Cowley v. The Seattle Times

Filed 1/30/07 Cowley v. The Seattle Times CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

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Plaintiff Peter Cowley filed a claim for defamation in a Washington state court against defendant The Seattle Times Company (Seattle Times) based on what Cowley believed were false statements Seattle Times made in articles regarding his alleged criminal history in California and his alleged failure to disclose that history to the Tulalip tribes in Washington where he worked as a dentist.

In response to the lawsuit, Seattle Times filed a petition in Sacramento County Superior Court for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to Folsom State Prison, where Cowley had worked as a dentist, for all documents within its possession or under its control that related in any way to Cowley. Cowley filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing, among other things, the subpoena invaded his right to privacy. The trial court granted Cowleys motion to quash and awarded $6,300 in sanctions, finding the requirements of the subpoena oppressive.

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Cowleys motion to quash the subpoena or in awarding sanctions, given the overbroad request for documents.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1989, Cowley began working as a dentist at the California Department of Developmental Services.

In September 1995, Cowley transferred to the California Correctional Center in Susanville. Approximately 16 months later, Cowley filed an internal complaint with the California Department of Corrections (CDC) alleging he had been harassed and discriminated against due to his gender, marital status, religion, and perceived sexual orientation.

In June 1997, Cowley was transferred to Folsom State Prison in response to his complaints of harassment and discrimination at Susanville. Three months later, Cowley alleged he was subjected to discrimination and harassment by his coworkers and supervisor at Folsom State Prison.

In October 1998, Cowley filed another internal complaint with CDC. Cowley believed he was still being discriminated against and harassed and CDC failed to address the situation. Cowley claimed he suffered direct severe physical and emotional injuries, and was humiliated and psychiatrically injured, which injuries continue to date.

Cowley took disability leave in October 1998. In February 1999, Cowley returned to work but was informed he had been transferred to the California State Prison in Sacramento, which Cowley viewed as a much less desirable assignment.

In December 1999, Cowley resigned from Folsom State Prison pursuant to a medical separation.

In June 2000, one of Cowleys former coworkers at Folsom State Prison filed a complaint against Folsom State Prison, CDC, and Cowley alleging, among other things, Cowley sexually harassed her and the prison failed to respond to her claims.

Also in June 2000, Cowley was charged with indecent exposure, committing a lewd act in public, loitering near a public toilet with the intent to commit a lewd or lascivious act, and resisting a peace officer, all misdemeanors occurring in Sacramento in February 2000.

In August 2000, Cowley pled guilty to resisting a peace officer in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. One month later, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Cowley on probation for three years.

In January 2001, Cowley filed an amended complaint in the Sacramento Superior Court for damages against CDC alleging, among other things, that as a result of the harassment and discrimination and the failure to address and prevent it, he suffered direct severe physical and emotional injuries, and was humiliated and psychiatrically injured, which injuries continue to date. Cowleys complaint was dismissed with prejudice on April 16, 2001.

In June 2001, Cowley began working as the chief dentist at the Tulalip Health and Dental Clinic in Washington.

In October 2003, Seattle Times published an article entitled, Tulalips health clinic under fire. The article stated that, according to the tribes director of health and human services, Cowley had become controversial, hadnt disclosed his criminal record when he started working at the clinic, and the clinic did not plan on reinstating Cowleys contract at the end of the year. The article also stated Cowley was convicted in Sacramento County, Calif., in 2000 of indecent exposure, disorderly conduct, loitering and obstruction or resisting arrest, all misdemeanors.

Six days after the article appeared, Seattle Times published a [c]larification stating Cowley was charged in 2000 with indecent exposure, disorderly conduct, loitering and obstruction or resisting arrest, but a Sacramento County, Calif., jury convicted him only of obstruction or resisting arrest. Th[e prior] article said he was convicted of all four charges.

In January 2004, Seattle Times published an article entitled News from around the county stating the Tulalip tribes decided to allow a dentist with a criminal record to keep treating clinic patients temporarily, because, according to a spokeswoman for the tribes, [t]heir only other option was to shut the dental portion of the clinic. According to [t]ribal officials . . . they planned to end Cowleys contract with the clinic at the end of 2003 because of the conviction, but according to the tribes spokeswoman, the tribal board voted to extend his contract until March. The article repeated the claim it made in the earlier correction that Cowley was charged in 2000 with indecent exposure, disorderly conduct, loitering and obstruction or resisting arrest, but a Sacramento County, Calif., jury convicted him only of obstruction or resisting arrest.

