Filed 4/30/07 Hutchings v. Drommerhausen CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Aviva K. Bobb, Judge and Eli A. Chernow, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI,  21.). Affirmed.

Bartsch & Webb, Duane L. Bartsch and Eric L. Webb for Defendant and Appellant.

Loeb & Loeb, Adam F. Streisand, and Nicholas J. Van Brunt, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I.        INTRODUCTION

In this consolidated appeal, Daniel G. Drommerhausen III, (Daniel) ^[1]challenges 3 separate orders of the probate court declaring that 38 real properties and 11 bank and brokerage accounts belong to: the Estate of Daniel G. Drommerhausen II; the Estate of Marjorie M. Drommerhausen; or the Drommerhausen Family Trust (the trust). Daniel G. Drommerhausen and Marjorie Drommerhausen were the parents of Daniel and Debra Hutchings. Ms. Hutchings, who is the executor of the parents wills and the sole successor trustee of the trust, filed three Probate Code^[2]section 850 petitions to confirm that the real properties and accounts belong either to the estates or the trust. The probate court entered the three orders following a stipulated trial by reference before Retired Superior Court Judge Eli Chernow. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Petitions

Mr. Drommerhausen and his wife, Ms. Drommerhausen, spent over 40 years acquiring real estate. Mr. Drommerhausen apparently used various methods to acquire the property including making purchases through various names, fictitious identities, and businesses. The record disclosed that, on occasions, property was acquired or deeds were recorded in the names of Ms. Hutchings or Daniel without their knowledge. Ms. Drommerhausen acted as a bookkeeper and a rental sales agent. The parties agreed that Ms. Hutchings took virtually no role in the family business. However, Daniel was involved in the family real estate business for at least 25 years. Although the level of his participation in the real estate business was disputed, Daniel received a salary of approximately $4,000 a month for his services.

Mr. Drommerhausen and Ms. Drommerhausen created the trust in December 1995. Schedule A of the trust identified certain real properties that were conveyed to the instrument at the time it was established. Ms. Hutchings and Daniel were named as successor co-trustees and are equal beneficiaries under the trust. Article I(A) of the trust provides: This Trust was created to hold the Settlors combined estate and provide continuity of management of the estate, both during the Settlors lifetimes and upon the Settlors deaths to avoid probate of the estate. During the lives of the Settlors, all Trust benefits shall accrue to the Settlors. At the death of a Settlor, any property remaining outside of the Trust may pass to the Trust estate through provisions of the deceased Settlors Last Will and Testament (Pour-Over Will). After the death of both Settlors, all Trust benefits shall pass to their beneficiaries as provided herein.

Also on December 20, 1995, Mr. Drommerhausen and Ms. Drommerhausen executed wills which contained identical provisions stating that the assets of each estate would pour over to the trust. The pour-over provisions provide that upon decedents death: I GIVE the entire residue of my estate to the Trustee then in office under that trust as named above. I direct that the residue of my estate shall be added to, administered and distributed as part of the Trust . . . .

Mr. Drommerhausen died on January 19, 2003. Ms. Drommerhausen died on August 10, 2003. On April 28, 2004, Ms. Hutchings was appointed sole executor of the wills of Mr. Drommerhausen and Ms. Drommerhausen. On June 3, 2004, the probate court granted an ex parte application suspending Daniels powers and enjoining him from taking further actions with respect to the trust property. Ms. Hutchings was appointed sole interim trustee of the trust.

On December 1, 2004, Ms. Hutchings, in her capacity of executor and trustee, filed three section 850 petitions to determine right title and ownership of property: In the Matter of the Drommerhausen Family Trust, u/d/t dated December 20, 1995, case No. BP086023; In the Matter of the Estate of Daniel G. Drommerhausen II, deceased, case No. BP083463; and In the Matter of the Estate of Marjorie Moraw Drommerhausen, deceased, case No. BP083462. The petitions alleged that disputes had arisen between Ms. Hutchings and Daniel concerning the ownership of certain real properties and bank and brokerage accounts. The petitions alleged that when there is real or personal property held in the name of Daniel G. Drommerhausen without a Roman numeral II or III, Daniel contended that he owned the property despite evidence to the contrary. The petitions further alleged that title to certain properties were held in Daniels name but were actually owned by either Mr. Drommerhausen and/or Ms. Drommerhausen and, therefore, belonged to their estates.

On January 20, 2005, Ms. Hutchings was appointed sole successor trustee pursuant to the parties stipulation. The parties also stipulated that the matter would be submitted to Retired Judge Chernow for trial by reference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 638. The probate court entered judgment following the referees recommendations as to the ownership of the disputed properties.

As previously noted, trial of the three separate petitions took place before Retired Judge Chernow over a nine-day period. At the trial, Ms. Hutchingss theory was that Mr. Drommerhausen had executed numerous real estate sham transactions over the years. This included transferring title by grant and trust deeds and foreclosure sales while maintaining control and beneficial ownership of the properties. The theory was that Mr. Drommerhausen did this in order to avoid paying taxes and to mislead creditors. Daniel contended: he is the owner of properties expressly titled Daniel G. Drommerhausen III; he is the owner of properties titled Daniel G. Drommerhausen with no Roman numeral; and he owns some real properties based on the parents promises to convey the properties to him upon their deaths for his decades of service to the family real estate business in reliance on the promises. Daniel further claimed he is the owner of 11 bank accounts by right of survivorship as a joint owner of the accounts.

B. The Trial

1. Overview

Several witnesses testified and numerous documents were entered into evidence. Because of the nature and number of the claims in this case, evidence related to the specific claims raised by the parties is set forth in the discussion portion of this opinion. But we shall set forth the main characters testimonies at this point for purposes of clarity.

2. Daniels Testimony

Ms. Hutchings called Daniel to testify under Evidence Code section 776. Daniel testified that he worked for his parents real estate business for about 25 years. He was paid about $4,000 a month with occasional bonuses. At times, his parents would tell him to keep the rents that he had collected. His parents paid for his health insurance about the mid-1990s after Daniel was divorced.

