Filed 8/10/22 Fuller v. Perez CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Following a hearing on the petition of respondent Tracey Fuller, the trial court granted a domestic violence restraining order against appellant Carlos Perez. (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) In appeal number H048490, Perez contends the court failed to consider the totality of circumstances in reaching its conclusion and there is not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s order. He further argues that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered Perez to stay away from Fuller’s parents’ home. In appeal number H048861, Perez alleges the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay Fuller’s attorney fees and costs.[1] Finding no error, we will affirm the orders.

1. Factual and Procedural Background

In June 2019, Fuller filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Perez. She alleged the parties had a brief dating relationship that ended in May 2019. On June 1, 2019, Perez came to Fuller’s house unannounced and uninvited after she sent a text message indicating she no longer wanted to have a relationship with him. Fuller alleged that she told Perez she was uncomfortable with the situation, and told him she did not want to see him. Fuller indicated that she felt concerned for her safety because she lived in a remote location.

According to Fuller, Perez returned to Fuller’s home on June 15, 2019, without prior invitation or announcement. Fuller was not home, but her boyfriend, Michael Sanchez was there. Fuller later learned that Perez and Sanchez got into a “physical fight” that day. Fuller explained that the incident made her “very scared of [Perez] and concerned for [her] personal safety.” On June 17, Fuller sent Perez a text message stating, “you have come to my home without my permission 4 times and it makes me feel unsafe and uncomfortable. I do NOT want you to contact me again, come to my home or any location you think I might be at in an attempt to find/contact me. Furthermore, do not contact any of my family members, friends or colleagues. I am blocking communication and telling you not to continue to show up at my home.”

Fuller alleged that on June 22, 2019, Perez left a letter at her parents’ home in Cupertino, in which he expressed concern that someone was stalking Fuller, and wrote about the fight with Sanchez. Fuller did not respond to the letter. On June 24, 2019, Perez sent Fuller a 15 minute video of himself, which Fuller described as “super creepy.” He discussed the fight with Sanchez, and admitted that Fuller had asked him not to contact her, stating that he would not contact her any further. He questioned why Fuller had not previously mentioned Sanchez to him, and why Sanchez was at her residence in her absence. Fuller claimed that Perez also “mentioned several of [Fuller’s] friends, and listed where they lived.”

Fuller blocked Perez’s phone number. On June 25, 2019, Perez left Fuller a voicemail from a “different incoming phone number,” in which Perez said that he forgave her and indicated this would be his last contact with her. Fuller reported the voicemail to the sheriff’s office.

The next day, June 26, 2019, Perez knocked on Fuller’s door “moments after” she returned home from work in the evening, “with a camera strapped to his chest.” Fuller did not see any cars parked in the area when she arrived home, leading her to conclude that he had hidden his car to gain an element of surprise. As Perez knocked, Fuller “immediately closed and locked the door,” and dialed 911 because she “was in fear for [her] safety.” Fuller went into a bathroom while on the line with the 911 operator. She could hear Perez talking in a loud voice. He remained outside talking for several minutes while she spoke with the 911 dispatcher. Perez would stop intermittently, leading Fuller to believe it might be safe to “come out.” However, when she would leave the bathroom, Perez would start talking again. A sheriff’s deputy arrived after about 15 minutes, by which time Perez had left Fuller’s property. The deputy called Perez from Fuller’s phone. Perez answered and the deputy, over speakerphone, admonished Perez not to come to Fuller’s house in the future.

Based on Fuller’s application, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order against Perez, which included personal conduct and stay away orders, including an order to stay at least 300 yards away from Fuller’s parents’ home.

Perez filed a written response to Fuller’s DVRO request. Perez denied Fuller’s claim that she sent him a text message on June 1, 2019, ending the relationship or indicating that she did not want further contact with him. Perez believed they agreed to take a two-week break, and that they would meet in person on June 15, 2019, at Fuller’s home. When Perez arrived at the home on that date, Fuller did not answer the door, so Perez left. While driving home, an unknown person in the car behind him began honking at Perez and tailgating his vehicle. Perez stopped his car, and claims that the person, who he later learned was Sanchez, verbally assaulted him, claiming Perez was “stalking and harassing [Fuller].” Perez alleged Sanchez physically assaulted him, while telling Perez that Fuller wanted him to leave her alone. The police arrived at the scene and cited both Perez and Sanchez for misdemeanors.

