Filed 12/10/18 Estate of Yuan CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David Hood, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.). Affirmed. Request for judicial notice denied. Request to take evidence on appeal denied.

Ka Wah Yuan, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Teri L. Maksoudian and Andrea Coller, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.

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Ka Wah Yuan, appearing in propria persona, appeals from the probate court’s June 2017 order settling and approving the first and final account, allowing compensation to conservator and her attorneys. Yuan fails to identify a claim of error on appeal, provides no cognizable legal analysis, and no error is apparent to us after our review of the record. Because Yuan fails to carry his burden of demonstrating error on appeal, we affirm the challenged order.

FACTS

In 2014, the Orange County Public Guardian (OCPG)^[1] filed a petition for appointment of conservator of the person and estate (petition) for Yuan. After a hearing on the petition, the trial court appointed the OCPG to act as Yuan’s conservator. In 2016, the conservatorship was terminated by stipulation of counsel. The court determined the “[OCPG] as to person only is discharged this date. [The OCPG] as to estate is discharged upon filing of final accounting.”

The OCPG filed its first and final account and report of conservator; petition for conservator’s and attorney’s compensation, and for final discharge in November 2016. Yuan objected to the fees charged, but made no specific legal argument as to why the requested amount was improper.

The trial court issued an order settling and approving the first and final account, allowing compensation to the OCPG and her attorneys and discharging the OCPG as conservator to the estate. The order allowed the OCPG $1,077 as compensation for services rendered. It also allowed Orange County Counsel $550 as compensation for legal services rendered during the period of the account. No assets remained in the estate after the approved payments.

DISCUSSION

1. Yuan Fails to Identify Any Errors with the Trial Court’s Order

“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) “The burden of affirmatively demonstrating error is on the appellant. This is a general principle of appellate practice as well as an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.” (Fundamental Investment Etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971.) The appellant also bears the burden to ‘“present argument and authority on each point.’” (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)

To demonstrate error, an appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority on the points made. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.928(a)(1)(A); see also Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368 [Appellant “fails to present any intelligible legal argument as to why the court’s denial of the motion was reversible error. One cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why”].) These principles apply with equal weight to appellants representing themselves in propria persona. (See Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639 [litigants representing themselves in propria persona are held to the same standards as attorneys].)

To the extent we understand his arguments, Yuan makes various assertions about perceived procedural issues that arose during the proceedings, as well as issues related to the OCPG’s accounting. Most, if not all, of Yuan’s arguments are unsupported by record citations. All lack legal analysis. Without specificity, we cannot presume error, and we must affirm the order.

Furthermore, for probate accounting matters we “reverse only when it is affirmatively shown a prejudicial abuse of discretion has occurred.” (Estate of Billings (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 426, 430.) “[W]e will only interfere with [the trial court’s] ruling if we find that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge reasonably could have reached the challenged result.” (Id.)

Here, the OCPG’s accounting provides a detailed breakdown of the finances over the course of the conservatorship which presumably includes any fees at issue. Yuan fails to demonstrate any error, much less a prejudicial one. The accounting adequately supports the trial court’s decision and we find no error.

2. The Motion to Take Evidence on Appeal and Request for Judicial Notice

Yuan filed a motion to take evidence on appeal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 909 and a request for judicial notice under California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a). Lane opposed both motions. We conclude Yuan failed to meet the standards to grant either motion.

California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(c), provides that “[a] party may move that the reviewing court take evidence.” Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 909, this Court “may for the purpose of making the factual determinations or for any other purpose in the interests of justice, take additional evidence of or concerning facts occurring at any time prior to the decision of the appeal . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc. § 909.)

While section 909 permits an appellate court to take additional evidence, “the power conferred upon appellate courts by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 909 is to be used sparingly and has been narrowly construed.” (In re Elise K. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 138, 149 (conc. opn. of Bird, C. J.) (Elise K.); see Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada ULC (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 591, 605 [‘““[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, no such [factual] findings should be made””’].) “[D]ecisions limiting the use of this power involved attempts to introduce on appeal evidence which (1) existed at the time of trial, (2) was contested on appeal or was cumulative of evidence that was contradicted at trial, and (3) was not conclusive on the question for which its admission was sought.” (Elise K., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 149 (conc. opn. Of Bird, C. J.).)

To the extent we can determine precisely what evidence Yuan is requesting this court to consider, it appears any such additional evidence referenced was in existence at the time of the hearing. Furthermore, any additional evidence would likely be cumulative and contradicted by evidence presented at trial and would not be conclusive on the issue for which its admission is sought. For these reasons, the motion to take evidence on appeal is denied.

We next consider Yuan’s request for judicial notice. California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(2), sets forth the requirements of a request for judicial notice: “The motion must state: (A) [w]hy the matter to be noticed is relevant to the appeal; (B) [w]hether the matter to be noticed was presented to the trial court and, if so, whether judicial notice was taken by that court; (C) [i]f judicial notice of the matter was not taken by the trial court, why the matter is subject to judicial notice under Evidence

Code section 451, 452, or 453; and (D) [w]hether the matter to be noticed relates to proceedings occurring after the order or judgment that is the subject of the appeal.”

Yuan’s request does not comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a). He provides no argument or analysis as to why the matter to be noticed is relevant to the appeal, if the matter was presented to the trial court, or why judicial notice is appropriate. The request for judicial notice is therefore denied. (See Kinney v. Overton (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 482, 497, fn. 7.)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The request for judicial notice is denied. The motion to take evidence on appeal is also denied. Lane shall recover her costs on appeal.

GOETHALS, J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

THOMPSON, J.