Daniel testified that Mr. Drommerhausen considered Ms. Hutchingss husband, David Hutchings, to be a baboon waiting to get control of the parents properties after they died. Ms. Drommerhausen was obsessed with making sure that Mr. Hutchings never got any of the estate property. The parents, however, wanted the property to be divided equally. Daniel also testified that it was his intention at the time of his parents deaths to claim properties outside the trust in order to share with Ms. Hutchings. According to Daniel, their father intended that the properties be held as a total unit for the benefit of everyone. However, things changed when Daniel and Ms. Hutchings became involved in litigation. The litigation was precipitated in part because Ms. Hutchings wanted to claim properties for the estates and to pay taxes. Daniel testified at his deposition that his parents did not file any income tax returns for about 10 years. Daniel wanted Ms. Hutchings to help with the family business. However, he never heard his parents ask her to give up a successful career to move to Los Angeles from Northern California.

Daniel prepared his 1996 marital settlement agreement on instructions from his ex‑wifes attorney and under duress. Daniel did not include properties he was now claiming in his 1996 marital settlement agreement. Daniels explanation was that the marital settlement agreement was signed by him under duress. Also, the marital settlement agreement was prepared by the attorney for Daniels former spouse. But at Daniels deposition, no mention was made of the ex-wifes attorneys advice to omit the 50 properties from the marital settlement agreement. Daniel did not remember that at his deposition he had not mentioned that his ex-wifes attorney advised him not to include the information about the 50 properties he was claiming. Daniel also testified that he signed the 1996 marital settlement agreement in haste. In the 1996 marital settlement agreement, he listed: the VIN numbers for his motorcycles; promissory notes of which he was the beneficiary; bonds by their numbers; and all his firearms with their serial numbers. However, he did not identify or list any of the disputed properties.

After Mr. Drommerhausen died in 2003, Daniel discovered a note dated November 15, 1992. On November 15, 1992, Mr. Drommerhausen wrote a note to Daniel explaining how to avoid paying estate taxes on the real properties by claiming properties held without a Roman numeral III. The handwritten note which was introduced at trial as exhibit 9-3 provides in part: Dan, on properties vested in Daniel G. Drommerhausen you can sign a deed as follows. Daniel G. Drommerhausen III, a married man who acquired title as Daniel G. Drommerhausen. Ann may be asked to sign a Quitclaim Deed releasing her community property interest if so acquired by title [company]. It may also work for properties held as Daniel G. Drommerhausen, a married man. Try it. Thanks Dad. This note was prepared three years before the December 20, 1995 trust was formed.

3. ADCO Investment Co.

ADCO Investment Co. (ADCO) was a fictitious business name for Daniel and Mr. Drommerhausen. Mr. Drommerhausen used the name in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1998, Mr. Drommerhausen renewed the business name. Mr. Drommerhausen agreed to allow Daniel to have all of ADCOs assets and liabilities. Daniel testified that he was active or involved with ADCO prior to 1998. Daniel admitted that there were checks on a Bank of America account in the name ADCO between 1998 and August 1999 which contained the signature of Mr. Drommerhausen. Also, there were checks in the account Ms. Drommerhausen had signed using her husbands name. Further, there were checks signed by Ms. Drommenhausen in Daniels name. Daniel claimed ownership of two properties based on ADCOs title to property located at 1122 Westmont and 8135 Christian Avenue, San Pedro. Daniel sold the 8135 Christian Avenue property for $250,000 after his parents died and kept the proceeds.

4. Ms. Hutchingss Testimony

Ms. Hutchings testified that her parents supported her move to Northern California. When she decided to join the family business between jobs, Mr. Drommerhausen told her that she should live her own life. After her son was born, Ms. Hutchings asked Mr. Drommerhausen if he was disappointed that she had not returned to Los Angeles to work in the family business affairs. Mr. Drommerhausen admitted he was disappointed Ms. Hutchings did not participate more actively in the family business affairs. But then in reference to Ms. Hutchings son, Douglas, Mr. Drommerhausen said, Well, yeah, but then there wouldnt have been Douglas.

According to Ms. Hutchings, Daniel would complain that she made more money than him working as a sales representative for Apple Computer. Mr. Drommerhausen would then explain Daniel was making money as a property manager and not paying taxes on that income. Ms. Hutchings parents never told Daniel that they would give him the lions share of their estates. They never told him that he would get more than Ms. Hutchings from the estates. Ms. Hutchings testified that her parents treated them equally in: stock purchases; college educations; honeymoons; annual $10,000 Christmas checks; and home purchases.

Ms. Drommerhausen did not like Ms. Hutchingss husband. There was an incident over the $10,000 Christmas check one year where Ms. Hutchings handed the check to Mr. Hutchings. However, Ms. Drommerhausen never said that Ms. Hutchings would receive less from the estates because of the marriage to Mr. Hutchings. Ms. Hutchings testified that Mr. Drommerhausen and Mr. Hutchings got along very well.

In the mid-1990s, Mr. and Ms. Drommerhausen and Daniel and Ms. Hutchings had a conversation about the estate at the family home. Mr. Drommerhausen told them that everything would be equally divided and Daniel and Ms. Hutchings would be co-executors. Mr. and Ms. Drommerhausen did not distinguish between what was in or outside of the trust. Mr. and Ms. Drommerhausen did not say the lions share of the estate would go to Daniel. Ms. Hutchings subsequently asked Mr. Drommerhausen what she would do with all the property. Mr. Drommerhausen responded, Well, half of it is yours and you can do with it what you want. Ms. Hutchings never heard her parents say that they wanted to give Daniel more to compensate him as a reward for his work in the real estate business. Although Daniel was present during conversations where their parents indicated that the estates would be shared equally, he never objected. Daniel never said that their parents had promised him more than Ms. Hutchings. Ms. Hutchings signed a resignation of trustee document because Daniel told her it would facilitate the sale of the Napa Street and Hillsdale properties. Daniel did not tell her that he would keep the proceeds from the sales.

