Garcia v. Service Corp. International

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 9/3/13  Garcia v. Service Corp. International CA2/2

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
TWO

 

 
>

MATEO RUELAS GARCIA,               Plaintiff and Appellant,               v.   SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL et al.,               Defendants and Respondents.

B237964         (Los Angeles County       Super. Ct. No. BC430926)

 

            APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Los Angeles
County.

Elizabeth Allen White, Judge.  Affirmed.

 

Steinbrecher & Span, Robert S.
Span for Plaintiff and Appellant.

 

            Gurnee
& Daniels, Steven H. Gurnee, Toby M. Magarian; Gilbert Kelly Crowley &
Jennett, Arthur J. McKeon III, Vanessa Hubert for Defendants and Respondents.

___________________________________________________

 

 

 

            Cemetery worker Mateo Ruelas Garcia was terminated from his
employment after damaging an existing gravesite with a backhoe, then covering
up the damage instead of reporting it to his supervisor, as required by company
policy.  He made two claims against his
employer for wrongful termination in violation of public policies protecting
whistleblowers, which were rejected by a jury; however, the jury found an
implied covenant not to terminate except for good cause, and a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV) for the defendants. 
The ruling is correct.  The
company handbook describes employees as “at-will,” and plaintiff testified at
trial to his understanding that he could be terminated at any time and for any
reason.  There is no evidence that
plaintiff received individual promises that he would be terminated only for
good cause, and mere longevity of employment does not establish a right to
remain on the job indefinitely.  We
affirm.

FACTS

            Plaintiff
Mateo Ruelas Garcia worked 28 years at Eden
Memorial Park (Eden),
a mortuary/cemetery owned by defendant Service Corporation International (SCI)
and its subsidiaries.href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">^[1]  Plaintiff, who has three years of primary
schooling, started out by caring for the lawn and cleaning tombstones, then
graduated to setting up tents and greenery for graveside services and driving a
tractor.  By the mid-1990’s, plaintiff
had responsibility for digging graves with a backhoe.

Plaintiff and his coworkers
prepared five to 10 graves per day. 
Plaintiff excavated “thousands” of graves.  Two former Eden
managers described plaintiff as a trusted employee who received regular merit
pay raises.  He became an assistant
supervisor in 2006;  in that position, he
no longer operated a backhoe.

            Plaintiff
acknowledged receipt of his employer’s handbook, and agreed to obey the
company’s “Code of Conduct.”  The company
handbook states that employees are “at will” and may be terminated at any time,
with or without notice, and with or without cause.  Plaintiff testified that he knew his
employment was “at will” and could end at any time, with or without cause.  The Code of Conduct is posted in English and
Spanish in the grounds crew offices.

Plaintiff’s supervisors regularly
conducted meetings to discuss company policies and employee
responsibilities.  Plaintiff attended
these meetings.  Employees were told that
if something went wrong or broke while preparing a grave, or if a casket, urn
or remains were found, they must stop work and report it to management.

Plaintiff’s personnel file shows
that he was disciplined multiple times for violating company policy.  In 2000, he was disciplined for a “wrongful
burial,” i.e., digging a grave and causing an interment at a site that the
deceased’s family did not own.  Plaintiff
was warned in writing that any future wrongful burials could result in a
suspension or termination.  It is a
serious offense.  In 2004, plaintiff
received a written warning for failing to cover graves properly.  In April 2007, plaintiff was warned about
setting grave markers incorrectly.

In June 2007, plaintiff again
caused a “wrongful burial” and was warned in writing that “[a]ny further
problems of this nature . . . not in alignment with company values or goals
will result in further disciplinary actions including up to termination.”  Plaintiff blamed another employee for leading
the mourners and the coffin to the wrong gravesite.  Plaintiff was required to take a remedial
interment course as a result of the wrongful burial.  On October
10, 2007, plaintiff was demoted from his position as assistant
superintendent.  Plaintiff was upset and
embarrassed to be demoted in front of fellow employees.

            During his
years of preparing graves at Eden,
plaintiff testified that he saw a coworker damage gravesites “many times,”
either deliberately or accidentally, occasionally causing pieces of coffins and
even bones to fall out of gravesites. 
Workers would try to fix the damage, but sometimes human remains were
scooped up by a tractor and taken to a cemetery dump.  Plaintiff claimed that the general manager
was aware of these incidents, and plaintiff’s supervisor directed plaintiff to
break nearby gravesites to allow room for a new burial.  Plaintiff testified that he was just
following orders when he participated in gravesite desecrations.

