Filed 4/6/17 In re A.G. CA5


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re A.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

KINGS COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMES V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F074360

(Super. Ct. No. 15JD0342)


OPINION

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kings County. Jennifer Lee Giuliani, Judge.
David Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-


James V. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to his now five-year-old daughter A.G. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Father submitted a letter in which he informs this court that with the passage of The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57), he anticipates being released from custody within six to eight months. In light of this development, he seeks reversal of the order terminating his parental rights and reinstatement of his reunification services.
We conclude father failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
In November 2015, at a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court removed then three-year-old A.G. from parental custody because of her mother’s chronic and extensive methamphetamine abuse and denied the mother reunification services. The court deemed father to be A.G.’s biological father and ordered the Kings County Human Services Agency (agency) to provide him reunification services. Just eight days before the hearing, father was released from prison. He said he had been in prison since A.G.’s birth but maintained a relationship with her through regular weekend visits and frequent telephone calls. He was willing to complete services to reunify with her.
Father actively participated in his services plan until he was arrested in February 2016 on a parole violation. He was sentenced to a prison term of four years and eight months.
In May 2016, the juvenile court conducted the six-month review hearing. By that time, A.G. was living with a maternal relative who wanted to adopt her and father had waived further reunification services. The court terminated father’s services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Neither parent sought extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s setting order.
In September 2016, father appeared in custody at the section 366.26 hearing. He addressed the court and objected to termination of his parental rights. He asked the court to “leave a door open” so that he could resume custody of A.G. when he was released from prison. The court explained that the law did not permit a delay in selecting a permanent plan under the circumstances. The court found that A.G. was likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
The sole purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is the selection of a permanent plan for the child. Reunification is not an issue before the juvenile court at that hearing. (In re Christopher M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 155, 160.) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), provides that if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely that the child will be adopted, “the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” unless one of the exceptions of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) applies.
We have reviewed the transcript for the September 8, 2016, permanency planning hearing, which reflects that father did not dispute A.G.’s adoptability. Nor did he argue that any of the statutory exceptions to adoption applies. Consequently, the pertinent record is devoid of any arguable issue that would result in reversal of the termination order. Further, on appeal, father does not claim the juvenile court erred. He merely seeks to reopen reunification, which was not an option. He has thus failed to raise any arguable issue on appeal from the order terminating parental rights pursuant to section 366.26.
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed.