Davidson v. Superior Court

Filed 10/5/07 Davidson v. Superior Court CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Geoffrey T. Glass, Judge. Affirmed.

Buffington Law Firm, Roger J. Buffington, Kaden J. Kennedy; Law Office of Henry B. LaTorraca and Henry B. LaTorraca for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

Songstad & Randall, Janet E. Humphrey and Damon D. Eisenbrey for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

* * *

Disagreements among church members resulted in the resignation of the minister and a fight for control over the church. That fight landed in the lap of the superior court. One faction of ousted church trustees sought a writ of mandate to have themselves reinstated as trustees. That relief was granted, because of certain irregularities in connection with the ouster.

However, the congregation voted to ratify the ouster of these individuals. The individuals in question are still fighting. Now, they seek relief beyond that requested in their original writ petition, including an order to the effect that all acts taken by the board of trustees at the first ouster meeting and every subsequent meeting are void. The superior court did not err in declining to grant them additional relief and in entering a judgment of dismissal, inasmuch as the congregation has ratified their ouster as trustees. We affirm.

I

FACTS

On June 2, 2006, Wilton Davidson and Loren T. Erickson filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 petition for a writ of mandate. On June 23, 2006, they filed a second petition, for an alternative writ of mandate, with expanded points and authorities. In each petition, they asserted that they were members of the seven-member board of trustees of the Golden Circle Church of Religious Science and that they had been unlawfully removed from the board at an improperly noticed meeting held on May 28, 2006. They also claimed that, at that same meeting, Tom Hodges was improperly voted in as a replacement trustee. Davidson and Erickson requested a writ of mandate directing the church to reinstate them as trustees and to remove Hodges as trustee. Hodges and the church filed oppositions and a demurrer to the petitions.

The court granted at least partial relief. Its minute order of August 23, 2006 provided in pertinent part: Because of the uncertainties and irregularities associated with the process by which the petitioners were voted out, many of which were caused by parties associated with the respondent, the court GRANTS the writ and orders the petitioners reinstated on the board as of May 28. The two members of the board who replaced the petitioners will be removed, without prejudice to any future elections.

On September 8, 2006, the church and Hodges filed a response to writ of mandate and Davidson and Erickson filed an application for an order to show cause re contempt. In their application, Davidson and Erickson alleged that Davidson had been denied access to the church building and told that the police would be called if he attempted to enter. They also alleged that counsel for the church had expressed the position that they were no longer members of the church and thus could not serve on its board of trustees. In addition, Davidson and Erickson said that Hodges continued to claim that he was the president of the board of trustees, even though he had been removed from office by court order.

Davidson and Erickson asked the court for an order requiring the church and Hodges to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the August 23, 2006 order. They also requested a judgment providing that: (1) they were restored as trustees effective May 28, 2006 with full access to the church; (2) the board of trustees as of May 28, 2006 consisted exclusively of Mary Jo Mosher and themselves; and (3) Hodges was removed from office.

In response, the church and Hodges filed both an opposition to the application and a motion for judgment of dismissal. In their pleadings, they asserted full compliance with the August 23, 2006 order. They stated that the day after they received the order, Davidson and Erickson were reinstated on the church board and the two board members who had previously replaced them were removed. Then, after providing notice as required by the church bylaws, another special meeting of the board was called to remove Davidson and Erickson as trustees. At the September 3, 2006 special meeting, Davidson and Erickson were removed as trustees again. In their pleadings, the church and Hodges also asserted that the request of Davidson and Erickson for relief was moot, inasmuch as the two had been expelled from the church at a July 2, 2006 special membership meeting.

The court denied the application for order to show cause re contempt and granted the motion to dismiss. It then entered a judgment of dismissal. Davidson and Erickson appeal.

II

DISCUSSION

A. BACKGROUND:

Article IV, section 1 of the church bylaws provides for a seven-member board of trustees. In early May 2006, the board consisted of president Sally Warrick, and trustees Robert Costes, Davidson, Erickson, Mitzi Fisher, Mosher, and Donnee Prestia. Fisher submitted a letter terminating her church membership effective May 11, 2006. Warrick, Costes, and Prestia each tendered his or her resignation as trustee, effective May 28, 2006. According to the declarations of Warrick, Costes, and Prestia, at the time of resignation, each of them intended his or her resignation to be effective as of midnight on the date in question.

