Estate of Santiel

Filed 3/29/06 Estate of Santiel CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

Bruce E. Mitchell, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, §21.). Affirmed.

Sandra B. DeMeo for Objectors and Appellants.

No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent.

This case arises out of a dispute over the estate of decedent Violet Santiel. Decedent's grandsons, Alvin J. Santiel, Jr., and Terral Santiel, challenge the trial court's order to return the proceeds of the sale of decedent's real property to the estate. The principal issue on appeal concerns the court's determination that the quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the property from decedent to two of her sons was forged. We affirm the trial court's order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Violet died intestate in December 1995. She was survived by four of her six children. Her son, Alvin J. Santiel, Sr., claimed she executed a quitclaim deed before her death transferring her house to him and his brother, Robert Santiel. Alvin, Sr., transferred his interest in the house to his sons, Alvin, Jr., and Terral Santiel, before he died in 2002. Several other family members learned of the deed only when the house was placed on the market. The house was sold in January 2003 for $129,272. The proceeds were shared by Robert, Alvin, Jr., and Terral.

In February 2003, Robert offered to share his portion of the proceeds equally with the other surviving heirs. In March 2004, Delitta Jones, Violet's granddaughter and the administrator of the estate, filed a petition for an order directing the transfer of the sale proceeds to the estate. After a bench trial, the court ordered Robert Santiel, Alvin, Jr., and Terral to return the proceeds to the estate. In April 2005, appellants filed a motion for further trial on part of the issues and for a new and different judgment. The motion was denied.

Appellants filed a timely appeal. No respondent's brief has been filed.

DISCUSSION

I

Appellants failed to discover that the court signed and filed an order and statement of decision after trial. We reviewed the file and discovered the documents were signed and filed on February 18, 2005. We found nothing indicating that the documents were sent to the parties. Given that, appellants had 180 days to appeal the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(3).) Appellants filed a timely appeal.

The order directing transfer of property to an estate pursuant to Probate Code section 856[1] is appealable. (§ 1300.) Appellants filed the motion for further trial and new judgment in an attempt to appeal the underlying order transferring the property to Jones. We construe the notice of appeal as having been taken from the order of February 18, 2005, granting Jones's section 850 petition.

Reaching the merits, we find none.

II

Appellants argue there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the quitclaim deed transferring the property from Violet to Alvin, Sr., and Robert was a forgery. The court based the finding on the deed, Violet's handwriting samples, and the testimony at trial.

On appeal, the trial court's findings of fact must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 369.) In applying this standard of review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and resolve all evidentiary conflicts and inferences therefrom in favor of upholding the trial court's order. (Ibid.)

A notary public, who was a longtime friend of Violet's and Alvin, Sr.'s, testified that she witnessed Violet's execution of the deed. She placed Violet's thumbprints on the deed and in her notary journal. Appellants' forensic expert, Donald J. Fandry, testified that the thumbprint on the deed and the thumbprint on the notary journal were made by the same person, but could not say whether they were Violet's prints. Respondent's expert, David Crisp, testified that the signature on the deed may have been written by Alvin. Neither respondent's nor appellants' forensic expert was able to determine whether the signature on the deed was that of Violet.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent, we uphold the court's determination that the deed was forged. The evidence at trial was controverted, but appellants failed to demonstrate error by the trial court. No reporter was present when the court issued its oral ruling and appellants did not proceed by settled statement. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 32.3.) Further, the statement of decision reflects the court's determination that the thumbprint evidence was not valid.

III

Appellants argue that the court erred by finding the defense of laches did not bar respondent's claim.

Laches is an equitable defense to the enforcement of a stale claim and requires a showing of unreasonable delay plus either the plaintiff's acquiescence in the act complained of or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. (Conti v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1969) 1 Cal.3d 351, 359.) We generally review a trial court's laches ruling under the substantial evidence standard. (Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1417.) The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay and (2) prejudice. (In re Marriage of Plescia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 252, 256.)

Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that there was no unreasonable delay in respondent's assertion of rights and that appellants suffered no prejudice. The trial court found the Santiel family members had no notice of the quitclaim deed until October 2002, when appellants placed the property on the market. Several family members testified at trial. Robert, Kathy, and Sabrina Santiel testified they had knowledge of the deed around the time it was executed. Kijana Madhi Santiel and respondent Delitta Jones testified they did not learn of the deed until approximately October 2002. The trial court acted within its discretion when it relied on Jones's and Kijana's testimony to support its finding that Jones did not learn of the deed until 2002.

Based on this testimony, the court found that â€