Gregory F. v. Superior Court

Filed 4/10/07 Gregory F. v. Superior Court CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Gregory F. (Father) challenges an order of the Humboldt County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, which set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] to select a permanent plan for Sharon T. (born June 2005). We deny his petition on the merits.[2]

Background

On April 12, 2006, the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), to establish dependency jurisdiction over Sharon. The allegations, as later amended, were that Dawn P. (Mother) had a substance abuse problem rendering her unable to care for Sharon, that she had left Sharon in the care of Mary F. in December 2005, and thereafter failed to return or contact Mary F., and that the fathers ability to care for Sharon or protect her from Mothers conduct was unknown. The petition identified Larry T. as the alleged father.

The juvenile court held a detention hearing the following day. At this hearing Mother indicated that Father was Sharons actual father, but apparently provided no additional information concerning Fathers whereabouts. Counsel for the Department requested that the court amend the petition accordingly, so it would reflect Father as an alleged father. The court declined to amend the petition at that time, but directed the Department to provide notice to both Larry T. and any other proposed father. In a formal order of detention, filed April 20, the court directed the alleged father to submit a statement regarding parentage,[3] and ordered Mother to disclose information concerning the whereabouts of all possible fathers and to cooperate with the Department in establishing paternity.

In the Departments report prepared for the jurisdictional hearing, signed April 28, the case worker stated that Larry T. has been established as Sharons father through the Paternity Opportunity Program. Specifically, the report indicated Larry T. had executed a voluntary declaration of paternity.[4] The effect of the declaration was to establish Larry T. as Sharons presumed father. (See Fam. Code, 7573, 7611.) Nevertheless, the report continued to list Larry T. as an alleged father.

In an addendum report prepared for the jurisdictional hearing, signed May 11, the same case worker reported that the Department, in a related dependency proceeding, had erroneously listed Father as the alleged father of Sharons half-sibling. The report sought to correct the error, stating that both Father and Larry T. were alleged fathers of Sharon. Fathers address was listed as the county jail.

Larry T., but not Father, appeared at the subsequent jurisdictional hearing on May 17. At the conclusion of this hearing the court sustained the amended jurisdictional allegations and continued the effect of its prior order detaining Sharon in foster care.

The dispositional hearing was continued to June 22. On that date Father made his first appearance, in custody. At that time the court appointed counsel for Father for the limited purpose of raising his status from alleged father to presumed father. The court then ordered a second continuance of the dispositional hearing.

On July 5, at the continued hearing, Fathers counsel indicated that she would be seeking formally to establish Fathers paternity. She requested that the court schedule a hearing on this issue on July 10, as Father was scheduled to be transferred on July 11 from the local county jail to a state prison. The court indicated it might schedule a paternity hearing at a later date and in that event would arrange for Fathers appearance notwithstanding his transfer. It then ordered a third continuance of the dispositional hearing.

Meanwhile, on July 5, Father filed a statement of paternity and a motion seeking to establish himself as Sharons presumed father. In a supporting declaration, Father averred that he and Mother had lived together at the time of Sharons conception, in the home of Fathers mother, Mary F. He was later incarcerated in state prison in December 2004 for about one year. After his release in December 2005, he returned to live with Mary F. The day after Fathers release, December 20, 2005, Mother left Sharon, at that time a six-month-old infant, in the care of Mary T. and Father. Father spent a lot of time with Sharon during the period that she was in their care. Father was arrested on June 9, 2006, for possession of methamphetamines. Mary F. confirmed this version of events in a second supporting declaration, adding that she and Father cared for Sharon between December 20, 2005, and April 10, 2006, when the Department first removed Sharon from her home.

On July 10, 2006, a new case worker completed the Departments dispositional report. This report again listed both Father and Larry T. as alleged fathers of Sharon, and indicated that both were currently incarcerated in the county jail. At the dispositional hearing on July 19, Father appeared in custody. The resulting dispositional findings and order included a finding that Father was an alleged father and was thus not entitled to reunification services.

