Filed 4/23/21 Diondria D. v. Superior Court CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Petition denied.

Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers; Law Office of Martin Lee, Bernadette Reyes and Anne Elder for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.

Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles, Margaret K. Lee and Ana Inguanzo, for Minor.

________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

At the continued disposition hearing for one-year-old A.W., the juvenile court found she could not safely be returned to either parent’s custody. The juvenile court denied reunification services for both parents and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] Mother, Diondria D., petitions for extraordinary relief, arguing that the juvenile court erred in its jurisdictional findings and in denying reunification services. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) We deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother has an extensive child welfare history which started in 2003. All five of A.W.’s siblings have been removed from mother’s custody and she has failed to reunify with any of them – sisters S.B. (born February 1999) and D.G. (born October 2002) and brothers T.A. (born February 2011), J.A. (born July 2012), and T.W. (born May 2017).

Mother’s history includes allegations that she had mental health and substance abuse problems and that her children had been neglected and subjected to physical and sexual abuse as well as domestic violence. In addition, mother was previously convicted of four counts of child cruelty under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death.

A.W., the youngest of mother’s six children and the subject of this petition, was born in September 2019. Because mother’s extensive history with the department is relevant to our analysis, we include significant detail about it.

1. Prior Removal of Mother’s Four Oldest Children (S.B., D.G., T.A., and J.A.) and Mother’s Failure to Reunify

Mother’s history with the Department of Children and Family Services (the department) began in Sacramento. A 2003 referral alleging domestic violence between mother and her ex-boyfriend was substantiated, but the abuse ended, and the children appeared well cared for. Later in 2003, a second referral alleged that mother, S.B., and D.G. were living in a home with 12 people in which there was drug activity and that the children were hungry and would ask the neighbors for food. The department was unable to find the family.

In 2008, mother learned that S.B.’s stepfather had sexually abused her when she was about three years old. Mother disclosed that the relationship also involved domestic violence. The report was inconclusive for physical and sexual abuse.

In 2009, mother contacted law enforcement after S.B.’s stepfather hit her. This investigation, too, was inconclusive.

Later that year, then six-year-old D.G. disclosed that her father had been sexually abusing her during visits. She disclosed that her father and his girlfriend would force her to perform oral sex on each of them and they would perform oral sex on her. She stated that her father threatened to slit her throat if she told anyone. The allegations were found to be substantiated.

In May 2012, the department received a report that mother had allowed a man and woman she did not know to take S.B. and D.G. away for an uncertain length of time. Mother also excluded S.B. from their motel room in the early morning hours.

Another referral alleged that mother physically abused S.B. and D.G. The following was reported: She assaulted them with her hands and with objects, resulting in bruising and marking. She called her daughters derogatory names, resulting in emotional distress. Mother bit D.G.’s wrist and, in the past, had struck her head and kicked her face, leading to bruising and a bleeding laceration. Mother struck S.B. in the head with an iron.

The juvenile court sustained a section 300 petition as to S.B., D.G., and T.A. and removed them from mother in May 2012.

After the incidents of May 2012, mother was convicted of multiple counts of child cruelty under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death, in violation of California Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a). Before trial, she was deemed mentally incompetent and committed to Patton State Mental Hospital.

Mother has an additional criminal history, including a 1998 conviction for first degree burglary (Pen. Code § 459) and a 2004 prison sentence for a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(1).)

J.A. was born in July 2012. At the time, mother and J.A. tested negative for drugs, but mother exhibited drug-seeking behavior by continuously asking for pain medication despite already having received it. A referral stated that mother admitted to using cocaine. J.A. was removed as a newborn.

The juvenile court ordered family reunification services, including parenting and anger management classes and individual counseling for mother. At the six-month review hearing, the court found mother and the fathers were not in compliance and terminated reunification services.

In 2014, D.G. reported that mother had hit her with a broom several years earlier. She said when the broom broke, mother stabbed her in the back with the broken end.

Mother did not comply with prior treatment orders, and did not reunify with S.B., D.G., T.A., or J.A. Her parental rights have been terminated as to T.A. and J.A. The record does not indicate whether her parental rights were terminated as to S.B. and D.G.