            On
cross-examination, plaintiff acknowledged that Eden’s
general manager always told him to be careful and respectful, and not to harm
the deceased.  Plaintiff knows that this
is company policy.  If something went
wrong, he was taught to report it to Eden’s
management.  He is familiar with the
“important” company policy of treating the body of the deceased “reverently,”
and realizes that management wanted to know if a burial container was broken so
that families could be contacted and appropriate repairs made.  He also knew that he could be fired for
violating company policies.

            SCI
California conducts “interment verification” training sessions for its
employees.  During a session on October 18, 2007, when plaintiff was
not present, the managing director of SCI California learned from some Eden
employees that they were instructed by Eden
supervisors to break concrete vaults or caskets of adjoining graves to make
room for new interments.href="#_ftn2"
name="_ftnref2" title="">^[2]  Eden
managers threatened to axe employees who did not make new graves fit, even if
doing so damaged surrounding gravesites. 
When employees obeyed this mandate, on occasion the vault surrounding
the casket, the casket, and human remains were discarded.  The interment crew camouflaged damaged
gravesites with artificial grass during funeral services.

            A training
session for a different set of interment crew members was held on October 19, 2007, which plaintiff
attended.  The complained-of conduct
discussed one day earlier was not raised in an open session.  In private meetings with the managing
director of SCI California, some Eden
employees raised the same concerns about gravesite disturbances and
intimidation by Eden’s management.

In response to employee
disclosures, SCI sent a lawyer to Los Angeles
to interview Eden’s groundsmen and
management.  One of the groundsmen
recalled that in 2002, he, plaintiff and another worker found a skull when they
were excavating a new grave above an existing site; they took the skull, put it
in the dirt trailer and took it to a “spoils” site where excess dirt from new
gravesites was dumped.  Plaintiff was
operating the backhoe.  When interviewed
a second time and asked about his coworker’s claim about the skull, plaintiff
confirmed the incident, though he did not reveal it in an earlier solo
interview.  None of the employees
reported the incident to Eden
management.  Plaintiff’s former
supervisor was stunned at the revelation: 
when he asked plaintiff why he did not report the skull, plaintiff
looked at the ground and did not respond.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">^[3]  The employees’ actions and their failure to
report the incident violated company policy. 
Eden’s managers and grounds
superintendent denied instructing employees to damage graves or disturb
remains.

            On December 12, 2007, SCI California
terminated the employment of Eden’s
general manager as a result of the misconduct disclosed during the October 2007
training sessions and the follow-up investigation.  On December
20, 2007, the recently fired general manager notified the state
Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) that Eden
misused endowment funds and engaged in other wrongdoing.  A DCA investigation concluded that five
graves were disturbed and unprofessional conduct occurred.  The DCA investigator was told by plaintiff’s
coworker on the interment crew that plaintiff was the gravedigger who broke the
most vaults.

SCI has a nonretaliation policy for
employees who disclose wrongdoing. 
Interment crew members were informed that they would not be disciplined
for revealing information about burial problems.  They were directed by SCI California not to
obey any future instructions to break adjacent gravesites while preparing a new
grave, because it violates written company policy to treat the deceased “with
dignity and respect.”

All groundsmen were told that henceforth,
they must not damage prior interments to make way for new ones.  Disturbing or mishandling human remains or
breaking burial containers is considered a violation of company policy
forbidding “indecent, immoral, unprofessional or abusive conduct.”  If a gravesite will not fit in a space,
employees cannot use part of another space or damage or remove any part of a
container to make room:  when confronted
with this problem, employees must stop work and notify the general
manager.  Further, problems must never be
concealed.  The repercussion for
violating this company policy is termination. 
SCI provides employees with a special toll-free telephone number to
report any improprieties at its cemeteries. 


            On December 14, 2007, plaintiff
received and signed a disciplinary memorandum stating that “During the course
of our recent investigation, you admitted concealing a serious burial problem
from management,” referring to gravesite disturbances.  When plaintiff received the December
disciplinary memorandum, the general manager told plaintiff it was absolutely
necessary to report broken burial containers. 
By his own admission, plaintiff then knew he could be fired for failing
to report a broken container. 