The court heard Fathers motion to establish his paternity on August 23. At that time, Fathers counsel informed the court that paternity testing was not yet completed, and stated she was in agreement with counsel for Larry T., that the testing should be completed before any determination of paternity as between Father and Larry T. The court accordingly continued the hearing on Fathers motion.

On October 3, Father supplemented his motion by filing a verified petition, pursuant to section 388, in which he alleged that the completed genetic testing had ruled out Larry T. as Sharons biological father. The following week, the court held a hearing on these combined pleadings and issued an order establishing Father as Sharons presumed father.[5] On that date it ordered the Department to provide Father with visitation consistent with county jail regulations.

The Department submitted its proposed case plan for Father at a hearing held October 26. The plan included a proposed visitation schedule of two supervised visits per month, in accordance with any visitation requirements set out by the county jail, with a proviso that visitation was to be discontinued in the event that Father was transferred to a prison or facility outside the county. Fathers counsel indicated she had discussed the plan with Father. The court accordingly adopted the plan and ordered reunification services. At this time Father was still on the county jails waiting list for visit approval, so he had not yet had any visitation with Sharon.

In its initial report prepared for the six-month status review hearing (six-month hearing), signed November 9, the case worker indicated that Father remained incarcerated at the county jail, subject to a transfer to state prison in the near future. She further reported that it appear[ed] [Father might] remain incarcerated in [prison] for approximately five months. In a second, addendum report, signed December 8, the case worker reported that Father had been sentenced on October 31 to 16 months imprisonment, less credits of approximately seven months, and that he was soon to be transferred to state prison. The Departments recommendation, set out in the initial report, was to terminate both parents services and set the matter for a hearing under section 366.26.

The court held the six-month hearing on December 21. It issued its findings and orders one week later, on December 28, 2006. The court found that Mother had failed to comply with her case plan and had made minimal progress toward alleviating the causes necessitating the out-of-home placement. It found Father had complied with his case plan, but had made minimal progress toward alleviating the causes necessitating the out-of-home placement. The court ordered the termination of services for both parents and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.

This petition followed.[6] ( 366.26, subd. (l); rule 8.450.)

Discussion

A. Introduction

If a child is not returned to his or his parents custody at the six-month hearing, and that child was under three years of age at the time of his or her initial removal, the juvenile court may schedule a hearing under section 366.26 in the event that it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan. ( 366.26, subd. (e).) There are two exceptions. Notwithstanding a parents failure to make substantive progress in his or her court-ordered plan, the court must continue matter to the 12-month permanency hearing if it finds either that there is a substantial probability that the child . . . may be returned to his or her parent . . . within six months, or that reasonable services have not been provided. (Ibid.)

In this case, Father contested the Departments recommendation at the six-month hearing, claiming essentially that the court should continue the matter to the 12-month permanency hearing because one or both of the above-mentioned exceptions applied, at least to him. With respect to the exception regarding services, he argued that his services had not been reasonable because he had suffered months of delay before their initiation. Consequently, he had only received services for a few weeks before the six-month hearing. He claimed his services were also unreasonable because his case plan improperly denied visitation in the event he was transferred to a prison outside the county, and because the social worker had not contacted San Quentin State Prison (San Quentin) to investigate what services might be arranged for Father at that facility.

The court found, among other things, that [t]he . . . Department ha[d] complied with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to make it possible for [Sharon] to safely return home.[7] Implicit in this findingas reflected by remarks indicating the courts rejection of Fathers argumentswas a determination that the Department had, in fact, offered or provided Father with reasonable services.

Fathers petition essentially challenges the validity of the implied finding that the Department offered or provided him with reasonable services.[8] In addressing his specific objections, our review is limited. That is, we uphold the implied finding if the record discloses that it is supported by substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) In examining the record, we construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the courts ruling. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 46.) We likewise do not reweigh the evidence, but resolve conflicts in favor of the ruling. (In re Jasmine C. (2000) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.)

