In re Amir B.
Filed 6/21/07 In re Amir B. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re AMIR B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMIR B., Defendant and Appellant. | E040660 (Super.Ct.No. RIJ103747) O P I N I O N |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Charles J. Koosed, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, 21.)[1] Affirmed as modified.
Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Lynee McGinnis and Garrett Beaumont, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is a juvenile criminal proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Following an adjudication hearing in Los Angeles County, minor, Amir B., was found to have committed a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (e)(1). That subdivision proscribes battery on a person with whom the defendant has a dating relationship.[2]
The case was then transferred to Riverside County. A dispositional hearing was held on May 22, 2006. Minor was committed to juvenile hall for 20 days with credit for time served. He was released to his parents with probation terms and conditions.
Minor appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile courts true finding. He also contends that two probation conditions must be modified. The People find the evidence sufficient, but agree to the proposed modification of the probation terms.
I. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE JUVENILE COURTS TRUE FINDING?
Since the primary issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile courts finding that minor violated Penal Code section 243, subdivision (e)(1), we will examine the testimony at the hearing closely.
Los Angeles Police Officer Minerva Mota testified that she was flagged down by civilians on September 9, 2005. The civilians directed her attention to a couple walking down the street and told her that the man had been beating up the woman. The officer identified minor as one member of the couple. The officer was then shown a picture of a woman (exhibit No. 1) and identified her as the victim she interviewed. The officer interviewed the female victim, but she was uncooperative. However, the officer did observe bruising on the females face, arms, and back. In the officers opinion, the bruising was consistent with her being punched by someone.
A civilian witness testified that he was having breakfast at a McDonalds restaurant in September 2005, when he heard a couple arguing in the restaurant. They then left and stood outside, about 10 feet from where the witness was sitting. The witness then saw the man punch the woman twice. The witness was then shown the same picture of a woman (exhibit No. 1) and identified her as the person who was punched.
The civilian witness misidentified minors father, who was present at the hearing, as the man who hit the woman. When recalled to the stand, the witness testified that he subsequently saw the police approach the couple that had been arguing in the restaurant. He also testified that his distance vision was not good and that he required glasses for distance vision. He was unable to further explain the misidentification.
However, minor testified that he had been at the McDonalds restaurant on September 9, 2005, with his girlfriend. He also testified that they began arguing outside the restaurant, but he denied any physical contact. As they were walking away, the police stopped them.
Another witness testified for the defense that the female victim had bruises on her face two or three days before the incident at McDonalds.
The issue raised by minor is whether the foregoing evidence is sufficient to support a finding that minor battered his girlfriend.
The People cite the appropriate general principles: In Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 . . . , the United States Supreme Court held, with regard to the standard on review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, that [t]he critical inquiry . . . [is] . . . whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [T]his inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. An identical standard applies under the California Constitution. [Citation.] In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier [of fact] could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] (People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460.)
Minor emphasizes that the only eyewitness could not identify him at trial and, in fact, misidentified minors father. He also notes that the witness admitted having problems with his eyesight and his memory. The infirmities of a witness obviously affect his or her credibility. But, if the trier of fact believes the witness, the testimony is sufficient to sustain the true finding. (Evid. Code, 411.)
Any significant identification issues in this case were resolved when minor testified that he was indeed at the restaurant with his girlfriend, and that he argued with her outside the restaurant. Minor was the male stopped by the police officer and the civilian witness saw the police officer approach the couple. Both the witness and the officer identified the picture of the female member of the couple. The only missing link was a positive identification of minor by the civilian witness. Minor filled this gap by admitting that he had argued with his girlfriend outside the restaurant before being stopped by police.
We therefore find ample direct and circumstantial evidence to allow the juvenile court to conclude that minor committed a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (e)(1). Certainly there was nothing inherently improbable about the testimony of the civilian witness, as minor argues. When considered with the other direct and circumstantial evidence described above, including minors own testimony, there was convincing and substantial evidence to support the true finding of the Los Angeles juvenile court judge.
II. THE PROBATION CONDITIONS
As noted above, the case was transferred to Riverside County and the disposition hearing was held in Riverside on May 22, 2006. The court released minor to the custody of his parents with detailed probation conditions.
Minor objects to two of those conditions. The first requires that minor [n]ot associate with anyone known to possess, sell, or use any controlled substance or any related paraphernalia. Minor seeks to modify this condition by adding the word illegally before the word possess. The People do not object to this change.
The second condition requires that minor [n]ot possess, consume, inhale, inject any intoxicants, alcohol, narcotics, aerosol products, or other controlled substances, poisons, illegal drugs, incl. marijuana nor possess related paraphernalia. Minor seeks to modify this condition by adding the word illegally before the word possess, or to add the words without a prescription after the words narcotics and controlled substances. Although the People agree that the latter change may be made, we find it clearer to merely add the word illegally before the word possess. We will order the conditions of probation modified accordingly.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by changing the probation terms to add the word illegally before the word possess in each of the two probation conditions described above. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
/s/ King
J.
We concur:
/s/ Ramirez
P.J.
/s/ Miller
J.
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[1] The petition was filed in Los Angeles County and it was adjudicated there by Cynthia Loo, Judge. The matter was then transferred to Riverside County and the dispositional hearing was conducted by Commissioner Koosed.
[2]Penal Code section 242 defines battery as any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.