Perez alleged that after this incident, he attempted to contact Fuller to obtain her “help.” When he received her text message alleging that he had come to her home four times without her permission, it “prompted [Perez] to believe she may have been triggered and showing symptoms from a prior trauma. . . .” He thereafter contacted her several times, claiming he wanted Fuller’s “help in understanding why [he] was unprovokedly assaulted and to understand why she had made false accusations.” He first sent a letter to Fuller’s parents via mail, stating his concerns that Fuller was acting “uncharacteristically” and recounting the incident with Sanchez. He then “privately shared a YouTube video via text message” which “served a legitimate purpose: Someone who claimed to know [Fuller] had assaulted and battered [him]. [He] was seeking [Fuller’s] help.” Perez denied making threats toward Fuller or anyone else, or using “harassing language.” He followed up by leaving a voicemail from his work telephone, which he said he used interchangeably with another phone. Finally, he went to Fuller’s home on June 26, 2019, in order to make a final attempt to “obtain Fuller’s help, to discuss what would be done about the plane tickets purchased for our trip to Spain, and to see if she would return [his] belongings.” Sanchez answered the door when Perez knocked, and notified Perez that they were going to call the police. Perez described the interaction as calm. The police later contacted Perez on speakerphone. Perez denied allegations that he was stalking Fuller, stating that he did not know where Fuller worked, or the name of her employer.

In November 2019, while the temporary restraining order was in place, Perez went to Sanchez’s workplace in an effort to serve him with notice of a small claims action Perez filed against him.[2] Fuller and Sanchez worked at the same location, although Perez disputed knowing this fact. When Perez appeared at the workplace, Fuller called 911, and Perez was arrested for violating the temporary restraining order. The criminal court issued a protective order against Perez in January 2020, which remained in effect until August 31, 2020.[3]

The court held a hearing on Fuller’s DVRO request on August 10, 2020, at which both parties testified as described above. Fuller argued that Perez’s conduct in June 2019 disturbed her peace.[4] Perez contended that he did not reach out to Fuller in order to harass her, but rather to get her help to obtain information about the June 15 assault, to retrieve his belongings, and “to make sure that she was safe.”

The trial court rendered its decision orally on the record. It first noted, “Mr. Perez, it seems that you were hung up on Ms. Fuller initially indicating that there had been four times in which she thought that you had gone by her house before June 15th. I’m not going to consider that. Because it was clear on June 15th that you thought the relationship was over and you shouldn’t be contacting her.” The court found that after Fuller made it clear she did not want Perez to contact her, Perez continued doing so, through the letter to her parents, the video, and the voicemail.

The court recognized Perez’s claim that he was contacting Fuller for legitimate purposes but found, “there was no reason for you to contact her regarding any of those things. [¶] In fact, in the video, you don’t talk about your belongings. You don’t talk about wanting to be reimbursed for the tickets. And earlier in your text messages, I pointed out you didn’t want reimbursement. You wanted her to go ahead and use the tickets and explore Barcelona. So that’s why I think those claims are pretextual.” The court stated that Fuller had “nothing to do with the alleged assault by Mr. Sanchez upon [Perez],” noting that Fuller was not home at the time of the incident. It determined that Fuller’s demeanor in court reflected that she was “frightened” and “upset” by Perez’s continued contacts, and indicated that it was understandable that Fuller was frightened and called the police when Perez appeared at her work location.

Finding that “the behavior [Perez] engaged in after June 15th was harassing and caused emotional distress to [Fuller],” and that Fuller had met her burden of proof, the court granted the request for a restraining order. It issued personal conduct orders against Perez, and ordered him to stay at least 300 yards away from Fuller, her home, work, and vehicle, and her parents’ home. The court reserved jurisdiction over Fuller’s request for attorney fees and costs. Perez timely filed a notice of appeal from the order (appeal No. H048490).

Thereafter, Fuller filed a request for attorney’s fees and costs, which Perez opposed. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Fuller’s request and ordered Perez to pay $4,628 in attorney’s fees.[5] Perez timely filed a notice of appeal from that order (appeal No. H048861).

