Flagg v. Corcoran

Filed 4/24/06 Flagg v. Corcoran CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977 .

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Thomas P. Nugent, Judge. Affirmed.

In this dispute over the use of a nonexclusive express easement for ingress and egress from an otherwise landlocked parcel of land, the trial court entered a judgment which allows the occupiers of the landlocked parcel to park vehicles in the easement on a transitory or temporary basis. The judgment further provides that if the owner of an adjacent parcel, who also has the right to use the easement, finds that such parking interferes with his ability to use the easement to move his recreational vehicle, he is required to give the occupiers of the other parcel at least one hour's notice of his intention to move his recreational vehicle. Following such notice, the occupiers of the landlocked parcel are required to move any vehicles under their control or the control of their guests. Where, as here, parties share a nonexclusive easement, they must accommodate each other's reasonable uses of the easement. (See Applegate v. Ota (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 702, 712.) Moreover, in fashioning a decree a court of equity is not bound by the parties' claims for relief or offers, but may enter an order which does justice to all parties. (Ibid.) As we interpret the trial court's judgment, it does nothing more than compel the parties to accommodate each other's reasonable use of the easement. We affirm the judgment.

SUMMARY

In 1981 respondents John W. Corcoran, Jr., and Kathleen Marie Corcoran subdivided land they owned on Yucca Road in Oceanside into three parcels. Two of the lots were so- called "panhandle lots," which required an easement access across the third parcel. As a condition of the subdivision, the Corcorans were required by the City of Oceanside to make the easement 20 feet wide. The Corcorans met this condition by conveying 10 feet on the northern border of their land as a nonexclusive easement for the use of the two panhandle lots and the lot to the north of their property; in addition, the Corcorans obtained from the owner of the lot to the north of their land a nonexclusive easement over the southern 10 feet of his property. The easement provides the only ingress and egress for the two panhandle lots; it provides ingress and egress to the rear of the lot to the north of the two panhandle lots.

In 1994 plaintiff and appellant E. Thomas Flagg purchased the home which was north of the two panhandle lots. Like his predecessor-in-interest, Flagg used the easement as a means of moving a large motor home to and from the rear of his lot.

The Corcorans eventually sold two of their three lots. The Corcorans retained one of the panhandle lots and constructed a home on it. In 1999 the Corcorans' daughter Colleen Mertes and her husband Todd Mertes moved into the home as tenants.

The Merteses regularly permitted social and business visitors to park in the easement. When this occurred, it made it difficult for Flagg to move his motor home. In response, on occasion Flagg would park his motor home in the easement, making it difficult for the Merteses and their guests to use the easement.

In 2002 the Merteses replaced a split rail fence on the south side of the easement with a wood and iron fence. The Merteses did not obtain a new survey for the fence and according to Flagg the fence not only encroached on the easement it also made it very difficult for him to move his motor home, even when no cars were parked in the easement.

In December 2003 Flagg filed a complaint against the Corcorans and the Merteses. He alleged the new fence encroached on the easement and gave rise to claims for trespass, nuisance, negligence, quiet title and declaratory relief. He asked for damages and an injunction requiring removal of the fence.

The Corcorans and the Merteses answered and filed a cross-complaint. In their cross-complaint they alleged they had the right to maintain the new fence and in addition asked the court for a declaration their guests and invitees had the right to temporarily park in the easement area.

Shortly before trial, the Mertses removed the new fence.

At trial John Corcoran testified that when he created the easement, he intended that occupants of the panhandle lots would be able to use the easement for temporary guest and visitor parking. The Corcorans and the Merteses also provided testimony that they, Flagg and Flagg's predecessor in interest had regularly used the easement for temporary parking.

Flagg presented testimony that when cars were parked in the easement, he was unable to move his motor home from his backyard.

At the close of trial the trial court issued its findings from the bench. The court denied Flagg's request for an injunction preventing the Corcorans and the Merteses from putting up a new fence. The trial court determined transitory and temporary parking in the easement is permitted and that Flagg is required to give the Corcorans and Meretses one hour's notice of his intention to move his motor home, at which point they are required to have their guests move any cars out of the easement. The court found these parking rights were provided both under the terms of the easement and as prescriptive rights. The Corcorans and the Merteses prepared a judgment reflecting the trial court's findings and the trial court entered the judgment.

Flagg filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I

We review the trial court's determinations of law de novo. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799.) "We review the trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence. Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, we are bound by the principal that 'the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,' to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citation.]" (Ninety Nine Investments, Ltd. v. Overseas Courier Service (Singapore) Private, Ltd. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1127.)