In November 1993, Ms. Hutchings tried to obtain information for the estate taxes. Daniel had a three-ring binder but would only orally give her information, which she had to write down. Shortly thereafter, Daniel sent her a copy of the handwritten November 15, 1992 note from Mr. Drommerhausen. Ms. Hutchings admitted on cross-examination that Daniel often asked her to come to Los Angeles to help him run the business. But Ms. Hutchings admitted she did not help Daniel.

After their parents died, Daniel told Ms. Hutchings that he was closing some accounts for consolidation and to clean up what he characterized as Mr. Drommerhausens mess. The two talked about what a mess the business was and how it needed to be cleaned up. Daniel did not tell her that the accounts belonged to him. Daniel blamed the mess on Mr. Drommerhausens mismanagement. Daniel never told Ms. Hutchings that his parents promised he would get all the property outside of the trust. Ms. Hutchings acknowledged Ms. Drommerhausens feelings about Mr. Hutchings. But, according to Ms. Hutchings, her parents always treated their children equally.

5. Third Party Testimony

a. Ann Brooks

Ann Brooks testified that she was married to Daniel from April 1, 1988 to September 6, 1996. She and Daniel filed joint tax returns. Daniel never reported income he received from his parents on the joint tax return. She had an attorney representing her during the divorce but Daniel did not. She confirmed that she wanted the divorce to go quickly because she wanted to remarry. She remarried two days after the divorce was final.

b. Theodore Byrne

Theodore Byrne testified that he is an attorney, a certified public accountant, and a licensed real estate broker. Mr. Byrne represented Mr. Drommerhausen. According to Mr. Byrne, he once did an Internet search. Mr. Byrne discovered two pages of documents containing the name Daniel G. Drommerhausen as owner of real property. Some of the names were held in trust and others were just under the name Daniel G. Drommerhausen. Mr. Byrne subsequently asked Mr. Drommerhausen to explain why the some properties were held in trust and others were not. Mr. Drommerhausen, in front of Ms. Drommerhausen, explained that he had placed some properties in a trust and those were for his children. The other ones were for Daniel. Mr. Byrne testified that Mr. Drommerhausen said the properties were to belong to Daniel. Mr. Drommerhausen explained Daniel did the dirty work such as changing sinks, repairing properties, and handling unlawful detainer actions. Mr. Drommerhausen never said there was a plan to avoid estate taxes by having Daniel claim properties with no Roman numerals after his surname. Mr. Byrne never heard Mr. Drommerhausen express an expectation that Daniel would take care of [Ms. Hutchings] after claiming the properties to avoid estate taxes.

Mr. Byrne initially believed that ADCO belonged to Mr. Drommerhausen. However, Mr. Drommerhausen would describe ADCO as Dans meaning Daniel. Thus, Mr. Byrne came to believe that ADCO belonged to Daniel. Mr. Byrne represented ADCO in a lawsuit about the time of Mr. Drommerhausens death. But Mr. Byrne testified he honestly wasnt sure of the exact nature of ADCO be it a sole proprietorship or otherwise. Mr. Byrne testified that, even though he represented ADCO in the lawsuit, It really was not made clear exactly who was what. Mr. Byrne testified: I kind of presumed based upon the evidence and discussions that ADCO was originally [Mr. Drommerhausen]. It developed as far as my opinion and my thought process were concerned that it was then Dan, his sons, ADCO Investment. Mr. Drommerhausen never told Mr. Byrne that ADCO belonged to Daniel. But Mr. Byrnes perception was that such was the case based on very regular conversations. After Mr. Drommerhausen died, Mr. Byrne dealt with Daniel. Mr. Byrne did not consider Daniel to be a client.

Mr. Byrne was retained by Ms. Drommerhausen to represent the trust in a La Jolla lawsuit. Ms. Hutchings discharged Mr. Byrne as counsel for the trust. Mr. Byrne referred Daniel to another lawyer. Mr. Byrne stated that Mr. Drommerhausen was very knowledgeable about real estate.

Mr. Byrne testified that Mr. Drommerhausen wanted the properties to stay as part of the family. The parents would mention that Ms. Hutchings had her own life going and that Daniel sacrificed his life to help with the family business interests. Mr. Byrne presumed that the properties were a reward for Daniels dedication to the family.

c. John Hum

While testifying at trial, John Hum was represented by an attorney. Mr. Hums lawyer was hired by Daniel. Mr. Hum never heard Mr. Drommerhausen make any promises to Daniel about properties outside the trust. Mr. Hum has been good friends with Daniel for 40 years. They had consummated some business transactions. Mr. Drommerhausen assisted Mr. Hum on a foreclosure once but that was the extent of their business association. Testimony from Daniels deposition was read into the record. Mr. Hum knew about Mr. Drommerhausens intention to leave property outside the trust to Daniel. (Daniel testified that Mr. Drommerhausen helped Mr. Hum extensively with real estate matters.)

d. Diane Taylor

Diane Taylor testified that she is the branch manager for the Ladera Heights Wells Fargo Bank. Ms. Taylor was the private and personal banker for Mr. Drommerhausen and Ms. Drommerhausen since about the latter part of 1998. Mr. Drommerhausen opened an account in the name of ADCO at Ms. Taylors office. Initially, Mr. Drommerhausen was the only one who had signature authority on the account but Ms. Drommerhausen was later added as a signatory. The ADCO account was closed by Ms. Drommerhausen after Mr. Drommerhausen died. Ms. Drommerhausen instructed Ms. Taylor to open an account in Daniels name because he had taken over the ADCO portion of the business. In 2001 or 2002, Mr. Drommerhausen told Ms. Taylor that Daniel would be taking over the business. This was because Mr. Drommerhausens eyesight had deteriorated. After Ms. Drommerhausen died, Daniel came into the bank with Ms. Hutchings. Daniel placed Ms. Hutchingss name on the ADCO account.

