In re Aliya K.
Filed 6/26/07 In re Aliya K. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re ALIYA K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIN K., Defendant and Appellant. | D050454 (Super. Ct. No. EJ2655) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Affirmed.
Erin K. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter Aliya K. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Erin challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2005, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition in the juvenile court on behalf of one-year-old Aliya under section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged Aliya had suffered and was at risk of suffering serious harm in the future. Police officers had found Aliya in the back seat of a car with Erin passed out in the front seat. The officers made several attempts to revive Erin. Erin awoke in a dazed state of mind and admitted to having little money and no place to live. The jurisdiction report indicated Aliya was found wearing a dirty diaper and suffering from a severe spider bite infection on her leg. Aliya also appeared to be sick with the flu. Social workers believed Erin suffered from a mental illness and it was recommended she participate in a psychological evaluation. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition, Aliya became a dependent of the juvenile court, and she was removed from parental custody.
During the next six months, Erin did not participate in therapy and attended only one parenting class. She believed that she did not require services. Dr. O'Meara conducted a psychological evaluation and determined Erin suffered from a depressive disorder and a personality disorder with schizoid traits. Erin required therapy to address her mental health needs and Dr. O'Meara referred her for a psychiatric assessment to determine whether medication would be suitable to address her condition. At the six-month review hearing, the court found Erin had not made substantive progress with her case plan, terminated reunification services, and set a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
The social worker observed visits between Aliya and Erin during the months before the section 366.26 hearing. The social worker believed Erin loved Aliya and made strong efforts to maintain a relationship. Aliya sometimes exhibited affection toward Erin and called her mom. The social worker further believed a bond existed between the two but that the bond did not outweigh the benefit of adoption and the relationship was not a parent-child relationship. Erin lacked the parenting skills needed to adequately parent Aliya and therefore was not capable of providing Aliya with the daily emotional and physical support she required. Erin sometimes became disruptive and angry during visits and the social worker noted Aliya had a tendency to react negatively toward Erin. At the conclusion of visits, Aliya separated easily from Erin and showed no signs of distress. Aliya had instead become attached to her new family.
The social worker assessed Aliya as adoptable based on her good health, young age, and affectionate disposition. Aliya was doing well in school and did not appear to have difficulties interacting with other adults and children. She exhibited some speech delays but she received ongoing therapy and was making significant progress. In addition, Aliya was attached to her caregivers and thriving in her current placement. The caregivers were committed to adopting Aliya and had an approved adoptive home study. There were numerous families interested in adopting a minor like Aliya in the event the caregivers were unable to adopt.
After considering the evidence, the court found that Aliya was likely to be adopted and none of the exceptions to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applied to preclude terminating parental rights. The court terminated parental rights and referred Aliya for adoption.
DISCUSSION
I
Erin contends the evidence is insufficient to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) does not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. She asserts she maintained regular visitation and contact with Aliya, who would benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship.
A
We review the judgment for substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence. (In re Casey D., (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53.) Rather, we "accept the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact." (Id. at p. 53.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947; In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
"Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of five specified exceptions. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1) (A)-(F); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides an exception to the adoption preference if termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." We have interpreted the phrase "benefit from continuing the relationship" to refer to a parent-child relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 811.)
To meet the burden of proof for this statutory exception, the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. (Ibid.; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.)
B
Visits between Erin and Aliya took place regularly but Erin did not meet her burden of showing her relationship with Aliya was sufficiently beneficial to outweigh the benefits of adoption for them. Although Erin and Aliya were affectionate with each other, Erin did not occupy a parental role in Aliya's life and lacked the necessary parenting skills to meet Aliya's daily needs. Aliya was happy to see and play with Erin and called Erin "Mama," but Aliya showed no signs of distress when visits ended. Although the social worker believed Aliya and Erin shared a bond, there was no evidence of a "significant, positive, emotional attachment" between the two such that terminating the parent-child relationship would result in great detriment to Aliya. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p.575.) The record shows Erin continued to struggle with the Agency's requests, she behaved strangely during visits, and made little effort to access services. Any possible benefit to Aliya of continuing a relationship with Erin was outweighed by the benefits of adoption. Aliya had instead developed a strong attachment to her caregivers and was happy with them.
Where, as here, the biological parent does not fulfill the parental role, "the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of parent. . . . To hold otherwise would deprive children of the protection that the Legislature seeks to provide." (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 854.) Substantial evidence supports the court's finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship did not apply to preclude terminating parental rights.
II
Erin contends the court erred by finding termination of her parental rights was in Aliya's best interests. She asserts guardianship was a better alternative than adoption because it would provide Aliya with the stability she needed while allowing her to preserve a relationship with Aliya. However, the Legislature has declared that a permanent plan other than adoption "is not in the best interests of children who cannot be returned to their parents. These children can be afforded the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by placing them in the most permanent and secure alternative that can be afforded them." (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419.) Unlike adoption, long-term foster care and guardianship are "not irrevocable and thus [fall] short of the secure and permanent placement intended by the Legislature." (Jones T. v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 240, 251.) Here, Erin could not meet Aliya's needs and Aliya deserves to have her custody status promptly resolved and her placement made permanent and secure. The court properly found that terminating Erin's parental rights and ordering a permanent plan of adoption were in Aliya's best interests.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
McINTYRE, J.
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[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
