Filed 8/14/17 In re Alejandro C. CA5



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re ALEJANDRO C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALEJANDRO C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F074711

(Super. Ct. No. JJD069908)


OPINION

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Hugo J. Loza, Judge.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Craig S. Meyers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Alejandro C., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order declaring him a ward of the court. Following a contested hearing on a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, appellant was found to have committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211.) Appellant contends the juvenile court erred because the evidence was insufficient to show he aided and abetted the robbery that occurred. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 26, 2016, the victim in this case, A.R., drove to a Wal-Mart store in Visalia in order to purchase a Samsung phone offered on Craig’s List, an online classified advertisement Web site. Instead, he was robbed. From the victim’s vantage point, a minor approached his car and attempted to open the door, which was locked. Shortly thereafter, another person approached with a red bandana covering his face and knocked on the passenger side window with the butt of a gun. The victim responded by unlocking his doors. The man with the gun opened the driver’s side door, took the victim’s wallet and cell phone, and struck the victim with the gun. The two individuals then fled.
Following the robbery, the police began searching for a silver vehicle that had struck a white BMW while exiting the Wal-Mart parking lot. A short time later, police detained appellant and three others near a silver car with white paint marks on one of its doors. The vehicle belonged to appellant’s father and was parked near a home. One of those detained near the car, Jose Ceja, possessed the victim’s wallet. The magazine for a nine-millimeter firearm was located in the car, along with a red bandana with two oval-shaped cuts suggesting eye holes in it, and some money. When officers searched the garage of that home, they found a loaded gun. Nicholas, one of the juveniles detained, confirmed that Ceja possessed the gun found in the garage that was used during the robbery.
Appellant was first interviewed at the location the car was found. He was completely cooperative. He admitted to driving the silver car and to striking the white BMW. He also confirmed that a gun had been used in the robbery. He claimed to be friends with Luis, one of the minors involved, but stated he did not know Nicholas or Ceja.
Appellant was later interviewed a second time. In this interview, appellant admitted to driving the others to the Wal-Mart. Appellant then engaged in the following discussion with respect to his knowledge that a robbery was going to happen:
“[OFFICER]: Okay. Le—let’s just get to this. You guys—all four of you guys are driving right?
“[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
“[OFFICER]: And, uh, you know what’s gonna go down, right?
“[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
“[OFFICER]: But you’re not—but you’re telling me, like, you know—you know what this dude’s gonna do, you’re just driving, is that right?
“[APPELLANT]: Yes.”
A bit later in the interview, while discussing how appellant knew a robbery was going to happen, the following exchange occurred:
“[OFFICER]: ... So what did he tell you on the way over there?
“[APPELLANT]: That he’s gonna get some guy, I don’t know who (inaudible) owes him money. I don’t know. I was just gonna take him there and that’s when we parked. And then my friend, the one with the—Luis. [¶] … [¶] Yeah, he was in the passenger, we stayed in the car … and they both went and I guess they did it and then we drove out. And we were driving out, my car door is messed up on the car and that’s when they hit it when I was coming out. And that’s how it got messed up and we just left from right there.”
Later appellant again summarized what happened after the robbery through the following exchange:
“[OFFICER:] And when—when they came running back, what did Nick say?
“[APPELLANT]: To just (inaudible) and that’s when I was leaving.
“[OFFICER]: What’d this guy say?
“[APPELLANT]: Nothing. He just got in the car.
“[OFFICER]: He just ran to the car and got in and why did you take off so fast, then, if they didn’t say anything?
“[APPELLANT]: No. I knew—I—I knew what was going down (inaudible).
“[OFFICER]: What did—what did—what did you think was going down?
“[APPELLANT]: ‘Cause they wanted me to, um, they had a—a gun and a bandana.
“[OFFICER]: Right.
“[APPELLANT]: And they told me they were gonna go get money from some guy. And then—
“[OFFICER]: So you figured they’re just gonna go r—you figure they’re gonna go rob some dude?
“[APPELLANT]: Right. [¶] … [¶] And then—yeah.
“[OFFICER]: But you never got out of the car?
“[APPELLANT]: Never got out of the car.
“[OFFICER]: Okay. But you stayed there, waiting for them?
“[APPELLANT]: Yeah.”
Finally, the following exchange occurred as appellant discussed the role of one of his friends in the robbery:
“[OFFICER]: What was his role in all this?
“[APPELLANT]: He was just with us.
“[OFFICER]: He was just with you?
“[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
“[OFFICER]: Did he seem, I mean, like, he—was he gonna get involved if he needed to?
“[APPELLANT]: No.
“[OFFICER]: Was he, like, just a lookout or something?
