Esparza v. Ford










Filed 4/28/17 Esparza v. Ford CA4/3







NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


JUAN ESPARZA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JOE MACPHERSON FORD,

Defendant and Respondent.



G051901

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00685645)

OPINION

Appeal from a judgment and postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Peter J. Wilson, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Law Office of Jeffrey Kane and Jeffrey Kane for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kolar & Associates, Elizabeth L. Kolar and Benjamin T. Runge for Defendant and Respondent.

* * *

Plaintiff and appellant Juan Esparza purchased a used vehicle from defendant and respondent Joe MacPherson Ford. The vehicle had mechanical problems. Plaintiff sued defendant for failure to provide a Spanish translation of the sales contract under Civil Code section 1632[1] (section 1632) and for breach of express and implied warranties. Ajury rendered a general verdict in favor of defendant, and the court denied plaintiff’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial.
Plaintiff contends the court erred by denying his JNOV and new trial motions because judgment in his favor was required as a matter of law. He also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and the court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on his breach of warranty claims.
We conclude plaintiff’s motion for JNOV should have been granted onthesection 1632cause of action because the transaction was negotiated primarily in Spanish. Therefore, we reverse and remand with directions to grant the motion for JNOV and enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor on this claim.Plaintiff’s other contentions have no merit.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff visited defendant’s car dealership on two consecutive daysin May 2013. Both days plaintiff dealt with a salesperson named Modesto Gonzalez, and they only spoke to each other in Spanish. On the first day Gonzalez answered plaintiff’s questions about a 2007 Ford Expedition (Vehicle) and they agreed to meet again the next day to complete the purchase.
On the second day, plaintiff met Gonzalez in the dealership parking lot, and arranged to take a testdrive. Before, during, and after the testdrive, they spoke at length about the Vehicle. Among other things, Gonzalez answered plaintiff’s questions about the mechanical condition of the Vehicle.
When plaintiff started the engine for the test drive, he heard a clicking sound for about five seconds. Gonzalez assured him he need not worry, that it was the result of a dressing applied to an engine belt during detailing and it would go away. Plaintiff was concerned about the 125,000 miles on the Vehicle, but Gonzalez told him it was a good car and it should get about 300,000 miles.
Plaintiff drove the Vehicle for about three miles on surface streets. When they got back to the dealership afterthe testdrive, plaintiff advised Gonzalez he wanted to buy the Vehicle. Gonzalez took plaintiff onto the showroom floor, andhelped him to fill out a credit application in English.
After plaintiff completed the credit application, Gonzalez took it into the finance manager’s office for about 15 minutes, and thenreturned to advise plaintiffthat he had been approved for a loan to purchasethe Vehicle. Gonzalez asked plaintiff for a $5,000 down payment, but after plaintiffsaid he was onlyable to afford $4,000, Gonzalez told him “we will work with 4,000.”
While they were on the showroom floor, Gonzalez also explainedall of the terms of the sale. After plaintiff agreed to those terms, Gonzalez presented plaintiff with a “Sales Menu” confirming those terms. It contained a description of the Vehicle, the purchase price, the down payment, the interest rate and term of the loan, the taxes and fees, and the balance due. Plaintiff signed and dated the Sales Menu while he was still on the showroom floor with Gonzalez.
After plaintiff had signed the Sales Menu confirming all of the agreed upon sales terms, Gonzalezsent plaintiff to the finance office where he dealt with RahmatullahGhafarshad, defendant’s finance manager. Ghafarshad was responsible for discussing aftermarket products, confirming the sales price and terms plaintiff and Gonzalez had agreed to, and preparing the “final paperwork.” Plaintiff and Ghafarshad only spoke to each other in English.
Ghafarshad gave plaintiff various documents related to the sale, and he explained the significance of some of them. He also offered plaintiff the opportunity to purchase various aftermarket products for an additional charge, but plaintiff did not purchase any of them. Ghafarshad had no role in negotiating the sales price of the Vehicle or the terms of the loan.
In fact, Ghafarshad confirmed that the Sales Menu, which set forth all of the material terms of the sale, was preparedby the sales office and signed by plaintiff before plaintiff came into the finance office.However, while plaintiff was in the finance office, Ghafarshad received a call from the lender offering a lower interest rate, and he used that lower rate in preparing the final paperwork.