In October 2005, Cowley filed a civil complaint in a Washington state court against Seattle Times for defamation. He claimed the articles contained false and defamatory statements,^[1]subjected him to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, and tended to lower [his] esteem in the community and to prejudice him in his profession, trade, vocation, or office. Cowley further claimed that [a]s a result of [Seattle Timess] publishing of the above false and defamatory statements, [he] incurred damages that would not have occurred but for [Seattle Timess] wrongful conduct, [b]ecause of the false and defamatory statements contained the news articles, [Cowleys] employer acted not to renew [his] employment contract, he suffered and continues to suffer lost wages and benefits, including back and front pay, due to the non-renewal of his employment contract, emotional pain, embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety, and stress, all in amounts to be proven at trial. Cowley sought, among other things, [g]eneral compensatory damages for pain and suffering, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, mental anguish and emotional distress and [s]pecial damages including . . . lost wages in the amount of approximately $125,300.00 per year, including front and back pay . . . .

In January 2006, Seattle Times filed a petition in Sacramento County Superior Court for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to Folsom State Prison to obtain the following: a copy of any and all documents within its possession or under its control that constitute, reflect or relate in any manner whatsoever to Peter M. Cowley (Cowley), Folsom Position Identification Number 071-214-9268-003, including but not limited to: [] (a) Employment records of Cowley; or [] (b) Disciplinary proceedings against or involving Cowley; or [] (c) Memoranda or correspondence sent to Folsom State Prison or Department of Corrections personnel regarding Cowley; or [] (d) Complaints filed by Cowley with the Department of Corrections Office of Equal Employment Opportunity or; [] (e) Complaints filed with the Department of Corrections Office of Equal Employment Opportunity naming Cowley; or [] (f) Administrative complaints filed by Cowley during his employment with the Department of Corrections; or [] (g) All documents that Cowley provided to the deponent that relate to any of the foregoing paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f).

Cowley filed a motion to quash the subpoena on the grounds it invaded his right to privacy, the records were not directly relevant to the Washington litigation, Seattle Times lacked a compelling need for the records, and the records were available through less invasive sources.

Seattle Times opposed the motion, arguing Cowley waived any privacy right he may have had in the records by putting his mental state and ability to find employment at issue in the Washington litigation and by disclosing their contents in his amended complaint for damages against CDC in January 2001. Seattle Times further contended the records were relevant because Cowleys credibility would be a central issue in the Washington litigation and the records would be material to test Cowley on this point.

Cowley responded he had not waived his right to privacy simply by alleging garden variety emotional distress, he had not alleged an inability to find employment, and his prior complaint against CDC did not waive his right to privacy in the Washington litigation.

The trial court granted Cowleys motion to quash, reasoning Seattle Times had not shown the records were directly relevant to the issues in the Washington litigation; Seattle Times was not entitled to inquire into all aspects of Cowleys life to determine if other stressors contributed to any emotional distress Cowley suffered simply because Cowley was seeking emotional distress damages in this lawsuit; Cowley did not waive his right to privacy by filing other lawsuits; and the claim by Seattle Times that it needed the records to explore Cowleys credibility would swallow every claim of privacy, as credibility is an issue in every lawsuit. The court also awarded $6,300 in sanctions to Cowley, finding the requirements of the subpoena oppressive.

Seattle Times filed a timely notice of appeal from the courts orders. On appeal, Seattle Times raises the following contentions: (1) we should review the courts decision not for abuse of discretion but as a question of law; (2) we should apply the more liberal Washington standard governing discovery rather than the more stringent California standard of direct relevance; (3) even if we apply California law, disclosure of the records was required; (4) even if Cowley did have a privacy interest in the records warranting protection, the trial court should have issued a protective order or ordered the records transmitted to the Washington trial court to permit their review in light of Washington law; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions.

As will be explained, we review the trial courts orders for abuse of discretion and affirm the orders if the trial court reaches the correct result, even if for the wrong reasons. Applying California law, we find the discovery request overbroad and therefore affirm the trial courts order granting the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. We therefore do not reach the Seattle Timess fourth contention enumerated above. Finally, for the trial courts guidance, if Seattle Times files a narrowly tailored petition for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for documents, we address what records we believe are directly relevant to Cowleys claim of defamation.

DISCUSSION

I

Appealability

Initially, we address Cowleys contention that the trial courts discovery order is not appealable.

As a general matter, a discovery order is not appealable. (Southern Pacific Co. v. Oppenheimer (1960) 54 Cal.2d 784, 786.) The reason for this rule is two-fold: one, in most cases, the delay due to interim review is likely to be protracted and result in harm to the judicial process; and two, discovery orders may be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment on the merits. (Warford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1041.)