Ms. Taylor knew that Ms. Drommerhausen did not like Ms. Hutchingss husband. Ms. Drommerhausen did not want her assets to go to Mr. Hutchings. Ms. Drommerhausen wanted the assets to stay in the family line and ultimately pass to Ms. Hutchingss son. Ms. Drommerhausen wanted to change the trust instrument so that the money stayed in the family. Daniel brought the trust instrument to the bank where another employee copied it and had it sent to the trust department for review. Ms. Taylor did not remember any conversation with Ms. Drommerhausen about changing the will and trust to leave more assets to Daniel than to Ms. Hutchings. Neither Mr. Drommerhausen nor Ms. Drommerhausen ever gave Ms. Taylor any indication that one of them deserved more than the other.

e. Steve Taylor

Mr. Taylor testified that on more than one occasion Mr. Drommerhausen expressed the wish that Ms. Hutchings would come to Los Angeles and become more involved in the family business affairs. Mr. Taylor had a 30-year business and social relationship with Mr. Drommerhausen. In Mr. Taylors opinion the father and son were always a whole together. Mr. Taylor worked with the father and son from approximately 1984 to 2003 on real estate deals. Mr. Taylor dealt with various Drommerhausen businesses including Hermosa Funding and ADCO. Mr. Taylor understood the businesses were owned by Mr. Drommerhausen and Daniel being the son. According to Mr. Taylor, Mr. Drommerhausen described ADCO as follows, He said it was both his and his sons company.

Mr. Drommerhausen wanted a substantial portion of the real estate holdings to go to Daniel. But there were some properties Mr. Drommerhausen wanted placed in the trust to be divided between Ms. Hutchings and Daniel. According to Mr. Taylor, Daniel earned them and had worked for them. This included the businesses. Mr. Drommerhausen and Ms. Drommerhausen indicated that they wanted the jewelry to go to Ms. Hutchings. They told Mr. Taylor that it was jewelry valued at about $1 million. On her deathbed, Ms. Drommerhausen told Mr. Taylor that she did not want Mr. Hutchings to get anything. Mr. Taylor appeared at the trial represented by a lawyer that Daniel had hired.

f. Tina Taylor^[3]

Tina is Mr. Taylors wife. Tina knew Mr. and Ms. Drommerhausen for about 22 years. Ms. Drommerhausen said that there was a trust for their two children to share equally. There was jewelry that Ms. Drommerhausen wanted to go to Ms. Hutchings. Ms. Drommerhausen said that whatever property Mr. Drommerhausen and Daniel were working on in the business was to go to Daniel. ADCO was Mr. Drommerhausens and Daniels business. It was to belong to Daniel when Ms. Drommerhausen died.

g. Tracey Hum

Tracey Hum was a friend of Ms. Drommerhausens since 1978. They saw each other about 10 times a year until Ms. Drommerhausen became ill. Ms. Drommerhausen and Daniel were very different from each other. Ms. Drommerhausen told Ms. Hum that Daniel did not like being around his mother because they did not have anything in common and he was rude. Daniel rarely talked to Ms. Drommerhausen. Ms. Drommerhausen never told Ms. Hum that she was going to give more of her estate to either of her two children.

h. Laura Davalos

Laura Davalos testified that she assisted in the preparation of the trust instrument. Ms. Davalos was neither an attorney nor an expert in estate planning. Ms. Davalos was surprised that there was property outside of the trust. Ms. Davalos worked as an independent agent for the company that prepared the documents.

C. The Referees Report and Recommendations

The referee found that credibility was a central issue. The referee found that Daniels testimony lacked any indicia of reliability and trustworthiness. The report explained: Unfortunately for [Daniel], the Referee is unable to give weight to [Daniels] self-serving testimony. [Daniel] has provided a verified response to the petitions herein and verified responses to discovery and testimony under oath in which he provides shifting claims. In some cases he asserted under oath that he was the person who originally acquired certain property when such a claim was highly dubious. In other circumstances he claimed not only that he made loans of tens of thousands of dollars at a time when he was 30 years of age or younger, but that he could not recall the circumstances of the transactions. With regard to one property, he testified that deeds of trust of which he was beneficiary, aggregating $100,000 or more, represented valid and bona fide loans made by him while he was a young man, but he could give no explanation and had no memory of how he came to be in a position to make such loans while he was a young man without professional training or employment. The tax returns produced by [Daniel] reflect his reporting of capital losses on property transactions where he was not the owner and in which he claimed a tax basis of his own creation. He admitted that his tax returns failed to include the salary paid to him by his parents. The referee awarded 38 real properties and 11 accounts to Ms. Hutchings.

D. The Probate Courts Orders

On March 6, 2006, the probate court entered orders adopting the referees report and recommendation in all three probate cases. Notice of entry of judgments were served on March 14, 2006. On March 29, 2006, Daniel filed a notice of intention to move for a new trial and to vacate judgment in all three cases. The probate court denied these motions on May 12, 2006. On May 15, 2006, Daniel appealed the probate courts March 6 and May 12, 2006 orders.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Overview

Daniel raises a number of challenges to the probate courts order including: improper allocations of burdens of proof; failure to apply correct presumptions of ownership of property; and failure to enforce promises to convey property to Daniel. Daniel claims: the referee improperly allocated the burden of proof as to ownership of the specific items of real and personal property to Daniel rather than to Ms. Hutchings; the referee erroneously concluded that Mr. Drommerhausens estate was entitled to reclaim property which he allegedly schemed to defraud creditors and to avoid taxes; the referee failed to apply the presumptions of ownership in favor of Daniel; the parents repeated promises to convey properties to Daniel is enforceable under principles of equitable estoppel; Daniel did not wrongfully withhold proceeds of property sales; Daniel is entitled to properties in the name of ADCO a partnership formed with Mr. Drommerhausen; Daniel is entitled to bank accounts by right of survivorship; and the referee erred in awarding prejudgment interest against Daniel.