Plaintiff ultimately signed aRetail InstallmentSales Contract (RISC), which was written entirely in English.Ghafarshad never offered plaintiff aSpanish language translation of the RISC. Plaintiff was unaware that he had a right to receive a Spanish language translation of the RISC, he never asked for one, and defendant neverprovided one to him.
Ghafarshad also gave plaintiff two additional documents, a “Buyer’s Guide” (Buyer’s Guide) and a “UsedVehicle Limited Mechanical Warranty” (Limited Warranty). The Buyer’s Guidestated in relevant part: “LIMITED WARRANTY: The dealer will pay 50% of the labor and 50% of the parts for the covered systems that fail during the warranty period. Ask the dealer for a copy of the warranty document and for a full explanation of warranty coverage, exclusions, and the dealer’s repair obligations. Under state law, ‘implied warranties’ may give you even more rights.” (Boldface omitted.) The Buyer’s Guide stated the duration of the warranty was 60 days, with unlimited mileage and a zero deductible. It also set out a list of the covered mechanical systems. Ghafarshad testified he explained to plaintiff the duration of the Buyers Guide was 60 days with unlimited mileage and it covered 50 percent of the repair costs.
The Limited Warrantyalso stated it was for 60 days with unlimited mileage and a zero deductible. It further stated: “I acknowledge that I have read the used car Buyer’s Guide displayed on the Vehicle and the dealer has explained the terms and conditions of this Limited Mechanical Warranty and provided me with a copy of the Buyer’s Guide and this Limited Mechanical Warranty.” (Capitalization omitted.)
By signing the Limited Warranty, plaintiff acknowledged he had been given both the Limited Warranty and the Buyer’s Guide and had read and agreed to the terms of the Limited Warranty. These explained which mechanical parts were covered and which were not. Plaintiff also acknowledged and agreed the written terms were “a complete statement of coverage and rights under the” Limited Warranty.
Ghafarshad testified he told plaintiff the Limited Warranty only covered certain mechanical parts and it required plaintiff to pay for 50 percent of the cost of repairs. Plaintiff testified he understood it was a 50/50 warranty and also that defendant did not provide him with any other warranty.
In June plaintiff returned the Vehicle to defendant complaining of the same engine noise he had heard during the test drive. The work order showed defendant diagnosed the noiseby checking the oil pressure and other components, and then replaced noisy camshaft phasers, timing chain tensioners and guides, and all of the valve lifters. The cost of these repairs was $2,800, of which plaintiff paid $1,400.
Defendant’s service manager, Kevin Begane, testified that when plaintiff brought the Vehicle in, plaintiff knew from his prior dealings with defendant that he had the 50/50 warranty. Although the work order and the invoice for the $2,800 in repairs described plaintiff’s $1,400 payment as a “deductible,” Begane testified it was not a deductible. Rather, that description on the work order was just the way defendant’s computer system reflected a customer’s 50 percent payment.
During the 60-day warranty period plaintiff also took the Vehicle into defendant’s service department for excessive bouncing. The service department personnel advised the shock absorbers needed to be replaced. Plaintiff was tolddefendant would replace them if plaintiff paid $2,200, 50 percent of the total price of $4,400. Plaintiff could not afford to pay $2,200 and declined the service. He later paid $1,500 to have them replaced elsewhere.
Plaintiff put about 34,000 miles on the Vehicle, using it daily. He drove it a few times from Irvine to Tijuana and back.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged causes of action for failure to deliver a Spanish translation of the RISCunder section 1632; breach of express and implied warranties of fitness and merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (§ 1790 et seq.(Act)); failure to promptly repurchase under the Act (§ 1793.2); and violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (§§ 1770, 1780).
After all of the evidence was presented to the jury, plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict (Code. Civ. Proc. § 630) on the section 1632 cause of action, on the grounds the undisputed evidence showed the transaction was negotiated primarily in Spanish. Defendant’s counsel opposed the motion on two grounds. First, she claimed the evidence on this point was actually disputed. Second, she argued section 1632 only applies when the consumer cannot speak any English.
The argument on the motion included the following colloquy between the court and defendant’s counsel:
“[Court]: Do you have a case that stands for the proposition that if a person perfectly fluent in both languages, in fact, negotiates the entire transaction in Spanish, this section simply doesn’t apply?
“[Counsel]: I don’t think there is a case either way on that.
“[Court]: Do you have anything at all in the Legislative history or in any commentary or anything other than an argument to substantiate the notion that, given how the statute is written, if a party is perfectly fluent in both languages, in fact, negotiates the entire transaction in Spanish, [section] 1632 should not apply?
“[Counsel]: It is not the entire transaction. It is primarily.
