves a delicate weighing of values. Any financial arrangement that would tempt the government attorney to tip the scale cannot be tolerated. (Id. at p. 749.)

Moreover, the Clancy court observed, [p]ublic nuisance abatement actions share the public interest aspect of eminent domain and criminal cases, and often coincide with criminal prosecutions. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 749.) A suit to abate a public nuisance can trigger a criminal prosecution of the owner of the property. This connection between the civil and criminal aspects of public nuisance law further supports the need for a neutral prosecuting attorney (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

Having determined that a neutral prosecuting attorney was required in a public nuisance abatement action, the Clancy court examined Clancys contingency fee agreement to evaluate whether prosecutorial neutrality would be maintained in the Citys public nuisance action against the Book Store. The court found that Clancy had an interest in the result of the case: his hourly rate will double if the City is successful in the litigation. Obviously this arrangement gives him an interest extraneous to his official function in the actions he prosecutes on behalf of the City. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 747-748.) Consequently, the court held that Clancy should be disqualified because his contingency fee agreement was antithetical to the standard of neutrality that an attorney representing the government must meet when prosecuting a public nuisance abatement action. (Id. at p. 750.)

The Clancy court issued a writ of mandate that, among other things, directed the trial court to issue an order dismissing Clancy as the Citys attorney in the pending public nuisance abatement action. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 750.) However, in a footnote the court stated that on remand the action herein should be brought in the name of Dallas Holmes, the Corona City Attorney. The City may hire Clancy to represent Holmes. (Id. at p. 750, fn. 5.)

B. The Test for Prosecutorial Neutrality

As I have discussed, the Clancy court indicated, in holding that Clancys contingency fee agreement with the City of Corona violated the standard for prosecutorial neutrality, that the standard of neutrality that applies to a government attorney in a public nuisance abatement action is the same standard that applies to a public prosecutor in a criminal action. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 748-749.) Therefore, for the purpose of evaluating the propriety of a contingency fee agreement in a public nuisance abatement action, decisions concerning the disqualification of a district attorneys office for a violation of the standard of neutrality are instructive.

The Clancy courts analysis relied in part on an earlier California Supreme Court decision, Greer, supra, 19 Cal.3d 255, for the proposition that a government attorney, like a public prosecutor, must be absolutely neutral. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 746-747.) In Greer, the defendants sought the disqualification of the district attorney on the ground that a conflict of interest existed because the victims mother was employed in the district attorneys office. (Greer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 259.) Our Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts order disqualifying the district attorney because the prosecutor might have an emotional stake in the case that could disturb his exercise of impartial judgment in pretrial and trial proceedings. (Id. at p. 270.)

The Greer courts analysis of the disqualification issue was based upon the defendants fundamental due process right not to be deprived of liberty without a fair trial and the prosecutors obligation to respect this mandate. (Greer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 266.) The prosecutor is a public official vested with considerable discretionary power to decide what crimes are to be charged and how they are to be prosecuted. [Citations.] In all his [or her] activities, his [or her] duties are conditioned by the fact that he [or she] is the representative not of any ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation is to govern impartially . . . and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. [Citations.] (Ibid.; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 208.)

In Greer, our SupremeCourt also recognized that the requirement of prosecutorial impartiality arose from the prosecutors discretionary powers. [I]t is precisely because the prosecutor enjoys such broad discretion that the public he [or she] serves and those he [or she] accuses may justifiably demand that he [or she] perform his [or her] functions with the highest degree of integrity and impartiality, and with the appearance thereof. (Greer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 266-267.) Thus, the advantage of public prosecution is lost if those exercising the discretionary duties of the district attorney are subject to conflicting personal interests which might tend to compromise their impartiality. In short, the prosecuting attorney  is the representative of the public in whom is lodged a discretion which is not to be controlled by the courts, or by an interested individual . . . .   [Citation.] (Id. at p. 267.)

In Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th 826, our Supreme Court also addressed the issue of prosecutorial neutrality. The court considered the merits of the defendants motion to disqualify the district attorneys office on the ground that the district attorney had accepted the services of a forensic accountant who was compensated by the victim, the City of Orange. (Id. at p. 829.) Under Penal Code section 1424, a motion to disqualify a prosecutor on the ground of conflict of interest may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. (Pen. Code, 1424, subd. (a)(1).) The court recognized, as it did in Greer, that a public prosecutor is required to act in an impartial manner because he or she has broad discretion over the entire course of the criminal proceedings . . . . (Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 839-840.) Accordingly, the Hambarian court determined that the proper test for a disqualifying conflict of interest under Penal Code section 1424 is whether the prosecutors discretionary decisionmaking has been placed within the influence or control of an interested party. (Id. at p. 841, fn. omitted.)

Our Supreme Court in Hambarian further instructed that a motion for disqualification of a district attorneys office should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, because no one factor will compel disqualification in all cases; the entire complex of facts must be reviewed to determine whether the conflict makes fair and impartial treatment of the defendant unlikely. [Citation.] (Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 834; People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 599.) Therefore, because the evidence showed that the forensic consultant had no control over critical prosecutorial decisions, the Hambarian court determined that the motion to disqualify the district attorneys office was properly denied. (Id. at pp. 839, 842.) Citing Clancy, the court explained that recusal [of the district attorney] is not necessary to ensure [the defendants] right to fair treatment during all portions of the criminal proceedings. [Citation.] (Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 840.)

Review of these California Supreme Court cases clarifies that a public prosecutor may be disqualified if a case-by-case review of the factual circumstances surrounding the claimed conflict of interest indicates that the prosecutors discretionary decisionmaking has been placed within the influence or control of an interested party (Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 841), or is subject to conflicting personal interests (Greer, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 267). Thus, the test for a disqualifying conflict of interest may be stated as follows: where the factual circumstances in a case indicate that the public prosecutors discretionary decisionmaking is not likely to be impartial, the standard of neutrality has been violated and the prosecutor may be disqualified.

The test for a disqualifying conflict of interest established by the California Supreme Court in Hambarian and Greer is equally applicable in civil actions, because a government lawyer in a civil action occupies a position analogous to a public prosecutor [and] is possessed . . . of important governmental powers that are pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice. [Citation.] (City of Los Angeles v. Decker (1977) 18 Cal.3d 860, 871.) Thus, [a] government lawyer in a civil action . . . has the responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair record, and he [or she] should not use his [or her] position or the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or results. [Citation]. (Ibid.)

The California Supreme Court in Clancy applied the test for a disqualifying conflict of interest in a civil action when the court found that a contingency fee agreement doubling the fees of a private attorney who succeeded in prosecuting a public nuisance abatement action created a conflict of interest, due to the private attorneys personal financial interest in the litigation. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 749-750.) The private attorney was apparently able, under his contingency fee agreement, to exercise the discretionary decisionmaking authority of a government attorney in litigating the public nuisance action, with the sole exception that the city council would decide whether to bring an action under the public nuisance ordinance. (Id. at p. 749, fn. 4.) Therefore, the factual circumstances in Clancy demonstrated that as a result of the contingency fee agreement, the private attorney was not likely to be impartial in his discretionary decisionmaking. The Clancy court therefore determined that the contingency fee agreement in that case was antithetical to the standard of neutrality that an attorney representing the government must meet when prosecuting a public nuisance abatement action. (Id. at p. 750.)

C. Federal and State Court Decisions

Federal and state courts have also grappled with the issue of the propriety of a contingency fee agreement between a public entity and private counsel. Several decisions support a general rule that a contingency fee agreement is permitted, even though private counsel retains a financial stake in the outcome, where the agreement provides that government attorneys will maintain control over the discretionary decisionmaking throughout the litigation.