B. Jurisdiction to Determine Title

Daniel claims that the referee lacked power to adjudicate title to a number of the properties because third parties were involved in the transactions. Generally, a probate court lacks power to decide a dispute between the estate and a third party who is not an heir or a person named in a testamentary instrument. (Estate of Baglione (1966) 65 Cal.2d 192, 196-197; Philbrick v. Huff (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 633, 650; Estate of Pieper (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 670, 681.) However, the probate court may properly resolve a dispute concerning title between the representative and heirs of the estate as between each other. (Philbrick v. Huff, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 650; Estate of Pieper, supra, 224 Cal.App.2d at p. 681.) There was nothing improper in resolving the title dispute between Ms. Hutchings, as the representative of the estates and the trust, and the beneficiaries, which in this case are Daniel and her. Further, the referee did not attempt to resolve ownership interests of third parties. For example, as to the property located at Victoria Avenue, the referee found that the parcel belonged to the estate. However, the referee also noted that there had been an assignment of a trust deed from Daniel to a Hugh Finkle in August 2003. The referee made no finding as to Mr. Finkles interest.

C. Burden of Proof

Daniel contends the referee imposed the burden of proof on him rather than on Ms. Hutchings. The petitions were brought by Ms. Hutchings pursuant to section 850 to determine ownership of real property and bank accounts. Ms. Hutchings sought orders pursuant to section 856 that the properties be transferred, conveyed, or determined as trust property. As the petitioner, Ms. Hutchings had the burden of proving the truth of her petitions. (Evid. Code,  500; Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1747.) Nevertheless, as Daniels response to the petitions illustrate, he also claimed ownership of property based on several different theories. For example, Daniel had the burden of proving that Ms. Hutchings is estopped to deny the promises of their parents to convey or give him property was subject to proof at trial. (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 641[party relying on equitable estoppel as a defense has the burden of proof]; Ringler Associates, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1190-1191, fn. 14 [same]; McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 [same], superceded by statute on a different point in Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 637, fn. 8.) Likewise, Daniel had the burden of proving the claim that property held without a Roman numeral after the surname belonged to him. (Chapman v. Tyson (Wash. 1905) 81 P. 1066, 1068 [when title fails to distinguish between father and son with the same name, the presumption is that the property belongs to the father in the absence of proof to the contrary]; In re Estate of Foster (N.Y. 1940) 19 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 [citing Chapman rule].) As the well-reasoned and extended referees report and recommendations establish, the burdens of proofs were shifting throughout the trial due to the nature of the claims raised by the parties.

Furthermore, despite to Daniels arguments to the contrary, Ms. Hutchings produced evidence during the trial. No doubt, much of the evidence produced and relied upon by the parties was Daniels own testimony. But Ms. Hutchings was entitled to rely on his testimony in proving her case. (Williams v. Barnett (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 607, 612; Long v. Standard Oil Co. (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 455, 462.) We have examined the record and are satisfied that the referee did not somehow misallocate the burdens of production or proof in any way much less in a prejudicial manner as to Daniel.

D. The Evidentiary Presumptions

1. The Law

Daniel further argues the referee failed to apply the evidentiary presumptions that should have been afforded to the title documents. It should be noted that in making this sweeping contention and in the face of the overwhelming evidence presented during the trial, Daniel is really asserting that he is entitled to conclusive presumptions as to title. Evidence Code section 601 provides: A presumption is either conclusive or rebuttable. Every rebuttable presumption is either (a) a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence or (b) a presumption affecting the burden of proof. Evidence Code section 620 states, The presumptions established by this article, and all other presumptions declared by law to be conclusive, are conclusive presumptions. A conclusive presumption is a rule of substantive law, rather than an evidentiary rule. (People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 184-185; Kusior v. Silver (1960) 54 Cal.2d 603, 619; People v. Burroughs (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1405; Estate of Gill (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 496, 501; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Burden of Proof and Presumptions,  160, p. 301.) Evidence may not be received to contradict a conclusive presumption. (People v. McCall, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 185; Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1250, fn. 17; Homestead Savings v. Darmiento (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 424, 432, fn. 6; Gayton v. Pacific Fruit Express Co. (1932) 127 Cal.App. 50, 61.) However, as shown below, the issues in this case were based on rebuttable rather than conclusive presumptions.

Rebuttable presumptions are evidence and as such can be weighed by the trier of fact. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 611-612; Laird v. T. W. Mather, Inc. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 210, 221; Weil v. Weil (1951) 37 Cal.2d 770, 788.) A disputable presumption may be rebutted by evidentiary facts. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the proffered evidence outweighs the presumption. (In re Marriage of Mix, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 611-612; Weil v. Weil, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 788; Olson v. Olson (1935) 4 Cal.2d 434, 437; In re Marriage of Freedman (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 65, 72-73; McDonald v. Hewlett (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 680, 688.) The finding a rebuttable presumption has been overcome will not be reversed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Mix, supra, 14 Cal.3d 604, 611-612; Weil v. Weil, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 788; In re Marriage of Friedman, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 72-73.)

2. Evidence Code section 662

Daniel argues he was denied the presumption, as the legal owner of certain parcels, that he is the owner of a full beneficial title under Evidence Code section 662 which provides: The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof. However, this presumption and its clear and convincing standard of proof, do not apply in all quiet title actions. Rather, the presumption, with its heightened standard of proof, only applies when legal title is undisputed and the parties are only seeking to resolve beneficial interests. (Murray v. Murray (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066-1067; see Toney v. Nolder (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 791, 793.) In this case, the very issue raised by the parties is whether Daniel has legal title to the properties Ms. Hutchings asserted belonged to either the estates or the trust. Thus, Daniel was not entitled to the presumption that he has the full beneficial interest.