On January 27, 2008, plaintiff
broke an existing grave container while digging a new grave.  Plaintiff expressly acknowledged at trial
that he broke the container with a backhoe. 
Plaintiff did not report it because he wanted to go to lunch.  Two of plaintiff’s colleagues immediately
reported the damage to management. 

Plaintiff concealed the damaged
container with sand and dirt.  Upon
learning of the problem, a supervisor instructed plaintiff to remove the new
vault:  he observed the damage plaintiff
had caused to the adjoining gravesite, as well as plaintiff’s attempt to hide
the damage.  The concrete container was
broken, not scratched, and had to be replaced after the deceased’s family was
notified.  When asked why he failed to
report the damaged grave to management, plaintiff replied, “I took care of it.”

Plaintiff testified that the damage
to the container seemed insignificant to him, compared to the “much worse”
damage he had seen in the past.  When
plaintiff’s coworkers told plaintiff that they should stop and report the
damage, plaintiff declined because he “felt since it wasn’t that much, let it
be, let’s continue with the work.” 
Plaintiff admits to concealing the damage.

Based on this incident of
concealing damage to a gravesite, SCI California terminated plaintiff from his
employment on February 8, 2008. 
Defendants were unable to produce the termination memo, but a supervisor
explained that plaintiff was fired “for not reporting immediately a broken
vault after we had a meeting to explain how we are going to do this, and
actually gave him a written disciplinary memo after that meeting to make it
crystal clear that we report these things.” 
The supervisor denied that plaintiff was fired in retaliation for filing
a complaint or participating in an investigation.

When he picked up his final paycheck,
plaintiff told Eden’s superintendent, Pedro Gonzalez, that “he had messed it
up, and he apologized for what he had done.” 
Gonzalez testified that he, personally, always reported damaged
containers to the general manager.

In May 2008, several months after
his termination, plaintiff was contacted by the DCA.  He confirmed that grave disturbances occurred
at Eden.  He declined to meet a state
investigator at the cemetery to show where disturbances occurred, saying “he
didn’t remember exactly where they were and there was really no need to meet
with him out there.”  Plaintiff
specifically recalled that a skull was removed from a grave and that one of the
former managers instructed him to break existing vaults two or three times
during plaintiff’s years at Eden. 
Plaintiff told the state investigator that he was terminated “for an
incorrect burial and a marker being placed in the wrong location.”  After being interviewed by the DCA, plaintiff
went on television and claimed that the breaking of burial plots was a common
practice during the last 10 years that he worked at Eden.  He never made such a claim when he spoke to
the DCA investigator.

Eden’s current general manager
testified that in the fall of 2009, there were five instances in which outer
burial containers were damaged during the excavation of new graves.  In those instances, the interment crew
stopped work and notified the general manager who, in turn, tried to locate and
contact the families of the deceased. 
The damage was then repaired.  No
interment crew members covered up damage instead of stopping and alerting
management.  Eden does not charge
families to repair or replace damaged containers.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January 2010, plaintiff filed
suit for wrongful termination; retaliatory termination in violation of state
statute; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and
defamation.  In a special verdict, a jury
found against plaintiff on his claims of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy and his defamation claim. 
It also found that there is an implied-in-fact contract not to terminate
except for good cause, and that defendants breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.  The jury
awarded plaintiff $137,689 against CCFS and $19,015 against SCI.

Defendants objected that the trial
court failed to instruct the jury that it could not find the existence of an
implied contract to terminate for cause if there is an express at-will
agreement, though defendants had requested such an instruction.  Also, the court improperly modified the
standard instruction for finding an implied contract not to terminate.  There was no basis for the jury finding SCI
liable for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The court overruled defendants’ objections
and entered judgment for plaintiff against CCFS and SCI.

SCI California moved to vacate the
judgment and enter a new judgment in its favor, on the grounds that the
judgment is not consistent with the special verdict.  SCI and CCFS moved for JNOV or a new
trial.  On October 20, 2011, the trial
court granted JNOV, found the motion for new trial to be moot, and entered
judgment in favor of defendants. 
Plaintiff appealed on December 14, 2011.

