Flores v. Griffith Laboratories

Filed 4/26/07 Flores v. Griffith Laboratories CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

I.

INTRODUCTION

The above-captioned actions both arise from a lawsuit brought by appellant Erlinda Flores (Flores) against respondent Griffith Laboratories U.S.A., Inc. (Griffith). In 1990, Flores, then represented by counsel, sued Griffith for wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress regarding her termination following her exposure to toluene while she worked at Griffith in 1989. The parties resolved the case, entering into a settlement agreement. Acting in propria persona, Flores brought a new action against Griffith in 2005, asserting that she had newly discovered evidence regarding the same toluene exposure in 1989. She also brought an action in propria persona against Christina Grace Cordoza (Cordoza), an attorney for Griffith in the 1990 case, alleging professional negligence and concealment of evidence of Floress medical records. Flores appealed in both cases after the trial court sustained demurrers without leave to amend to both complaints, and entered judgments of dismissal. On our own motion, we consolidate the appeals, and affirm the judgments in both cases.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Flores reported receiving a Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry in 1966. In November 1989, Flores was employed by Technical Aid Corporation, a temporary personnel agency, and assigned to work at Griffith beginning on November 14, 1989. Flores alleged she was exposed to toluene while working at Griffith on December 5 and 6, 1989. She alleged that her supervisor at Griffith warned her not to file a complaint with CAL/OSHA, and then assigned her to clean laboratory grills, rather than her usual duties. On December 9, 1989, Flores left work and sought medical treatment. On December 11, 1989, Flores wrote a letter to the president of Griffith, informing him of her exposure to toluene in the Griffith lab. She stated, Last December 5, 1989 I was exposed to toluene, a highly flammable, toxic organic solvent[,] which is a derivative of Benzene used in the manufacture[] of TNT and known to be a carcinogenic substance . . . when my . . . manager . . . dumped the contents of his flask soaked with toluene into the sink. . . . I immediately had headaches and cold sweats. On December 15, 1989, after refusing to talk with her supervisor, she was terminated by Griffith. Flores wrote another letter[1] to the Griffith company president on December 18, 1989, in which she stated, That day I gave my notice of release by the doctor and 2 medical report[s] stating that I was exposed to toluene. I told the doctor I was exposed to toluene when my QA manager dumped the contents of his flask into the sink. . . .

Through counsel, Flores filed a complaint against Griffith in December 1990, alleging wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She alleged in her complaint that she was exposed to toluene while working at Griffith, specifically alleging that on December 9, 1989 she went to the hospital with severe emotional trauma and abdominal pains which were due to her toluene exposure and her treatment on the job.

Cordoza was one of the attorneys representing Griffith. The parties executed a settlement and release agreement in January 1992, which included a payment from Griffith to Flores of $4,200. Flores also released Griffith from any and all claims . . . known or unknown, of every kind, nature and character which [Flores] has or has ever had, against [Griffith] . . . including any claims that may have been or could have been included in the 1990 lawsuit against Griffith. Floress attorney in this action acknowledged explaining the settlement agreement to her.

On February 14, 2005, Flores, in propria persona, filed a new complaint against Griffith, alleging causes of action for reconsideration, spoliation of evidence and discrimination, based on new discoveries. The trial court sustained Griffiths demurrer to her complaint, without leave to amend, on two bases. The court held that Flores had executed a settlement and release of her claims over a decade ago, and that her claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Flores, again acting in propria persona, also filed a complaint against Cordoza in May 2005, alleging that Cordoza was professionally negligent in that she had suppressed, fraudulently concealed and engaged in negligent spoliation of evidence. Flores claimed that Cordoza concealed Floress own medical reports from her, and abused the discovery process by failing to take her deposition or seek an independent medical exam in the underlying 1990 case against Griffith. The court sustained Cordozas demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend, on the bases that Cordoza owed no duty to Flores, and the causes of action were all barred by the absolute litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) and the applicable statutes of limitations. The court also held that Flores alleged no facts in support of her abuse of process claim, and that negligent spoliation of evidence is not a viable cause of action.

Flores appealed from the judgments of dismissal following the orders granting the demurrers without leave to amend and the orders denying her motion for reconsideration.

III.

DISCUSSION

The Demurrers to Floress Complaints

Flores argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers to her complaints in both underlying actions, and in not granting her leave to amend. We conduct a de novoreview to determine whether the complaints on their faces fail to state a cause of action or disclose a complete defense. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) We review the trial courts denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, considering whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect[s] can be cured by amendment . . . . (Ibid.; Kilgore v. Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770, 781.)

As to Floress complaint against Griffith, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and by Floress prior settlement and release agreement with Griffith. To the extent we can discern the legal basis for Floress argument on appeal, she appears to claim that she did not fully understand the extent of her injuries at the time she executed the settlement agreement because Cordoza, Griffiths attorney, concealed her medical records and failed to seek an independent medical exam, or to depose Flores. As Flores asserted in the trial court, if I only knew that the [medical report] was disclosed, I should not have settled.

