INTRODUCTION

          Appellant Cynthia Guillory brought this action against her employer, respondent Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., alleging employment discrimination and wrongful termination, in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).  Appellant's action was dismissed on summary judgment after undisputed facts showed that no part of appellant's employment was performed in California.  The trial court held that there could be no extraterritorial application of California law under the facts of this case.  We agree and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

          Appellant commenced this action April 14, 2005, by filing a complaint for employment and disability discrimination in violation of article I, section 8 of the California Constitution, Government Code sections 12940 and 12945, and Civil Code section 3345.[1]  Appellant had previously filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which later issued a right-to-sue notice informing her, among other things, of the requirement that she file a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 30 days, if she intended to pursue federal remedies.[2]  One week later, appellant filed her complaint in the instant case, alleging only state claims.

          After answering the complaint, respondent brought a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, seeking dismissal of the complaint and each cause of action, on the ground that California law did not apply to any of the alleged claims.  The principal facts were undisputed.  Respondent, a Bermuda corporation with corporate offices in California, operates cruise ships, all of which are of foreign registry.  At all times, appellant was a resident of California, and had been hired in California.  She was continuously employed by respondent from 1997 to 2004, under a series of separate contracts.[3]  Six months was the maximum duration of each contract, which was terminable whenever medical evidence indicated that the employee was unfit for his or her duties, or the ship's master was of the opinion that continued employment was likely to endanger the ship or any person on board.  The parties understood that respondent had the right to determine whether appellant was fit for duty and, if it determined she was not, to require that she disembark.  It was respondent's policy to terminate the remainder of the contract of any crew member seven days after he or she had been required to disembark due to a finding of unfitness, if the condition persisted.

          As each six-month contract took effect, appellant was assigned to one of respondent's ships, all of which sailed in international waters and stopped at ports outside the United States.  Her final six-month tour began August 30, 2004, when she was assigned to the Dawn Princess as a staff member in one of the onboard gift shops.  The Dawn Princess was registered in Bermuda, and sailed from its home port in Florida to various ports-of-call in the Caribbean.  Appellant performed none of her job duties in California.  Her final tour ended in December 2004, when the ship's doctors declared her unfit for duty due to a pregnancy considered high-risk, and caused her to disembark in Florida.  Appellant's pregnancy was approximately 21 weeks along when she was required to disembark.

          The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment March 9, 2006, and entered judgment May 9, 2006, dismissing the action.  Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal.  Respondent filed a cross-appeal, which we dismissed, as it merely asserted additional grounds to affirm the judgment.

DISCUSSION

          We review summary judgments de novo.  (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)  Further, the interpretation and applicability of a statute is a question of law that we determine de novo.  (See Bialo v. Western Mutual Ins. Co. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 68, 76-77.)  Thus, we independently resolve whether California's employment discrimination laws apply extraterritorially.  

          Ordinarily, state statutes are not given extraterritorial effect.  (North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 174 Cal. 1, 4 (North Alaska Salmon Co.).)  â€