Filed 8/31/18 In re Andrew R. CA1/3

Posted 11/16/18 due to technical error

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

After the juvenile court denied his Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1 motion to suppress evidence, appellant Andrew R. admitted an allegation that he assaulted a police officer under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (c)(2). The court declared Andrew a ward of the court and placed him on probation. Andrew now appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying his suppression motion. He contends he was subject to a de facto arrest by police without probable cause, or alternatively, he argues police detained him without reasonable suspicion. As such, he asserts all the evidence obtained from his unconstitutional seizure should have been excluded and the court’s dispositional order should be reversed. We agree with the juvenile court’s determination that the police’s initial seizure of Andrew was a detention, not an arrest, supported by reasonable suspicion. We conclude no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, so we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In December 2015, the district attorney petitioned to have Andrew declared a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a). The petition alleged Andrew committed three felonies: two counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon Newark police officers (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)) (counts 1 and 2) and one count of throwing a rock at a vehicle and its occupants (Veh. Code, § 23110, subd. (b) (count 3)). Andrew moved under Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1 to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his detention and arrest. The following evidence is taken from the suppression hearing on Andrew’s motion.

On December 11, 2015, in the middle of the night, Newark police officer Salvador Sandoval was driving north on Newark Boulevard in the department’s armored SWAT truck, and Officer Brian Simon was in the front passenger seat. The weather was bad, with rain, thunder, and lighting. At 1:53 a.m., Officer Sandoval issued an emergency “11-99” call, used when an officer is in distress or has been shot. In minutes, several officers in approximately a dozen police vehicles with sirens blaring and lights flashing made their way to the Newark Boulevard location of the distress call. Among the responding officers were Sergeants David Lee and Jolie Macias and Detectives Jennifer Bloom and Shannon Todd, all of whom testified at the suppression hearing. One of the arriving officers saw Officer Simon laying inside the armored vehicle covered in blood before he was taken to the hospital. The general understanding among the responding officers was that Officers Sandoval and Simon had been shot at with a firearm.

Several of the officers set up a perimeter along Newark Boulevard from where the armored truck had been hit to the next main intersection to the north, approximately a quarter of a mile away. Sergeant Lee coordinated a search team of at least 4 officers, including Officer Macias and a canine officer. The team drove north on Newark Boulevard close to the apartment buildings on the west side of the street looking for an active shooter, or “anybody that was going to be out at that time of night” who might be a witness.

Officer Macias testified that at 2:03 a.m., in the middle of the roadblocked area, she saw two young men turn away from the street and walk towards a staircase leading to a second-story apartment. Sergeant Lee testified to seeing what “seemed like a couple shadows turn and walk away.” He thought it was unusual for anyone to be outside because it was raining and they had not seen anybody. One of the boys did not have a shirt on, which struck Officer Macias as unusual because of the bad weather. At that point, the officers got out of their vehicle. Sergeant Lee, who was operating under the belief an officer had been shot, approached the two young men with his rifle drawn, and other officers had drawn their weapons as well. Sergeant Lee identified himself as police. With his rifle and its flashlight pointing at them, Sergeant Lee ordered the two to stop. He followed typical detention protocol and had the two lay on the ground face down. They complied. He held the two at gunpoint until they were handcuffed. Meanwhile, two other young males came from the second-story apartment. They were ordered to come down and get on the ground. They may have been directed to crawl to the officers. They complied with all orders. They were handcuffed. At that point, about 10 to 15 minutes had passed since Officer Sandoval’s 11-99 call.

The four boys were placed in separate patrol cars, where they remained handcuffed, and handed off to patrol officers who transported them for questioning. They needed to be transported because it was still uncertain whether the area was safe or whether there was a shooter in the vicinity. Three of the boys, including Andrew, were taken to a firehouse just outside the perimeter. Meanwhile, the team continued to search for an active shooter. Sometime later, the search team became aware that Officer Simon may have been hit with a rock not a bullet. The search team did not find or see anyone else.

At the firehouse, Detectives Bloom and Todd were to interview the boys, whom they recognized as Andrew, O.C., and S.V. Before talking with the young men, the detectives became aware that it was a rock and not gunfire that struck Officers Sandoval and Simon. The boys remained handcuffed during their interviews.

Detective Bloom read Andrew his Miranda[1] rights and spoke with him while he sat in the back of the patrol car. According to Detective Bloom, Andrew told her he stayed up late playing video games with O.C and S.V. As he was getting ready to fall asleep on the couch, they heard sirens. Out of curiosity, he poked his head outside. At that point, he was detained at gunpoint by arriving officers.

Between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m., Detective Todd interviewed S.V., who lived at the Newark Boulevard apartment building where officers initially encountered the boys. S.V. said that he and his friends were sleeping but woke up because of the sirens and then decided to go outside. When Detective Todd asked him where he was sleeping, S.V. said that they were not actually sleeping but hanging out in the living room. Detective Todd then interviewed O.C., who told the detective he had been hanging out with his friends but refused to identify them.