In Ohio, the federal court recently considered the Sherwin-Williams Companys challenge to the contingency fee agreements between three Ohio cities and private counsel in lead paint litigation. (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Columbus (S.D. Ohio, July 18, 2007, No. C2-06-829, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51945 (Sherwin-Williams).) The courts original ruling on Sherwin-Williamss motion for injunctive relief directed the cities to amend their contingency fee agreements because the court found that the contingency fee agreements between private counsel and the three cities were unconstitutional insofar as the agreements reposed an impermissible degree of public authority upon retained counsel, who have a financial incentive not necessarily consistent with the interests of the public body. (Id. at pp. *3-*4.)

In a subsequent ruling, the federal court in Sherwin-Williams approved the two contingency fee agreements that had been amended to expressly vest in the city attorney control over the litigation and the sole authority to authorize any settlement of any claim or complaint. (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51945, p. *6.) However, the court found that the third contingency fee agreement was not adequately amended because the agreement provided that neither private counsel nor the city could settle or dismiss the case without the consent of the other. (Id. at p. *10.) The court stated that it had made it abundantly clear in its previous ruling that a contingency fee agreement between a municipality and private counsel in a public nuisance action which purports to vest in private counsel authority to prevent a settlement or dismissal of a suit is unconstitutional. (Ibid.)

In a public nuisance abatement action in California, the federal court considered the defendants motion to disqualify private counsel on the ground that their contingency fee agreement violated the government attorneys duty of neutrality. (City of GrassValley v. Newmont Mining Corp. (E.D. Cal., Nov. 20, 2007, No. 2:04-cv-00149-GEB-DAD, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 89187.) Relying on Clancy, the defendants argued that a public entity could not hire private counsel on a contingency fee basis to litigate a public nuisance abatement action. The federal court rejected this argument and denied the disqualification motion, finding that defendants had not countered Plaintiffs showing that the City Attorney for the City of Grass Valley is acting as co-counsel in this action and the City retains ultimate decision-making authority in the case. [Citation.] (Grass v. Newmont Mining Corp., supra, U.S. Dist. Lexis 89187, p. *3.)

In tort litigation involving a states claim against the tobacco industry for recovery of the health care costs of citizens with tobacco-related illnesses, the defendants also relied on Clancy to challenge the legality of a contingency fee agreement between a public entity and its private counsel. In Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening (1998) 349 Md. 660, 709 A.2d 1230 (Glendening), the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the defendants challenge to the contingency fee agreement between the Attorney General of Maryland and the private law firm that represented the State of Maryland in tort litigation against the tobacco industry. The contingency fee agreement expressly provided that the Attorney General shall have the authority to control all aspects of [outside counsels] handling of the litigation . . . [and] such authority shall be final, sole and unreviewable. [Citation.] (Id. at p. 663.)

After determining that state law authorized the Attorney General to enter into contingency fee agreements, the Glendeningcourt addressed the defendants claim that the contingency fee agreement violated due process and public policy under the principle, as illustrated in Clancy, that a public officer should not participate in a matter in which he or she has a personal or pecuniary interest. (Glendening, supra, 349 Md. at p. 684.) The Maryland court determined that Clancy was distinguishable because the case before it did not directly implicate any constitutional or criminal violations. Equally important, the court also found, was the absence in Clancy of the oversight of an elected State official, who shall have the authority to control all aspects of [outside counsels] handling of the litigation, and whose authority shall be final, sole and unreviewable. (Id. at p. 686.) The court therefore held that the Maryland Attorney Generals oversight prevented outside counsels financial interest in the outcome of the tobacco litigation from violating prosecutorial neutrality. (Id. at p. 688.)

The federal court similarly determined in City and County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1997) 957 F. Supp. 1130 (Philip Morris) that a contingency fee agreement between several public entities and the private law firm of Lieff, Cabraser, Heinmann & Bernstein in tobacco-related tort litigation was not barred under Clancy. The court stated, While the contingent fee arrangement here clearly gives Lieff, Cabraser a stake in the litigation, the Court finds that this case is sufficiently distinguishable from Clancy to allow for the governments retention of private counsel. First, as plaintiffs explain, Lieff, Cabraser is acting here as co-counsel, with plaintiffs respective government attorneys retaining full control over the course of the litigation. Because plaintiffs public counsel are actually directing this litigation, the Court finds that the concerns expressed in Clancy regarding overzealousness on the part of private counsel have been adequately addressed by the arrangement between Lieff, Cabraser and the plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 1135.) The court in Philip Morris also found that the case before it was a civil tort action, which further distinguished it from Clancy. (Ibid.)

