Filed 4/13/17 Fix the City v. City of Los Angeles CA2/5
On rehearing
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE


FIX THE CITY, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

Defendants and Appellants;

HOLLYWOOD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,

Intervener and Appellant;

RICHARD MACNAUGHTON,

Objector.
B263181

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BS138370)


APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, John A. Torribio, Judge. Affirmed.
Angel Law and Frank P. Angel for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
No appearance for Defendants and Appellants.
No appearance for Intervener and Appellant.
Richard MacNaughton, in pro. per., for Objector.
________________________

Objector Richard MacNaughton appeals from a March 9, 2015 sanctions order. The order enjoined MacNaughton “from filing any court papers on behalf of or holding himself out as attorney for [plaintiff] SaveHollywood.Org,” and further directed MacNaughton to pay plaintiff $27,600 in attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with its sanctions motion. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and affirm the sanctions order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

It is important to clarify the two entities using plaintiff’s name, SaveHollywood.Org. Plaintiff is identified in the underlying litigation as an unincorporated association. Plaintiff’s governing body is the Legal Committee, which was originally comprised of six members: George Abrahams, Robert Blue, Ziggy Kruse, Fran Reichenbach, Jim Van Dusen, and MacNaughton. Members of the Legal Committee created a separate corporation, which was also named “SaveHollywoodOrg” without the period between “SaveHollywood” and “Org.” Abrahams serves as president and Reichenbach serves as the secretary of the corporation. Although the corporation shares the same name as the unincorporated association, it is not a party to the underlying litigation.
On July 18, 2012, plaintiff, represented by MacNaughton, filed one of three related cases challenging environmental approvals of the Hollywood Community Plan Update by the City of Los Angeles. According to the verified mandate petition and complaint, plaintiff is described in part as follows: “For all times herein relevant, [SaveHollywood.Org, also known as People for Livable Communities] was and is an unincorporated association of residents of Los Angeles County who are concerned about the quality of life in the City of Los Angeles and in particular with the quality of life in the area of the City known as Hollywood . . . .” On November 2, 2012, Angel Law was hired as cocounsel for plaintiff.
On September 16 and 17, 2013, a trial was held before Judge Allan J. Goodman on plaintiff’s verified mandate petition and complaint. On February 11, 2014, Judge Goodman entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor, granting the peremptory writ of mandate and injunctive relief.
On March 1, 2014, MacNaughton gave notice of an ex parte application seeking to remove Angel Law as plaintiff’s counsel. MacNaughton’s request for ex parte relief was denied and the hearing on the motion to discharge Angel Law was continued. On March 25, 2014, Judge Goodman denied MacNaughton’s motion to disqualify Angel Law as plaintiff’s counsel.
On July 14, 2014, Judge Goodman issued a number of interlocutory orders which, among other things, remanded the cause to the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles City Council, and Los Angeles Department of Planning (the City) to take further administrative actions. (Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (Mar. 24, 2015, B257712) [nonpub. opn.].)
While the City appealed from the July 14, 2014 post-judgment orders, the dispute over who was representing plaintiff was litigated. MacNaughton filed a motion to dismiss the City’s appeal on plaintiff’s behalf. On December 26, 2014, Presiding Justice Turner denied MacNaughton’s dismissal request. (Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (Dec. 26, 2014, B255712) [nonpub. order].) That same day, Presiding Justice Turner issued an order indicating Angel Law was the only firm authorized to represent plaintiff and ordering McNaughton not to file any further papers as counsel for plaintiff. (Ibid.) On March 24, 2015, this court issued its opinion dismissing the appeal from the July 14, 2014 post-judgment orders. (Fix the City v. City of Los Angeles (Mar. 24, 2015, B257712) [nonpub. opn.].)