At the controversial May 28, 2006 special meeting of the board of trustees, four members were present, i.e., Warrick, Costes, Mosher and Prestia. They elected Tom Hodges to fill the position of Fisher. Hodges then joined the meeting. The five members then elected Elma Powers to fill the seat of Davidson and Susan Golden to fill the seat of Erickson. Powers and Golden then joined the meeting. Thereafter, the board accepted the resignation of Costes and elected Lauren Maddison to fill his seat. It also accepted the resignation of Prestia and elected Sandra Satterwhite to fill her seat. In addition, the board accepted the resignation of Warrick, with her seat to be filled at a later date. Finally, the board selected Hodges as president.

At the conclusion of what Davidson and Erickson call the illegal board meeting, the board of trustees consisted of Hodges as president, and trustees Golden, Maddison, Mosher, Powers and Satterwhite, with one seat open. The board as thus constituted voted unanimously on that date to terminate the memberships of Davidson, Erickson, Bob Gover and Virgil Snow. Termination letters were then sent to those four persons.

Shortly thereafter, Davidson and Erickson filed their first writ petition and sought to take control of the church by establishing an alternate board, which they asserted to be the lawful one. They called a special meeting of the alternate board in June 2006. They represent that they invited Mosher to participate, but she declined. At the June 2006 alternate board meeting, Davidson and Erickson appointed Charles Ditchey to the board. Davidson and Erickson also represent that they held other meetings and eventually established a board consisting of themselves, Ditchey, Mosher, Blayne Henton, Peter Cresswell, and Antoinette Del Peral as trustees.

With the writ petition pending and the uncomfortable existence of two feuding boards, certain members of the congregation sought to shore up the foundations of the church by holding a special meeting of the members. Out of a congregation of 85 or 90 members, Hodges received petitions from 29 members calling for a special meeting. The meeting was convened on July 2, 2006. 49 votes were cast to affirm the Golden Circle Church Board of Trustees, specifically: Tom Hodges, Mary Jo Mosher, Elma Powers, Lauren Maddison, Sandra Satterwhite and Susan Golden, and also affirm all actions taken by the Board on behalf of the Golden Circle Church. 13 votes were cast to the contrary. Two church members abstained from voting.

After receipt of the August 23, 2006 minute order, Hodges, as president of the board, sent a notice dated August 29, 2006 to Davidson, Jan Elinsky, Erickson, Maddison, Mosher, and Satterwhite. The notice stated that, in accordance with the court order, Davidson and Erickson were reinstated to the board of trustees. It also stated that a special meeting of the board would be held on September 3, 2006, for the purpose of voting to expel Davidson and Erickson from the board for conduct not in harmony with the purpose of the Golden Circle Church. That same date, Hodges also sent separate notices to Davidson and Erickson in which he informed them that they were reinstated to the board of trustees and that there would be a special meeting of the board of trustees on September 3, 2006. The notices also asked Davidson and Erickson to be present for the meeting, and notified them that they would be removed as trustees at the meeting.

At the September 3, 2006 meeting call to order, Hodges announced that, in compliance with the court order, Davidson and Erickson had been reinstated to the board of trustees as of May 28, 2006. Hodges, Maddison, Mosher and Satterwhite were in attendance, but Davidson and Erickson were not. The board members in attendance ratified the appointment of Elinsky to the board, to fill the seat vacated by Warrick. The minutes of the September 3, 2006 meeting stated that Elinsky had been properly appointed to the board after May 28, 2006, but that, out of an abundance of caution, her prior appointment was being ratified. The five board members, including Elinsky, then voted unanimously to remove Erickson from the board and to appoint Golden to fill his seat. The six board members, including Golden, then voted unanimously to remove Davidson from the board and to appoint Powers to fill his seat.