Thus, these federal and state courts have ruled that the propriety of a contingency fee agreement between a public entity and private counsel must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, by examining the terms of the agreement to determine whether prosecutorial neutrality has been preserved by the government attorneys retaining control over discretionary decisionmaking, such as settlement and dismissal, and by considering the factual circumstances of each case.

D. Petitioners Contingency Fee Agreements

Based on my review of California Supreme Court authority and the decisions of federal and state courts, I believe that the court must evaluate the propriety of a contingency fee agreement between a public entity and private counsel in a public nuisance abatement action on a case-by-case basis. The factual circumstances of each case and the terms of each contingency fee agreement should be reviewed to determine whether the prosecutors discretionary decisionmaking has been placed within the influence or control of an interested party (Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 841), or is subject to conflicting personal interests (Greer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 267). If so, the contingency fee agreements must be barred because the agreements are antithetical to the standard of neutrality that an attorney representing the government must meet when prosecuting a public nuisance abatement action. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d. at p. 750.)

Applying this test, I agree with the majority that, based on the record in this original proceeding, the current contingency fee agreements are not antithetical to the standard of neutrality that a government attorney must meet in a public nuisance abatement action. Here, the terms of the contingency fee agreements expressly provide that the government attorneys retain complete control of the litigation, including, in some instances, all decision making authority and responsibility. It is therefore reasonable to assume at this point in the litigation that the government attorneys intend to retain control over all discretionary decisionmaking. Moreover, the factual circumstances do not include a pending or anticipated criminal prosecution arising from the alleged public nuisance, and therefore the bar on contingency fee agreements in criminal prosecutions (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 748) is not implicated. For these reasons, I believe that a contingency fee agreement is permissible in the present public nuisance abatement action and that it is not likely, under the current terms of the petitioners contingency fee agreements, that the requirement of prosecutorial neutrality in public nuisance abatement actions will be violated.

In reaching this conclusion, I recognize the trial courts concern that as a practical matter, it would be difficult to determine (a) how much control the government attorneys must exercise in order for a contingent fee arrangement with outside counsel [to] be permissible, (b) what types of decisions the government attorneys must retain control over, e.g., settlement or major strategy decisions, or also day-to-day decisions involving discovery and so forth, and (c) whether the government attorneys have been exercising such control throughout the litigation or whether they have passively or blindly accepted recommendations, decisions, or actions by outside counsel.

However, as I have stated, the California Supreme Court has instructed that the decisions over which the government attorneys must retain control in a public nuisance abatement action are the discretionary decisions. In the public prosecutor context, our Supreme Court has observed that the prosecutor has broad discretion over the entire course of the criminal proceedings, from the investigation and gathering of evidence, through the decisions of whom to charge and what charges to bring, to the numerous choices at trial to accept, oppose, or challenge judicial rulings. (Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 840.) In Clancy, the court stated that  [t]he prosecutors discretionary functions are not confined to the period before the filing of charges . . . A district attorney may thus prosecute vigorously, but both the accused and the public have a legitimate expectation that his [or her] zeal, as reflected in his [or her] tactics at trial, will be born of objective and impartial consideration of each individual case.  (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 749, fn. 4.) With respect to eminent domain actions, the court has emphasized that [a] government lawyer in a civil action . . . should not use his [or her] position or the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or results. (City of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 871.)