2. Discussion

1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“Pursuant to the DVPA, (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), a court may issue a protective order ‘ “to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 225 (Davila & Mejia).)[6] “ ‘Domestic violence’ is abuse perpetrated against . . . [¶] . . . A person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.” (§ 6211, subd. (c).)[7] “Abuse” includes “behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).)

Section 6320, subdivision (a) authorizes an order enjoining a party from, among other things “contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise” as well as “disturbing the peace of the other party. . . .” “ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party. This conduct may be committed directly or indirectly, . . . and by any method or through any means including, but not limited to, telephone, online accounts, text messages, internet-connected devices, or other electronic technologies.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) “[T]he plain meaning of the phrase ‘disturbing the peace of the other party’ in section 6320 may be properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.”[8] (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497 (Nadkarni).)

Past abuse must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (Davila & Mejia, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) Under section 6430, subdivision (a), the trial court may issue any of the orders in section 6320, et seq., after notice and a hearing. We review the trial court’s order granting a DVRO, as well as any alleged failure in considering evidence in issuing that order, for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 115–116 (F.M. & M.M.).) We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the review of the trial court’s factual findings. (Id. at p. 116.) “ ‘ “If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.) Whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard in exercising its discretion is a question of law that is subject to de novo review. (Ibid.)

We will not overturn a trial court’s exercise of discretion unless, as a matter of law we can say the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason or no reasonable judge would have made the same order. (McCord v. Smith (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 358, 364 (McCord).) “In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision, we resolve all conflicts in the evidence in [the prevailing party’s] favor and indulge all reasonable, legitimate inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s order. [Citation.] If two or more reasonable inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, we have no authority as a reviewing court to substitute our judgment for the trial court’s judgment. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

2. The Trial Court did not Err in Granting the DVRO Against Perez

1. The trial court properly considered all relevant evidence.

Perez argues that the trial court failed to assess the credibility of the witnesses, or to consider the totality of the circumstances as required by section 6301 before issuing the restraining order. Relying on a statement made by the court when it rendered its oral decision, Perez claims the court failed to consider the parties’ conduct prior to June 15, 2019, in granting the DVRO. Dividing the relevant evidence into two portions, he contends that Fuller consented to his contacts with him before June 15, and that his contacts with her after June 15 were justified. He asserts that Fuller defamed him to Sanchez, and that his subsequent contacts with Fuller were designed both to retrieve his property and to cause her to admit that her statements about him were false. He contends that the trial court’s failure to consider Fuller’s false statements about him to Sanchez was an error of law requiring us to review his claims de novo. We do not find merit in Perez’s arguments.

With respect to persons who may be granted a domestic violence restraining order, section 6301, subdivision (c), provides: “The length of time since the most recent act of abuse is not, by itself, determinative. The court shall consider the totality of circumstances in determining whether to grant or deny a petition for relief.” (§ 6301, subd. (c).) Appellate courts have interpreted this section to require that trial courts assess the timing and context of alleged acts of abuse. Thus in F.M. & M.M., the appellate court determined the trial court violated section 6301 when it found irrelevant petitioner’s proffered evidence of alleged abused that took place after she filed the request for a restraining order. (F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 117.) In contrast, in McCord, the trial court correctly considered text messages that were “part of an overall series of actions by McCord that threatened Smith’s peace of mind. . . . Whether one single act by McCord would have been sufficient to justify the issuance of the DVRO is not the question—the trial court considers whether the totality of the circumstances supports the issuance of the DVRO. (Fam. Code, § 6301, subd. (c).)” (McCord, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 366.)

We discern no violation of section 6301, subdivision (c) in the trial court’s ruling here. In rendering its decision, the trial court indicated “I’m not going to consider” that “there had been four times in which [Fuller] thought that you had gone by her house before June 15th. . . .” From this, Perez deduces that the trial court did not assess the evidence related to the pre-June 15 events. This misconstrues the court’s meaning. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court failed to consider the evidence of events that preceded June 15, 2019. Rather, the court indicated that it was basing its issuance of a restraining order on the events that occurred subsequent to June 15 because at that point the evidence demonstrated that Fuller had unequivocally conveyed her desire to cease all contact with Perez and he had acknowledged her wishes: “Because it was clear on June 15th that you thought the relationship was over and you shouldn’t be contacting her.” The court did not rule that the events preceding June 15 were irrelevant, but found they were not necessary to its determination of whether evidence of abuse had been presented that justified the issuance of a restraining order.