B. ANALYSIS:

(1) Introduction

Mandate is the principal extraordinary writ surviving under California law. It issues to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . . . (Code Civ. Proc.,  1085, subd. (a), italics added.) It is said that the writ rests in the discretion of the issuing court, but becomes a matter of right when the plaintiff shows that there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. [Citations.] (City of King City v. Community Bank of Central California (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 913, 925.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, providing for writs of mandate, permits challenges to ministerial acts by [the holder of the office, trust or station]. To obtain such a writ, the petitioner must show (1) a clear, present, ministerial duty on the part of the respondent and (2) a correlative clear, present, and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty. [Citations.] (Alliance for a Better Downtown Millbrae v. Wade (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 123, 128-129.) On appeal following a trial courts decision on a petition for a writ of mandate, the reviewing court need only review the record to determine whether the trial courts findings are supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] However, we review questions of law independently. [Citation.] (Id. at p. 129.)

The question before the trial court was whether Davidson and Erickson had met their burden to prove clear, present, ministerial duties on the part of the church and Hodges, and a clear, present, and beneficial right in themselves to the performance of those duties. The record contains no statement of decision, so we do not know the precise reasoning of the court underlying its ruling. That being the case, all intendments will favor the trial courts ruling and it will be presumed on appeal that the trial court found all facts necessary to support the judgment. [Citation.] (Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 104.) Therefore, we presume the trial court found that Davidson and Erickson had failed to meet their burden of proof as to at least one of the two identified elements. We determine whether this finding is supported by substantial evidence. (Alliance for a Better Downtown Millbrae v. Wade, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th

at p. 129.)

(2) May 28, 2006 Meeting

Davidson and Erickson claim the May 28, 2006 meeting was illegal and all acts flowing therefrom were void. As they note, article V, section 5 of the church bylaws requires that notice of a special meeting of the board of trustees be given orally to each trustee and confirmed by mail, at least three days before the meeting. They insist that the notice given did not comply with the bylaws, and that there were other procedural irregularities tainting the meeting.^[1]

According to the declaration of Warrick, she gave oral notice to Costes, Mosher and Prestia, and thereafter, on May 25, 2006, provided e-mail notice to those three persons, and Davidson and Erickson as well. She also claimed that e-mail was the primary method of communication for the board of trustees. In addition, Warrick said she directed Prestia to provide facsimile notice to Erickson, because he had previously stated facsimile notice was his preference. Prestia also provided a declaration, in which she stated that she provided the facsimile notice to Erickson on May 25, 2006. Based on a reading of the bylaws alone, it would appear that the notice was defective, inasmuch as oral notice was not provided to Davidson and Erickson and there is no indication that confirmation was provided to any trustee by mail.

Interestingly, the church and Hodges cite no authority addressing whether the notice could have been satisfactory, despite lack of technical compliance with the bylaws, on account of custom and practice. They also cite no authority with respect to the effect of actual notice. Warrick declared that Davidson and Erickson each had actual notice of the meeting. According to Warrick, each of them was present at church at the start of the meeting. However, they each refused to participate in the meeting. Erickson left the premises when the meeting started. Davidson, on the other hand, remained in the church but declined to attend the meeting. The church and Hodges do not address whether Davidson and Erickson should be estopped to deny receipt of sufficient notice with respect to the special meeting of May 28, 2006.

Based on the record and arguments before us, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the courts factual finding as expressed in its August 23, 2006 order, to the effect that there were irregularities in connection with the May 28, 2006 meeting. At this point, however, Davidson and Ericksons complaint with respect to the order is that it was too limited in scope. They contend that the court should not have simply ordered their reinstatement and the removal of the two board members who replaced them, but should have invalidated all actions taken at the May 28, 2006 board meeting. In other words, the court should have gotten rid of all of the board members elected at that meeting, so that the illegal board would have been unable to take further actions, such as scheduling the special membership meeting of July 2, 2006 and the special board meeting of September 3, 2006, and following through with the actions taken at those meetings.

However, Davidson and Erickson did not request this relief in their writ petition. They requested that the court reinstate themselves and remove Hodges. They did not request that the court also remove Maddison and Satterwhite and leave a three-member board consisting only of themselves and Mosher. But once they realized that the order left a functional board, one able to take actions they did not like, they returned to court seeking to expand the scope of their original writ petition.

The information then before the court, however, included information about both the July 2, 2006 special meeting of the members of the congregation and the September 3, 2006 special meeting of the board. Before it ruled, the court also had before it the motion for judgment of dismissal.

Without a statement of decision, we do not know the courts precise reasoning in granting the motion for judgment of dismissal. However, as the reporters transcript of the October 16, 2006 hearing reflects, the court made clear that it never intended to remove all board members purportedly elected at the May 28, 2006 meeting. The court articulated that the intent of the August 23, 2006 order was to remove only the two trustees who purportedly had been elected to replace Davidson and Erickson and to reinstate the latter two. The court specifically stated that it never had any intention to leave the church with a nonexistent board or a board consisting of no one other than Davidson, Erickson and Mosher.^[2]At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under submission. Whatever the particular reason underlying the courts ultimate determination to enter the judgment of dismissal, substantial evidence, as we shall show, supports an implied finding that neither the church nor Hodges then owed any clear, present, ministerial duty to Davidson and Erickson that would support a grant of relief under the writ petition.

(3) July 2, 2006 Special Membership Meeting

As stated above, at the July 2, 2006 special membership meeting, 49 members of the congregation voted to affirm a board of trustees consisting of Golden, Hodges, Maddison, Mosher, Powers, and Satterwhite and also to affirm all actions taken by that board. Davidson and Erickson contend this vote was ineffective, for several reasons. First, they contend that the meeting was improperly lead by Reverend Sharon Hudson. Second, they argue that, in advance of the meeting, the membership voting list was not posted in compliance with the bylaws. Third, they assert that the bylaws do not permit the members of the congregation to remove or terminate other members, even by a vote at a special meeting. We address these contentions in turn.

As Davidson and Erickson correctly point out, article VII, section 4 of the bylaws state that the president shall preside at all church meetings. That provision also states that in the event of the inability of the president to act, the vice-president shall preside, and in the event of the inability of the vice-president to act, the board of trustees shall select a president pro tempore.

Here, the subject matter of the meeting was whether the president and the entire allegedly tainted board were to continue leading the church and whether the acts of that board should be affirmed. One could reasonably find that Hodges, as president, and the other trustees, each suffered an inability to preside over the meeting, due to conflicts of interest. Consequently, an alternate was invited to preside. The alternate was Reverend Hudson, the ecclesiastical representative from the United Church of Religious Science, the head church of Golden Circle Church of Religious Science. According to Reverend Hudson, [it was her] role as an Ecclesiastic Representative, to assist the churches under [her] care and support them during periods of transitions. She was, in effect, selected to act as president pro tempore to preside over the meeting. Davidson and Erickson have not shown how this violated the bylaws.

Davidson and Erickson also complain that, at the meeting, Reverend Hudson refused to entertain either discussion on the subject matter of the vote or proper motions from members. However, their assertions, and the supporting declarations, are too vague to support a determination of error on Reverend Hudsons part.

Next, Davidson and Erickson argue that certain provisions of the bylaws pertaining to voting were violated. Article III, section 2 of the bylaws provides: The members of this church shall be classified as voting and nonvoting members immediately prior to regular or special meetings of the membership. (Italics added.) In addition, article III, section 2c states: The Membership Committee shall prepare and post a list of the voting members at least ten (10) days prior to the holding of any regular or special meeting of the membership. The completed list shall be approved by the Board of Trustees. Only voting members appearing on said list, or who can establish at any such meeting that they qualify as voting members . . . , shall be eligible to vote on any matter which may be submitted to the membership. (Italics added.) Davidson and Erickson assert that there is no evidence of compliance with the requirements of article III, section 2c, many members on the posted voting list were not permitted to vote, and some of the proxy votes were not counted.

