Filed 5/2/17 County of Los Angeles v. Lexington Nat. Ins. Corp. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
LEXINGTON NATIONAL
INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
B277853
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BV031241)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David Fields, Judge. Reversed.
Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Brian T. Chu,
Joanne Nielsen, Principal Deputy County Counsel, and
Lindsay Yoshiyama, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________
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INTRODUCTION
Lexington National Insurance Corp. (Surety) posted a bail
bond for a criminal defendant who did not appear for a pretrial
conference, and so the trial court ordered the bail forfeited. The
Surety successfully moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate
the bond. The County of Los Angeles appeals. Based on People v.
Safety National Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703 (Safety
National), we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of
law in vacating the forfeiture and exonerating the bond.
Accordingly, we reverse the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Surety posted a $20,000 bail bond on February 19, 2013, to
secure the release of defendant Pablo Sanchez Renteria, who was
charged with one count of possession of marijuana for sale, in
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11359, a felony.
Renteria appeared at his arraignment on June 19, 2013.
On that date, the trial court scheduled a pretrial conference for
July 18, 2013. Renteria failed to appear at the pretrial
conference and so the court ordered the bail forfeited. (Pen. Code,
§ 1305.)1
The appearance period, which had been extended, expired
without forfeiture having been set aside and so the trial court
entered summary judgment against Surety on the bond.
Surety timely moved to set aside the summary judgment,
discharge the forfeiture, and exonerate the bail. Surety argued
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the bail forfeited
on July 18, 2013 because defendant’s presence was not lawfully
required by section 1305, subdivision (a). The County opposed

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
the motion on the ground that section 977, subdivision (b)
mandated Renteria’s presence. Both parties acknowledged that
the question of the interplay between sections 977 and 1305 was
under review by the Supreme Court in Safety National, supra,
62 Cal.4th 703.
The trial court granted Surety’s motion and ordered the
forfeiture set aside and the bond exonerated. The County’s
timely appeal followed. Surety has not filed an appellate brief.
DISCUSSION
“The purpose of bail and its forfeiture is to ensure a
criminal defendant’s appearance in court and adherence to court
orders. [Citation.]” (People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1147.) Although orders granting or
denying a motion to set aside a bail forfeiture are reviewed for
abuse of discretion (ibid.), when we are asked to review a trial
court’s interpretation of a statute on undisputed facts, the issue
involves a question of law and our review is de novo. (People v.
Fairmont Specialty Group (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 146, 151.)
When a criminal defendant is released on bail and
thereafter fails to appear as ordered or as otherwise required,
without sufficient excuse, the trial court must declare the bail
bond forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a).) Required appearances for
criminal defendants include arraignment, trial, judgment, and,
“[a]ny other occasion” where the “defendant’s presence in court is
lawfully required.” (Id., subd. (a)(1)(D).) Although it does not
expressly govern bail forfeitures, section 977 provides that
defendants charged with a felony “shall be personally present” at
five listed proceedings, and at “all other proceedings” unless they
properly executed a written waiver. (Id., subd. (b)(1), italics
added.)
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After the trial court made the challenged ruling in this
case, our Supreme Court issued its opinion in Safety National,
supra, 62 Cal.4th 703, and we conclude it is controlling.
Analyzing the interaction between sections 1305, subdivision (a)
and 977, subdivision (b)(1) (Safety National, at p. 707), the
Supreme Court held that the nonappearance at a scheduled
pretrial proceeding by a felony defendant, who did not execute a
written waiver, constitutes a basis to forfeit bail under section
1305, subdivision (a). (Safety National, at pp. 707-708.) The
court explained that the requirement of section 977, subdivision
(b)(1) of personal presence at “all other proceedings” “gives rise to
a ‘lawfully required’ appearance under section 1305[, subd.] (a).”
(Safety National, at p. 708.) The court reasoned that the “broadly
phrased term” “at all other proceedings” in section 977,
subdivision (b)(1) “suggests the provision’s reach is inclusive, i.e.,
subsuming those court proceedings not specifically listed in
section 977.” (Safety National, at p. 712.) Specifically, pretrial
hearings that are to be held in open court are those that fall
within the scope of the phrase “other proceeding[]” in section 977,
subdivision (b)(1). (Safety National, at pp. 716-717.)
Renteria failed to appear at the July 18, 2013 pretrial
conference scheduled in open court when he was present. He did
not execute a written waiver of his right to be present at that
hearing, and he did not offer a “sufficient excuse” for his absence
pursuant to section 1305, subdivision (a). Nor does anyone claim
that Renteria had no actual notice of the scheduled July 18, 2013
hearing. (See Safety National, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 717.) The
trial court properly ordered bail forfeited under section 1305,
with the result it erred as a matter of law in setting aside the
forfeiture and exonerating the bond.
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. The County is awarded its costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ALDRICH, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
JOHNSON (MICHAEL), J.


Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.