Davis v. Aslan
Filed 3/22/06 Davis v. Aslan CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
| STEPHANIE DAVIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. MUZAFFER ASLAN, Defendant and Appellant; ALP ASLAN, Defendant and Respondent. | B177448 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SC061518) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Linda Lefkowitz and Gerald Rosenberg, Judges. Reversed.
Soukup & Schiff, Scott A. Schiff and Julie M. Weber for Plaintiffs and Appellants Davis.
Robert S. Gerstein for Defendant and Appellant Muzaffer Aslan.
Law Office of Kent M. Bridwell and Kent M. Bridwell for Defendant and Respondent Alp Aslan.
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This action comes before this court challenging the entry of a default judgment in a case that had been previously dismissed by the trial court. Having divested itself of the authority to act in the matter, the court was without power to enter that judgment. Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case is before us on a default judgment. Because the substance of the underlying claim is not at issue, and the facts related to the issues presented to us are undisputed, we will not review the underlying transaction in detail.
Stephanie Davis and her husband James Prince, the plaintiffs, respondents and cross-appellants in this matter (Davis) sued defendants, appellants, and cross-respondents Muzaffer, Rosa, and Alp Aslan (Aslan) on claims arising from a real estate transaction in which Muzaffer and Rosa Aslan were the sellers, and Alp the alleged broker. The written contract of sale contained an arbitration clause and, after a dispute arose between the parties, the parties filed a stipulation to arbitration in the trial court. That stipulation provided for a stay of the civil action, and agreed that no response to the complaint was required. The trial court did not stay the action, but instead dismissed it without prejudice, permitting the parties to proceed to arbitration. Neither party challenged the court's decision to proceed by way of dismissal, rather than stay.
After months of delay, the parties selected an arbitrator. Following a dispute concerning discovery, Aslan's lawyer withdrew from representation, and Aslan appeared in propria persona. The arbitrator withdrew from the case, and the parties returned to court on Davis's motion to appoint a new arbitrator or, in the alternative, restore the case to the civil active list; Aslan objected to both alternatives. At the hearing on the motion, after urging Aslan to obtain counsel, the court ordered the case restored to the civil active list and set a trial date.[1] Davis thereafter filed and mailed, but did not serve, a first amended complaint under the caption and case number of the case that had been dismissed. Aslan did not answer, and the court entered default on July 16, 2003.
Aslan thereafter retained counsel, who moved for relief from default, asserting both lack of jurisdiction and excusable neglect. The court denied the motion and entered final judgment against Muzaffer and Rosa Aslan only on June 22, 2004.[2] This timely appeal followed, as well as a timely cross-appeal challenging the amount of damages and the failure to enter judgment against Alp Aslan.
DISCUSSION
The threshold question raised on this appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the matter once it dismissed the case. If it did not, we need not resolve the other issues raised by the parties. This foundational question is one of law, resting on undisputed facts. Accordingly, our review is de novo. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799; Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 266.)
The Dismissal Terminated the Court's Jurisdiction
In the face of the parties' stipulation, the trial court dismissed the case by signed order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 581.)[3] That dismissal terminated the matter as to the parties[4] and divested the court of jurisdiction to hear or decide the later motion, or to reinstate the matter to the civil active list. Accordingly, the orders that followed were void.
Following a section 581 dismissal, the â€