“[APPELLANT]: Not really. He was just there (inaudible) going on with them. ‘Cause he lives on my street and, uh, I know him all my life.
“[OFFICER]: So this was all—were you guys all talking about this before you even left Earlimart today? This was all planned, right? ‘Cause you're saying if Luis is with you, so you’re not alone, uh, you’re saying it was these—it was Nick and this other guy’s plan?
“[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
“[OFFICER]: It was their whole plan? And Luis knew what was up.
“[APPELLANT]: Luis (inaudible) they told me—well, um, well, they tell me when I went to go pick them up. I picked up Luis and then we just—we want to go cruise. And then that’s when I went back home. And then Nick was texting me to go to his house and that’s when I went. And then he got in the car and then—yeah, he told me to go pick up that guy from that Delano and that’s when (inaudible).
“[OFFICER]: And Nick told you what was gonna go down?
“[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
“[OFFICER]: And Luis—and you picked him up?
“[APPELLANT]: Yeah, Luis.
“[OFFICER]: Uh, aft—well, you picked Luis up first?
“[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
“[OFFICER]: So Nick’s in the car telling you what was gonna go down? And what did Luis say about it? Nothing?
“[APPELLANT]: He was just minding his business.
“[OFFICER]: He’s just along for the ride?
“[APPELLANT]: Mm-hmm.
“[OFFICER]: But he knew what was up, I mean, in case stuff was gonna go down, he’d know—so he would have to react or something, is that right?
“[APPELLANT]: Yeah.”
Following the admission of this evidence and additional argument the juvenile court concluded that “in my view, ... [appellant] clearly knew what was going on prior to arriving at the Wal-Mart, [and] that he knew the purpose for going there was to commit this robbery or this theft from the individual that was to be the buyer of this phone.” Thus, the court determined appellant was an aider and abettor in the robbery, and found the petition true.
The court subsequently declared appellant a ward of the court, ordered him to serve between 90 and 180 days in the Tulare County short term program, and placed him on probation. This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to show that he had knowledge of the planned robbery prior to the completion of the crime. In particular, appellant contends the evidence is sufficient, at most, to demonstrate he knew something bad was going to happen but not sufficient to demonstrate he had the specific intent to participate in a robbery. Accordingly, appellant argues he could only be an accessory after the fact.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s role is a limited one. ‘ “The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738–739.) “The applicable standard of review is the same as for adult criminal appeals.” (In re Amanda A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 545.)
“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211.) Thus, the elements of robbery are: (1) the taking of personal property (2) from a person or the person’s immediate presence (3) by means of force or fear, (4) with the intent permanently to deprive the person of the property. (Ibid.; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34.)
“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164 (Cooper).)
Neither presence at the scene of a crime nor failure to prevent its commission is sufficient alone to establish aiding and abetting. (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90.) “Among the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” (In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094.) “In addition, flight is one of the factors which is relevant in determining consciousness of guilt.” (Id. at p. 1095.)
For purposes of determining aiding and abetting, “the intent to facilitate or encourage [the] commission of the robbery [must be formed either] prior to or during the carrying away of the loot to a place of temporary safety.” (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1165, italics & fn. omitted.)
Sufficient Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding
Although appellant focuses heavily in his briefing on when the robbery concluded, we find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s more direct conclusion that appellant knew about and intended to participate in a robbery prior to reaching the Wal-Mart parking lot. Although appellant made several statements supporting his position that he was merely a driver, he also made several direct and unmistakable admissions concerning his knowledge of the planned robbery. Appellant stated he had been told what was going to happen prior to reaching the Wal-Mart, noted he saw the gun and bandana when picking up one of his companions, agreed that he knew his companions intended to commit a robbery, and even conceded that one of his friends, who was allegedly not involved in the crime, was aware of the group’s plans based on discussions held in the car. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable trier of fact could accept these concessions and properly infer from them that appellant knew of the robbery, acted to assist in the robbery by driving the robbers to the location of the crime, and did so intending to assist in the crime. That appellant was merely the driver in the plan does not absolve him from responsibility as an aider and abettor to the robbery.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.