Filed 4/2/18 Danielle D. v. Superior Court CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



DANIELLE D.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY,
Respondent;
SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Real Party in Interest.




A153443

(Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. 3890-DEP)


Petitioner Danielle D. (Mother), mother of six-year-old J.D., filed in propria persona, an extraordinary writ, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, after the juvenile court set the matter for a permanency planning hearing on January 11, 2018, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. In her petition, Mother does not challenge any of the findings and orders made at the January 11 hearing, but instead seeks extraordinary relief from the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders previously made on March 14, 2017.

The Department has filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s writ petition on the grounds that it is procedurally inadequate and the arguments raised are time barred. For the reasons discussed herein, we agree with the Department and shall therefore grant the motion to dismiss the petition for extraordinary writ.
DISCUSSION
I. The Writ Petition is Procedurally Inadequate Under Rule 8.452(b)
In enacting section 366.26, the Legislature “sought to achieve substantive as well as expeditious review of the trial court’s order[]” in cases such as the present one. (In re Glen C. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 581 (Glen C.); see § 366.26, subd. (l)(4)(A) & (B).) A writ petition challenging an order setting a section 366.26 hearing must nonetheless comply with the requirements set forth in rule 8.452. A petition is therefore required to include a “summary of the grounds of the petition.” (Rule 8.452(a)(1)(D).) It must also be accompanied by a memorandum that includes first, “a summary of the significant facts, limited to matters in the record” (rule 8.452(b)(1)); second, a statement of “each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point and support[ing] each point by argument and citation of authority” (rule 8.452(b)(2)); and third, support for “any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the record. . . .” (Rule 8.452(b)(3).)
In short, while a writ petition is to be “liberally construed” (rule 8.452(a)(1)), “the points and authorities must, at a minimum, adequately inform the court of the issues presented, point out the factual support for them in the record, and offer argument and authorities that will assist the court in resolving the contested issues.” (Glen C., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.)
In this case, Mother’s petition was accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities that failed to comply with the requirements of rule 8.452(b) in that it contains many factual assertions that are not in the record (rule 8.452(b)(1)); it does not state each point under a separate heading and does not support points made by any real argument or citation of authority (rule 8.452(b)(2)); and it contains no citation to the record (rule

8.452(b)(3)). Dismissal is thus appropriate based on Mother’s failure to comply with these requirements. (See Glen C., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 583-584.)
II. The Issues Raised in the Writ Petition Are Waived
“Various provisions of the statutory scheme strictly control the timing and manner of appeal or writ review of the critical findings and orders that can culminate in an order terminating parental rights, their primary goal being to expedite finality and thereby achieve permanency for the child.” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405-406.) In light of this goal, any orders not appealed in a timely manner are subject to the waiver rule. (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1151 (Meranda P.).)
“The waiver rule as applied in dependency cases flows from section 395, under which the dispositional order is an appealable judgment, and all subsequent orders are directly appealable without limitation except for post 1994 orders setting a .26 hearing, which are subject to writ review ([rule 8.452]) and related limitations (§ 366.26, subd. (l)).[ ] A consequence of section 395 is that an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order. [Citations.] In other words, ‘A challenge to the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.’ [Citation.] The rule serves vital policy considerations of promoting finality and reasonable expedition, in a carefully balanced legislative scheme, and preventing late-stage ‘sabotage of the process’ through a parent’s attacks on earlier orders. [Citation.]” (In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355, citing In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 206-207 (Janee J.) & Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150.) The waiver rule is equally applicable to belated claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Meranda P., at p. 1151.)
Here, although Mother’s notice of intent to file writ petition was from the findings and orders following the January 11, 2018 hearing in which the court set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, as noted, her petition seeks relief only from the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders made on March 14, 2017, at which time she was represented by counsel. Her allegations include “(1) Attorney negligence; (2) No Reasonable Effort made; (3) Denied discovery; (4) Denied right to a fair trial; (5) No witnesses were present at my trial though there were witnesses willing to testify on my behalf; (6) siblings have unusually strong bond; (7) both my trial and this case have taken more time than allowed causing detriment to my child; (8) it is in the best interest of my children.” She also argues generally that “[t]here were many errors which impacted the decision by the court on March 14, 2017 to bypass me for services in regards to my children . . .” and J.D.
None of these contentions relate to any order made at the status review hearing held on January 11, 2018, when the court terminated the father’s reunification services and set the matter for a hearing under section 366.26. Nor do the contentions implicate any defects that “fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme” such that Mother was kept from availing herself of “the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole.” (Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 208-209.) Accordingly, Mother has waived review of her contentions challenging the court’s now final orders from the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. (See In re Jesse W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 355; Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is dismissed. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)



_________________________
Kline, P.J.


We concur:


_________________________
Richman, J.


_________________________
Stewart, J.