“[Court]: I am asking you to adopt my hypothetical.
“[Counsel]: I am sorry. I don’t know of a case that says that either way because that’s not what the statute says.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Court]: Do you have any authority that you want to cite to me on the question of whether his ability to understand English has any relevance to this claim?
“[Counsel]: I don’t as I stand here, your honor. . . .”
The court then took the matter under submission, “Not least because it is unclear with respect to what remedies might flow, whether that would all be somehow for the court’s determination or still in the province of the jury.” The court later denied the motion by way of minute order without further explanation.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of defendantthat merely stated, “We find in favor of [defendant] and against [plaintiff].” (Capitalization omitted.) The judgment was entered on February 24, 2015.
Plaintiff then moved for a JNOV and a new trial (Code. Civ. Proc. §§ 629, 657), and the court denied both motions. The court explained, “As I concludethat there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, the motion for JNOV is DENIED. [¶] . . . [¶] I also do not find that the verdict is in any respect unsupported by substantial evidence and against the law.”
This timely appeal followed from both the judgment and the postjudgment orders denying plaintiff’s motions for a JNOV and a new trial.
DISCUSSION
1. Motion for JNOV
a. General Principles and Standard of Review
Code of Civil Procedure section 629, subdivision (a) requires the trial court to grant a motion for JNOV when a motion for directed verdict should have been granted. In ruling on a JNOV motion, “‘“the trial court may not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, as it may do on a motion for a new trial, but must accept the evidence tending to support the verdict as true, unless on its face it should be inherently incredible. Such order may be granted only when, disregarding conflicting evidence and indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn from [defendant’s] evidence, the result is no evidence sufficiently substantial to support the verdict.”’” (Carter v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1320 (Carter).)
An appeal from denial of a JNOV challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s ruling. (Paulus v. Crane Co. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1362.) The standard of review for denial is the same as if a JNOV had been granted. We,“‘“must read the record in the light most advantageous to the[defendant], resolve all conflicts in [its] favor, and give [it] the benefit of all reasonable inferences in support of the original verdict.”’” (Carter, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)
“[T]he settled rule that a general verdict implies a finding in favor of the prevailing party of every fact essential to the support of his action or defense.” (Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 663, 673.) We, “‘infer that ‘the jury by its general verdict found for respondent on every issue submitted.” [Citation.] Specifically, the jury’s general verdict “‘imports findings in favor of the prevailing party on all material issues; and if the evidence supports implied findings on any set of issues which will sustain the verdict, it will be assumed that the jury so found.’ . . . [Citations.]” (Everett v. Everett (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1053, 1063-1064 (Everett).)
b. Section 1632
Section 1632 provides in relevant part: “[a]ny person engaged in a trade or business who negotiates primarily in Spanish . . .[,] in the course of entering into [a conditional sale contract governed by the provisions of the Automobile Sales Finance Act,shall deliver to the other party to the contract or agreement and prior to the execution thereof, a translation of the contract or agreement in the language in which the contract or agreement was negotiated, that includes a translation of every term and condition in that contract or agreement.”(§ 1632, subd. (b), italics added.)
The section 1632 claim in this case presents two distinct questions—one legal and one factual. First, does the statute apply to a person who speaks both Spanish and English, if the contract is negotiated primarily in Spanish?We review this legal question de novo. (Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 284.) “In construing [section 1632], “‘we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its ‘plain meaning.”’ [Citations.]’ [Citation.] By its plain terms, [section 1632]applies only, when the ‘person engaged in a trade or business . . . negotiates primarily in Spanish . . . .’” (Lopez v. Asbury Fresno Imports, LLC (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 71, 76.)
There is nothing in the language of section 1632 which is ambiguous, and nothing in it provides for an exception if the customer speaks both Spanish and English. Moreover, the parties have not cited us to any authority which would support such an exception and we have found none. Therefore, we need go no further in considering the question. We conclude section 1632 means what is says—if the contract is negotiated primarily in Spanishthen a Spanish translation must be provided.