In so ruling, the trial court did not place the burden on Perez “to prove false the allegations of stalking prior to June 17,” as he contends. It instead concluded that Fuller proved that Perez’s conduct after June 15 supported the issuance of a restraining order, holding her to the applicable preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

Perez also asserts that the trial court’s finding that Fuller had nothing to do with Sanchez’s actions during the altercation between Perez and Sanchez on June 15, 2019, evidences the trial court’s failure to consider the totality of the circumstances. We disagree. The trial court’s finding reflects its assessment of the credibility of the parties, which is within the trial court’s purview as fact finder. (McCord, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 364.) Perez suggests the court was required to determine whether or not Fuller defamed Perez to Sanchez, as he contends his efforts to obtain clarification regarding Fuller’s alleged statements to Sanchez justified his continued contact with her. We perceive no necessary or logical connection between any alleged statements by Fuller to Sanchez about Perez, and the trial court’s issuance of the restraining order. Even had the court determined that Fuller falsely described Perez to Sanchez as an individual who had been stalking her, the court could rightfully consider the evidence of Perez’s actions in response to Fuller’s termination of their dating relationship to determine whether it should issue a restraining order under sections 6211 and 6320.

For these reasons, we determine that Perez has not demonstrated that the trial court failed to fully consider the “totality of the circumstances” under section 6301, subdivision (c) when evaluating Fuller’s request, or that the court applied an incorrect legal standard when it issued the restraining order under section 6301.

2. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of abuse.

Perez argues that the trial court’s findings that he stalked and harassed Fuller are not supported by substantial evidence. Guided by precepts of appellate review, we conclude the record demonstrates otherwise. “In reviewing the evidence, we examine the entire record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We must accept as true all evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If substantial evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts exist that would support a contrary finding. [Citation.]” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 (Curcio).)

Perez first alleges that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that he stalked or harassed Fuller prior to June 15, 2019. The trial court did not make such a finding. The trial court found that the behavior Perez engaged in after June 15 “was harassing and caused emotional distress to [Fuller].” It made no such findings regarding conduct prior to that date.

Perez next contends he was acting in good faith when he contacted Fuller, attempting to mitigate damages caused by her alleged slander of him, and to recover his property. He argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that these reasons served as pretexts for harassment. Actions taken in good faith, for “a legitimate and nonharassing reason” should not be enjoined under the DVPA. (J.J. v. M.F. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 968, 976 [mutual restraining order issued improperly where wife shoved husband in self-defense and made telephone calls regarding child’s jacket in good faith].) However, resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial court’s issuance of the restraining order (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12), the record contains ample support for the trial court’s finding that Perez’s stated reasons for contacting Fuller were pretexts and that his actions constituted harassment.

After their interactions in early June and the altercation between Perez and Sanchez, it is undisputed by the parties that on June 17, 2019, Fuller expressly told Perez not to contact her anymore. On June 21, Perez sent a letter to Fuller’s parents’ home describing his concern that someone was stalking Fuller and that she was acting out of character. On June 24, 2019, Perez sent Fuller a 15-minute video in which he admitted that Fuller told him “never to contact [her] again,” but he did so believing that “his messages” were not “getting across to her.” In the video Perez stated that he had reached out to Fuller’s parents because he was “concerned about what happened.” Perez questioned Fuller’s mental status, stating that she may be suffering from amnesia or from the effects of past trauma. He asked Fuller to “seek medical help” if she did not remember the period from June 1 to June 15, 2019. Perez stated that he did not understand why Sanchez was at her house while Fuller was not home, and noted that she had not talked about Sanchez with him, despite talking about her many other friends. He noted that Fuller regularly went on Saturday morning bike rides with a friend. He concluded the video saying he “was not going to contact [Fuller] again.” The video did not address the return of his property, or the cost of the airline ticket in dispute.