Sanctions Motion

Plaintiff, represented by Angel Law, served its Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 sanctions motion on August 26, 2014. The motion was subsequently filed on September 18, 2014 (while the appeal from the July 14, 2014 post-judgment orders was pending). The basis of the sanctions motion was that: MacNaughton had filed a motion to compel a notice of preparation (NOP) of an environmental impact report (EIR) on plaintiff’s behalf; MacNaughton knew he could not file the motion because he had been terminated as plaintiff’s counsel on July 7, 2014; the primary reason MacNaughton filed the motion to compel was for an improper purpose; and the improper purpose was to needlessly increase plaintiff’s litigation costs. The motion sought monetary sanctions and an order enjoining MacNaughton from filing any court papers on behalf of or holding himself out as attorney for plaintiff.
The sanctions motion was based on a number of exhibits as well as declarations filed by Abrahams, Reichenbach, and Van Dusen. The declarations of Angel Law attorneys Jessica Cheng and Frank Angel were also submitted in support of the motion. We summarize their pertinent parts below.
Until January 15, 2013, plaintiff’s Legal Committee consisted of Abrahams, Blue, Kruse, MacNaughton, Reichenbach, and Van Dusen. On January 15, 2013, Blue sent a resignation e-mail to the other members of the Legal Committee. He wrote: “I would like to have my name removed from any official papers of SaveHollywood.org and no longer be part of the SaveHollywood.org board. I am still opposed to the Hollywood Community Plan, but I cannot support how SaveHollywood.org is being handled.” Blue’s e-mail went on to express his dissatisfaction with the manner in which a letter of support to the Los Angeles Chapter of the Sierra Club was handled by Abrahams. The letter sought the Sierra Club’s assistance in the present lawsuit, specifically requesting that the Sierra Club intervene and also help raise funds for the lawsuit.
On February 8, 2014, MacNaughton sent an e-mail addressed as follows: “Legal Committee: Fran Reichenbach, George Abrahams, Richard MacNaughton, Ziggy Kruse, Bob Blue, Jim van Dusen.” MacNaughton stated no member of the Legal Committee was permitted to speak on behalf of plaintiff at an upcoming Los Angeles City Council meeting.
On February 11, 2014, MacNaughton sent a notice to Abrahams and Reichenbach concerning a February 12 meeting of the Legal Committee. The purpose of the meeting was to terminate Angel Law as plaintiff’s counsel. In the notice, MacNaughton claimed the Legal Committee consisted of only himself, Kruse, Blue, and Van Dusen. He alleged Abrahams and Reichenbach resigned from the Legal Committee, but both Abrahams and Reichenbach denied ever resigning from the committee.
On February 12, 2014, MacNaughton held a meeting of the Legal Committee to terminate Angel Law as plaintiff’s counsel. Although Abrahams and Reichenbach attended the meeting, MacNaughton excluded them from voting. Van Dusen protested Abrahams and Reichenbach’s exclusion, as well as Blue’s inclusion on the Legal Committee (because Blue had resigned on January 15, 2013). Although Van Dusen refused to participate, he made it clear that he was not resigning from plaintiff’s Legal Committee. Kruse, Blue, and MacNaughton voted to terminate Angel Law’s legal services. After the meeting, Kruse sent an e-mail to Van Dusen characterizing his statements at the meeting as withdrawing from the Legal Committee. Van Dusen responded that he did not resign from the Legal Committee. On February 14, 2014, Angel Law received an e-mail from MacNaughton stating that its legal services had been terminated by plaintiff.
On February 15, 2014, notice was given to Reichenbach, Abrahams, Kruse, Van Dusen, and MacNaughton for a meeting of the Legal Committee to be held on February 19, 2014. MacNaughton and Kruse did not attend the meeting. Because there was a quorum, the meeting proceeded and all members present voted to reaffirm Angel Law’s representation of plaintiff.
On February 19, 2014, notice was given to Reichenbach, Abrahams, Kruse, Van Dusen, and MacNaughton for a meeting of the Legal Committee to be held on February 22, 2014. MacNaughton and Kruse did not attend. Because a quorum was present, the meeting proceeded and the members unanimously approved adding Rosemary DeMonte to the Legal Committee. This reconstituted the Legal Committee to consist of Abrahams, DeMonte, Kruse, MacNaughton, Reichenbach, and Van Dusen.
On July 1, 2014, notice was sent to all Legal Committee members of a meeting to be held on July 5, 2014. The meeting had two agenda items: (1) the termination of MacNaughton’s legal representation of plaintiff; and (2) an update of the retainer agreement between plaintiff and Angel Law. MacNaughton responded that the Legal Committee was “bogus” and “false.” MacNaughton and Kruse did not attend the July 5, 2014 meeting. Having a quorum, the meeting proceeded. A majority of members present voted to terminate MacNaughton’s legal representation of plaintiff. On July 7, 2014, Abrahams wrote MacNaughton, informing him of the Legal Committee’s decision. Abrahams’s letter expanded on plaintiff’s reasons for the termination, and unequivocally requested that MacNaughton not hold himself out as plaintiff’s counsel. MacNaughton denied the Legal Committee’s authority to terminate him, calling the Legal Committee a “bogus entity” that was “committing a fraud by . . . masquerading as [plaintiff’s] Legal Committee.”
On July 16, 2014, MacNaughton filed a motion to compel the filing of a NOP of an EIR, along with an ex parte application to shorten time for a hearing on this motion. These and other papers were filed without consultation with plaintiff’s Legal Committee. MacNaughton was not authorized to file the motion to compel according to Abrahams and Reichenbach. Further, Angel Law was never notified in advance of any intention to file a motion to compel. On September 24, 2014, Judge Goodman denied McNaughton’s motion.