A settlement agreement has the attributes of a judgment in that it serves to bar reopening of the issues settled. [Citations.] (A. J. Industries, Inc. v. Ver Halen (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 751, 759.) Absent a fundamental defect in the agreement itself the terms are binding on the parties. A party to a settlement agreement may not seek to rescind it by proving the merits of his original claim and then establishing that an erroneous assessment by him of that claim led to the settlement. (Ibid.)

Flores executed a settlement agreement with Griffith, under which Griffith paid her $4,200 and she signed a waiver and release of all claims, whether known or unknown. Flores then filed a request for dismissal of the action against Griffith with prejudice. The possibility that Flores agreed to the settlement based on her erroneous assessment of her medical condition, is not grounds to rescind the settlement agreement. (See A. J. Industries, Inc. v. Ver Halen, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 759.) Accordingly, the 1992 settlement agreement between Flores and Griffith bars Floress new complaint against Griffith.

The trial court also held that Floress new complaint against Griffith was barred by the statute of limitations. Flores attempts to argue that the delayed discovery rule applies to prevent her complaint from being time-barred. Under this doctrine, the statute of limitations period begins to run when the party claiming injury suspects or should suspect the injury was caused by wrongdoing. (McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 (partly superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Grisham v. Phillip Morris U.S.A, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 637, fn. 8).) Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her. [Fn. omitted.] . . . [T]he limitations period begins once the plaintiff   has notice orinformation of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry . . . .   (Gutierrez [v. Mofid (1985)] 39 Cal.3d [892,] 896-897, quoting Sanchez [v. South Hoover Hospital (1976)] 18 Cal.3d [93,] 101 (italics added by the Gutierrez court).) A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific facts necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110-1111.)

Floress claim of delayed discovery is meritless. In 1990, Flores, a chemist herself, obviously suspected that her exposure to toluene while working at Griffith was wrongdoing that caused her injuries. In her initial complaint filed in 1990, Flores alleged that on December 5, 1989 [Griffith] manager George Delaye dumped a flask saturated with Toluene into a sink which released excessive Toluene Fumes. [Capitalization in original.] In her second amended complaint, dated June 19, 1991, she alleged that on December 5, 1989, plaintiff[]s manager [] George Delaye dumped a flask saturated with Toluene, a harmful toxic substance into a sink which released excessive Toluene fumes. Plaintiff was exposed and inhaled the Toluene fumes. Flores also alleged that she sought medical care for her personal injuries on December 9, 1989. Her complaint stated on December 9, 1989, plaintiff had to leave work in an emergency and went to Eden Hospital with severe abdominal pains and emotional trauma . . . which were due to her exposure to Toluene and her treatment on the job. The Eden Hospital record from this visit is one of the documents Flores claims was concealed from her.

Flores knew, on December 5, 1989, that she was exposed to toluene. She also knew, on that date, that she suffered physical effects due to the toluene exposure. She sought medical treatment on December 9 and December 12, 1989, at Eden Hospital, informing them each time of her toluene exposure and the subsequent symptoms. On December 21, 1989, Flores sought treatment from Dr. Jane Wardzinska for symptoms she believed were the result of her toluene exposure. The evidence which she claims was concealed by Cordoza consisted of her own medical records regarding these and other visits. Under these factual circumstances, the delayed discovery doctrine does not aid Flores.

The trial court also sustained the demurrer without leave to amend to Floress complaint against Cordoza, the attorney for Griffith. Flores asserts that Cordoza, as counsel for Griffith, concealed Floress medical records which indicated she was exposed to toluene. She also claims that Cordozas failure to take her deposition or to seek an order for an independent medical exam is somehow related to this alleged concealment of evidence, and appears to allege malpractice against Cordoza.

Flores apparently bases this argument on the fact that Cordoza, acting as an attorney for Griffith, caused a request for production of documents to be served in the 1990 action, and consequently had received copies of Floress medical reports. To state the obvious, it was Flores who consulted these medical professionals and gave them the information in the reports regarding her toluene exposure. In fact, Floress appendices contain copies of records from numerous visits to medical professionals, dating from December 1989, which indicate that Flores repeatedly informed medical personnel of her exposure to toluene and believed it was the cause of numerous medical and psychological problems. Flores also appears to base this claim of concealment on the fact that counsel for Griffith declined to respond to Floress document production request in 2005, because the case had been dismissed. Counsels refusal to respond to Floress request for document production after the case had settled cannot be considered a concealment of Floress own medical records.

After conducting our independent review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining both demurrers without leave to amend.[2]

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgments in both cases are affirmed.

_________________________

Ruvolo, P. J.

We concur:

_________________________

Reardon, J.

_________________________

Rivera, J.

Publication Courtesy of California attorney referral.

Analysis and review provided by Vista Property line attorney.

[1] Copies of both letters are included in the approximately 375 pages of attachments to Floress 2005 complaint against Griffith.

[2]Flores does not appear to maintain on appeal that the court erred in its rulings regarding professional negligence and spoliation of evidence. Nevertheless, in our independent review, we find no error in any of the trial courts rulings.