Despite saying he would not contact Fuller again, Perez left Fuller a voicemail on June 25, 2019, although Fuller had blocked calls on her phone from his primary number. He again indicated that he would not contact Fuller in the future. The voicemail was terminated because it exceeded the three-minute message limit, and addressed Perez’s confusion and feelings about Fuller’s decision to break off their relationship. Perez later stated that he had insufficient time to ask about the return of his property, debts that remained to be settled, and “more importantly to determine if something had triggered her and how to help.” At the hearing, Perez provided conflicting testimony, stating that he had asked Fuller to pay for her share of the plane tickets in the voicemail message.

On June 26, 2019, Perez went to Fuller’s house unannounced and uninvited. Perez had a GoPro camera “attached to [his] person[.]” While he declared that he was wearing the camera because he had been at a dog park with his dogs, he also stated that he recorded his visit to Fuller’s “out of precaution.”[9] Perez stated that he went to Fuller’s home to attempt to clarify why he was assaulted by Sanchez and to understand why Fuller had made false statements about him to Sanchez, to discuss what would be done about the plane tickets he purchased for their planned trip to Spain, and to see if she would return his property. He did not mention these reasons for his visit to her home when contacted by the sheriff’s deputy in response to Fuller’s 911 call after Perez left the property. His arrival at Fuller’s door was against her explicit direction, was unannounced, and took place in the evening after work hours. She was sufficiently frightened that she called for emergency law enforcement assistance.

The evidence of this series of events is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Perez’s contacts with Fuller after June 15, 2019, were initiated not to resolve the practical and financial details of their relationship or even to address his proposed lawsuit for defamation, but with the intent to engage with Fuller against her wishes regarding the termination of their relationship. The evidence also supports a reasonable inference that Perez was frustrated by Fuller’s new partnership with Sanchez. In the context of the previous physical altercation between Perez and Sanchez, the trial court reasonably determined that it did not find credible Perez’s more benign explanations for his letter to Fuller’s parents, and his calls, videos, and visits to Fuller’s home. “A trier of fact is free to disbelieve a witness . . . if there is any rational ground for doing so.” (In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043.) Here, the trial court had rational grounds to reject Perez’s proffered explanations for reaching out to Fuller as “pretextual.”

Perez argues that the conduct at issue here does not rise to the level of abuse enjoined by the DVPA as interpreted in case authorities. He asserts that the conduct he engaged in pales in comparison to the conduct addressed in other appellate opinions, including Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1483. The Legislature did not enact the DVPA “to address all disputes between former couples, or to create an alternative forum for resolution of every dispute between such individuals.” (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 13 [a single, private post on Facebook did not support issuance of a DVRO].) Nor should the trial court issue a restraining order “based on any act that upsets the petitioning party.” (Ibid.) Rather, the conduct must “rise to the level of destruction of [the petitioning party’s] mental and emotional calm[.]” (Ibid.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Perez’s conduct exceeded the bounds of a normal dispute between a former couple, constituted abuse, and justified the issuance of a restraining order. On multiple occasions after Fuller expressly told Perez not to contact her or her family and friends, he knowingly persisted with conduct that would “destroy[] the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) He utilized multiple means of communication to contact her against her will: a letter mailed to her parents, a YouTube video sent to Fuller through a text message, a lengthy voicemail message, and personal contact at her home. When Fuller blocked Perez’s primary phone number, he used another number to call her. The content of his messages was accusatory, questioned her mental status, questioned why Sanchez was at her residence and had not been mentioned by Fuller previously, involved her parents and mentioned her friends. The trial court described the 15-minute video Perez sent to Fuller after she told him to stay away as “disconcerting,” stating that “by her demeanor, [it could] see that [Fuller was] frightened, and she [was] upset by [Perez’s] continued contacts with her after making it absolutely clear not to contact her.” Perez’s unannounced arrival at Fuller’s house and use of video to record his interaction with her and Sanchez was also intimidating and invasive of her privacy. His communication and contacts with Fuller were checked only when law enforcement intervened.

Our analysis requires us to resolve all conflicts in the evidence in Fuller’s favor and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s order. (McCord, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 364.) The trial court could reasonably conclude that Perez’s contacts with Fuller were threatening to her, particularly because of the recent physical altercation between Perez and Sanchez. The trial court could also reasonably infer that because Perez used a variety of approaches to reach Fuller, he would not accept that their dating relationship was terminated, and was insistent that she interact with him against her wishes. For these reasons we determine that the trial court did not err when it concluded that Perez disturbed Fuller’s peace as described in section 6320. (§ 6320, subd. (a); Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Perez’s actions constituted abuse under sections 6211 and 6320, subdivision (a).