DISCUSSION

1.  Standard of Review

            When
reviewing a JNOV, an appellate court determines “whether it appears from the
record, viewed most favorably to the party securing the verdict, that any
substantial evidence supports the verdict. 
‘“‘If there is any substantial evidence, or reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom in support of the verdict, the motion should be denied.’”’  [Citations omitted.]  In general, “‘[t]he purpose of a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not to afford a review of the jury’s
deliberation but to prevent a miscarriage of justice in those cases where the
verdict rendered is without foundation.’”” 
(Trujillo v. North County Transit
Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 284.)

If the issues on a JNOV present
solely a question of law—the interpretation and application of a statute to
undisputed facts—review is de novo.  (>Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist.,> supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 284.)  Further, the correctness and consistency of a
special verdict must be analyzed as a matter of law and reviewed de novo.  (Id.
at p. 285; Singh v. Southland Stone,
U.S.A., Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 338, 358.)  “A court reviewing a special verdict does not
infer findings in favor of the prevailing party [citation], and there is no
presumption in favor of upholding a special verdict when the inconsistency is
between two questions in a special verdict.” 
(Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone,
Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1092; Orthopedic
Systems, Inc. v. Schlein (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 529, 542.)

2.  Existence of Implied Contract to Terminate
for Good Cause

a.  Jury Instructions and Jury Findings

In a special verdict, the jury
found that plaintiff (1) was not wrongfully discharged in violation of public
policy against retaliatory terminations and (2) was not wrongfully discharged
in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 (prohibiting retaliatory
firing).  The jury also found that “there
was an implied in fact contract not to terminate except for good cause.”

The jury instructions relating to
its finding in favor of plaintiff state that “An employment relationship is not
at will if the employee proves that the parties by word or conduct agreed that
the employee would be discharged only for good cause.  Plaintiff Mateo Garcia claims that Defendant
CCFS breached their employment contract. 
To establish this claim, Plaintiff Mateo Garcia must prove all of the
following:  One, that plaintiff and
Defendant CCFS entered into an employment relationship; Two, that Defendant
CCFS promised, by words or conduct, to discharge plaintiff only for good cause;
Three, that plaintiff substantially performed his job duties; Four, that
Defendant CCFS discharged plaintiff without good cause, and; Five, that
Plaintiff Mateo Garcia was harmed by the discharge.”

The instructions list bases for
finding a promise by CCFS to discharge an employee only for good cause, such as
CCFS personnel policies or practices, but noting that “length of service,
raises, and promotions by themselves are not enough” to imply a promise to
discharge only for good cause.href="#_ftn4"
name="_ftnref4" title="">^[4]  “Good cause exists [when] an employer’s
decision to discharge an employee is made in good faith and based on a fair and
honest reason.  Good cause does not exist
if the employer’s reasons for the discharge are trivial, arbitrary,
inconsistent with usual practices, unrelated to business needs or goals, or if
the stated reasons conceal the employer’s true reasons.  In deciding whether defendant had good cause
to discharge Plaintiff Mateo Garcia, you must balance CCFS’s interest in
operating the business efficiently and profitably against the interest of
Plaintiff Mateo Garcia in maintaining employment.”

            >b.  Plaintiff’s
Testimony Prevented a Finding of an Implied Promise to Terminate for Good Cause


An employment having no specified
term may be terminated at the will of either party.  (Lab. Code, § 2922; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 678.)  When employment is at will, the employer’s
“motive and lack of care”—including its “bad faith”—are generally
irrelevant.  (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 351 (>Guz).) 
An at-will employer may even “act peremptorily, arbitrarily, or
inconsistently, without providing specific protections such as prior warning,
fair procedures, objective evaluation, or preferential reassignment.”  (Id.
at p. 350.) 

Plaintiff has the burden of
rebutting the statutory presumption that his employment is at will.  (Haycock
v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1489.)  The existence of an implied promise to
discharge for cause is generally a question of fact for the jury; however, if
the facts are undisputed and permit only one conclusion, the issue may be
resolved as a matter of law.  (>Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1386-1387.)

