1
Filed 4/28/17 Hartford v. Karnazes CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JOHN HARTFORD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ELIZABETH KARNAZES,
Defendant and Appellant;
DAVID MELCHNER,
Plaintiff.
A143423
(San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. CIV 458258)
The genesis of this dispute, and the background for this appeal, is explained in our
previous opinion:
“At all relevant times, Elizabeth Karnazes and John Hartford were attorneys, and
for a considerable number of years appear to have practiced together. Their parting of the
ways was in no sense amicable. The courts became their battleground, and the judges of
San Mateo County the most unwilling observers of their repeated campaigns of scorched
earth litigation tactics[1]
. . . . [¶] After it granted Hartford’s special motion to strike
Karnazes’s cross-complaint, the trial court granted his motion for the award of costs and
attorney fees guaranteed him by the SLAPP statute. ([Code Civ. Proc.,
[2]
] § 425.16,

1 As required by the California Rules of Court, Karnazes, the appellant here,
included the register of actions in the record on appeal. Bound as a separate volume, the
register has 145 pages.
2
Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
subd. (c).) The amount of the award was $21,143.37, and the order was filed on
September 28, 2009.”
“In the ensuing 31 months, that party [i.e., Hartford] claims to have incurred
almost 15 times that amount—more than $300,000—in attorney fees attempting to
enforce the judgment. The issue presented is whether sections 685.040 and
685.070 . . . authorize that party to claim these additional fees simply by filing a
supplementary memorandum of costs with the clerk of the court, or can the court require
the party to file a noticed motion in order that the court can review the validity and
amount of the fees claimed. We agree with the trial court that a noticed motion is
required. Indeed, to accede to the judgment creditors: construction of sections 685.040
and 685.070 would create the unique anomaly of a judgment debtor being liable, at least
in theory, for unlimited amounts of attorney fees that are never required to undergo
judicial inspection to determine if the fees are both reasonable and necessarily incurred in
enforcing the judgment. This would be an absurd consequence we cannot believe was
contemplated, much less intended, by the Legislature.” (Karnazes v. Hartford (Feb. 10,
2014, A136400) [nonpub. opn.] [2014 WL 511089], at *1, fn. omitted.)
This was the same conclusion that had been reached by the trial court when it in
effect granted Karnazes’s motion to tax Hartford’s claimed costs, almost all of which
were attorney fees claimed under section 685.040, for attempting to execute on the
judgment from September 2009 up to April 2012. We further agreed with this statement
by the trial court: “ ‘[T]he Court is not convinced that the attorney’s fees claimed in Mr.
Hartford’s April 30, 2012 Memorandum of Costs should be automatically added to and
incorporated into the judgment by mandatory operation of law, as he argues. If Mr.
Hartford seeks to recover those fees, the Court requests that a noticed motion be filed
pursuant to . . . § 685.080.’ ” (Karnazes v. Hartford, supra, 2014 WL 511089, at *1-3.)
Accordingly, we affirmed the two orders from which Hartford had appealed. (Id. at *7.)
This appeal by Karnazes is from three ensuing orders.
3
DISCUSSION
There are several preliminary matters. First, we must make clear the limited scope
of our review. In her opening brief (she filed no reply brief), Karnazes makes numerous
and extended references to the circumstances that led to entry of the original fee order in
September 2009. She acknowledges that her attempted appeal from that order was
dismissed in September 2011. As we advised Karnazes in a subsequent order in 2012,
that dismissal “is now final.” (See Karnazes v. Hartford (Feb. 27, 2012, A128486)
[nonpub. opn.] [2012 WL 629880], at *1.) It is even more final five years later. As this
court held long ago: “An appealable order once final cannot be collaterally attacked
where not void on its face.” (Estate of Lee (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 687, 692; accord,
Machado v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 875, 886.) More recently, our
Supreme Court has stated flatly: “If an order is appealable, however, and no timely
appeal is taken therefrom, the issues determined by the order are res judicata.” (In re
Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 393.) Karnazes cannot—indeed, does not try to—
demonstrate that the order is void on its face, but she does excoriate it as “frivolous,”
“excessive” in amount, a “windfall” to Hartford, and the product of his fraud and the
connivance of Albert Lee, who represents him. All of these references will be
disregarded.3
The same is true for all other orders that could have been appealed, but
were not.
Second, “It is the duty of a party to support the arguments in its briefs by
appropriate reference to the record, which includes providing exact page citations.”
(Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1205 [citing what is now
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)]; accord, Nazari v. Ayrapetyan (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 690, 694, fn. 1.) Karnazes seldom discharges this duty in her brief,
particularly with regard to the seven volumes of the clerk’s transcript. There are some

