Harris v. Discount Beauty Supply CA1/4
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
CONSTANCE HARRIS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DISCOUNT BEAUTY SUPPLY etc.,
Defendant and Respondent.
A148727
(San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. CGC-14-537970)
Appellant Constance Harris appears to appeal from an order entered June 10, 2015, granting respondent’s motion for terminating sanctions due to appellant’s failure to comply with discovery orders. First, assuming this order is itself appealable, appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed until June 9, 2016, almost one year after the June 10, 2015 order was filed, and notice of entry of judgment (Judicial Council Form CIV-130) was filed. Thus, the time for appeal had long since passed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).)
In addition, appellant’s briefs present a confusing compilation of disjointed historical facts and claims that fail to comply with many fundamental rules of appellate procedure. Those deficiencies include the failure to: (1) present legal analysis and relevant supporting authority for each point asserted, with appropriate citations to the record on appeal (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856); (2) support references to the record with a citation to the volume and page number in the record where the matter appears; and (3) state the nature of the action, the relief sought in the trial court, and to summarize the significant facts, but limited to matters in the record (rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), (2)(A), (C)).
Moreover, appellant appears to have incorporated only her view of the facts. This one-sided presentation of the evidence violates another established rule of appellate practice. An appellant must fairly set forth all of the significant facts, not just those beneficial to her. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.)
These are not mere technical requirements, but important rules of appellate procedure designed to alleviate the burden on the court by requiring litigants to present their cause systematically, so that the court “may be advised, as [it] read[s], of the exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.” (Landa v. Steinberg (1932) 126 Cal.App. 324, 325.)
Perhaps most importantly, the incomprehensible nature of appellant’s briefs makes it impossible for this court to discern what precise errors she is claiming were made by the trial judge, and how such errors were prejudicial. We are not required to search the record on our own seeking error. (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)
We note that appellant appears before us in propria persona. Her unrepresented status in no way excuses the deficiencies in her briefs. (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 [“ ‘ “the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney” ’ ”].) Appellant’s self-represented status does not exempt her from the rules of appellate procedure or relieve her of her burden on appeal. Those representing themselves are afforded no additional leniency or immunity from the rules of appellate procedure simply because of their in propria persona status. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985; see also Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.) These deficiencies are each separate and independent bases requiring the dismissal of the current appeal.
DISPOSITION
The order granting terminating sanctions and dismissing appellant’s complaint is affirmed. In the interest of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs of appeal.
_________________________
RUVOLO, P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
REARDON, J.
_________________________
RIVERA, J.
A148727, Harris v. Discount Beauty Supply
Description | Appellant Constance Harris appears to appeal from an order entered June 10, 2015, granting respondent’s motion for terminating sanctions due to appellant’s failure to comply with discovery orders. First, assuming this order is itself appealable, appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed until June 9, 2016, almost one year after the June 10, 2015 order was filed, and notice of entry of judgment (Judicial Council Form CIV-130) was filed. Thus, the time for appeal had long since passed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).) In addition, appellant’s briefs present a confusing compilation of disjointed historical facts and claims that fail to comply with many fundamental rules of appellate procedure. |
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