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Filed 4/28/17 In re Joseph C. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re Joseph C., A Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ALAMDEA COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH C.,
Objector and Respondent.
A148290
(Alameda County Super. Ct.
No. OJ11017924)

I. BACKGROUND
In November 2011, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) filed a
juvenile dependency petition with respect to then 16-year-old Joseph C. pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), after discovering the
boy in the “ ‘unlivable’ ” home of an adult sister who had been incarcerated for several
months on prostitution and human trafficking charges.
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The minor, an active marijuana
user, reported that the house was used for prostitution and other illegal activities. In
addition, Joseph’s five-month-old niece had been found dead at the site in a suspected

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
indicated.
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case of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). After the Louisiana homes of Joseph’s
mother and adult brother were rejected as appropriate placements under the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), the minor was made a California juvenile
court dependent in April 2012 and placed directly into a permanent plan of long term
foster care.2
Joseph subsequently turned 18 and was declared to be a non-minor dependent at a
review hearing in September 2013. He remained in a permanently planned living
arrangement in California. By the August 2014 six-month review hearing, however,
Joseph had relocated to Louisiana to be near his maternal family. He was living with an
adult brother and remained eligible for dependency by obtaining part-time employment.
Periodic review hearings continued throughout 2015. At each of these hearings, the court
found that the Agency had complied with Joseph’s transitional independent living case
plan (TILCP) by “making reasonable efforts, including whatever steps are necessary to
finalize the permanent placement and prepare the non-minor for independence.” The
court also held that the Agency had “made reasonable efforts and provided assistance to
help the non-minor establish and maintain compliance with the conditions in WIC section
11403(b).”3
At the six-month review on January 13, 2016, the matter was continued because
Joseph’s attorney had been unable to contact him. She was concerned that there had been
two months when Joseph was not visited in person by the Agency. When Joseph’s
attorney was still unable to reach him by the hearing on January 28, the court ordered the
Agency to report on its contacts with the non-minor. At the continued hearing on
February 8, 2016, Joseph’s attorney set the matter for a contest on the issue of reasonable
services due to the two missed monthly visits. In advance of the contest, the Agency

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The whereabouts of Joseph’s alleged father were unknown.
3
Section 11403, subdivision (b), contains certain conditions for continued receipt of
federal aid for non-minor dependents, including various educational or employment
requirements.
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filed an interim report detailing the Agency’s contacts with Joseph, including monthly
contact either in person or by telephone.
At the contested hearing on March 2, 2016, the social worker testified with respect
to her work with Joseph. She indicated that she had been unable to visit Joseph in person
for two months during the previous six-month period because the Agency required her to
pay out-of-pocket for some of her travel costs; her reimbursement checks were often
delayed for 60 or 90 days; and, on those two occasions, she did not have the funds
available to make the trip. The juvenile court noted that the Agency’s policy was to visit
non-minor dependents monthly. Given Joseph’s particular needs and the lack of in-person
visitation in the case, the court concluded that “reasonable efforts in fact were not in
place during the course of the last six months of review for Joseph.” The court
elaborated on the basis for its determination as follows: “I want to be very clear that I
think the [social worker] rocks, for lack of a better way to say it. She did a great job. I
don’t think this has anything to do with her personal abilities, or her track record. I think
this has more to do with the fact that I can’t believe that in this day and time The Agency
is forcing child welfare workers to pay for things up front, and knowing if they can’t
afford to do that, they’re not back-filling with someone else to do the work.” The court
felt that there had to be a remedy for this lack of reasonable efforts and thus ordered the
Agency to provide another six months of services to Joseph, past his twenty-first
birthday. In doing so, the court expressly noted that the services would be “at County
cost if the State and Feds cannot pay for it.” The court then set a six-month review for
August 2016 and an interim review in 30 days for a report on Joseph’s status.
At the interim review on April 6, 2016, however, Joseph indicated that he was
now living with his father and no longer wanted to remain a non-minor dependent. The
matter was therefore continued to his twenty-first birthday for the completion of a section
391 termination report.4
At the continued hearing, the court terminated Joseph’s

4
Section 391 requires a specific process for any hearing at which a juvenile court
terminates jurisdiction over a non-minor dependent. In particular, the county welfare
department must submit “documentation of the reasonable efforts made by the
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dependency, expressly finding that “Joseph is no longer within the eligible age range for
status as a non-minor dependent subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.” On
April 29, 2016, the Agency filed a timely notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s prior
orders of March 2, 2016.
II. DISCUSSION
As the Agency acknowledges, “ ‘ “the duty of this court, as of every other judicial
tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect,
and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ ”
(Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536,
541.) Recently, our colleagues in Division One held that “the critical factor in
considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can
provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) Even if effective relief cannot be given to the parties in a particular
proceeding, however, an appellate court may still exercise its discretion to resolve a claim
in certain circumstances “such as when there is an issue of broad public interest that is
likely to recur, there is a likelihood that the controversy will recur, or material questions
remain for the court’s determination.” (Id. at p. 60, fn. 3.)
In the present case, the Agency challenges two aspects of the juvenile court’s
March 2 order extending services to Joseph beyond his twenty-first birthday.
Specifically, the Agency asserts that, under the Juvenile Court Law, there is no statutory
authority for extending a non-minor dependency past a youth’s twenty-first birthday. The
Agency further argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that the Agency failed to
provide reasonable services to Joseph, because there is no statutory requirement that a

department to provide the non-minor with the assistance needed to meet or maintain
eligibility as a non-minor dependent” and the court must determine that the department
has also provided the non-minor with a number of important documents, such as written
information concerning the non-minor's case, a birth certificate, a social security card, and
a health and education summary. (§ 391, subds. (b)(3) & (e).)
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juvenile court make a reasonable services finding at a non-minor dependency review
hearing.
Although Joseph’s dependency action has been dismissed, the Agency argues that
we should address the merits of its claims of error because they are either not moot or fall
within recognized exceptions to the general mootness rule. For instance, with respect to
the question of whether the juvenile court has the statutory authority to extend a
dependency proceeding beyond a non-minor dependent’s twenty-first birthday, the
Agency claims that we should reach the merits because it is an issue of first impression, it
is of broad public interest, and it is likely to recur. All of these assertions may be true.
However, we cannot ignore the simple fact that the juvenile court in this case changed its
mind and, at Joseph’s request, dismissed dependency on the nonminor’s twenty-first
birthday. Thus, the Agency was never actually required to provide services beyond age
twenty-one. Under such circumstances, the Agency presents an interesting academic
question completely untethered to the specifics of the case at hand. Although it “eagerly
seeks” a published decision affirming its position, we decline to exercise our discretion to
satisfy its curiosity with respect to what is, in essence, an abstract principle of law.
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With respect to the question of reasonable services in the context of a non-minor
dependency, the Agency argues that the statutory scheme for non-minor dependents does
not require a reasonable services finding at each review hearing. The Agency further
opines that, in this case, the issue is not moot despite dismissal of the underlying
dependency because the court’s finding that the Agency did not provide reasonable
services may result in the loss of federal funding for Joseph’s support while in foster care,
an issue of “vital importance” to the Agency. Again, we are not convinced.
The Agency’s fear regarding loss of funding is speculative at best. Indeed, if it is
correct that no reasonable services finding was required in this context, its federal
funding should remain intact. Moreover, the Agency is essentially asking us to determine

5 We find the Agency’s additional argument in reply—that the matter is not moot because
they can obtain “effective relief . . . in the form of appellate statutory interpretation that
would guide them in the future”—equally unpersuasive for similar reasons.
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whether the existence of a policy requiring social workers to front travel costs for
monthly visitation is sufficient to render the otherwise reasonable services offered to a
dependent non-minor unreasonable. Yet, the Agency represented to the court below that,
as of the March 2 hearing, this policy had been changed and was no longer in effect.
Thus, our conclusion, were we to draw one, would have little relevance outside of this
particular case. Finally, the absence of eligibility for federally supported extended foster
care benefits is not a bar to continuation of dependency jurisdiction. (See In re Shannon
M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 301-302.) And, in this case, the juvenile court made
clear that it was making its order regardless of any impact on available state or federal
funding. Given all of these circumstances, we see no actual controversy requiring our
appellate intervention.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
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_________________________
REARDON, ACTING P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
RIVERA, J.
_________________________
STREETER, J.
In re Joseph C. A148290