B. The Delay in Services

Due process considerations require a social services agency to make reasonable efforts to locate and provide notice to absent parents. (See In re Arlyne A. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 591, 598.) Father contends the Department failed to exercise due diligence in providing him with more timely notice of the proceedings. In connection with this objection, he claims the Department also unreasonably failed to provide him with services before he raised his status to that of presumed father, without providing any explanation whether or why such services would be detrimental to Sharon. He also suggests that the Departments counsel improperly failed to stipulate to genetic testing during the dispositional hearing on July 19, 2006. In Fathers view, the combination of these negligent or improper omissions caused a substantial delay in the initiation of his reunification services. That delay, in turn, effectively precluded him from making any substantive progress in his court-ordered plan before the six-month hearing.

The relevant circumstances may be summarized as follows. When the Department first removed Sharon from the home of Mary T. in early April 2006, she evidently failed to provide information about Father and did not even disclose the fact that she was, or believed herself to be, Sharons paternal grandmother. It appears she provided such information for the first time in her declaration filed on Fathers behalf in early July. Meanwhile, at the detention hearing on April 13, Mother, through her counsel, identified Father as Sharons actual father. On that date the court directed the Department to give notice of the proceedings both to Larry T. and any proposed father. The record does not indicate Mother disclosed additional information concerning Fathers whereabouts. By the time of the jurisdictional report signed on April 28, the Department regarded Larry T. as Sharons established father, by virtue of his voluntary declaration of paternity. In an addendum report signed on May 11, the Department for the first time reported that Father was an alleged father of Sharon. The case worker admitted he had previously, incorrectly listed Father as the alleged father of Sharons half-sibling, who was the subject of a separate, related dependency proceeding. Father did not appear at Sharons jurisdictional hearing held May 17, but did appear, in custody, at the dispositional hearing on June 22. At that time the court appointed counsel for Father to assist him in raising his status and again continued the matter. Father made a motion to raise his status on July 5. At the continued dispositional hearing on July 19, the minutes indicate that counsel for the parties discussed the issue of alleged father status for both fathers listed and the issue of DNA testing. During this discussion [m]ost counsel agreed to stipulate to a DNA test, except [counsel for the Department]. The precise nature or purpose of the stipulation is not explained. On the other hand, the court on this date apprised Father of the fact that he needed to raise his status from alleged father in order to receive services. Nevertheless, when Fathers motion came on for hearing on August 23, 2006, his counsel agreed to defer any ruling on paternity pending the completion of genetic testing. When the court finally raised Fathers status, on October 11, it directed the Department to arrange for visitation consistent with the regulations of the county jail where he was incarcerated. Father did not, at that time, request additional services pending the Departments completion of his case plan, despite the fact that counsel for the Department stated it would take an additional three weeks to complete the plan. Thus, the court ordered services for Father on October 26, at the time it received and approved his case plan. The six-month hearing commenced some two months later, on December 21.

The foregoing circumstances do not, in our view, affirmatively establish a lack of due diligence on part of the Department. Presumably the Department gave Father notice of Sharons proceeding sometime around May 11, when it first reported his address and status as an alleged father. This was only one month after the detention hearing. If the Department had erroneous information concerning Fathers status before that time, its error cannot be entirely attributed to negligence. As the court below noted, Fathers mother was not 100 percent forthright concerning Father and his whereabouts in her initial interviews with the Department. Moreover, the Department had learned that Larry T. had executed a voluntary declaration of paternity. The case worker reasonably could have regarded this as an eventuality overshadowing Mothers statement at the detention hearing, that Father was Sharons actual father.

Even if we were to assume that the circumstances show a lack of due diligence by the Department, we see no actual prejudice. For one thing, Fathers own declaration, filed July 5, averred that he had been living in the home of his mother at the time the Department initially removed Sharon from that home. If Father lacked timely official notice from the Department regarding Sharons dependency proceeding, he nevertheless had actual notice from the outset that the Department had detained Sharon, an action that necessarily impinged upon his parental right of custody and control. Yet, prior to his first appearance on June 22, Father failed to come forward or contact the Department in order to assert his rights, even though he had an unfettered ability to do so before the date of his arrest and incarceration on June 9.

