Filed 2/27/18 Estate of O’Brien CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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Estate of JOSEPH HERB O’BRIEN, Deceased. C082342


PAUL KINNEY et al.,

Petitioners and Respondents,

v.

JAMES J. BRYAN,

Objector and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. 34201100106127PRGPFRC)



James J. Bryan appeals from the trial court’s decision to dismiss his petition contesting the 2000 Joseph Herb O’Brien Revocable Trust without leave amend. Bryan is the brother of the deceased, Joseph O’Brien. Bryan argues the trial court erred by: (1) granting respondents’ motions for judgment on the pleadings on grounds that did not appear on the face of his petition or any judicially noticeable document; (2) not giving reasons or citing legal authority for dismissing his second through sixth grounds for challenging the trust; and (3) not granting him leave to amend. Bryan has failed to demonstrate any error on the part of the trial court. Therefore, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2014, Bryan filed a petition to contest the decedent’s trust. The trustee, Paul Kinney, and trust beneficiary Glenn Scott Slattery both filed objections to Bryan’s trust contest. Both respondents then moved for judgment on the pleadings as to Bryan’s petition.
The superior court granted respondents’ motions and dismissed Bryan’s petition without leave to amend on the grounds that the trust contest did not state a legal basis for invalidating the trust. Because Bryan challenges the language of the trial court’s order, we set forth the relevant portion of the order in its entirety:
“The Petition lists six grounds for contesting the trust. These grounds are not formally described as causes of action. The first ground states that the trust is being contested based on ‘[f]raud]’ because ‘at the time of the alleged execution of the purported trust, the decedent was a married man not a[n] unmarried man.’ [Citation.] This purported ground is insufficient as a matter of law. Claiming that the decedent, Joseph Herb O’Brien, signed a trust that stated he was unmarried fails to state a fraud claim. Fraud generally requires ‘(1) a misrepresentation, (2) with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the misrepresentation, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.’ (Conroy v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. (2009) 45 Cal.[4th] 1244, 1255.) The Petition contains no allegation that Mr. O’Brien signed the trust based on any misrepresentation to him and no allegation of reliance by him.
“The second ground for contest is also based on the question of Mr. O’Brien’s marital status at the time the trust was created. [Citation.] It states that ‘the purported trust was premised on the alleged fact that Herb O’Brien was not a married man and that his previous marriage to Doris Thompson was dissolved by judgment in the year 2000’ when the married [sic] was allegedly not dissolved. [Citation.] This allegation is not a ground for Mr. Bryan, Mr. O’Brien’s brother, to challenge the trust.
“The third ground is that the trust allegedly distributes asserts [sic] that are community property under Mr. O’Brien’s marriage to Doris Thompson. [Citation.] The court disposed of this claim in a prior order. [Citation.] Even assuming this claim were not previously ruled upon, Mr. Bryan has no standing to contest the trust on this basis.
“The fourth ground is that . . . Mr. O’Brien breached his marital settlement with Ms. Thompson because he continued to have Ms. Thompson insure him under her health insurance policy at the time of his death in March 2011. [Citation.] (The marital settlement agreement between Ms. Thompson and Mr. O’Brien had a provision under which she would continue covering him on her health insurance.) Whether this allegation is true or not, a marital settlement agreement between two parties now deceased gives Mr. Bryan no ground to contest the trust.
“The fifth ground alleged that Mr. Slattery agreed with Mr. Bryan that if Mr. Bryan helped defeat Mr. O’Brien’s will then Mr. Slattery would allow the estate to pass to Mr. Bryan. [Citation.] Whether this private agreement occurred or not, it does not provide a ground to invalidate the trust.
“The sixth ground is that Mr. Slattery’s counsel . . . and Mr. Bryan’s counsel . . . agreed to split the proceeds of the trust between their clients if they were successful in challenging Mr. O’Brien’s will. [Citation.] This purported agreement is not a ground to invalidate the trust.
“Because the trust contest states no legal basis for invalidation, both motions for judgment on the pleadings are GRANTED without leave to amend. The Petition of James J. Bryan . . . is DISMISSED.”
Bryan timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. [Citation.] A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review.’ [Citation.] ‘All properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law . . . .’ [Citation.] Courts may consider judicially noticeable matters in the motion as well.” (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.) “[W]e review the trial court’s disposition of the matter, not its reasons for the disposition.” (Ott v. Alfa-Laval Agri, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1448.) Additionally, “[d]enial of leave to amend after granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
Even under de novo review, orders and judgments are presumed to be correct, and the appellant must affirmatively show error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.] Hence, conclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
The appellant must also “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “This is not a mere technical requirement.” (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) It is designed so that we may be advised of “ ‘the exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.’ ” (Ibid.) “Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.” (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.)
B. The Grounds for Granting the Motions Appeared on the Face of the Pleading
The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleading must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) Bryan argues the trial court erred by granting the motions for judgment on the pleadings on grounds that did not appear on the face of his petition or any judicially noticeable document. This argument is embraced broadly in a heading, but is only supported with argument as to his third and fourth grounds for contesting the trust.
Bryan’s third ground for challenging the trust was that it allegedly distributes assets that are community property under the decedent’s marriage to Thompson. The trial court explained that this claim was previously disposed of in a prior order. Bryan challenges only the trial court’s alternative conclusion that “[e]ven assuming this claim were not previously ruled upon, Mr. Bryan has no standing to contest the trust on this basis.” Bryan does not challenge the prior order. As such, Bryan has not demonstrated the trial court erred in dismissing his third ground for challenging the trust.
Bryan’s fourth ground for challenging the trust was an allegation that the decedent breached his marital settlement agreement with Thompson by having her continue to insure him until he died. Bryan challenges the dismissal of this claim on the basis that “[n]o where [sic] on the face of the pleadings or in the documents judicially noticed can it be established that a judgment of dissolution was ever entered between” the decedent and Thompson. But the trial court’s ruling was not based on whether the marriage was ever dissolved. The trial court ruled that whether the allegation that the decedent breached his marital settlement agreement was true or not, “a marital settlement agreement between two parties now deceased gives Mr. Bryan no ground to contest the trust.” Bryan offers no argument or authority to the contrary. Again, he has not demonstrated any error in the trial court’s ruling.
C. The Trial Court’s Order Was Sufficiently Detailed
Bryan contends the trial court erred by not stating reasons or citing legal authority for dismissing his second through sixth grounds for challenging the trust. This is an argument that we have extricated from the mass. It is also unpersuasive. As set forth above, the trial court stated its grounds for granting the motions. Bryan cites no authority suggesting a trial court must supply citations to legal authority in granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Moreover, Bryan fails to show how any failure of the trial court to cite legal authority entitles him to reversal of the judgment. As the appellant, he has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error warranting reversal of the judgment. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) Bryan has not met this burden.
D. No Leave to Amend
Bryan asserts in a conclusory manner that the trial court erred by not granting him leave to amend. This is another argument we have extricated from the mass. We review the trial court’s denial of leave to amend after granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings for abuse of discretion. (Ott v. Alfa-Laval Agri, Inc., supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448.) Because Bryan does not identify any facts he can add by way of amendment to state a valid cause of action or even attempt to satisfy his burden on appeal on this point, Bryan has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him leave to amend. (HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 513, fn. 3; Palm Springs Tennis Club v. Rangel (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed. Respondents Paul Kinney and Glenn Scott Slattery shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)


/S/

RENNER, J.



We concur:


/S/

HULL, Acting P. J.


/S/

ROBIE, J.