2. Termination of Parental Rights as to T.W.

In May 2017, a reporting party expressed concern about newborn T.W. The caller stated that, although mother was bonding with him and was calm and appropriate with him, mother had not been taking her prescribed psychotropic medication or getting other mental health services. The caller also reported that mother and father lacked stable housing.[2]

When investigated, father told a department social worker that he had not taken psychotropic medication since 2015. He admitted to having heard voices, but believed his condition was spiritual, not medical. He reported being a chronic heroin and cocaine user. He smelled of alcohol during the interview but denied being under the influence and said the liquid he was drinking was juice. The family had been chronically homeless for 10 years. Father said he was going to take T.W. away in his truck “upon discharge,” apparently referring to T.W.’s discharge from the hospital.

In November 2017, the juvenile court sustained a section 300 petition as to T.W. The petition documented mother’s diagnosed mental health and emotional problems, her failure to take psychotropic medication, her history of substance abuse, her three positive tests for amphetamines and methamphetamine during August and September 2017, and her physical abuse of T.W.’s older siblings. The petition also documented that father had a history of heroin and cocaine abuse and was a current abuser of alcohol. The court granted mother and father reunification services, which the court then terminated on August 15, 2018. Mother and father did not reunify with T.W. On January 8, 2019, the juvenile court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights as to T.W.

3. The Instant Proceedings Involving A.W.

a. The Referrals, the Initial Investigation, and the April 23, 2020 Detention Hearing

On February 27, 2020, a referral expressed concern about mother’s and father’s care of then five-month-old A.W.

During an initial interview with mother on March 9, 2020, she appeared to be coherent and sober. She discussed A.W.’s developmental progress and her schedule for physicals. Mother said she did not discipline A.W. because she is a baby. She said that she was physically disciplined as a child and does not agree with hitting as a form of discipline.

The social worker observed A.W. to be appropriately dressed, content, healthy, and bonded to both parents. She had no visible marks or bruises. The home appeared clean and organized, with no visible safety hazards.

Mother said she had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, which she described as a mixture of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. She said she was receiving an injection of Haldol once a month and was stable. Mother stated that when she was not medicated, she would hallucinate, see spirits, and think people were out to kill her. Her last such episode was when she delivered A.W. in September 2019. She said the pain medication for her C-section interacted or interfered with the psychotropic medications she was prescribed during her pregnancy. During the episode, she thought people were after her and wanted to kill her. She said she had not been in therapy for about six months, and that she was open to therapy but found it stressful because it involves discussions about her childhood.

Mother said she smoked marijuana when she was younger and would drink around the holidays but had stopped. She also said father would drink occasionally if there were a celebration. She and father agreed to a drug and alcohol test the next day. Mother admitted she had an arrest history, but claimed her arrests were for petty theft.

Father said his substance abuse history involved cocaine use in the 1980’s and 1990’s and heroin use a few times in the 1980’s. He said he has one or two beers if a game is on but denied having a drinking problem.

Mother and father both denied substance use issues. Both also denied that father has a mental health diagnosis.

On March 9, 2020, mother’s case manager at Enki Health Services, her mental health provider, called the department and said mother had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. The case manager reported that mother was in compliance with her medications and was cooperative with her assessments.

On March 10, 2020, mother tested positive for marijuana. She first told the department social worker that she does not use marijuana, but had eaten “weed” brownies weeks ago. She said she got them from a neighbor and at first did not realize what they were. She said she had not told the social worker because she did not think it would show up in her system. The social worker explained that marijuana can interact with her medication. Mother said she understood, and that father – who had not had any of the brownies – had been watching A.W. at the time.

Father tested positive for alcohol at a level of .19 percent on March 23, 2020. The department social worker spoke to father about the results. Father said he had already reported occasional drinking and said he had had a drink with a friend the day of the test. The social worker explained that the issue was not occasional drinking, but the high level detected. Father responded that the drink may have been 100 proof. The social worker said he would need to be in a program to help him, which father disputed.

On March 26, 2020, mother’s second toxicology screen was positive for marijuana at a higher level than her first results.

On April 14, 2020, a new referral alleged that D.G. visited her mother that day and observed mother high and father drunk. D.G. and father got into an argument, and father cornered her against a wall and threatened to shoot her if A.W. is removed.