3 Karnazes does not confine her personal attacks to members of the State Bar. She
accuses one clerk of lying to the trial court, others of improper filing practices, and all of
unspecified “malfeasance.” And we are singularly unimpressed with her attacks on the
competence and integrity of members of the San Mateo County Superior Court.
4
instances where there is a reference to the reporter’s transcript, or the register of actions,4
or a reference to a lengthy document. There are many instances where Karnazes simply
makes naked assertions, often to utterly extraneous events, with absolutely no citation to
the record. Far more common are references to a document alone. This practice is
aggravated by Karnazes simply putting “Id.” after a number of paragraphs. Occasionally
there is a mixture or hybrid citation. There is even the implicit suggestion that this court
conduct its own investigation of matters of no relevance to the resolution of this appeal.
This is an awful lot of material that must be either disregarded or severely discounted.
Third, we cannot agree with Karnazes that our review should be de novo. The
correct standards are clearly established abuse of discretion for the order striking
Karnazes’s cost bill (e.g., Costerisan v. Melendy (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 57, 61;
Brueckner v. Ferrara (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 398, 403), and for the fee awards made
under the SLAPP statute. (E.g., Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138, 1141;
569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 426, 433.)
Most emphatically do we reject Karnazes’s solicitation that we undertake judicial
fact-finding in the first instance and provide “an order vacating and setting aside with
prejudice all orders and judgments against Appellant following the voluntary dismissal
[of her cross-complaint] . . . on May 27, 2009. Respondents [sic] have unclean hands,
and the Doctrine of Laches, among others, apply.” (Italics added.)
Finally, Karnazes badly misreads our prior opinion. It, like the trial court’s
decision, involved solely a point of procedure—the correct mechanism for Hartford to
seek an award of attorney fees and costs. Neither the trial court, nor this one, expressed
an opinion on the merits of an award made according to the correct procedure. Karnazes
is therefore in error in stating that the fee awards constituted an improper attempt “to
obtain . . . attorney’s fees and costs that were denied by this Court” (italics added). And
there is no basis for Karnazes to believe that by renewing his applications for fees and

4 Karnazes also extends this practice to the register in other actions.
5
costs, Hartford was “flatly ignoring the warning they were issued” by this court on the
previous appeal.
THE FIRST ORDER
In the first of the orders that figure on this appeal, which was filed on August 22,
2014, the trial court granted Hartford’s motion to strike the “Memorandum of Costs on
Appeal” submitted by Karnazes on the ground that it was untimely. The trial court gave
its reasoning as follows:
“Hartford’s Motion to Strike Memorandum of Costs on Appeal is GRANTED.
A memorandum of costs on appeal must be filed and served within 40 days to claim the
costs. [California Rules of Court] Rule 8.276(c)(1).
“The Remittitur in this case was issued on April 14, 2014, and the clerk of the
court notified the parties on that date in writing. Not counting the first day and including
the final day, the 40th day fell on May 25, 2014. Although [Karnazes’s] Proof of Service
states that the Memorandum was mailed to the court on May 22, 2014, it was not filed by
the court clerk until May 28, 2014. She has not demonstrated sufficient mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect under CCP § 473(b) to warrant relief from the
filing requirements under [California Rules of Court] Rule 8.276(c)(1).”5
Karnazes makes two attacks on this order.
First, she disputes the accuracy of the trial court conclusion that her request for
appellate costs was not timely by arguing that her process server mailed it to the court
within the 15-day period specified by the Rule of Court cited in the trial court’s order.
She makes reference to documents that will supposedly substantiate this claim, but none
of them is in the record she designated. The issue did figure at the hearing conducted on

5 Karnazes included in the clerk’s transcript nothing, absolutely nothing, relevant to
what led up to this order. She did provide the reporter’s transcript of the hearing held on
Hartford’s motion to strike her memorandum of costs, but not one page of the underlying
documents. At Hartford’s motion, and over Karnazes’s objection, we deemed the record
augmented to include Hartford’s papers in support of his “Motion to Strike Memorandum
of Costs on Appeal”—which included the memorandum for $1425.21—the order
granting that motion, and Karnazes’s notice of appeal.
6
Hartford’s motion, at which the court indicated it was “familiar with your arguments.”
The court declined to hear testimony from Karnazes and the process server,
6
and was
obviously more impressed with the date stamp on the envelope received by attorney Lee
with a copy of the cost bill. Lee also made reference to Karnazes’s “hearsay statements”
as the only support for her claim that the clerk received the memorandum for costs a day
before the date stamp on the letter received by Lee.
The issue of whether Karnazes’s memorandum was timely filed thus turns upon
which side’s version of service is believed, which is a question of fact. (E.g., Him v. City
and County of San Francisco (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 437, 441–446; Dickinson v.
Zubiate Mining Co. (1909) 11 Cal.App. 656, 662.) Clearly, the trial court resolved that
issue against Karnazes, based on Lee’s envelope and the same-day file stamp of
Karnazes’s memorandum by the clerk’s office. Because that decision is supported by
substantial evidence, it must be upheld.
Karnazes’s second point is that by contesting the merits, Hartford waived any
objections to any defects of notice. She cites Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th
690, 697, wherein one encounters the following: “ ‘It is well settled that the appearance
of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits
is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion. [Citations.] This rule
applies even when no notice was given at all. [Citations.] Accordingly, a party who
appears and contests a motion in the court below cannot object on appeal or by seeking
extraordinary relief in the appellate court that he had no notice of the motion or that the
notice was insufficient or defective.’ ”
There can be no quarrel with this excerpt as stating the fundamental principle of
appellate review that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider argument not first
presented to the trial court. But Hartford is not the appellant, nor is he affirmatively
seeking relief, extraordinary or otherwise. He is not arguing the merits of the costs