3. Evidence Code section 622

Evidence Code section 622 provides, The facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest; but this rule does not apply to the recital of a consideration. The recital of consideration is not conclusive. (Civ. Code,  1614^[4]; Treat v. Treat (1915) 170 Cal. 329, 336; Kott v. Hilton (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 548, 552; accord Bertelsen v. Bertelsen (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 479, 483.) However, the party challenging the validity of the instrument has the burden of proof as to its invalidity, which may be established through extrinsic evidence establishing the absence of consideration. (Civ. Code,  1615^[5]; Treat v. Treat, supra, 170 Cal. at p. 336 ; Estate of Hobart (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 502, 508-509; Banducci v. Banducci (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 600, 604.) As the court explained in Kott v. Hilton, supra, 45 Cal.App.2d at page 552: If the presumption is wholly irreconcilable with the facts and surrounding circumstances, it has been overcome. The burden of showing lack of consideration rests upon the party seeking to avoid or invalidate the instrument. [Citation.] This may be accomplished through direct evidence or upon one or more circumstances. If the evidence is cumulatively strong enough to overcome the disputable presumption, a trial court is justified in reaching a conclusion contrary to the recital. (Accord, Bertelsen v. Bertelsen, supra, 49 Cal.App.2d at p. 483.) It is for the trier of fact to determine an absence of consideration for all the challenged transactions under all the circumstances. (Kott v. Hilton, supra, 45 Cal.App.2d at p. 553; Estate of Baxter (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 493, 501-502.) The factfinders determination that any particular transaction is sham and fictitious for want of lack of consideration which is substantiated by the record is not subject to reversal on appeal. (Ibid; see also Banducci v. Banducci, supra, 63 Cal.App.2d at p. 605.)

Here, the parties disputed whether Daniel owned a number of properties due to the nature of the transactions. Ms. Hutchingss theory was that these transactions were sham or fictitious based on the following evidence: Daniel had made substantial loans on properties at a time when he would have had little or no assets; deeds showed Daniel received properties for as little as $100; Daniel did not list properties he claimed ownership of in his 1996 marital settlement agreement; Daniel could not recall the details of the transactions; and Ms. Hutchings testified that she did not remember acquiring property for which deeds were placed in her name. The referee found more credible the evidence supporting Ms. Hutchingss contention that Daniel did not actually acquire any interests. Rather, Daniel acquired title under circumstances showing that the transactions were merely shams. (Simmons v. California Institute of Technology (1949) 34 Cal.2d 264, 271-272; Kott v. Hilton, supra, 45 Cal.App.2d at pp. 551-552, 554.)

For similar reasons, we reject Daniels argument that the parol evidence rule barred the referee from considering extrinsic evidence that certain deeds and other instruments were sham documents. The primary issue in this case was whether the deeds were sham instruments intended by the parties to: deceive creditors; avoid paying taxes; or not intended to be binding or effective between the parties. The parol evidence rule bars consideration of extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of an integrated written instrument. (Code Civ. Proc., 1856; Civ.Code,  1625; Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 343; Alling v. Universal Mfg. Corp. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1433.) However, the parol evidence rule does not prohibit the consideration of extrinsic evidence which is offered to show that a written instrument is merely a sham document. (P.A. Smith Co. v. Muller (1927) 201 Cal.219, 222; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 401.) The parol evidence rule did not preclude the referee from considering extrinsic evidence to show that the signatories on the deeds did not intend them to be binding and intended them only as shams. In other words, such evidence is admissible to show that the written instruments were shams and never intended to have any legal effect. (P.A. Smith Co. v. Muller,supra, 201 Cal. at p. 222; accord, Parker v. Meneley (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 391, 401-402; see also Yarus v. Yarus (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 203.)

4. Evidence Code sections 600 and 638

Daniel also contends he was denied presumptions and inferences that he was the owner of property because he exercised control over the property pursuant to Evidence Code sections 600 and 638 respectively. Evidence Code section 638 provides, A person who exercises acts of ownership over property is presumed to be the owner of it. The presumption of ownership unless there is other evidence must prevail in the absence of any other evidence of title. (Kunza v. Gaskell (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 201, 208, citing People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Shasta Pipe, etc., Co. (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 520, 534, overruled on a different point in Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme (1971) 4 Cal.3d 478, 495.) This presumption is subject to rebuttal by production of contrary evidence. (Adler v. Blair (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 92, 95; People v. J.P. Loubet Co. (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 566, 568.) Daniels claims of title even with acts of ownership were subject to rebuttal by contrary evidence.

Likewise, Daniel was not entitled to an inference of ownership under the circumstances of this case based on Evidence Code section 600, subdivision (b) which states, An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. Our Supreme Court explained this statute as follows: Like a presumption, an inference is not itself evidence; it is the result of reasoning from evidence. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 333 (1965 Reg. Sess.) [enacting Evid. Code] reprinted at 29B pt. 2, Wests Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foll.  600, p. 4.) (People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 183.) The presumptions in Evidence Code section 600 are rebuttable. (People v. McCall, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 183.) Accordingly, as the factfinder, the referee was entitled to draw his own inferences from the evidence presented by the parties.

5. Civil Code sections 1069, 1107, and 1217

Daniel claims that, in evaluating the validity of trust deeds, the referee failed to apply proper legal standards contained in Civil Code sections 1069, 1107, and 1217. Civil Code section 1069 states in part, A grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantee . . . . Civil Code section 1107 provides: Every grant of an estate in real property is conclusive against the grantor, also against everyone subsequently claiming under him, except a purchaser or incumbrancer who in good faith and for a valuable consideration acquires a title or lien by an instrument that is first duly recorded. Civil Code section 1217 states, An unrecorded instrument is valid as between the parties thereto and those who have notice thereof. No doubt, recordation is not a prerequisite to the validity of a deed where third party rights are not at issue. (Devereaux v. Frazier Mountain Park & Fisheries Co. (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 323, 328; Pomper v. Behnke (1929) 97 Cal.App. 628, 638; 54 Cal.Jur.3d pt. 2 (1998) Real EstateSelected Topics,  635.) Recordation was not the issue in this case. Rather, the issue was whether the deeds were valid or meant to be sham transactions.