An at-will provision in an href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">express written agreement or
acknowledgement, signed by the employee, cannot be overcome by proof of an
implied contrary understanding.  (>Faigin v. Signature Group Holdings, Inc. (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 726, 739; Guz, >supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 340, fn. 10.) 
“Cases in California and elsewhere have held that at-will provisions in
personnel handbooks, manuals, or memoranda do not bar, or necessarily overcome,
other evidence of the employer’s contrary intent.”  (Guz,> at p. 339.)  The Supreme Court agrees that “disclaimer
language in an employee handbook or policy does not necessarily mean an
employee is employed at will.”  (>Id. at p. 340.)  It added, “Of course, the more clear,
prominent, complete, consistent, and all-encompassing the disclaimer language
set forth in handbooks, policy manuals, and memoranda disseminated to
employees, the greater the likelihood that workers could not form any
reasonable contrary understanding” that they are not at-will.  (Id. at
p. 340, fn. 11.)

The Supreme Court in >Guz cited with approval cases holding
that “long duration of service, regular promotions, favorable performance
reviews, praise from supervisors, and salary increases do not, without more,
imply an employer’s contractual intent to relinquish its at-will rights.”  (Guz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 341.)  The
court wrote, “We agree that an employee’s mere
passage of time in the employer’s service, even where marked with tangible
indicia that the employer approves the employee’s work, cannot >alone form an implied-in-fact contract
that the employee is no longer at will.” 
(Id. at pp. 341-342.)  Rather, “the issue is whether the employer’s
words or conduct, on which an employee reasonably relied, gave rise to that >specific understanding” that seniority
and longevity of employment created rights against termination at will.  (Id. at
p. 342.)

In this instance, plaintiff signed
acknowledgements (in English and in his native language Spanish) in 2004 and
2005, upon receiving his employee handbook. 
Printed material above plaintiff’s signature addresses his employment
status.href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title="">^[5]  Plaintiff does not claim that he received
individual promises or representations that his employer would retain him
except for good cause.  (See >Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 341.)  On the contrary, plaintiff expressly
testified at trial that he understood that the company has the right to sever
employment at any time, with or without cause. 
He was asked “So you understood you could be fired at any time for any
reason and that you could leave your job at any time for any reason,
correct?”  His response was, “Yes, I knew
it.”

Plaintiff testified that company
policy requires careful and respectful treatment of the deceased and their
gravesites.  He realized that management
wanted to be informed if a burial container was broken so that families could
be contacted and appropriate repairs made. 
He testified that he knew he could be fired for violating company
policies.  Plaintiff expressly
acknowledged at trial that he broke a grave container with a backhoe and did
not report it to management.  His
rationale for concealing the damage instead of reporting it was that the damage
seemed insignificant to him because he had seen “much worse” in the past.  He told a DCA investigator in May 2008 that
he was terminated for a wrongful burial and incorrect placement of a grave
marker, not in retaliation for reporting illegal conduct at Eden, which is what
the DCA was investigating.

Plaintiff observes that the company
handbook assures that he would not be retaliated against for participating in
an investigation or reporting violations of law or public policy.  By special verdict, the jury found that
plaintiff was not fired in violation
of public policy, and was not fired
in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, i.e., in retaliation for reporting
misconduct at Eden and being a whistleblower. 
The jury instructions for the rejected wrongful termination claims fully
encompassed plaintiff’s contention that he was fired because he disclosed or
threatened to disclose information that he believes violated state or federal
laws or regulations.

Despite the jury’s rejection of his
public policy and statutory wrongful discharge tort claims, plaintiff argues
that JNOV was improperly granted because defendants breached an implied contract
not to terminate him in retaliation for reporting wrongful conduct.  Employees have a statutory right to disclose
information about employer wrongdoing to government agencies under Labor Code
1102.5, without threat of retaliation. 
There is no need to look for an implied contract not to retaliate
against whistleblowers when there is already an express law covering the
subject and protecting employees’ rights in this area, as a matter of public
policy. 

Plaintiff failed to convince the
jury of the validity of his two retaliatory firing claims.  The jury clearly concluded that plaintiff was
not fired for disclosing wrongful practices at Eden that were orchestrated by
his supervisors.  The only issue
presented by the JNOV was whether plaintiff’s employer made promises or
representations that plaintiff would only be fired for good cause.  As previously discussed, plaintiff expressly
testified that he understood his employer could terminate him at any time, with
or without cause, negating the possibility of finding an implied agreement to
the contrary. 