This brings us to the second question. Is there sufficient evidence to support the court’s agreement with the jury’s implied finding that the RISC was not negotiated primarily in Spanish? This is a factual question which we review under the substantial evidence standard. (Carter, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)
The undisputed portions of the evidence set out above show the RISC was negotiated primarily in Spanish. All of the material terms of the RISC were negotiated between plaintiff and Gonzalez in Spanish. Those terms includedthe purchase price, the down payment, the interest rate and term of the loan, the taxes and fees, and the balance due. Those terms were memorialized in the Sales Menu signed by plaintiff on the showroom floor, before he went into the finance office and met Ghafarshad.
The only material term which changed after plaintiff went into the finance office was the interest rate, and that was the result of the phone call from the lender, not any negotiation between plaintiff and Ghafarshad in English. That Ghafarshad also tried to sell plaintiff various aftermarket products is immaterial. Plaintiff didn’t purchase any of them. So Ghafarshad simply, “did the final paperwork” that reflected the agreement which had been negotiated between plaintiff and Gonzalez in Spanish.
Defendant contends there is “a plethora of evidence” which supports the jury’s verdict on the section 1632 claim, and he gives three specific examples. We are not persuaded.Defendant first notes, “Esparza did not need a Spanish interpreter at trial, and heappeared to have no issue understanding all of the Court proceedings inEnglish.” This evidence is irrelevant under our interpretation of section 1632 above.
Second defendant claims, “with the exception of the sale price, Esparza admitted thatthe contract he signed was negotiated only in English with . . . Ghafarshad.” Defendant provided us no citation to the record which supports this claim, and our independent review of the record revealed no evidence of any such admission.
Third defendant argues, “the testimony of . . . Ghafarshad provesthat he and Esparza discussed all aspects of the sales transaction other thanthe purchase price entirely in English.”We disagree. Ghafarshad only testified it is his job to, “go over all the numbers . . ., and everything to make sure it is correct.” He did not testify he ever actually did so with plaintiff.
But even if Ghafarshad and plaintiff had discussed all aspects of the sales transaction other than the purchase price entirely in English, it would make no difference. Ghafarshad testified that before he meets with a purchaser,the Sales Menu is signed, and “the deal is in place.” And Ghafarshad admitted he did not negotiate the price, the down payment, or the number of months on the loan with plaintiff. We find ourselves in agreement with Ghafarshad; the deal was in place before he met plaintiff.
In sum, substantial evidence does not support the jury’s implied finding the RISC was not negotiated primarily in Spanish. On this record, plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on his claim under section 1632 should have been granted and, as a result, his motion for a JNOV on that claim should have been granted too. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 629; Carter, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)For all of these reasons, the judgment on the general verdict in favor of defendant must be reversed.
In light of the court’s expressed concern about the remedies that flow from reversal on this ground we will provide further direction.Subdivision (k) of section 1632 states: “(k) Upon a failure to comply with the provisions of this section, the person aggrieved may rescind the contract or agreement in the manner provided by this chapter. If the contract for a consumer credit sale or consumer lease that has been sold and assigned to a financial institution is rescinded pursuant to this subdivision, the consumer shall make restitution to and have restitution made by the person with whom he or she made the contract, and shall give notice of rescission to the assignee. Notwithstanding that the contract was assigned without recourse, the assignment shall be deemed rescinded and the assignor shall promptly repurchase the contract from the assignee.”
Subdivision (k) of section 1632 surely provides plaintiff the right to rescind the RISC and the loan agreement. However, that rescission necessarily raisesrestitution questions which were not addressed below and, contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, we cannot resolve those questions as a matter of law on appeal. Instead, we will direct the trial court to address them in the first instance on remand.
c. Implied Warranty
Under the Act there is an implied warranty of merchantability in each sale. (§ 1792.1) “‘Implied warranty of merchantability’ . . . means that the consumer goods meet each of the following: 1) “Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description,” 2) “Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,” 3) “Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled,” and 4) “Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.” (§ 1791.1, subd. (a).) The warranty applies to used goods (§ 1705, subd. (a)) and “‘“provides for a minimum level of quality.”’” (Mocek v. Alfa Leisure, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 402, 406.)