As will be explained later in greater detail, there is substantial evidence Mr. Drommerhausen had perfected the art of obfuscating title on his numerous real estate holdings with the object of either avoiding taxes or creditor claims. There was overwhelming evidence of numerous transactions wherein Mr. Drommerhausen contemporaneously executed deeds, notes, and encumbrances on the properties that were not bona fide transactions. Mr. Drommerhausen routinely engaged in the practice of creating purported obligations or ownership interests in Daniel and others which were mere shams.

Daniel worked for over 25 years in the family real estate business. Daniel was very aware of Mr. Drommerhausens practices and ultimately engaged in the same activities. The referees report indicates: It is also clear from the 1992 writing that [Mr. Drommerhausen] planned that after his passing [Daniel] could act as the record holder of title to many of the properties, without the burden of probate proceedings or estate, inheritance or transfer taxes or property reassessment. The record also shows that [Mr. Drommerhausen] had a strong aversion to paying taxes. No income tax returns were filed by the senior Drommerhausens for approximately ten years prior to their deaths. [Mr. Drommerhausen] held some deeds unrecorded for decades, apparently to avoid taxes. Notwithstanding Daniels contentions, to the extent that the transactions were sham, he has no ownership interests in the properties. (See Lee v. Joseph (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 30, 34.)

Moreover, we disagree with Daniel that the evidence fails to establish that he lacked knowledge of the schemes or did not participate in them. As will be noted, it is abundantly clear that Daniel is not an innocent bona fide purchaser of interests in the contested properties. (See Evans v. Gibson (1934) 220 Cal. 476, 482 [court may properly consider unfavorable evidence against person claiming innocence in real property fraudulent transaction scheme where evidence discloses that the exchange with plaintiff was not an entirely separate and distinct transaction, but one of a series of successive transactions closely following each other in time and part of a comprehensive plan for mulcting innocent persons].) In addition, the fact that Daniel is claiming property from transactions occurring with little or no consideration shows that the referee properly scrutinized those matters to determine whether the conveyances between the father and son were bona fide and not mere shams. (Evans v. Sparks (1915) 170 Cal. 532, 534 [court acts properly in scrutinizing conveyance between father and son which was purportedly made with no consideration and with intent to defeat creditors]; Gray v. Galpin (1893) 98 Cal. 633, 635 [whether a family member was connected to bad faith of fraudulent purpose in a fraudulent or sham real estate transaction is factual and reviewed for substantial evidence].)

E. Evidence of the 1996 Marital Settlement Agreement

Daniel argues that the referee erred in considering evidence of his 1996 marital settlement agreement. Daniel reasons: the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the document was drafted in haste; the marital settlement agreement was drafted by his former spouses attorney; he was not represented by counsel during the divorce; and the 1996 marital settlement agreement is irrelevant because it was not used to divide the couples property. This issue is forfeited because Daniel has not established that he objected to consideration of the 1996 marital settlement agreement. (Evid. Code  353; Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069; OHearn v. Hillcrest Gym & Fitness Center, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 491, 500.) We review relevance issues for an abuse of discretion. (In re Freeman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 630, 649; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 474.) Part of Daniels defense was that he had exercised control and ownership over certain real properties, businesses, and accounts. His failure to list the properties in the dissolution action was relevant as to his ownership claims. Also, the absence of the properties in the marital settlement agreement was relevant to the issue whether Daniels testimony concerning ownership was believable.

F. Admissibility Of Tinas Mothers Testimony

Daniel argues the referee improperly excluded the proposed testimony of Miriam Rose Taylor, Tinas mother. The proposed testimony was that on an occasion, Ms. Drommerhausen attended a lunch with the Taylors. During the lunch, Ms. Drommerhausen indicated that she intended to leave all the real estate to Daniel. The referee had broad discretion to exclude the testimony as cumulative given that several witnesses had testified the parents said they intended to leave real estate to Daniel. (Evid. Code  352; People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 529; People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1140.) Daniel has not established that the referee abused his discretion by acting in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124; Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1685.)

G. The Sufficiency Of The Evidence

1. Overview

At the trial, Ms. Hutchingss theory was that Mr. Drommerhausen had perpetrated numerous real estate sham transactions over the years. This included transferring title by grant and trust deeds and foreclosure sales while maintaining control and beneficial ownership of the properties. Ms. Hutchings argued Mr. Drommerhausen did this in order to avoid paying taxes and to avoid creditors. Daniel contends: he is the owner of properties expressly titled Daniel G. Drommerhausen III; he is the owner of properties titled Daniel G. Drommerhausen with no roman numeral; and he owns some real properties based on the parents promises to convey them to him upon their deaths for his decades of service to the family real estate business. Daniel further claims he is the owner of 11 bank accounts by right of survivorship as a joint owner of the accounts. The referee resolved the bulk of the issues in favor of Ms. Hutchings. Review of the referees finding in a section 850 action is for substantial evidence. (Estate of Cross (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 80, 83; Estate of Johnston (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 855, 861-862.)

2. Property standing in Daniel IIIs name

a. referees findings

Daniel contends he is the owner of property expressly titled Daniel G. Drommerhausen III. Daniel argues: the referee failed to apply the proper legal standards in evaluating ownership of the properties; there is insufficient evidence to overcome the presumptions of ownership in favor of Daniel; the referee erred in concluding that proceeds from property Daniel sold in 2005 which had grant deeds in his name were owned by the estates; and the referee erred in considering Daniels 1996 marital settlement agreement as controlling evidence.