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Perez to stay away from Fuller’s parents’ house.

Perez contends the trial court exceeded its authority by ordering him to stay away from Fuller’s parents’ house on the grounds that the order misapplies the language of section 6321. He further argues that the order could impinge on his constitutional rights in the future.

Section 6321 allows the trial court to preclude the restrained party from contacting the petitioning party “either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise. . . .” (§ 6321, subd. (a).) Under section 6322, the court may “enjoin[] a party from specified behavior that the court determines is necessary to effectuate orders under Section 6320 or 6321.” Based on the substantial evidence presented to the trial court that Perez used Fuller’s parents and mail to their address as a way to continue to contact Fuller, the court found it necessary to enjoin Perez from going within 300 yards of Fuller’s parents’ residence. We discern no error in the court’s order, which appropriately issued the order under sections 6321 and 6322.

Perez expresses concern that Fuller’s parents could move from their home in the future, and/or that Perez’s place of worship could relocate within 300 yards of the address of the parents’ home, such that he would then be precluded from attending worship at that location. Perez does not cite any evidence to demonstrate that he now suffers from some restraint on his religious activity, and we decline to address any such hypothetical circumstance. As Fuller notes in her respondent’s brief, Perez can seek to modify the restraining order if his concerns are realized in the future.

4. Perez has not demonstrated an error in the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs.

In his opening brief, Perez contends Fuller’s attorney improperly “threatened” Perez with a “contempt motion” when Perez failed to pay Fuller’s attorney fees pursuant to the order issued by the trial court after it granted the DVRO. Although it is clear Perez asks this court to reverse the attorney fees order if it reverses the DVRO, his arguments on appeal relate to his contentions regarding the propriety of counsel’s conduct after the court issued the order. He does not cite any legal authority supporting his arguments in this regard. Moreover, he refers to events that happened after the court issued the order and thus asks this court to consider matters outside of the record on appeal. “The parties to an appeal may not refer to matters outside the record on appeal. [Citations.] The reviewing court is not required to develop the parties’ arguments or search the record for supporting evidence and may instead treat arguments that are not developed or supported by adequate citations to the record as waived. [Citation.]” (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684.) For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s order granting attorney’s fees.

3. Disposition

The August 10, 2020 restraining order after hearing (appeal No. H048490), and January 8, 2021 findings and order after hearing (appeal No. H048861) are affirmed.

_______________________________

Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________

Grover, J.

______________________________________

Lie, J.

Fuller v. Perez

H048861 H048490

[1] We ordered appeal numbers H048490 and H048861 considered together for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and disposition.

[2] Perez first filed a small claims action against Fuller for defamation, alleging that Fuller made false statements about Perez to Sanchez. Perez dismissed that case shortly thereafter. Perez then filed a small claims action against Sanchez for damages arising from their altercation in June 2019.

[3] Pursuant to Perez’s request, we take judicial notice of the order terminating the criminal protective order, and the order sealing the arrest record under Penal Code section 851.92. The trial court took judicial notice of the protective order at the hearing in August 2020, although the order itself is not part of the record on appeal.

[4] Although there was discussion during the hearing of the small claims actions Perez filed after June 2019, as well as the alleged violation of the temporary restraining order in November 2019, Fuller stated she was not asking the court to determine that these events disturbed her peace. She relied only on the June incidents to support her request.

[5] The trial court’s order granting the motion is not part of the record on appeal. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the order, filed January 8, 2021, a copy of which Perez attached to the Civil Case Information Statement he filed in appeal number H048861.

[6] Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

[7] There is no dispute that the parties to this appeal had a dating relationship as described in the statute.

[8] On appeal, Perez contends the trial court issued the order on a finding that he stalked or harassed Fuller. The trial court did not find that Perez stalked Fuller. It stated Perez’s behavior was “harassing and caused emotional distress to [Fuller].” The trial court’s order reflects an implicit finding that Perez disturbed Fuller’s peace. The parties each address the showing required for such a finding in their briefs on appeal.

[9] The video was not introduced in evidence at the hearing and is not part of the record on appeal.