There is, however, an exception to the rule of nonappealability where no final review of the underlying action will take place in a California forum. (Warford v. Medeiros, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 1041.) In Warford, the trial court denied plaintiffs application for an order to show cause why certain nonparty witnesses should not be required to provide deposition testimony and requested documents for use in a Hawaii civil suit. (Id. at pp. 1038-1039.) The appellate court held the order denying the plaintiffs application was appealable because it was final, at least in California, and no review of the underlying action would take place in California. (Id. at p. 1041.) In reaching its holding, the appellate court relied on a century and one-half old case from our Supreme Court, Adams v. Woods (1861) 18 Cal. 30, which held that a discovery order by a California court relating to production of documents for use in an action pending in New York was final and appealable. (Ibid.)

The same rationale applies here. A California trial court has issued an order relating to the production of records in an action pending in Washington. This order is final in California, and is therefore appealable.

As to the award of sanctions for $6,300, this order is directly appealable as an award of sanctions exceeding $5,000. (Code Civ. Proc., 904.1, subd. (a)(12).)

II

California Discovery Law Applies

Seattle Times contends we should apply Washington law to this discovery dispute, noting an apparent distinction between the stringent test of direct relevance in California for obtaining discovery when privacy rights are implicated (see, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842)^[2]and the broad test in Washington permitting discovery when it may lead to admissible evidence (see, e.g., Barfield v. City of Seattle (1984) 100 Wash.2d 878, 888). Seattle Times argues Washington law applies because both parties are Washington residents and the underlying case is pending in a Washington court. We are not persuaded.

First of all, Seattle Times forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. In its opposition to the motion to quash the subpoena, Seattle Times contended that Washington takes a broad view of relevance, quoting from Barfield v. City of Seattle, supra, 100 Wash.2d at page 878 and then argued that Californias interpretation of relevance is similarly expansive. Seattle Times did not argue in the motion that a conflict of law appeared or that Washington law controlled over California law.^[3] [G]enerally speaking the forum will apply its own rule of decision unless a party litigant timely invokes the law of a foreign state. In such event he must demonstrate that the latter rule of decision will further the interest of the foreign state and therefore that it is an appropriate one for the forum to apply to the case before it. (Hurtado v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574, 581.) As Seattle Times never asserted the alleged conflict of law in its motion and urged why Washington law as opposed to California law should control the discovery dispute, it has forfeited this claim on appeal.

In any event, the argument fails on the merits. Seattle Times overlooks the compelling interests California has in preventing or limiting disclosure of the records at issue here. Under our state Constitution, all Californians have a right to privacy. (Cal. Const, art. I, 1.) This right to privacy, which encompasses records created within the state when a resident was living here, does not evaporate simply because a resident moves out of state. If privacy rights were as transitory as Seattle Times implies, the privacy of records such as those at issue here would be in a constant state of flux, depending on the current residency of the individuals who are subjects of those records. Moreover, the records here arguably implicate not only Cowleys privacy rights but also all others whose names appear in the broad array of documents Seattle Times seeks. California also has a compelling interest in protecting those individuals right to privacy. Finally, California is the state that has the most significant relationship with the records, as they were created here and remain here. Accordingly, we reject the argument Washington law applies to this discovery dispute.

III

Standard Of Review

Seattle Times argues we should review the trial courts order as a matter of law, while Cowley argues for an abuse of discretion standard. We agree with Cowley.

A trial courts ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., Grannis v. Board of Medical Examiners (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 551, 566.) Where there is a basis for the trial courts ruling and it is supported by the evidence, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court. (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612.) The trial courts determination will be set aside only when it has been demonstrated that there was no legal justification for the order granting or denying the discovery in question. (Ibid.) If the trial court reaches the correct result, we will not disturb it on appeal merely because the trial court gave the wrong reasons for its ruling. (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19.)

IV

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

In Granting The Motion To Quash

Seattle Times contends the court erred in ruling Cowleys employment records or personnel records from Folsom State Prison were not discoverable.

We begin with the flawed premise on which Seattle Times bases its argument. Seattle Times did not request only Cowleys employment or personnel records. Rather, it requested from Folsom State Prison a copy of any and all documents within its possession or under its control that constitute, reflect or relate in any manner whatsoever to Peter M. Cowley . . . . The breadth of this request is the problem. We explain by first discussing the right to privacy and its interplay with a civil litigants right to discovery and then discussing the case relied upon by the trial court to quash the subpoena and its relationship to the facts here.