Further, because Sharon was under three years of age at the time of her initial removal, Father was generally entitled to receive services only during a six-month period. ( 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) Fathers six-month period commenced on May 17, the date of the jurisdictional hearing.[9] The running of this period was not tolled during the time Father sought to raise his status from alleged father. (See In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 452.) Nor was it tolled by his incarceration. (See 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) Nevertheless, Father, who was represented by counsel from the time of his first appearance, raised no objection that the delay in raising his status was unreasonably depriving him of the ability to engage in services while this period was running. The record indicates Father first complained of the delay in receiving services in his at-issue memorandum filed December 1, some two weeks after the lapse of his six-month period for receiving services.

Finally, we note that the Department was not under any duty to offer services to Father before October 11, when the court raised his status to presumed father. During the brief period of time before that date, following the completed genetic testing that indicated Father was Sharons biological father, it was the juvenile court, not the Department, that had discretionary authority to order services. ( 361.5, subd. (a).) Father himself did not seek such services as a biological father prior to October 11.

We conclude the record provides substantial support for the courts implied finding, that the Department did not improperly delay the initiation of Fathers services, so as to render those services unreasonable.

C. The Visitation Schedule

An incarcerated parent is entitled to reasonable services unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child. ( 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) These may include visitation services, where appropriate. ( 361.5, subd. (e)(1)(C).) In determining detriment to the minor, the juvenile court must consider the age of the minor, the bond between the minor and the incarcerated parent, the length of the parents sentence, the nature of the underlying offense, the degree of detriment to the minor if services are not offered, and other appropriate factors. ( 361.5, subd. (e)(1); see In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1406-1407.)

Father argues his services were unreasonable because the court improperly limited his visitation services. He reasons, in effect, that the court below erred in adopting the Departments proposed visitation schedule, because it improperly denied visitation based solely on an arbitrary geographical limit. He cites as his principal authority the decision in In re Jonathan M. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1234 (Jonathan M.), disapproved on another ground in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414.)

In Jonathan M., the juvenile court denied visitation services because the incarcerated parent was housed in a facility that lay beyond a 50-mile travel limit set by the social services agency. The Court of Appeal construed the phrase visitation services, where appropriate, as set out in section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), to mean where it would not be detrimental to the minor. Thus travel distance or difficulty might be an appropriate consideration, but only in the context of considering all appropriate factors, including those specified in the statute. (Jonathan M., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1238.)

In this case, the juvenile court did not deny all visitation, but it did adopt a condition that precluded visitation during any time that Father was incarcerated in an out-of-county facility. We agree this was error in the absence of any finding consistent with the requirements of section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1).

But Father made no objection to the improper condition at the time the court adopted it on October 26. When he finally did object to the restriction at the six-month hearing, the court proceeded to make an oral but explicit finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would be detrimental to Sharon to order additional services for Father of any kind, based on his continuing incarceration. The court indicated it had reached this determination after consideration of the appropriate factors set out in section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1). That is, it had considered the degree of the bond between Sharon and Father, the length of Fathers continuing incarceration in light of Sharons age, and its conclusion that Sharon would suffer no detriment in the event additional services were not offered.

There is substantial evidence in the record to support this determination. The case workers testimony and the reports submitted at the hearing indicate Sharon was approximately 18 months of age, that Fathers contact with her had been extremely limited since his incarceration in June 2006, that he was currently incarcerated in San Quentin and was expected to remain there for a period of at least five months, and that during this period Sharon would, in the case workers opinion, be in need of meaningful bonding experiences. There was, on the other hand, a complete absence of any evidence of a significant bond between Sharon and Father.