The implied warranty of merchantability “‘does not “impose a general requirement that goods precisely fulfill the expectation of the buyer.’”” (Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1330.) Rather, a vehicle must be “‘in safe condition and substantially free from defects.’” (Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 27 (Isip).)[2]
Plaintiff contends there is undisputed evidence defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability because, within 60 days after he purchased the Vehicle,[3] it needed engine repairs totaling over $2,800 and new shocks at a cost of approximately $4,400, half of each amount paid or to be paid by plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s expert explained if the timing chain is not working properly, the cam shaft, crank shaft, and piston do not work properly and will “cause[] a catastrophic failure” with the engine “literally destroy[ing] itself.” The first indicator of a problem is a certain type of engine noise.
Plaintiff’s expert also testified about the struts, which include shock absorbers. Their primary purpose is to ensure traction and safety by properly supporting suspension and ensuring the tires stay on the ground.
Defendant argues, without citing any case or statute, thatthe warranty was not breached just because significant repairs to the Vehicle were necessary. It points out plaintiff used the Vehicle every day to commute. In addition, he drove the Vehicle three times from Irvine to Tijuana and back.
Defendant challenges plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, noting he never discussed plaintiff’s experience driving the Vehicle, and further points out that despite the expert’s testimony regarding catastrophic failure, he agreed there had been none. Defendant also asserts it repaired the engine problem but could not replace the shocks because plaintiff declined their offer to do so.
Defendant’s expert testified based on the engine noise plaintiff heard, it was likely there was wear and tear on the timing chain or cam chain guides. It would make more engine noise but did not mean anything was wrong with the engine. Defendant’s expert never heard the engine noise.
Defendant’s expert also testified the timing chain was not stretched because the Vehicle passed the smog check and, when he drove the Vehicle, after the repairs had been made, the expert did not feel excessive bouncing. He did not find anything in the Vehicle he would consider to be defective.
Plaintiff counters that the trips to Tijuana were made only after the repairs were made, and the engine repairs alone prove the breach of implied warranty claim.
On this record, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s implied finding that, although significant repairs were necessary, the Vehicle was safe and substantially free from defects. Plaintiff was able to drive the Vehicle. Defendant’s expert testified there was no danger in doing so and he found nothing wrong with the Vehicle. Thus, the court properly denied plaintiff’s JNOVmotion on the implied warranty claim.
d. Express Warranty
Plaintiff maintains the Buyer’s Guide and the Limited Warranty are two separate express warranties and their terms are different. He contends defendant honored the Buyer’s Guide, but breached the Limited Warranty by charging him for the repairs. He argues this is so because the Buyer’s Guide covered only 50 percent of the cost of repair but the Limited Warranty covered 100 percentwith no deductible, and some components covered by the Limited Warranty and the Buyers Guideare different.
Plaintiff relies primarily on the language of the Limited Warranty which stated he had read and agreed to its terms and conditions, and that they were a “complete statement of coverage and rights under this [Limited Warranty].” It also stated he “[was] not relying on any writings other than this [Limited Warranty] or any representations or promises other than those made in this [Limited Warranty],” and the Limited Warranty was the “only warranty extended by [defendant] to [plaintiff] with respect to the . . . [V]ehicle.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Defendant contends the Buyer’s Guide and the Limited Warranty together constituted only one express warranty. It relies on aprovision in the Buyer’s Guide which directed plaintiff to ask defendant for “a copy of the warranty document for a full explanation of warranty coverage, exclusions, and . . . [defendant’s] repair obligations.” (Boldface omitted.)Defendant emphasizes plaintiff’s testimony that he understood which parts of the covered systems were included at the 50 percent rate after Ghafarshad explained the terms to him,[4]the Limited Warranty was the only warranty defendant gave him, andhe understood it provided 50/50 coverage.
Plaintiff replies that because the Buyer’s Guide and the Limited Warranty are not ambiguous and there was no conflict as to the parol evidence admitted, we are required to interpret the two documents as a matter of law. Not so.
The testimony of plaintiff and Ghafarshad regarding the Buyer’s Guide and the Limited Warranty was parol evidence which conflicted and gave rise to a question of fact for the jury to decide. (Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279, 295; see Fischer v. First Internat. Bank (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1443 [If parol evidence is admissible, and the competent parol evidence is in conflict, the construction of the contract becomes a question of fact].)