In his declaration, Hodges, on the other hand, stated that the requirements of article III, section 2c had been met. He elaborated: There is a permanent place on the bulletin board in the Social Hall at the Church which is labeled Voting members. A list of Voting Members is always posted there. In May, a revised Voting Member list was posted with an effective date of May 21, 2006. As such, a Voting list was posted at least ten (10) days prior to the Special Meeting. The Bylaws at article III, section 2 also provide that the members of this church shall be classified as voting and nonvoting members immediately prior to regular or special meetings of the membership. This was done in a (previously recessed) board meeting convened at approximately 9:06 a.m. on July 2, 2006 specifically to approve the list of voting and nonvoting members. (Boldface and underscoring omitted.)

The declaration of Lynn Aldis was also provided. Aldis was a member of the church and a former trustee. Aldis said that she had been asked to conduct an audit of the vote to ensure that all ballots and proxies were received and correctly counted and also to compare the July 2, 2006, Membership List that was used to determine who was eligible to vote to the previous May 21, 2006, Membership List. She concluded that all ballots and proxies were counted accurately and that there was very little difference between the May 21 and July 2 Membership Lists, and any differences would not have changed the outcome of the meeting.

Aldis explained that she reviewed and re-counted each ballot and proxy. She also contacted each member identified on the July 2, 2006 membership list that had not voted, to confirm that those persons had neither voted in person nor submitted proxies. Aldis also declared: I then compared the July 2, 2006, Membership List to

the . . . May 21, 2006, Membership List. There were two additions to the July 2, 2006, Membership List . . . but neither person voted . . . . There were seven deletions: (1) [Davidson, Erickson], and Robert Gover and Virgil Snow were removed, since their membership was terminated . . . ; (2) [two others had] resigned . . . ; and (3) [one] was reclassified as a non-voting member since she had not attended Church in over a year. Finally, Aldis declared: Importantly, even if the May 21 Membership List was used and the seven (7) members who had been deleted from the July 2, 2006 Membership List had voted not to affirm, this would have only given [Davidson and Erickson] a total of 20 votes which is not a majority of members who voted. Conversely, even using the May 21, 2006 Membership List, there still would have been a majority vote of 49 votes to affirm. (Boldface omitted.)

As these two declarations show, a list was posted more than 10 days before the special membership meeting, as required by article III, section 2c. A list was prepared immediately prior to the meeting, in compliance with article III, section 2. Only persons who were identified on each of the two lists voted. Seven persons were named on the first list, but not on the second, including Davidson, Erickson, Gover and Snow. Davidson and Erickson cite no portion of the record containing declarations of any of these seven persons indicating whether or not they desired or attempted to vote.

In any event, the 49 votes were sufficient to carry the ratification of the composition of the board of trustees. The May 21, 2006 voting list reflected 90 members and the July 2, 2006 voting list showed 85 members. A total of 49 members, a clear majority of either voting list, voted to affirm the composition of the May 28, 2006 board and the acts undertaken by that board.

Davidson and Erickson assert that it does not matter how many members voted in favor of the illegal board and its acts, because the bylaws do not permit the removal or termination of members of the church by a vote of the members of the congregation. It is correct that the bylaws do not specify that members may be removed or terminated via a special membership meeting vote. However, it is also true that the bylaws place no restrictions on the types of matters the membership may take to a vote at a special meeting. Furthermore, it is also the case that the bylaws specifically permit both the removal of trustees and the replacement of those trustees, by a majority vote at a special membership meeting.

Article IV, section 11 of the bylaws provides: Any Board Member may be removed from the Board by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all the members on the Board, when in their prayerful judgment his conduct or loyalty is not in harmony with the purpose of the Church; or by a majority ballot vote . . . at any special membership meeting properly called for that purpose. In addition, article IV, section 6 of the bylaws provides that if a vacancy occurs on the board before the expiration of any regular term of office, the vacancy may be filled by appointment by a majority vote of the remaining trustees, or by a majority ballot vote . . . of the attending members at a special meeting called for that purpose. If a special membership meeting is called for the purpose of filling a trustee vacancy, this shall take precedence over an appointment by the Board.