Opposition to Sanctions Motion

MacNaughton contended the sanctions motion was based on false representations by Angel Law that, on March 25, 2014, Judge Goodman determined MacNaughton did not represent plaintiff. As previously mentioned, on March 25, 2014, Judge Goodman denied MacNaughton’s motion to disqualify Angel Law as plaintiff’s counsel. MacNaughton argued that Judge Goodman made no determination as to who represented plaintiff, and in fact, refused to do so.
In a supplemental brief, MacNaughton argued that Blue was a member of the Legal Committee and only resigned from the corporation, not plaintiff’s Legal Committee. Therefore, the vote to terminate MacNaughton was invalid as Blue was absent when the vote was taken. Moreover, MacNaughton took the position that Reichenbach’s and Abrahams’s repeated statements that the Legal Committee did not exist and their refusal to participate in the Legal Committee starting in September 2013 constituted their constructive resignations.
MacNaughton filed declarations of Kruse and Blue. The declarations stated that Kruse and Blue, along with MacNaughton, formed the unincorporated association entitled “SaveHollywood.org aka People for Livable Communities” in 2011. In the spring of 2012, the Legal Committee was formed and its members were MacNaughton, Blue, Kruse, Reichenbach, Abrahams, and Van Dusen. On August 29, 2012, the corporation was formed for fundraising purposes. Kruse and Blue were members of the corporation’s board and worked closely together raising money. In November 2012, Kruse attempted to develop a relationship with the Los Angeles Chapter of the Sierra Club. However, a letter sent by Abrahams in January 2013 to the Sierra Club destroyed efforts to develop a relationship with that entity. Blue was so furious with Abrahams for mishandling the letter to the Sierra Club that he resigned from the corporation’s board on January 15, 2013.
Kruse and Blue claimed Blue never resigned from plaintiff’s Legal Committee, only the corporation’s board. According to Blue, the corporation handled fundraising while plaintiff’s Legal Committee managed the litigation. In Blue’s opinion, fundraising and managing the litigation were two separate worlds: “After I resigned from the Corp Board, I continued on [plaintiff’s] Legal Committee. No one ever mentioned that they thought I had resigned from the Legal Committee. I have received a number of e-mails where George Abrahams and Fran Reichenbach continued to include me in all the e-mails concerning The Legal Committee. [¶] The first I heard any claim that I was not a member of the Legal Committee was in February 2014, when Frank Angel began to claim that he represented the Legal Committee. In order to explain my absence from his Legal Committee, Frank Angel asserted, for the first time, that I had resigned in January 2013.”
Kruse explained why Reichenbach and Abrahams were not members of the Legal Committee: “After Frank Angel’s claim that the [corporation] was [plaintiff] was shown to be false, we attempted to re-establish a cooperative relationship with Fran Reichenbach and George Abrahams. Because they had constructively resigned from the Legal Committee, we invited them to attend the February 12, 2014 meeting as observers. When both Fran Reichenbach and George Abrahams refused to participate in a Legal Committee which had Bob Blue as a member, it was not possible to re-admit Ms. Reichenbach and George Abrahams. Another member of the Legal Committee, [Van] Dusen said he was resigning from the Legal Committee and departed with Ms. Reichenbach and Mr. Abrahams, but he later sent an e-mail stating he had not resigned. This matter has remained open as [Van] Dusen has made no effort to cooperate with the Legal Committee and instead associates with Fran Reichenbach and George Abrahams who are now pressing a new bogus version of the Legal Committee.”

