Fink v. Superior Court
Filed 9/15/06 Fink v. Superior Court CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DAVID FINK, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent; WARREN GARTH KIRWIN et al., Real Parties in Interest. | G037364 (Super. Ct. No. 05CC09179) O P I N I O N |
Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Mary Fingal Erickson, Judge. Petition granted in part and denied in part.
David Fink, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Michael G. Dawe and Victor Rocha, Prenovost, Normandin, Bergh, Dawe, for Real Parties in Interest.
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THE COURT:*
David Fink filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging various trial court orders in this $10,000 debt collection case. For most of the orders Fink has an adequate remedy at law, and we summarily deny the petition on those issues. Fink raises one issue, however, for which he does not have an adequate remedy and which must be addressed now to avoid irreparable injury. Palma notice was given. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.)
I
When Fink filed this action in August 2005 he filed an application for a fee waiver. His application was granted pursuant to Government Code section 68511.3, subdivision (a)(6)(A), which provides that persons receiving specified government benefits are entitled as a matter of right to a fee waiver. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 985(b).) Fink prosecuted this action in reliance on the fee waiver order until June 2006, when the trial judge assigned to the case summarily, and without prior notice, questioned Fink about his assets and purported to rescind the fee waiver.
It began during a regular law and motion calendar. When Judge Erickson called the case, she verbally dressed down petitioner and counsel for real parties in interest for instances of conduct she considered â€