Thus, as emphasized in Clancy and Decker,it is the consequences of discretionary decisionmaking, rather than the details of each decision, that are significant in determining whether the standard of neutrality has been met in the litigation of a public nuisance abatement action. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 749, fn. 4; City of Los Angeles v. Decker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 871.) Where zealous representation of the government by private counsel has a result that is just and consistent with the public interest, and the conduct of the litigation is born of objective and impartial consideration, the trial court may reasonably determine that the government attorneys have maintained control of the discretionary decisionmaking and therefore prosecutorial neutrality has been preserved.

The trial court also has an important oversight role in ensuring prosecutorial neutrality, because the court has the inherent power to review attorney fee contracts and to prevent overreaching and unfairness. (Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 933.) Thus, as a federal district court has noted, [A]n attorneys right to contract for a contingent fee is not completely beyond judicial control. A lawyer is first an officer of the court, and as such his [or her] commercial contractual rights must yield to his [or her] duty. [Citation.] (Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (C.D. Cal. 2002) 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1168; see also State of North Dakota v. Hagerty (N.D. 1998) 1998 N.D. 122, 580 N.W.2d 139, 148 [courts inherent power to supervise attorney fees].) Thus, the propriety of a contingency fee agreement may be raised at any time in the litigation, whether by a motion for disqualification or other procedural means such as the motion to bar payment of contingent fees to private attorneys that was filed in the case at bar.

Finally, because the decisions of the California Supreme Court, the federal courts and other state courts support my view that the propriety of a contingency fee agreement in a public nuisance abatement action must be determined on a case-by-case basis, I do not believe that the language of the contingency fee agreement is the only factor to be considered. Other significant factors must also be considered. For example, there may be public nuisance abatement actions in which parallel criminal prosecutions are pending or anticipated, because as the Clancy court noted, Public nuisance abatement actions . . . often coincide with criminal prosecutions. These actions are brought in the name of the People by the district attorney or city attorney. (Code Civ. Proc., 731.) A person who maintains or commits a public nuisance is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, 372.) (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 749, fn. omitted.) Another important factor that must be considered is the conduct of plaintiffs counsel, which may reveal whether the government attorneys discretionary decisionmaking has been placed within the influence or control of an interested party (Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 841), or is subject to conflicting personal interests (Greer, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 267).

Thus, the propriety of a contingency fee agreement in a public nuisance action must be evaluated by careful consideration of the many important factors in each case, including the factual circumstances, the terms of the contingency fee agreement, and the conduct of plaintiffs counsel, because, as the Clancy court stated, The justification for the prohibition against contingent fees in criminal actions extends to certain civil cases. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 748.)

Therefore, based on my review of the factual circumstances in this case and the terms of the contingency fee agreements, I would conclude that the California Supreme Courts decision in Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d 740 does not bar the public entity plaintiffs in this case from retaining private counsel under their current contingency fee agreements to assist the government attorneys in the litigation of this public nuisance abatement action

I recognize, however, that the issue of the circumstances under which public entities may properly retain private counsel under contingency fee agreements to assist in the litigation of public nuisance abatement actions is of great public significance. For this reason, I would respectfully invite the California Supreme Court to review this issue and to provide guidance to the courts and public entities in this important and developing area of the law.