The next day, a department social worker called D.G., who appeared to recant and withhold information. She said she and father had a disagreement and father got upset with her and yelled, but he did not threaten her or try to hurt her. She said mother was not involved in the incident and had not been high. She said she had been speaking “out of anger.”

Later that day, D.G. called back, explaining that she had been with either mother or both of her parents when the social worker called that morning, and could not speak candidly.

D.G. explained that father had gotten upset when she asked him to pick up her friend at a bus stop. D.G. said father was acting irrationally and claimed he was praying. D.G. left, but came back at mother’s request. D.G. said that when she returned, father was yelling. He slammed the door, kicked the empty baby stroller, and pushed mother while she was holding A.W. He picked up a wooden fruit basket and threw it at D.G., but it did not hit her. D.G. was not sure if it hit A.W. Father also threw a glass bowl at her, but that also missed. Father “got in her face” and threatened to hit her. A neighbor held him back. Father called D.G. a demon. More neighbors arrived and told D.G. to come upstairs so she would be safe. D.G. said she spent the night at a neighbor’s home in her mother’s complex. Mother went to the neighbors’ home and apologized to her. Father later apologized, too. D.G. then denied that mother was high, but said father was drinking from a bottle, from which mother took a drink.

Father called the department social worker on April 15, and accused D.G. of having been the aggressor. He said she threw the fruit basket, rushed him as though she was going to hit him, and called him a demon. Mother got on the phone and said D.G. was making it up. A department social worker called mother back to clarify some aspects of the incident, but “the story did not make sense” to the social worker.

The social worker spoke with the upstairs neighbor with whom D.G. had stayed the night before. The neighbor explained that father had been yelling at D.G., called D.G. and other women in the complex bitches, and called people demons. The social worker asked whether it was possible that D.G. was not telling the truth, and that in fact she had attacked father. The neighbor said no; she said father was the one who threw things and attacked D.G. In fact, the neighbor and her relative were so concerned that they went and retrieved D.G. from the home.

The social worker also spoke with foster mother. Foster mother said D.G. told her that father “cornered” her and accused her of seducing him. She also reported D.G. telling her that father was “drunk” and mother was “high.” Foster mother reported that D.G. said that father threw a fruit basket at her, but missed and hit A.W., that A.W. cried, and that mother picked her up. D.G. later clarified to the social worker that father had not accused her of seducing him, but rather, when they were in the car after the parents picked her up, he warned her against trying to seduce him.

Two days after this incident, department social workers returned to remove A.W from the home. They explained that there were still unaddressed substance use issues. Mother then admitted she had taken the pot brownie because it helps stabilize her. When the social workers noted that she had earlier claimed the consumption was inadvertent, mother admitted she had not been forthcoming out of fear that the department would remove A.W. When the social worker told mother that marijuana could interact with her psychotropic medications, mother disagreed and indicated she smoked to lower her anxiety. However, she also said she stopped using marijuana and father stopped drinking after the last drug test in March.

On April 20, 2020, the department filed a section 300 petition alleging then seven-month-old A.W. was a child coming within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j).

The juvenile court held a detention hearing on April 23, 2020. Mother submitted a parenting class certificate, which was illegible. She also submitted a February 2018 certificate from a drug treatment program, to which the court gave little weight due to its age. The juvenile court ordered A.W. detained and ordered twice weekly two-hour visits for mother and father.

b. Continued Investigation and the July 27, 2020 Jurisdiction / Disposition Hearing

In a July 27, 2020 jurisdiction / disposition report, the department recommended against offering reunification services.

The department reported that visitation was not going well. A.W.’s caregiver (also T.W.’s foster mother) reported that the parents sometimes were inappropriate during the visits. While mother sometimes read a book to A.W., other times they missed visits or would bring other people onto the call or walk away from the video. During the first visit, father cursed at the caregiver and blamed her for A.W.’s removal, causing her to end the call. In July, when A.W.’s teeth were coming in, father told A.W. to bite the caregiver.