We note, moreover, that the case workers testimony and the report signed on December 8, 2006, indicated Father had been transferred on that day from the county jail to the state prison13 days before the six-month hearing. Thus, he was actually subject to the improper visitation restriction for only this brief period. Regulations applicable to state prisons restrict an inmates visitation during intake processing and require the facilitys prior approval of any visitation. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, 3170.1, subd. (e), 3172, subd. (c).) In view of such regulations, it is reasonable to infer that there was little, if any, possibility that a visit could have been arranged during this 13-day period even if the court had not approved the improper visitation restriction.[10]

In view of these circumstances, we conclude the courts error was harmless. It is not reasonably probable that Father would have had a more favorable result in the absence of the error. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

D. The Departments Compliance with the Case Plan

Reunification services provided or offered to a parent may be deemed reasonable when the evidence shows the case plan identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, the offered services were designed to remedy those problems, and the agency maintained reasonable contact with the parent and made reasonable efforts to assist that parent in areas in which compliance proved difficult. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414 (Riva M.).) When a parent is incarcerated, the agency should, at a minimum, contact the facility to determine what services might be available to or arranged for the parent. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1013.)

Father contends, as he did below, that his services were unreasonable because the case worker had not contacted San Quentin to determine what services might be arranged for him. He also complains that the case worker did not comply with the case plan to the extent it required her to contact Father at least once per monthin person while he remained at the county jail, and by letter or telephone once he was transferred to state prison.

In the interim report signed October 20, 2006, which the Department submitted together with Fathers proposed case plan, the case worker reported that she met with Father at the county jail on October 12, 2006. At that meeting they discussed the preparation of his case plan, and Father took an active role in its development. Because his criminal record indicated several drug-related arrests, including his most recent arrest, a primary component of the case plan called for him to obtain a drug-abuse assessment and follow any treatment it might recommend. He was to obtain the assessment through the facility where he was incarcerated, if possible, and take advantage of any alcohol or drug treatment services available there. The plan also called for him to participate in any parenting classes that were available at the facility, and to begin making plans to prepare for caring for Sharon following his release, including arrangements for her care while he was away at work. In the status report signed November 9, the case worker reported that, after the October 11 hearing, she had sought and obtained approval from the county jail for visitation beginning November 2. As of the date of that report, one visit had taken place. (See also fn. 11, ante.) At the six-month hearing, the case worker testified she had attempted to visit Father at the county jail on November 15, but Father had declined to see her. She remembered that Fathers counsel had called her the following day, to apologize on Fathers behalf, but she had no recollection that Fathers counsel made any request at that time to reschedule the meeting. She stated she did not attempt to meet with Father at the county jail after that date. She also stated that, as of the date of the six-month hearing13 days after Fathers transfershe had not yet contacted San Quentin concerning possible services. She testified she had made previous contacts there, however, and was familiar with resources available there as recently as three months prior to the hearing.

This evidence shows that the case worker promptly met with Father at the county jail on the day after the court elevated his status to presumed father, and at that time worked with him to develop a case plan tailored to his particular case. She attempted to meet with him at the county jail the following month. Father remained there less than one month after that attempted meeting. While she had not contacted Father since his transfer to San Quentin, and had not yet contacted that facility, Father had been there for less than two weeks, and she was familiar with the facilitys resources based on earlier contacts, the latest of which had been some three months earlier. This evidence by no means compels a finding that the case workers conduct was so far out of compliance as to render Fathers services unreasonable. To the contrary, in our view it shows that she did maintain reasonable contact and did make reasonable efforts to assist him with his case plan. (Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.)

The standard is not whether the agency could have provided better services in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record, despite Fathers specific objections, to support the implied finding that the Department offered or provided services that were reasonable under the circumstances of this case.

Disposition

The request for stay is denied, and the petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Cal. Const., art. VI,  14; Kowisv. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894; Bay Development, Ltd.v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024.) This decision is final in this court immediately. (Rule 8.264(b)(3).)

______________________

Marchiano, P.J.

We concur:

______________________

Stein, J.

______________________

Swager, J.