Importantly, where, as here, the appellant did not ask for any additional findings, we are required to imply any reasonable finding which supports the judgment. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1333-1334 (Marriage of Arceneaux).) "When the court announces its tentative decision, a party may, under [Code Civ. Proc.] section 632, request the court to issue a statement of decision explaining the basis of its determination, and shall specify the issues on which he is requesting the statement; following such a request, the party may make proposals relating to the contents of the statement. Thereafter, under section 634, the party must state any objection to the statement in order to avoid an implied finding on appeal in favor of the prevailing party. The section declares that if omissions or ambiguities in the statement are timely brought to the trial court's attention, the appellate court will not imply findings in favor of the prevailing party. The clear implication of this provision, of course, is that if a party does not bring such deficiencies to the trial court's attention, that party waives the right to claim on appeal that the statement was deficient in these regards, and hence the appellate court will imply findings to support the judgment. Furthermore, section 634 clearly refers to a party's need to point out deficiencies in the trial court's statement of decision as a condition of avoiding such implied findings, rather than merely to request such a statement initially as provided in section 632." (Id. at pp. 1133-1134, fns. omitted.)

II

Because the Merteses are not owners of the lot they occupy, Flagg argues the trial court erred in giving them parking rights under the terms of the judgment. However, the agreements by which the easement was created contain the following provisions: "6. The easement granted herein is not exclusive to Grantee or their successors in interest.[¶] . . . [¶] 10. This instrument shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives, successors, and assigns of the parties hereto." As tenants the Merteses clearly fall within the category of the Corcorans' assigns. We also note that Civil Code section 809 provides: "The owner of any estate in a dominant tenement, or the occupant of such tenement, may maintain an action for the enforcement of an easement attached thereto." (Italics added.) In light of the terms of the easement agreements and Civil Code section 809, the trial court did not err in providing the Merteses' with rights under the easement.

III

Flagg argues that because the easement agreements make no reference to parking in the easement, the trial court erred in finding the easement documents nonetheless permitted parking. We disagree.

In Heath v. Kettenhofen (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 197, 204, the court found an easement "for roadway and utilities" included an implied right to transitory parking. The court stated: "Here the entire judgment must be read in the light of its fundamental holding that the rights of the parties in and to the easement, for roadway purposes, are coexisting and equal, and that these rights embrace as necessary incidents thereto the reasonable use of the easement by each party for such transitory parking as will not interfere with the rights of the other." (Ibid., italics added.) This implied right of transitory parking is particularly appropriate here where the easement is the only means by which visitors have access to the dominant tenement. Given those circumstances the parties could reasonably expect the easement would be available for visitors' transitory parking so long as the parking did not interfere with use of the easement by the other grantees.

We also disagree with Flagg's contention that the transitory parking rights unduly interfere with his right to move his motor home. In making this argument Flagg implicitly concedes that, other than the use of his motor home, parking in the easement does not prevent ingress and egress from his property. In addition, Flagg's agreement strongly suggests that when he is moving his motor home through the easement, no other use of the easement is physically possible. Flagg also concedes that in the recent past he has only used his motor home a few times each year. Under these circumstances the trial court could fashion an order which in effect requires the parties merely accommodate each other. (See Applegate v. Ota, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 712.) In our view the judgment entered by the trial court meets this objective without unduly interfering with the rights of either party. For his part, Flagg is required by the judgment to accommodate the transitory parking the Corcorans and Merteses need; for their part, the Corcorans and Merteses are required to accommodate Flagg's need to occasionally move his motor home free of any cars in the easement. Since his needs are only occasional, the trial court could reasonably put the burden of providing notice on Flagg without unduly interfering with his right to use the easement. As the court in Applegate v. Ota stated: "A court of equity is not limited in granting relief by demands and offers of parties themselves but may fashion a decree which will do justice to all parties." (Ibid.)

Contrary to Flagg's contention, the uses the trial court permitted are sufficiently defined. In the event more than visitors and guests use the easement for parking or their parking is overnight, Flagg may obtain appropriate relief under the terms of the judgment.

IV

Flagg also attacks the trial court's finding the parties' right to the easement and its use for transitory parking were supported not only under the terms of the granted easement but as prescriptive rights.

Although Flagg points out the Corcorans and the Merteses did not allege any prescriptive rights, the record also indicates that at trial Flagg's counsel asked the court for a determination the Corcorans and Merteses did not have any prescriptive right to park vehicles in the easement area. In light of this request by Flagg's counsel, he cannot on appeal object to the fact the trial court made a determination on the existence, if any, of the parties' prescriptive rights. (See Weber, Lipshie & Co. v. Christian (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 645, 658.)

Flagg also contends there was no showing parking took place in the easement for the required five-year period. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 318; Civ. Code, § 1007.) Flagg misunderstands the nature of the trial court's ruling. There is no dispute there was sufficient evidence the easement was used for ingress and egress for the required five-year period in an open, notorious and hostile manner. Thus the trial court had an ample basis upon which it could determine that a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress was established. In determining the scope of that prescriptive easement, and in particular whether it included an incidental right to park in the easement, the trial court was not required to find that transitory parking took place for five years. Rather, all the trial court was required to find was that such use was permissible in an easement for ingress and egress. Because the record shows transitory parking did not unduly interfere with the rights of the parties and was in fact an expected use of the easement, the trial court could determine the prescriptive easement included a right to transitory parking.

V

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining there was no prevailing party. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1).) Given the fact Flagg essentially prevailed on his claim the fence encroached on the easement and the Corcorans and Mertes prevailed on their parking claim, the trial court could reasonably decide that neither party had prevailed.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

Each party to bear its own costs of appeal.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

IRION, J.

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