The California Constitution guarantees all Californians the right to privacy. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 16.) The right to privacy, however, is not absolute. In appropriate circumstances, this right must be balanced against other important interests. [Citation.] On occasion [a partys] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponents right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery. [Citation.] (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1199 (John B.).)^[4]

Here, the trial court ruled Seattle Times had not met its burden of showing the records . . . [we]re directly relevant to the issues in the defamation action, noting that [m]erely seeking emotional distress damages in a lawsuit does not entitle defendants to inquire into all aspects of a plaintiffs life to determine if other stressors may have contributed to any emotional distress suffered by plaintiff, citing Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008 (Davis). We agree with the trial court that Davis applies, but not for the reasons it stated.

In Davis, the petitioner (Davis) and her husband filed a garden variety complaint for general damages for pain and suffering arising out of personal injuries she incurred in an automobile accident. (Davis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1011, 1015.) The defendant, who was the driver of the vehicle, subpoenaed all of Daviss treatment records from the Cedar Womans Center. (Id. at p. 1011.) Davis filed a motion to quash the subpoena and requested a protective order to limit discovery to directly relevant medical history of a 10-year period prior to the accident. (Ibid.) She also filed a supplemental declaration stating she made no claim for damages for mental and emotional distress apart from her claim for damages for pain and suffering associated with the injuries sustained in the automobile accident and the Cedar Womans Center provided her no treatment in connection with the injuries for which she sought compensation. (Id. at p. 1015.) The trial court denied the motion to quash, limited discovery to the last 10 years, and directed the records be kept confidential and used only for this case. (Id. at p. 1011.) Davis filed a petition for writ of mandate contending, among other things, the trial courts order invaded her constitutional right of privacy. (Id. at pp. 1011-1013.)

The appellate court held that the mere act of filing a personal injury action asking for general damages for pain and suffering does not tender the plaintiffs mental condition so as to make discoverable postinjury psychotherapeutic records. (Davis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011.) In reaching its holding, the appellate court was mindful of the broad range of materials sought by the driver that encompassed any and all medical or hospital records relating to the care and treatment of petitioner to date. (Id. at p. 1017.) The appellate court noted the driver made no attempt to limit the request to specific matters directly relevant to [Davis]s pain and suffering from the physical injuries and the request was overbroad because it necessarily encompasses privileged material which is not relevant to the lawsuit. (Id. at pp. 1017-1018.)

Davis demonstrates the discovery request here is also overbroad.^[5] Seattle Times sought a copy of any and all documents possessed by or under the control of Folsom State Prison that constitute, reflect or relate in any manner whatsoever to Peter M. Cowley. (Italics added.) This request encompassed every single document possessed or controlled by Folsom State Prison that related in any way to Cowley. This included, for example, all inmates dental records where Cowley (presumably as the treating dentist) was mentioned. It also included all documents tendered by third parties to Folsom State Prison related to Cowley, no matter what their nature and no matter what privacy concerns of the third parties the records implicated. Without an effort by Seattle Times to craft a discovery request limited to specific items directly relevant to Cowleys defamation case, the request is overbroad. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Cowleys motion to quash the subpoena.

V

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

In Awarding Sanctions

When a discovery request is overbroad on its face and its full scope does not appear reasonably related to the issues in the case, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the requirements of the subpoena were to harass and improperly burden. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) We review a trial courts decision to impose discovery sanctions for manifest abuse. (Kuhns v. State of California (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 982, 988.) As we have explained, the discovery request here asked for literally every single document possessed by or under the control of Folsom State Prison that related in any way to Cowley. Seattle Times never explained how all of these documents were directly relevant to Cowleys defamation claim. A trial court could reasonably conclude such a request was oppressive. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial courts sanction order.

VI

Seattle Times May Still Seek Specific Records

Directly Relevant To Cowleys Defamation Claim

Notwithstanding our holding, Seattle Times is not without recourse. Our opinion does not prevent Seattle Times from seeking specific records that are directly relevant to Cowleys defamation claim by a narrowly drawn discovery request. (See Davis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.)

In the event Seattle Times seeks specific records, we offer the following observations. We begin with the elements of a cause of action for defamation in Washington to frame what Cowley will be required to show to prevail on his claim. In Washington, a cause of action for defamation includes the following elements: (1) Did the defendant make a false statement that caused damage to the plaintiffs reputational or other compensable interest? (2) If so, should the defendant be held liable for the damage? (Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc. (1997) 87 Wn.App. 579, 589, fn. omitted.) The first question addresses whether the defendant engaged in wrongful conduct, and whether that conduct caused harm to the plaintiff. Its facets include, at a minimum, (a) whether the defendant uttered the statement in issue; (b) whether the statement in issue was false in whole or in part; and (c) whether the statements falsity, if any, was a cause of damage to the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 589, italics added.)