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[1] Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

[2] Section 366.26, subdivision (l)(1)(A), bars review on appeal if the aggrieved party has not made a timely writ challenge to an order setting a hearing for selection and implementation of a permanent plan. The statute also encourages the appellate court to determine all such writ petitions on their merits, as we do here. ( 366.26, subd. (l)(4)(B).)

[3] That is, Judicial Council Form JV-505.

[4] The Paternity Opportunity Program, implemented in 1995 by the state Department of Child Support Services, encourages unmarried fathers to complete a voluntary Paternity Declaration. (See Fam. Code, 7573, 7574, 7611.) The program provides information and declaration forms at participating birthing facilities, prenatal clinics, welfare offices, vital records offices, and courts. (See [as of April 2, 2007]; see also Fam. Code, 7570-7572.) It appears the voluntary declaration of paternity executed by Larry T. was filed with the court in August 2005.

[5] The courts ruling was essentially a determination that Fathers declaration regarding paternity, executed in July 2006, was controlling as to the conflicting declaration of paternity filed by Larry T. in August 2005. (See Fam. Code,  7612.) Once it was made, counsel for the Department indicated it would move to set aside Larry T.s declaration of paternity. (See fn. 4, ante; see also Fam. Code, 7575.) The court granted this motion by an order filed October 31, 2006, and dismissed Larry T. as a party to this proceeding.

[6] The Department, prior to filing its brief in opposition to the petition, filed a motion to strike case worker notes attached to the petition, which had not been admitted into evidence below. No opposition was filed. That motion is hereby granted. (Rule 8.54(c).)

[7] This finding was required under section 366. (See 366, subd. (a)(1)(B), 366.21, subd. (e).)

[8] Among Fathers arguments, both below and before this court, is his claim that the juvenile court was required to make this finding on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. He urges that the court erred by failing to apply this evidentiary standard explicitly. We disagree. Fathers claim rests on language in this courts decision in In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296 (Monica C.). That decision was based on provisions of former section 366.21, subdivision (g)(3), which are now set out in section 366.21, subdivision (g)(2). (Monica C., supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at pp. 310-311; see Stats. 1997, ch. 793, 21.) Subdivision (g)both now and at the time of the decision in Monica C.states clearly that it applies only when a minor is not returned to his or her parent at the [12-month permanency] hearing held pursuant to [section 366.21,] subdivision (f). ( 366.21, subd. (g).) By contrast, the court in this case made the challenged finding pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e), which governs six-month hearings. We note further that the relevant paragraph of subdivision (e)that which authorizes the court to set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing under specified circumstances involving a very young minorwas added by legislative amendment after the decision in Monica C. (See Stats. 1996, ch. 1083 (A.B. 1524), 3; Stats. 1996, ch. 1084 (S.B. 1516), 6.9, 14(c).) Thus, in Monica C., this court had no occasion to consider whether the requirements of subdivision (g) applied to six-month hearings under subdivision (e) as well as to 12-month permanency hearings under subdivision (f). Plainly, they do not. When it added the relevant paragraph to subdivision (e), the Legislature could have amended subdivision (g) to make its requirements applicable both to six-month hearings and 12-month permanency hearings, yet it did not. It is evident the Legislature thereby intended to distinguish the requirements for setting a section 366.26 hearing at a six-month hearingin certain cases involving very young minorsfrom the requirements that apply more generally at a 12-month permanency hearing. To the extent language in Monica C. may suggest that the requirements of subdivision (g) apply invariably whenever a court sets a section 366.26 hearing, that language must be deemed limited by the subsequent amendment of subdivision (e).

[9] The six-month period begins when the minor enters foster care, which is the earlier date of the jurisdictional hearing or the date 60 days after initial removal. (See  361.5, subd. (a)(3).)

[10] The delay in arranging visitation at the county jail is illustrative. The Department requested approval after the court directed it to make arrangements for visitation at the hearing held October 11, 2006. On October 26, some 15 days later, the jail gave its approval to visits beginning no sooner than November 2.