Regarding her physical and emotional abuse of S.B. and D.G., mother said that was years ago and she was off her medication at the time. She said she was now on her medication and had been since 2017. Mother said she had not experienced suicidal ideation or visual hallucinations in years and had not been hospitalized for psychiatric treatment since 2016. She also said she had not done drugs in a long time. She admitted she did in the past, but said it was because she was homeless, her son had been taken away, and she was in “a bad place.” Regarding her recent positive marijuana tests, mother again admitted she ingested marijuana-laced brownies. This time, she said she thought it was not a problem because marijuana is legal.

As to the parent’s alcohol use, she said that when she drank, father watched A.W., and when he drank, she watched A.W. Still, she claimed she no longer used marijuana or alcohol. Mother also stated that father’s alcohol use was occasional -- if he was with friends or watching a game -- and that he did not drink every day.

The department contacted D.G. and they spoke about the mid-April incident. She said she had been at mother’s house for either three or four days. Every day she was there, either mother or father was drunk, which Mother explained by saying she was celebrating D.G. being home. D.G. also said she believed mother continued to have mental health problems, because she still thought that witches exist and because mother said her ex-boyfriend had a demon in him. D.G. said her mother would hit them as children “because she believe[d] that they were witches” and would call them witches and demons.

D.G. said she did not believe the parents were fit to care for A.W. She believed mother and father neglected A.W. She said they left her alone in her bed or stroller while they went in the back to drink or smoke marijuana. D.G. said she had to care for A.W. She said she gave A.W. a bath when she arrived because she was very dirty. She also said she had to clean A.W.’s bottles. D.G. reported that that when A.W. cried father would say the child had a demon in her and state, “I rebke you, demon.” D.G. believed A.W. was left alone in her stroller or bed when she was not present.

[u]c. Further Investigation and the Continued Disposition Hearing

On August 17, 2020, a department social worker called mother’s case manager at Enki. She confirmed that a patient must request their complete file to procure it, and that mother had been aware of this since June 2020.

The social worker called mother the same day. As was true every other time he had called mother, father answered the call, and mother put the phone on speaker so father could listen. The social worker relayed the information from the case manager about requesting her records. Father disputed what the social worker was saying. Mother calmed him down and told the social worker she understood and would request the records.

LA CADA sent a progress letter on August 14, 2020 confirming mother’s enrollment in the intensive outpatient program since April 27, 2020 and her attendance in individual and group counseling, anger management, relapse prevention, parenting classes, and weekly case management services. LA CADA reported that mother had been actively involved in her treatment, had worked on identifying triggers and coping mechanisms and on building a relapse prevention plan. She had remained sober her entire time at LA CADA. The letter reported that mother would continue in the intensive outpatient program and then would be dropped down to the outpatient level the following month.

On August 18, 2020, mother’s drug counselor reported that mother was doing well and had not missed any sessions.

On August 25, 2020, mother tested positive for alcohol at a level of .14 percent. When the department social worker reported the positive alcohol results, mother said that was impossible. She offered that perhaps she tested positive because her neighbor was cooking with wine, but she did not think cooking wine would make her test positive.

Mother’s and father’s visits with A.W. did not improve. As before, they sometimes canceled, often called late, and sometimes had other people on the calls. Foster mother reported an occasion when she had to end a visit early because father was cursing at her and accusing her of trying to steal A.W.

On a date in early August, the social worker called the parents and left them voice messages to let them know that foster mother had to cancel a visit because A.W. had a dentist appointment. Father called back later that day and left five voice messages in which his speech was slurred, and he yelled and cried. Father had a negative alcohol test that day, but the social worker noted that he may have tested early and then gotten a drink or that father may have an undiagnosed mental health condition.

During one week in mid-August, both parents missed their Monday and Wednesday visits. When the social worker spoke to them about this, they explained that they had not been able to pay their phone bill. On another occasion, the parents accidentally left foster mother a voice message in which they could be heard planning to take the children to Texas. They also could be heard talking about getting some medicine with $17 they had found.

On one occasion, Father left four voice mails for a department social worker over a roughly 25-minute period complaining that foster mother had not picked up a late phone call. Father told the social worker that foster mother should let them have phone visits despite the fact that they were late, and claimed foster mother was trying to make them look bad because she wants their daughter. He explained that they were late for their visit because they had to wait for their court-ordered class to end. Father also claimed foster mother will not let him talk to his daughter because she thinks he will try to get his son. Father then admitted he is trying to get his daughter first and will then try to get his son.