In this case, the matter put to vote was the ratification of both the composition of the board, which excluded Davidson and Erickson, at the end of the May 28, 2006 meeting, and the acts of that board, which included the removal of Davidson and Erickson as trustees. In sum and substance, Davidson and Erickson were removed as trustees^[3]and replaced by other trustees, by a majority vote at a special membership meeting called for that purpose, as permitted by article IV, sections 6 and 11 of the bylaws.

(4) Special Board Meeting of September 3, 2006

In addition to claiming that the special meeting of May 28, 2006 was improperly called, Davidson and Erickson claim that the special meeting of September 3, 2006 was also improperly called. They assert that Hodges, as the purported president, had no authority to call the meeting because he was neither a trustee nor the president, having gained his purported trusteeship and presidency only at the tainted May 28, 2006 special meeting. Davidson and Erickson further contend that the court, having determined that the notice for the May 28, 2006 meeting was improper, also determined that everything that transpired at that meeting was a legal nullity. This, they say, means that Hodges could not have been elected to the board.

Davidson and Erickson misread the August 23, 2006 order. In that order, the court removed not Hodges, but the two trustees who had been elected to replace Davidson and Erickson. As the minutes of the May 28, 2006 meeting show, those persons were Golden and Powers. The court order did not declare the entire meeting a nullity and did not disturb Hodgess status as a trustee. Consequently, he did not act in contempt of court when he continued to act as president and when he called the September 3, 2006 special meeting of the board.^[4] Indeed, the August 23, 2006 court order explicitly provided that it was without prejudice to future elections.

(5) Conclusion

The thrust of the argument of Davidson and Erickson is that the trial court awarded insufficient relief in its August 23, 2006 order that it should have awarded broader relief than that requested. In essence, they argue that if the court found irregularities with respect to the May 28, 2006 meeting, then everything that went on at that meeting was void, and the court should have so ordered, even without being requested to do so. They also insist that all acts of the board occurring thereafter were void.

The court could have provided different relief in its August 23, 2006 order, but Davidson and Erickson did not originally seek the nullification of four trustee positions and all board actions after May 27, 2006. More importantly, the members of the congregation voted to ratify the composition of the May 28, 2006 board and the actions of that board, so that the church could proceed under stable, chosen leadership. The effect of that vote was not addressed in the August 23, 2006 order, because, as the court stated at the July 17, 2006 hearing on the writ petition, the matter had not then been put before the court. Impliedly, however, the effect of that vote was considered by the court before entering the judgment of dismissal. We infer all findings necessary to support the judgment of dismissal, including a finding that Davidson and Erickson were removed as trustees by a majority vote at the special membership meeting of July 2, 2006. Davidson and Erickson have not shown that the vote of the special membership was void.

The court did not err in declining to hold Hodges and the church in contempt or in entering the judgment of dismissal. Substantial evidence shows that by the time the contempt application and the motion for judgment of dismissal were before the court, Hodges and the church had no remaining duty to reinstate Davidson and Erickson as trustees.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Hodges and the church shall recover their costs on appeal.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, J.

FYBEL, J.

Publication courtesy of California pro bono lawyer directory.

Analysis and review provided by Chula Vista Property line attorney.

^[1] Davidson and Erickson raise a number of procedural issues, such as whether the president of the board was permitted to vote in the absence of a tie, whether it was possible for the remaining trustees to make the two-thirds vote necessary for trustee removal, and the effective dates of the resignations of certain trustees. However, we need not address every one of the asserted procedural irregularities, because as our opinion does not turn on the legal effect of the May 28, 2006 meeting.

^[2] Similarly, the trustees who resigned effective May 28, 2006 did so with the belief that the meeting was valid, and they still had the power to act as trustees until their replacements were elected at the meeting, so that a seven-member board would continue to steer the church. Indeed, Costes, Prestia and Warrick each filed a declaration in opposition to the writ petition stating that if the court reinstated Davidson and Erickson to the board, then on that condition, he or she would withdraw his or her prior resignation from the board.

^[3] Davidson and Erickson, in their writ petition, sought to be reinstated as trustees and their status as members of the church was not at issue. Consequently, we do not address their status as members of the church, only as trustees.

^[4] We need not detail each additional reason why Davidson and Erickson claim Hodges and the church acted in contempt.