Under these circumstances, we hold the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s implied findings there was only one express warranty,which was explained in both the Buyer’s Guide and the Limited Warranty, and it required plaintiff to pay 50 percent of the cost of repairs performed by defendant; and,as a result, defendant did not breach the express warranty when it charged plaintiff for those repairs. So the court properly denied plaintiff’s JNOVmotion on the express warranty claim.
2. Motion for New Trial
a. General Principles and Standard of Review
A court may grant a new trial where there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict.[5] (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (6).) The court may not grant the motion “unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the . . . jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.” (Id., subd. (7).) In doing so the court: may “‘“disbelieve witnesses, reweigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences therefrom contrary to those of the trier of fact”[citation;] . . . sits as “an independent trier of fact” [citation;] and . . . must “independently assess[ ] the evidence supporting the verdict” [citation]. The trial judge has “to be satisfied that the evidence, as a whole, was sufficient to sustain the verdict; if he [or she] was not, it was not only the proper exercise of a legal discretion, but his [or her] duty, to grant a new trial.”[Citation.]’”(Pacific Corporate Group Holdings, LLC v. Keck (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 294, 317-318.) A motion may not be granted unless the trial court error has caused a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)We review an order denying a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859.)
b. Section 1632
Here again the question is whether the RISC was negotiated primarily in Spanish or English. Because the answer is Spanish, we conclude the court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion for new trial on the section 1632 claim. But this conclusion is moot in light of our disposition of the corresponding JNOV claim.
c. Implied Warranty
Again there is sufficient evidence to support afinding the implied warranty was not breached and the court properly denied the JNOV on this claim.Looking at this evidence through the lens of a motion for new trial leads to the same conclusion. The record as a whole does not convince us the jury “clearly” should have come to a different conclusion. Hence, the motion for new trial was properly denied on this claim too.
d. Express Warranty
Once more, there is sufficient evidence to support the defense verdict on the breach of implied warranty claim. The jury could reasonably find there was only one express warranty, it covered only 50 percent of the cost of repairs and, as a result, defendant did not breachthe express warranty.Again the record does not show the jury “clearly” reached an incorrect verdict. Consequently, the court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for new trial on the express warranty claim.
3. Insufficiency of the Evidence
Plaintiff also argues insufficient evidence supports the verdict on the three causes of action he has disputed in this appeal. For the reasons discussed, we agree as to his section 1632 cause of action, and disagree as to his implied and express warranty causes of action. But these conclusions have no bearing on our disposition of this appeal.
4. Jury Instructions
Plaintiff avers the court improperly instructed the jury on the breach of implied and express warranty claims. Specifically, he maintains the court erred by refusing to give seven special instructions he requested. He argues each of these instructions was a proper statement of the law and was supported by the evidence. He also argues the court erred by giving one special instruction defendantrequested, because it was an incorrect statement of the law. We disagree. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate any reversible instruction error, for reasons which we will now explain.
“[T]here is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission. A judgment may not be reversed for instructional error in a civil case ‘unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 580.) “Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial ‘where it seems probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the verdict.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff has not met and cannot meet his burden of demonstrating the requisite prejudicebecause a general verdict form was used. We infer the jury found for defendant on each issue. (Everett, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 1063.) Furthermore, we need not speculate as to any specific ground on which the jury found. (Id. at pp. 1063-1064; accord Wilson, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193.)And we will not guess whether any asserted jury instruction error had any prejudicial effect on the verdict. Thus, plaintiff has not shown the error complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice



DISPOSITION
The judgment and the postjudgment order denying the JNOV motion are reversed. On remand the trial court is directed to:enter an order granting plaintiff’s motion for JNOV on the section 1632 cause of action; and enter a judgment in favor of plaintiff rescinding the RISC and the related loan agreement upon payment of such restitution as the court determines is required. Plaintiff is entitled to costs on appeal.



THOMPSON, J.

WE CONCUR:



BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.



MOORE, J.



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[1] All further statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise indicated.
[2] We reject defendant’s argument the implied warranty of merchantability is breached only if the defect “is so basic it renders the vehicle unfit for its ordinary purpose of providing transportation.” (American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1296 (Suzuki).) Isipdistinguished that principle, limiting it to the facts of Suzuki.
Isip explained the question in Suzuki was whether the class had been properly certified. (Isip, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Suzuki ruled the claim was too speculative to support certification. (Isip, at. p. 25.) Suzuki’s statement the implied warranty of merchantability is violated “‘only if the vehicle’” “‘is unfit for its ordinary purpose of providing transportation’” (Isip, at p. 25.) was in the context of cases where the plaintiffs had not suffered any damages. Thus, Isip disagreed with the proposition that “a vehicle ‘[necessarily does not] violate[] the implied warranty of merchantability” if it can simply ‘provide[] transportation” from point A to point B. (Ibid.; accord Brand v. Hyundai Motor America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1546); see also Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1303; Becerra v. General Motors LLC (S.D.Cal. Mar. 10, 2017, 15cv2365-WQH-JMA) __ F.Supp.3d __, 2017 WL 951028 *12 [following ISIP’s distinction of Suzuki].)
[3]The duration of the implied warranty is coextensive with the duration of the express warranty, in this case, 60 days. (§ 1795.5, subd. (c)).
[4] Plaintiff testified he “might not understand the coverage” but did not tell Ghafarshad that.

[5] In addition to this theory, plaintiff mentions an alternative ground under Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivision (7), that the verdict was against the law. If plaintiff intended to rely on this ground as part of his appeal, it has been forfeited for failure to provide reasoned legal argument. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)