6 Although it did “tak[e] into account the proffer of . . . Mr. Novak’s testimony.”
We interpret this as the court accepting Karnazes’s statements as to what the process
server would recount if allowed to testify as an offer of proof.
7
Karnazes tried to claim. And we do not think the quoted excerpt is reasonably extended
to prevent the respondent on an appeal from defending an order or judgment on the same
procedural ground heard and accepted by the trial court.
THE SECOND AND THIRD ORDERS
The second order, which was filed on September 8, 2014, was the first to award
attorney fees. The court granted Hartford’s “Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Incurred from May 1, 2012 to December 31, 2013” in the amounts of $66,958.50 and
$1,203.25, respectively. The court gave the authority for this ruling as “§§ 425.16(c),
685.040 and 685.080 as well as Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.”
The third order was filed on September 30, 2014. By it, the court granted
Hartford’s “Motion for Supplemental Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Incurred from
September 29, 2009 Up Through April 30, 2010” in the amounts of $85,000.00 and
$1,369.00, respectively. The court reiterated that its authority was “§§ 425.16(c),
685.040 and 685.080 as well as Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.” The
court added: “The Court has reviewed the records for the billing period of September 29,
2009 through April 30, 2010. While it appears that Mr. Lee [counsel for Hartford] was
quite busy responding to numerous motions filed by Ms. Karnazes and handling several
ex parte applications, as well as a debtor’s examination and post-judgment discovery
disputes, many of those motions and oppositions were repetitive of the same arguments
advanced by [Hartford] earlier. As explained in the previous hearing on attorneys’ fees,
this is the reason why the Court is reducing the fee award to a more reasonable amount.
The Court has reduced the number of attorney hours from 274.60 to 200 hours to come
up with the sum of $85,000.00 in attorneys’ fees.”
As indicated above, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. Karnazes
demonstrates none. And there was none, as a review of the record clearly shows.
At both hearings leading to the orders, the court heard extensive argument, 40
pages on the second order, and 30 pages on the third. The trial court noted that it had
reviewed the entire file, and was familiar with it, and the history of the dispute between
the parties. Moreover, the court on several occasions indicated its concern about the
8
reasonableness of expending so much time and effort in pursuit of what began as a
$21,000 judgment—the same question we ourselves have been concerned about in the
matter. Finally, the trial court did not award Hartford all he sought, but reduced both
requests significantly, cognizant that the issue was whether the amounts were “reasonable
and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment.” (§ 685.040.)
Karnazes contends that both of Hartford’s motions for attorney fees and costs
should have been denied because the fees and costs claimed “were windfall, exorbitant,
unreasonable, and unnecessary.” However, apart from repeatedly denouncing their
immorality, Karnazes makes no genuine attempt to demonstrate that either of the awards
evidences an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. She does not address the
unreasonableness of either the number of hours or hourly rate used by the trial court.7
“ ‘In challenging attorney fees as excessive . . . , it is the burden of the challenging party
to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the
evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do
not suffice.’ ” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.) In her
opposition to both fee requests, Karnazes argued that Hartford “has not remotely satisfied
the requirements of proving his attorney’s fees and costs are reasonable and were
necessarily incurred in this matter,” and therefore each request should be denied “in its
entirety.”8 As indicated above, the trial court addressed this issue head-on.

7
Indeed, with respect to the $425 hourly rate proposed by Hartford and accepted by
the trial court, Hartford made a point of advising this was “the rate that was agreed upon
by Mr. Hartford and his counsel five years ago,” and was still less than Karnazes’s billing
rate “nine years ago.”
8
In opposition to the first fee request, Karnazes submitted two declarations, the
caption of each proclaiming that it included “specific objections to billing of Attorney
Albert Lee.” However, in neither declaration did Karnazes concede that Hartford should
receive a single dollar in fees or costs. And in each Karnazes declared under penalty of
perjury that “Attorneys HARTFORD and LEE have failed to satisfy to [sic] burden of
proof that they have incurred reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs for the
sole purpose of enforcing the underlying Judgment, and they are making an untimely
claim for unconscionable, windfall, unreasonable, and unnecessary attorneys’ fees and
costs, which they should not be awarded.”
9
Recalling the considerable deference extended to trial courts in determining
attorney fee awards, cognizant that the attorney fees awarded are approximately half the
size seen on the prior appeal, and satisfied that Hartford employed noticed motions as we
directed on the prior appeal, we conclude no abuse is shown. (See Cabral v. Martins
(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 491–492.)
The orders are affirmed.

Karnazes also submitted two declarations in opposition to Hartford’s second fee
motion in which she incorporated by reference “my previous Declarations filed in this
action in support of my position that Attorneys HARTFORD and . . . LEE should not be
awarded fees and/or costs in this case.”
10
_________________________
Richman, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Kline, P.J.
_________________________
Stewart, J.
A143423; Hartford v. Karnazes