Other visits had problems as well. On August 28, 2020, the parents had a make-up visit scheduled, which was cut short because A.W. was sick. The parents missed their August 30, 2020 make-up visit and their August 31, 2020 visit. On A.W.’s first birthday in September, Mother and father failed to make their scheduled call. Foster mother called them that evening, but the call only lasted about a minute and a half.

The department was concerned that although mother and father were participating in services, they lacked insight about their situation, were not applying the skills they were learning in classes and therapy to their visits, and were not maintaining their bond with A.W.

Concerns about father’s mental health arose as well. After a visit with A.W. was cancelled, a department social worker called father. Father’s speech was again slurred, which he claimed was because “his teeth were out.” His speech continued to sound slurred during subsequent phone calls. Father called foster mother multiple times and hung up. The department social worker expressed concern that father, who was mother’s support system, had an undiagnosed mental health condition for which he was not getting appropriate treatment.

Efforts to obtain mother’s medical records from Enki continued. Mother said she would be going to Enki on September 11 and would request the records then. On September 15, mother said she still had not requested her records, but was on her way to do so. The records were never produced at the hearing.

On September 14, 2020 mother’s therapist at Enki stated that she had been seeing mother since May 27, 2020. Her sessions were weekly and, due to the pandemic, virtual. She said mother had good attendance and was making progress. Mother seemed engaged, responsive, and attentive and the therapist had never seen mother acting strangely. The therapist reported that mother’s treatment goal was to increase appropriate anger verbalization and expression. When a department social worker spoke to the therapist about getting the detention and jurisdictional reports, the therapist said she did not need them because she was “not focus[ed] on that.” The social worker responded that a reason for mother receiving counseling was to overcome trauma and understand the department’s concerns. The therapist still insisted she did not want the reports.

A psychiatric nurse practitioner with Enki explained that mother started taking psychotropic medication in October 2017. She stopped taking her medication in 2018, and then started again in 2019. She was prescribed a different medication during her pregnancy with A.W., but re-started her usual medication in October 2019 and had been taking it ever since. Mother was consistent with the appointments for her injections. She was inconsistent in meeting with the nurse practitioner for her medical appointments, but rescheduled her appointments when she missed them.

Mother submitted a letter from her therapist. The therapist reported Mother was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and dissociative identity disorder. The therapist reported that mother was compliant and engaged in services, which included individual therapy (for which mother timely attended the majority of the sessions), case management services, and medication services.

At the continued hearing, the juvenile court admitted the department’s and parents’ documents into evidence. The court acknowledged that the parents had made some efforts, but the efforts were not substantial enough given the “unresolved, longstanding issues.” The court found there was “no substantial probability that we’re going to be able to get where we need to be in the time that the law allows for these parents.” The court found by clear and convincing evidence that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) applied as to both parents and that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) applied as to mother, and therefore denied reunification services.

Mother and father each filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. Father’s counsel then filed a letter pursuant to Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, advising this court that he was unable to file a writ petition on the merits. The present petition for extraordinary relief followed on behalf of mother.

DISCUSSION

Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and denial of reunification services. She further contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the request to continue the jurisdictional hearing. We disagree and affirm.

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Findings as to Mother

“ ‘We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for sufficiency of the evidence. [Citations.]’ ” (In re J.L. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1433.) We review the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the order is appropriate. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)

Once the juvenile court finds a child to be endangered as described by one of the subdivisions of section 300, the child comes within the court’s jurisdiction. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491.) Once jurisdiction is established, “[a] jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a particular parent is not necessary for the court to enter orders binding on that parent . . . .” (Id. at p. 1492; see also In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for [asserting jurisdiction over a minor], a reviewing court can affirm” the jurisdictional finding if substantial evidence supports any of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that the petition enumerates.].)

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings based on father’s conduct are unchallenged. Thus, the juvenile court will continue to have jurisdiction over A.W. regardless whether mother’s challenge to the court’s findings are successful. Mother acknowledges this fact. This is a sufficient basis to deny the challenge to the jurisdictional finding.