______________________________________

BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Honorable Jack Komar

Attorneys for Petitioners

County of Santa Clara, et al: Ann Miller Ravel, County Counsel

Cheryl A. Stevens, Deputy County Counsel

Aryn P. Harris, Deputy County Counsel

Office of the Santa Clara County Counsel

Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney

Owen J. Clements, Chief of Special Litigation

Erin Bernstein, Deputy City Attorney

Office of the San Francisco City Attorney

Michael J. Aguirre, City Attorney

Sim von Kalinowski, Chief Deputy City Attorney

Office of the San Diego City Attorney

Richard E. Winnie, County Counsel

Raymond L. MacKay, Deputy County Counsel

Office of the Alameda County Counsel

Dennis Bunting, County Counsel

Office of the Solano County Counsel

Thomas F. Casey III, County Counsel

Brenda Carlson

Rebecca M. Archer

Office of the San Mateo County Counsel

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel

Donovon M. Main, Deputy County Counsel

Robert E. Ragland, Deputy County Counsel

Office of the Los Angeles County Counsel

Jeffrey B. Issacs

Patricia Bilgin

Elise Ruden

Office of the City Attorney, City of Los Angeles

Attorneys for Petitioners

County of Santa Clara, et al: John A. Russo

Christopher Kee

Office of the Oakland City Attorney

Charles J. McKee, County Counsel

William M. Litt, Deputy County Counsel

Office of the Monterey County Counsel

Frank M. Pitre

Nancy L. Fineman

Ara Jabagchourian

Douglas Y. Park

Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy

Michael P. Thornton

Neil T. Leifer

Thornton & Naumes

Fidelma Fitzpatrick

Aileen Sprague

Motley Rice LLC

Mary Alexander

Jennifer L. Fiore

Mary Alexander & Associates

Attorneys for

Real Party in Interest

Atlantic Richfield Company: Sean Morris

Shane W. Tsend

John R. Lawless

Kristen L. Roberts

Philip H. Curtis

William H. Voth

Arnold & Porter LLP

Attorneys for

Real Party in Interest

American Cyanamid Company: Richard W. Mark

Elyse D. Echtman

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP

Peter A. Strotz

Daniel J. Nichols

Filice Brown Eassa & McLeod LLP

Attorneys for

Real Party in Interest

ConAgra Grocery Products

Company: Lawrence A. Wengel

Bradley W. Kragel

Greve, Clifford, Wengel & Paras, LLP

Allen J. Ruby

Glen W. Schofield

Ruby & Schofield

James P. Fitzgerald

James J. Frost

McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C.

Attorneys for

Real Party in Interest

E.I. du Pont de Nemours

and Company: Steven R. Williams

Collin J. Hite

McGuire Woods LLP

Clement L. Glynn

Patricia L. Bonheyo

Glynn & Finley, LLP

Attorneys for

Real Party in Interest

Millennium Holdings LLP: Michael T. Nilan

Halleland, Lewis, Nilan & Johnson, P.A.

James C. Hyde

Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley

Attorneys for

Real Party in Interest

The OBrien Corporation: Paul F. Markoff

Crowley, Barrett & Karaba, LTD

Archie S. Robinson

Robinson & Wood, Inc.

Attorneys for

Real Party in Interest

NL Industries, Inc.: James H. McManis

William W. Faulkner

Matthew Schechter

McManis, Faulkner & Morgan

Donald T. Scott

Bartlit, Beck, Herman, Palenchar & Scott

Timothy Hardy, Esq.

Attorneys for

Real Party in Interest

The Sherwin-Williams

Company: Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr.

Paul Pohl

Jones Day

John W. Edwards

Jones Day

Brian J. ONeill

Jones Day

Attorney for Amicus

Curiae California State

Association of Counties

on behalf of Petitioners

County of Santa Clara, et al: Jennifer B. Henning

Attorney for Amicus

Curiae Association of

California Water

Agencies on behalf of

Petitioners County of

Santa Clara, et al.: Victor M. Sher

Sher Leff LLP

Attorneys for Amicus

Curiae Public Justice, P.S.,

Healthy Children Organizing

Project and Western Center

For Law and Proverty on

behalf of Petitioners County

of Santa Clara, et al.: Arthur H. Bryant

Victoria W. Ni

Public Justice, P.C.

Attorney for Amicus

Curiae Chamber of

Commerce of the United

States of America and

the American Tort Reform

Association on behalf of

Real Party in Interest

Atlantic Richfield Company: Kevin Underhill

Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP

Attorney for Amicus

Curiae The Civil Justice

Association of

California on behalf of

Real Party in Interest

Atlantic Richfield Company: Fred J. Hiestand

Attorneys for Amicus

Curiae The American

Chemistry Council on

behalf of Real Parties in

Interest: Richard O. Faulk

John S. Gray

Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP

Jay Smith

Steptoe & Johnson LLP

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