The referee found: In most circumstances the fact that property stands unequivocally in the name of a person other than the decedent would be the beginning and the end of the analysis of whether the property was an asset of the estate. Here the executor contends that the pattern of transactions entered into during the lifetime of [Mr. Drommerhausen] demonstrates that [Mr. Drommerhausen] frequently placed title, or purported security interests, into the name of [Daniel] or other family members or business associates through recorded instruments that were sham and without economic substance. [Ms. Hutchings] contends the challenged documents were recorded for the purpose of misleading creditors or third parties with claims to title. []  The Referee finds in favor of [Ms. Hutchings], as executor. The Referees findings are based on the following factors: the inherent implausibility of many of the transactions, such as [Daniel] obtaining beneficial ownership of $175,000 worth of deeds of trust in a short period when [Daniel] had no apparent source of funds for such investments; the fact that interests were recorded in [Ms. Hutchingss] name without her knowledge and without economic substance; purportedly valuable interests were conveyed that recited consideration of less than $100; purportedly valuable security interests were reconveyed without any consideration; interests were placed in names of [Mr. Drommerhausens] mother-in-law, and [Daniels] then fianc, which were subsequently reconveyed to [Daniel]; the failure of [Daniel] to include on his 1996 Marital Settlement Agreement any reference to many valuable properties or security interests that he now claims were his prior to the 1996 dissolution of marriage; the fact that [Mr. Drommerhausen] appears to have maintained control over the properties, and acted as if he were the sole owner during his lifetime; [and] [Daniel] has produced no evidence that he, rather that [Mr. Drommerhausen], enjoyed the economic benefits and burdens of property ownership during [Mr. Drommerhausens] lifetime, rather [Daniel] was paid a $48,000 annual salary and bonuses for his work on the properties. []  The fair inference from the evidence, the Referee finds is, as [Ms. Hutchings] contends, that [Mr. Drommerhausen] routinely placed title or deeds of trust in the names of his family members or business associates while maintaining full control and equitable ownership in himself. []  Petitioner contends that such record interests were created to mislead creditors, including judgment creditors, or to defeat junior lien holders, or for similar purposes. Such contentions may be plausible, and indeed the evidence includes a number of judgment liens against [Mr. Drommerhausen]. Such judgment liens support Petitioners contentions. However, the motivation behind such transactions is not at issue. What is at issue in this case is whether the interests standing in the name of [Daniel], supported by all presumptions in favor of record title holders, have been shown to be mere interests of bare legal title. []  The title documents and security instruments record by [Mr. Drommerhausen] lead the Referee to concluded that [Mr. Drommerhausen] maintained control and equitable ownership of most of the disputed properties or security interests standing in the name of [Daniel]. []  From the pattern of transactions engaged in by [Mr. Drommerhausen], the Referee makes the further finding that the deeds and deeds of trust presented in this matter in support of the claims of [Daniel] that appear to have been orchestrated by [Mr. Drommerhausen] are unreliable and insufficient, by themselves, to support a finding that [Daniel] holds more than bare legal title to property or to a security interest in real property. . . .  Similarly, the Referee finds that [Daniels] sworn testimony or declaration is insufficient, in and by itself, to support such findings. []  The Referee will consider individually each property in which [Mr. Drommerhausen] acquired title or a security interest contemporaneously or prior to the recording of an interest in the name of [Daniel] to determine if some independent evidence supports [Daniels] claim of equitable as well as legal ownership.

b. 1146 East 215th Street, Carson

The property located at 1146 East 215th Street in the city of Carson was acquired pursuant to a grant deed conveyed on April 29, 1976 by Preston and Lottie Smith. The Smiths assigned their trust deed to Ms. Drommerhausens mother, Ebba Moraw. Ms. Moraw foreclosed on her son-in-laws default on November 3, 1977. Minnie Dahl took title to the property by a trustees deed upon sale on April 4, 1978. Daniel testified that he never met Ms. Dahl. Daniel testified she was an associate of Mr. Drommerhausens attorney during this time period. The trustee was Mr. Drommerhausens business associate, Charles I. Monti. The property was conveyed on October 28, 1983, by grant deed from Ms. Dahl to Daniel G. Drommerhausen III, a single man. The October 1983 deed was not recorded. The consideration for the transaction was less than $100. Daniel testified that he paid off a loan on the 1146 East 215th Street property from personal funds in 2003. Daniel did not recall the details of the property transaction with Ms. Dahl. Daniel did not identify the property in his marital settlement agreement. The referee, who found these transactions to be a striking example of [Mr. Drommerhausens] recording of untrustworthy instruments ruled that the property belonged to the estates. The referees findings are supported by substantial evidence.

c. 328 West 235th Street, Carson

In October 2004, a deed of trust was assigned to Mr. Drommerhausen for the property located at 328 West 235th Street in Carson. A year later the property was transferred by grant deed from Jack Clark Blevin dated October 15, 1975 to Daniel, a single man. A trust deed was signed by Daniel in favor of Mr. Belvin. One month later, the trust deed was assigned to Ms. Hutchings. Yet Ms. Hutchings had no knowledge of this transaction. Ms. Hutchings did not recall receiving any loan payments from Daniel for a loan on the 328 West 235th Street property. Daniel did not remember how he acquired the property. Daniel did not list the property in his 1996 marital settlement agreement. Several judgments were recorded against the property against Daniel Drommerhausen or Mr. Drommerhausens fictitious businesses. The referee found: Once again it is hard to believe that [Daniel] acquired a bona fide interest in this property at the age of 28, and did not remember it at the time of the dissolution of his marriage. Once again the record does not contain evidence that [Daniel] rather than [Mr. Drommerhausen] was treated by the Drommerhausens as the owner of this property during the lifetime of his father. The more reasonable inference is that [Mr. Drommerhausen] acquired the equity in this property in 1974 and thereafter placed interests in the names of his children as nominees to hold bare legal title. The findings are supported by substantial evidence.

d. 438 West 235th Street, Carson