Even if, as plaintiff contends, a
promise not to retaliate against “whistleblowers” created an expectation of
continued employment after poor management practices were revealed, the
evidence at trial does not support a finding that plaintiff was a
whistleblower.  The company handbook
states that “Associates are not subject to retaliation for participating in
protected activity, such as filing bona fide complaints, participating in any
investigation, or reporting any violations of law or Company policy.”

The nonretaliation policy cannot be
interpreted to protect employees who merely confirm something that the employer
already knows—that the employee himself violated company rules—as opposed to
independently reporting the wrongdoing of others.  In other words, the policy protects
plaintiff’s two colleagues who reported that plaintiff broke an adjacent coffin
container while excavating a new grave in January 2008, but it does not protect
plaintiff when his supervisor investigated the report, the broken container was
revealed, and plaintiff admitted that he concealed the damage.  Though plaintiff recalled “much worse” damage
in the past, he also admitted that starting in December 2007, he knew for a
fact that it was absolutely necessary to report broken containers and that he
could be fired for failing to do so.

Any whistleblowing in this instance
occurred during interment verification training on October 18, 2007, when some
of plaintiff’s coworkers disclosed in open session that they were instructed by
Eden supervisors to damage adjoining graves to make room for new
interments.  Plaintiff was not present
when the disclosures were made.  The following
day, plaintiff attended training, but no discussion about grave damage took
place during an open session.  Later on,
in private meetings and in response to questioning, plaintiff may (or may not)
have disclosed mishandling of human remains. 
In his deposition, plaintiff could not recall “what I said.”

Someone who discloses personnel
matters during an exclusively internal administrative investigation is not
generally considered a whistleblower.  A
whistleblower is someone who discloses legal violations to a government agency,
because the courts do not want to be thrust into “micromanaging employment
practices . . . arising from the routine workings and communications
of the job site.”  (Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 1378, 1385.)  Giving
plaintiff’s testimony the broadest possible reading, there is no evidence that
he was a whistleblower:  plaintiff’s
colleagues blew the whistle on management, and he (at a later date) merely
confirmed what his colleagues had already disclosed.  Plaintiff did not initiate any disclosures;
instead, the company solicited his input. 
Plaintiff’s colleagues who originally disclosed wrongdoing at Eden were
not fired, although the general manager certainly was, based on defendants’
investigation.

No substantial evidence supports a
finding of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate for good cause.  Plaintiff forthrightly admitted at trial that
(1) the company handbook states that his employment is at-will; (2) he
understood he could be terminated at any time, without cause; (3) he was
required to report broken grave containers; (4) he broke a grave container with
a backhoe, ignored his coworkers’ pleas to report the damage, and concealed the
damage; and (5) he knew he could be terminated for violating company policies.

Plaintiff did not testify to any
understanding that he could only be terminated for cause.  The evidence showed, and the jury found, that
plaintiff was not terminated in retaliation for being a “whistleblower.”  Temporal proximity between an employee’s
protected actions and his termination, standing alone, is not sufficient
evidence of a pretextual firing when there is proof that the employer had a
legitimate reason for termination.  (>Arteaga v. Brink’s Inc. (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 327, 357.)

3.  Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing

The jury
awarded plaintiff damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.  “[T]he implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing imposes no independent limits on an employer’s
prerogative to dismiss employees.”  (>Guz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 351.)  “The covenant of good faith is read into
contracts in order to protect the express covenants or promises of the
contract, not to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied
to the contract’s purposes.”  (>Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47
Cal.3d at p. 690.)  When employment is at
will and there is no evidence of a promise of continued employment, a claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails.  (Flait
v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 480-481.)

As discussed in section 2, >ante, plaintiff’s employment was at will
and there was no promise of continued employment.  As a result, his claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails.  As a further basis for vacating the judgment,
the jury awarded damages against SCI, although the jury instructions only refer
to CCFS.  If the jury was instructed to
make findings only as to CCFS, it could not award damages against a defendant
who was not mentioned in the instructions. 
(Compare Weddle v. Loges (1942)
52 Cal.App.2d 115, 119, in which the jury allocated damages among “two joint
tort feasors.”)

>DISPOSITION

            The judgment is affirmed.

            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

 

                                                                        BOREN,
P.J.

We concur:

 

            ASHMANN-GERST, J.

 

            CHAVEZ, J.