Francisco G. v. Super. Ct.

Filed 8/1/07 Francisco G. v. Super. Ct. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

Francisco G, seeks extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating family reunification services for his children, and setting the matter for a permanent plan hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code,  366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.)[1] We deny the petition for extraordinary writ.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 16, 2006, the Ventura County Human Services Agency ("HSA") filed dependency petitions on behalf of four-year-old Francisco G., three-year-old Mariah G., and one-year-old Shanya G. HSA alleged that the children's mother had abandoned them with a relative and suggested that the relative "give the children to social services."[2] The children's father, Francisco G., was then imprisoned after suffering a conviction in 2005 for driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury, and child cruelty. Francisco G. has an eighteen-year criminal history, including battery, driving under the influence of alcohol, domestic violence, and theft. HSA alleged that the children's parents had failed to protect and provide for them. ( 300, subds. (b) & (g).)

On May 17, 2006, the juvenile court ordered that the children be detained. On September 28, 2006, the juvenile court held a jurisdiction and disposition hearing in which Francisco G., represented by counsel, participated. The court sustained the allegations of the dependency petition, continued the children in foster care, and ordered HSA to provide family reunification services. The family reunification services plan required Francisco G. to obtain counseling regarding domestic violence and impulse control, attend and complete a parent education program, obtain inpatient or outpatient drug and alcohol counseling and treatment, submit to random drug testing, and attend a 12-step program three times a week.

During the dependency, Francisco G. was arrested and reconfined on two occasions. As a condition of parole, his parole officer ordered that Francisco G. have no contact with his wife or his children. Francisco G. complied in part with portions of his family reunification services plan; he attended parent education classes and meetings of 12-step programs. Although he did not submit to random drug tests for HSA, he complied with drug testing conditions of his parole. Francisco G. resided for a short time at "Freedom House Sober Living," but left and attended "Alano Club" (12-step meetings) instead.

On February 15, 2007, the juvenile court held a six-month review hearing. Francisco G. was once again in custody, having been arrested on charges of theft, resisting arrest, and violating parole. At the six-month review hearing, Francisco G. testified that HSA did not provide sufficient reunification services in view of his homelessness, lack of income, and lack of transportation. He conceded that HSA referred him to Ventura County Drug and Alcohol Services, but stated that he did not follow up with the program because it required proof of his lack of income.

HSA social worker Gladys Gonzales testified that she met with Francisco G. upon his release from prison and that she provided him bus tokens and a directory of services. She also referred him to "The Lighthouse" for drug and alcohol counseling.

The juvenile court found that Francisco G. had not sufficiently progressed with family reunification services. The juvenile court judge stated: "[I]t's true that the parents have failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress by clear and convincing evidence. . . . [Francisco G.] hasn't done any of his case plan services except for a very minimal amount." The juvenile court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 permanent plan hearing.

Francisco G. seeks an extraordinary writ vacating the juvenile court order. He contends that HSA did not provide adequate family reunification services and that the juvenile court was biased against him. HSA responds in part that the petition is inadequate because it does not provide citation to the record or argument with supporting authorities. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.452 (a) & (b); Glen C. v. SuperiorCourt (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 577.) HSA urges that we dismiss the petition or treat it as abandoned.

DISCUSSION

I.

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (i)(1), requires the reviewing court to decide a writ petition setting a section 366.26 hearing "on the merits by written opinion" unless "exceptional circumstances" exist. Although Francisco G.'s petition for extraordinary writ is deficient in some respects, we decide his arguments on the merits in view of his continuing incarcerated status and the existence of a sufficient appellate record.

II.

Francisco G. argues that HSA did not provide adequate reunification services, pointing out that he had several social workers and that their referrals were not successful. In particular, he asserts that a referral to "The Lighthouse" was inappropriate because it accepts only female patients.

We affirm a finding of reasonable reunification services if it is supported by sufficient evidence. (In reAlvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) We do not redetermine the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1650.)

Here HSA provided Francisco G. with a directory of services, including Ventura County Drug and Alcohol Services. He lived at Freedom House Sober Living before attending 12-step programs at the Alano Club. Late in the dependency, Francisco G. also enrolled in and attended parent education classes. In most cases, it may be that services could have been provided more frequently or that the services were imperfect. (In reMisako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) "The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (Ibid.)

HSA provided reasonable and adequate services to Francisco G. The reunification services plan required either inpatient or outpatient substance abuse treatment. Francisco G. did not follow through with the referrals provided. The law does not require HSA to "take the parent by the hand" or lead him step-by-step along the way. (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 414-415.)  

Under certain circumstances, section 366.21, subdivision (e), permits the termination of family reunification services after six months to parents whose dependent child is under the age of three. The circumstances include the parent's failure "to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan" unless there is "a substantial probability" that the child may be returned within six months. Here Francisco G. states in his petition that he will be released from incarceration in October 2007. There is insufficient evidence of "a substantial probability" that his children will be returned to him within six months of the last review hearing held February 15, 2007.

III.

Francisco G. contends that the juvenile court was biased against him, pointing out that the court described the dependency as "heartbreaking."

Francisco G. misinterprets the juvenile court's comments. The reference to a "heartbreaking" situation described the initial division of the children among foster homes. Within several weeks of the detention, however, the children were reunited in one foster home. We have reviewed the record and find no comment or evidence indicating that the juvenile court was biased against Francisco G. or that he did not obtain a fair hearing. Indeed, the court's statement reflected its concern and compassion for the children.

IV.

Francisco G. argues that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not inquire if he had witnesses to present regarding jurisdiction and disposition. The record reflects, however, that Francisco G. executed a written waiver of rights and submitted the issue of jurisdiction on the basis of HSA reports and documents. Moreover, Francisco G. was incarcerated at the time of the children's detention and for six weeks afterwards. He has not established that his attorney's representation was deficient and that such deficiency resulted in prejudice. (In re Dennis H. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 94, 98; In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1711 [standard of review].)

We deny the petition for extraordinary writ.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P.J.

We concur:

COFFEE, J.

PERREN, J.

Tari L. Cody, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Francisco G. for Petitioner.

Noel A. Klebaum, County Counsel, County of Ventura and Linda L. Stevenson, Assistant County Counsel for Respondent..

Ventura County Human Services Agency for Real Party in Interest.

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[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[2] The children's mother is not a party to this writ petition.