Given Cowleys need to prove a causal link between the defamation and emotional distress he claims to have suffered, we believe records reflecting Cowleys prior complaints of emotional distress are directly relevant to his defamation claim. We do not read Davis as undercutting Seattle Timess ability to access Folsom State Prisons records reflecting Cowleys prior complaints of emotional distress. In fact, when the Davis court was confronted with a claim by the driver that she had a right to obtain records of the Cedar Womans Center that may reflect [Daviss] complaints of pain and suffering associated with physical injuries, the Davis court stated such information appeared relevant since the issue of physicality ha[d] been tendered. (Davis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018, fn. 6.)

We do not believe, however, records relating to Cowleys reputation at Folsom State Prison or CDC are directly relevant to the defamation claim. Contrary to the argument made by Seattle Times, Cowleys assertion in his complaint the allegedly false and defamatory statements tended to lower [his] esteem in the community and to prejudice him in his profession, trade, vocation, or office did not implicate his overall reputation as a dentist. It is clear that Cowley left dentistry practice in California and the relevant community was, as the trial court found, the one in which he found himself now, Snohomish County or thereabouts. Moreover, we fail to see how the records of CDC or Folsom State Prison could have damaged Cowleys professional reputation at large given the private nature of those records.

As to all of Cowleys employment records at CDC and Folsom State Prison, we also believe they are not directly relevant to Cowleys defamation claim. Seattle Times contends that Cowleys entire employment history at CDC and Folsom is directly relevant to show whether the articles it published were the sole reason for the Tulalip tribes termination of Cowley and his inability to find a job, to show whether the articles were substantially true as evidenced by the significant problems Cowley experienced at [CDC] and Folsom, and to show whether Cowley is credible.

We fail to see how Cowleys employment history at Folsom and CDC is directly relevant to Tulalips decision to terminate Cowley, as the tribes stated reason for wanting to terminate Cowley did not relate to that employment history. Moreover, Cowley is not claiming he is unable to find employment, so his employment history that may bear on his difficulty finding employment is irrelevant. We also fail to see how Cowleys entire employment history is directly relevant to establishing the truth of the articles. It may be that certain records pertaining to Cowleys employment history, for example, employment records reflecting Cowley lied in the past (such as fabricating allegations against coworkers), would be directly relevant to test his credibility in the defamation claim, where one of Cowleys contentions regarding the articles veracity related to whether he disclosed his criminal history to the Tulalip tribes.

Finally, we note that although some of the documents we have discussed appear directly relevant to Cowleys defamation claim, their disclosure is not required unless, upon balance, the right of Seattle Times to discover relevant facts outweighs the privacy interests of persons whose records are subject to discovery. (John B., supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1199.)

DISPOSITION

The orders quashing the subpoena and awarding sanctions are affirmed. Cowley shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1).)

ROBIE , J.

We concur:

NICHOLSON , Acting P.J.

RAYE , J.

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^[1] The three statements Cowley identified as false and defamatory were: (1) he was convicted in Sacramento County, Calif., in 2000 of indecent exposure, disorderly conduct, loitering and obstruction or resisting arrest, all misdemeanors; (2) he hadnt disclosed his criminal record when he started working at the clinic; and (3) a Sacramento County, Calif., jury convicted him only of obstruction or resisting arrest.

^[2] Elsewhere in its argument, Seattle Times contends Californias direct relevance standard was superseded by a recent case from our Supreme Court. Later in the Discussion, we will address this argument.

^[3] Elsewhere in its opposition, Seattle Times did cite to the direct relevance standard that governs in California. However, nowhere in the motion did it argue the conflict in California and Washington law or that Washington law and not California law should apply.

^[4]John B. was filed after the trial court issued its ruling here. Therefore, the trial court cited Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, to enunciate the necessary showing a civil litigant must make to obtain discovery when privacy rights are implicated. Board of Trustees states that even when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. (Id. at p. 525, italics added.)

In a footnote, Seattle Times contends the direct relevance standard enunciated in Board of Trustees has been superseded by our Supreme Courts decision in John B. These two cases do not articulate a different standard. In fact, in John B., supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 1199, our Supreme Court relied on another Supreme Court case reiterating that an implicit waiver of a partys constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiffs claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit. (Vinsonv.Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 842, italics added.) Our Supreme Court would not have cited to the very page on which this quotation from Vinson appeared had it meant to overrule this standard of direct relevance.

^[5] The broadness of a discovery request is part and parcel of the issue of privacy. (Boler v. Superior Court (1987) 201 Cal.App.3d 467, 475.)