Even if we were inclined to address the jurisdictional findings based on mother’s conduct, we would find sufficient evidence to support them. We disagree with mother’s contention that the juvenile court relied solely and erroneously on uncorroborated hearsay in sustaining the allegations against her. The juvenile court did not err in overruling mother’s untimely hearsay objections. Moreover, the hearsay evidence was corroborated.

“For purposes of this subdivision, an objection is timely if it identifies with reasonable specificity the disputed hearsay evidence and it gives the petitioner a reasonable period of time to meet the objection prior to a contested hearing.” (§ 355, subd. (c)(2).) The department presented most of the witnesses’ statements in its April 22, 2020 detention report. During the April 23, 2020 detention hearing, the juvenile court set the jurisdictional hearing for July 27, 2020. The department filed its jurisdiction/disposition report on July 14, 2020, 13 days before the July hearing. Mother first filed her objections to the hearsay evidence in the documents on Friday, July 24, 2020, one court day before the Monday hearing. Further, A.W.’s counsel established that she did not receive the objections until 4:40 p.m. that Friday afternoon.

By filing her objections on the last court day before the hearing, she did not give the department “a reasonable period of time to meet the objection prior to a contested hearing.” (§ 355, subd. (c)(2).) Mother had ample time to object to the hearsay in the reports. She failed to do so a reasonable amount of time before the hearing. The juvenile court properly denied her objections as untimely and properly admitted hearsay evidence.

Even if mother’s hearsay objections had been timely, and no hearsay exception applied, the evidence was still sufficient to support the jurisdictional finding. If hearsay evidence is corroborated, it is admissible at a jurisdictional hearing despite a timely objection. (See § 355; see also In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1280.) “Corroborating evidence is evidence which supports a logical and reasonable inference that the act described in the hearsay statement occurred. [Citation.] The quantum of corroboration necessary to support a jurisdictional finding is ‘somewhat analogous to the rule in criminal law requiring independent corroborative proof of accomplice testimony,’ that is, direct or circumstantial evidence, even if slight, is sufficient if it tends to connect the accused with the act. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1280-1281.) Further, the corroborating evidence need not establish the precise facts in the hearsay statements. (In re Christian P. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 437, 448.)

Here, there was corroborative evidence. Mother twice tested positive for marijuana during the investigation. She also admitted she and father took turns drinking alcohol. This was sufficient to corroborate D.G.’s testimony that mother continued to have a substance abuse problem. In addition, mother’s mental health diagnoses, her admitted mental health episode when she gave birth to A.W., and the fact she was not receiving individual counseling when the department became involved in this case corroborate D.G.’s observation that mother’s mental health issues were still unresolved.

For all of these reasons, there can be no question but that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings should be affirmed.

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Mother’s Request to Continue the Jurisdictional Hearing

Mother next contends the court erred in denying her request to continue the jurisdictional hearing. We disagree.

“Continuances are discouraged in dependency cases.” (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 604.) A juvenile court may grant a parent’s request to continue a hearing, but only upon a showing of good cause and only for the time shown to be necessary. (§ 352, subd. (a)(2).) The party requesting a continuance must do so in writing at least two court days before the date set for the hearing, unless the court for good cause entertains an oral motion. (Id., subd. (a)(3).) The juvenile court may not grant a continuance if it would be contrary to the interests of the child. “In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).)

An order denying a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.) An order is an abuse of discretion if the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and would result in a miscarriage of justice. (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 180.)

Mother requested a continuance of the jurisdictional hearing to allow for the three witnesses as to whom she filed hearsay objections to be made available for cross-examination. However, she did not request the continuance in writing at least two court days before the date set for the hearing.

As we have previously pointed out, the department provided most of the statements by these witnesses approximately three months before the jurisdictional hearing. Even the jurisdiction report was filed 13 days before the hearing. This provided mother ample time to secure the witnesses for in-court testimony. Instead of doing so, she did nothing but make an untimely request for continuance. The trial court’s decision to deny that request was not an abuse of discretion.

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Denying Mother Reunification Services

Mother next contends the trial court erred in denying her reunification services. We are not persuaded.

While offering reunification services is the norm, section 361.5, subdivision (b) reflects the reality that reunification services may be fruitless in some cases. (Deborah S. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 741, 750.) This subdivision allows the juvenile court to deny a parent reunification services if the court finds any of certain circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.)

Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) provides that reunification services may be denied if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence “[t]hat the court ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings or half siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to reunify with the sibling or half sibling after the sibling or half sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian pursuant to Section 361 and that parent or guardian is the same parent or guardian described in subdivision (a) and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent or guardian.”

A “reasonable effort” is not synonymous with a “cure.” (See Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121 (Jennifer S.).) “[N]ot every ‘effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort and as such render these provisions inapplicable.’ ” (Ibid.)

In evaluating the parent’s efforts for reasonableness, “ ‘t is certainly appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the duration, extent and context of the parent’s efforts, as well as any other factors relating to the quality and quantity of those efforts . . . .’ ” ([i]Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121, italics omitted.) Although it is not the focus of the juvenile court’s analysis, the “ ‘parent’s progress, or lack of progress, both in the short and long term, may be considered to the extent it bears on the reasonableness of the effort made.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., italics omitted.)

The juvenile court’s order denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) is reviewed for substantial evidence. (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1121-1122.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)

Here, it is apparent the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could have found it highly probable the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) exception applied. First, the juvenile court previously terminated reunification services for five of A.W.’s siblings. The juvenile court sustained section 300 petitions as to siblings S.B., D.G., T.A., and J.A. in October 2012 due to mother having, among other things, physically and emotionally abused S.B. and D.G. The court removed all four children and offered mother reunification services, but she did not reunify with them. The juvenile court then sustained a section 300 petition as to sibling T.W. in November 2017. The court found that mother had severely physically and emotionally abused his siblings, that mother had mental health and substance abuse issues including marijuana use, and that T.W. was at risk as a result. The court offered mother reunification services, but she did not reunify with him.

Second, the record contains substantial evidence that mother failed to make reasonable efforts to address her substance abuse and mental health issues.

Mother has a long history of substance use. As a teenager, marijuana made her paranoid. Marijuana use was a factor in her losing custody of T.W. Nonetheless, her substance abuse issues continue. When the department learned of A.W.’s birth, mother initially denied using any drugs, including marijuana. Shortly thereafter, however, she then tested positive for marijuana. Mother initially claimed she had consumed it inadvertently, but later admitted the ingestion was volitional. Thereafter, mother tested positive for marijuana at an even higher level than she had on the first test. The juvenile court nonetheless left open the question whether to offer reunification services, and instructed the department to provide updates on mother’s and father’s progress. Mother then tested positive for alcohol at a level of .14 percent before the continued dispositional hearing. She and father also accidentally left a voicemail for foster mother discussing plans to obtain “medicine” with $17 they had found.

In addition, mother was “high” on April 14, 2020, when father attacked D.G. and that she drank alcohol from a bottle. Further, D.G. said mother was intoxicated when they picked her up and that she had been drinking during her visit with them. D.G. reported mother and father would leave A.W. unattended when drinking or smoking marijuana in the back. Mother admitted to D.G. that she was drinking during D.G.’s visit, explaining she was doing so in celebration of D.G. being home.

Mother did not tell her mental health providers about ingesting the marijuana-laced brownie. The record does not indicate that mother’s mental health providers were aware of her marijuana or alcohol use or had advised her that it would be safe to use either in spite of her diagnoses and prescribed psychotropic medication.

It is true that mother had enrolled in intensive outpatient substance abuse counselling on April 27, 2020 and that she was attending three group sessions every week. Further, that her drug counsellor reported mother was doing well in treatment. However, even if these last minute, short term efforts were genuine, their extent was limited – having started only after A.W. was removed. Although T.W. was detained in November of 2017, there is no indication mother addressed her substance abuse problem in the time that passed between then and A.W.’s detention in April 2020. In sum, mother made efforts to address her lifelong substance abuse issues for about three months, only when she was threatened with losing her parental rights for the sixth time. Given the short duration of her effort, and the context of her failure to address the issue in the years she has known she had a substance abuse problem, we cannot say her efforts were reasonable. Instead, the record reflects her ongoing addiction issues interfered with her parenting of A.W., as D.G. reported.