The Ruling

On March 9, 2015, Judge John A. Torribio granted plaintiff’s sanctions motion. Judge Torribio stated the “fulcrum issue in this matter is simply, ‘Did Blue resign from the Legal Committee on January 15, 2013 when he sent in his letter of resignation?” His findings and order were as follows.
Judge Torribio found Blue resigned from plaintiff’s Legal Committee on January 15, 2013. He noted Kruse “stated unequivocally that [plaintiff] supervised the Litigation and [the corporation] SAVEHOLLYWOODORG (NO DOT) did the fundraising.” This was important because Blue was aware of the distinction yet he sent the resignation letter to plaintiff, SaveHollywood.Org, not the corporation, SaveHollywoodOrg. Judge Torribio found, “The only logical conclusion is that Blue resigned from the Legal Committee of [plaintiff]. Blue’s dispute over the handling of the request to have the Sierra Club join the action financially and with the litigation, makes no sense re resigning from the fundraising arm, but makes complete sense from the litigation angle.”
Judge Torribio determined MacNaughton was plaintiff’s attorney until his termination on July 7, 2014, but he “continued to act as [plaintiff’s] attorney even though he was not.” MacNaughton violated section 128.7, subdivisions (b)(1) and (3) by filing his ex parte application and motion to compel a NOP, purportedly on behalf of plaintiff. MacNaughton knowingly and intentionally proceeded to file his motion to compel, stating without evidentiary support that the motion was brought by plaintiff. MacNaughton proceeded with his motion to compel primarily for the improper purpose of needlessly increasing litigation costs and to harass plaintiff. MacNaughton forced plaintiff to spend time addressing the unauthorized filings and ignored his professional duty, as an officer of the court, to refrain from holding himself out as counsel for a party he no longer represents.
Judge Torribio enjoined MacNaughton from filing any court papers on behalf of or holding himself out as plaintiff’s counsel, and ordered him to pay plaintiff $27,600 in attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the sanctions motion.

DISCUSSION

MacNaughton challenges Judge Torribio’s March 9, 2015 sanctions order, contending it “was without jurisdiction and was 100 [percent] contrary to the evidence.” Based on the record before us, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions.
“[S]ection 128.7 provides that the filing of a pleading certifies that, to the attorney or unrepresented party’s ‘knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,’ the pleading is not being presented ‘primarily for an improper purpose,’ the claims, defenses and other legal contentions therein are ‘warranted,’ and the allegations and other factual contentions ‘have evidentiary support.’ (Id., subd. (b).) If these standards are violated, the court can impose an appropriate sanction sufficient to deter future misconduct, including a monetary sanction. (Id., subds. (c), (d).)” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 575, superseded by statute on another ground as discussed in Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 977.) Section 128.7 does not require any showing of subjective bad faith, rather it “requires only that the conduct be ‘objectively unreasonable.’” (Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 167.) “The purpose of section 128.7 is to deter frivolous filings.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 826.)
We review a section 128.7 sanctions award under the abuse of discretion standard. (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 441.) An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ [Citation.]” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) We cannot say Judge Torribio’s order fell within these parameters.
Judge Torribio found MacNaughton’s conduct was objectively unreasonable because he was notified of his termination on July 7, 2014, yet he continued to purportedly act on plaintiff’s behalf by subsequently filing his motion to compel on July 16, 2014. Judge Torribio’s ruling that MacNaughton violated section 128.7, subdivisions (b)(1) and (3) rests, in part, on his finding that Blue resigned from plaintiff’s Legal Committee on January 15, 2013.
The ruling is supported by the record and common sense. Kruse stated “unequivocally” in her declaration that plaintiff supervised the litigation, while the corporation handled the fundraising. The most rational conclusion to be drawn from Blue’s resignation letter was that he was resigning from plaintiff’s Legal Committee, i.e., the litigation arm of the organization. Blue was frustrated over the manner in which a request to have the Sierra Club support the litigation was handled and specifically asked to be removed from “SaveHollywood.org,” which is the unincorporated association. Given Blue was aware of the distinction between “.org” and “Org,” Blue would have likely referenced “SaveHollywoodOrg” in his letter if he sought to limit his resignation to the corporation. Because the trial court’s finding that Blue resigned from the Legal Committee is supported by the record, plaintiff’s Legal Committee properly convened without Blue (or notice to Blue) on July 5, 2014, and its subsequent vote to terminate MacNaughton as plaintiff’s attorney was valid. We conclude Judge Torribio acted within the bounds of reason in determining the imposition of sanctions were justified on the ground that MacNaughton improperly acted as plaintiff’s attorney after he had been terminated from that position. (See County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 301, 316 [abuse of discretion occurs when lower court exceeds the bounds of reason].)
We note MacNaughton has not challenged the reasonableness of plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the sanctions motion. He has therefore waived the issue on appeal. (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 830 [“[t]he absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived”].) In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing a monetary sanction in the sum of $27,600 in attorney fees and costs in connection with the motion. The attorney declarations filed in support of monetary sanctions were sufficiently detailed for the court to determine the time spent and work performed were reasonable.
DISPOSITION

The March 9, 2015 sanctions order is affirmed. Plaintiff and Respondent SaveHollywood.Org is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS


KUMAR, J.

We concur:


KRIEGLER, Acting P.J.


BAKER, J.