The same can be said about mother’s efforts to address her mental health issues. Clearly, mother suffers from significant mental health problems, having been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and dissociative identity disorder. In addition, mother admitted to having a significant mental health breakdown in 2019 when A.W. was born. During the episode, she thought people were after her and wanted to kill her. Further, D.G. reported that in April of 2020, mother continued to have mental health issues; D.G. said mother told her she believed in witches and that her ex-boyfriend had a demon in him.

Mother’s previous case plans included individual counseling, but she was not enrolled in individual counseling when the department began its investigation regarding A.W. She enrolled only after the department became involved. Even then, the therapist indicated that they were not addressing her traumatic and abusive history, focusing instead on anger issues. Given mother’s early statement that she was not going to therapy because she found it stressful to talk about her childhood and her therapist’s decision not to spend much time discussing mother’s past, the record raises concerns about the sufficiency of mother’s therapy efforts.

Further, mother never provided her full medical records to the court, which would have allowed the court to determine whether she was in compliance with her mental health treatment. Mother knew since June 2020 that she had to request her full medical records. The department requested she do so multiple times, and the juvenile court ordered her to do so. We can only assume mother’s failure to present them to the court is because they would not have been favorable to her.

Moreover, while mother was in compliance with her monthly injection of Haldol, she was not consistent with her medical appointments with the psychiatric nurse practitioner. These appointments allowed mother’s medical provider to assess how she was responding to medication and to monitor the medication’s effects on her health.

Although mother may have made some progress since T.W.’s removal, the record contains substantial evidence from which we find it highly probably that mother has failed to make reasonable efforts to address her mental health issues. Mother has longstanding, substantial mental health problems which can only be kept at bay by being consistently addressed with extensive medicinal and therapeutic intervention. Given that mother was known to beat her children when she believed they were witches and would call them witches and demons, and that mother still believed witches exist and was currently reporting that her ex-boyfriend had a demon inside him, A.W. remains at great risk for physical abuse.

Given this context, her four months of modest effort with some positive feedback is insufficient. This is especially true given that mother hid the entire picture of her mental health history and showed recent signs of its effects on her parenting of A.W.

In light of our finding that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) applies, we do not address the applicability of subdivision (b)(13).

D. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Failing to Find that it Would Be in A.W.’s Best Interest for Mother to Receive Reunification Services

Finally, mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find it would be in A.W.’s best interest for mother to receive reunification services. Once again, we disagree.

Section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2) provides: “[t]he court shall not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in paragraph . . . (10) . . . of subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.”

It was mother’s burden to show that, despite the applicability of section 361.5, subdivision (b), it nonetheless would be in A.W.’s best interest to provide reunification services. (See In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227.) The juvenile court considers various factors in determining the child’s best interests. They include the parent’s efforts and fitness, the parent’s history, the gravity of the problem that led to the dependency, and the strength of the bonds between the child and the parent and between the child and the caretaker. To find that reunification services would be in the child’s best interest, the juvenile court also must find that further reunification services have a likelihood of success. (See id. at pp. 1228-1229.)

The juvenile court acknowledged that mother had made some progress in her efforts to overcome the substance abuse and mental health conditions that led to the removal of A.W.’s five older siblings. But the court found that those efforts were not substantial enough to allow mother to be in a position to reunify with A.W. in the applicable six-month period. Where reunification services will not succeed, delaying the date by which a child may achieve stability and continuity is not in her best interest. In addition, the department presented the juvenile court with extensive evidence of mother’s long-standing mental health and substance abuse issues, of her abuse of S.B. and D.G., of her failure to reunify with any of her five older children, and of mother’s and father’s inconsistency with visitation. Failing to find by clear and convincing evidence that it would be in A.W.’s best interest for mother to receive reunification services was not an abuse of discretion.

To the extent mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying reunification services without an express finding that this would be in A.W.’s best interest, we disagree. If a relevant provision of section 361.5, subdivision (b) applies, the juvenile court must deny reunification services unless the parent demonstrates that reunification services would be in the child’s best interest.

Disposition

The petition is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court pursuant to rule 8.490(b)(2)(A) of the California Rules of Court.

BIGELOW, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

STRATTON, J.

[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

[2] A.W.’s father is also T.W.’s father.