After they interviewed the minors, the detectives conferred and concluded they needed to investigate further because of S.V.’s inconsistent statement. Around 3:30 a.m., Detective Todd, who was aware of a surveillance camera outside of S.V.’s apartment from past dealings with his family, returned to the apartment building and requested access to the video. The surveillance footage showed the boys coming in and out of the apartment before Officer Sandoval’s distress call. Upon observing this, the detectives understood that the boys had not been sleeping and were not truthful about being inside the apartment before the police converged on the area in response to Officer Sandoval’s distress call. Based on the inconsistencies in their statements, the minors were taken to the Newark Police Station between approximately 4:08 and 4:15 a.m.

The court denied Andrew’s suppression motion. It found that Andrew’s initial seizure—from the point he was confronted at the apartment building to the point he was taken to the police station—was not an arrest but a reasonable detention. The court explained that there had been a serious offense and that officers initially thought another officer had been shot in the head. Andrew and his companions were outside in the same area the assault occurred shortly after it happened. It was unusual for anyone to be outside at all, given it was a cold and wet night. They were also dressed inappropriately, indicating it “could be they discarded garments.” The court further noted that they turned and walked away, which it deemed “minimal” but of “some weight.” Noting that the minors were detained at gunpoint in a “very aggressive[]” manner, handcuffed, and made to walk backwards and possibly to crawl, the court found the handcuffing reasonable at that point given the officers’ belief an active shooter had struck Officer Simon. Even though the court described the handcuffing as “troubling,” it found it was justified based on the seriousness of the offense and the officers had no knowledge of how the minors would react to detention. The court found “the method of detention was reasonable under the circumstances.”

Further, the court found no evidence of undue delay. The boys were detained shortly after 2:00 a.m. and not questioned until about 3:00 a.m. Under the “pretty hectic circumstances,” the court deemed the timeline reasonable. The court found it was reasonable for the detectives to return to the scene, talk to the officers there, talk to each other, and then spend time deciding what to do before interviewing the boys. Given inconsistent statements from the minors, it was also reasonable for the detectives to search out and review the footage from the surveillance cameras in the area.

Subsequent to the court’s ruling, Andrew admitted in a negotiated disposition to a lesser-included offense of assault on a law enforcement officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2).) The remaining two charges were dismissed. The juvenile court declared Andrew a ward of the court and placed him on probation. Andrew now appeals the court’s order on his suppression motion.

DISCUSSION

Andrew contends the court erroneously denied his suppression motion because he was arrested without probable cause or alternatively was detained without reasonable suspicion. He contends that statements he made to the police and the surveillance footage obtained by the police were the products of an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and should have been suppressed. Under the totality of the circumstances, we disagree and affirm the juvenile court.

“The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established and is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings.” (In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.) “ ‘On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court which are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts support the court[’]s legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]” (In re William V. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468.)

1. The Officers’ Initial Seizure of Andrew was a Detention, Not an Arrest.

The parties dispute whether the officers’ seizure of Andrew before he was transported to the police station was an arrest or a detention. Andrew argues it was a de facto arrest without probable cause. The People contend it was a detention for which the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion. It was a detention, not a de facto arrest.

“ ‘Detentions’ ” for Fourth Amendment purposes are seizures of an individual which are “strictly limited in duration, scope and purpose” and which “may be undertaken by police ‘if there is an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.’ ” (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784, quoting Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498.) “Because an investigative detention allows the police to ascertain whether suspicious conduct is criminal activity, such a detention ‘must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 674 (Celis).)

However, “courts have long recognized that an investigative detention may, at some point, become so overly intrusive that it can no longer be characterized as a minimal intrusion designed to confirm quickly or dispel the suspicions which justified the initial stop. [Citation.] When the detention exceeds the boundaries of a permissible investigative stop, the detention becomes a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.” (In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 372, 384.) “ ‘Even if the police do not formally arrest a suspect, that suspect may nevertheless be under actual arrest if the restraint employed by the police goes beyond that which is reasonably necessary for a detention.’ ” (People v. Campbell (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 588, 595.)

There is no “ ‘hard and fast line to distinguish permissible investigative detentions from impermissible de facto arrests. Instead the issue is decided on the facts of each case, with focus on whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly, using the least intrusive means reasonably available under the circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 674–675.)

The police’s seizure of Andrew up to the time he was taken to the police station was a permissible investigative detention and not a de facto arrest. On the facts of this case, the officers diligently pursued their investigation in a manner reasonably designed to quickly dispel or confirm their suspicions, using the least intrusive means reasonably available. The officers who seized Andrew were part of a search team responding in the middle of the night to an emergency “11-99” code issued because Officer Simon had been struck in the head while sitting in the passenger seat of a moving armored vehicle. When the officers encountered Andrew and his companions—less than 15 minutes after the assault on their colleague—the officers believed they were in search of an active shooter and that someone armed and dangerous was in the vicinity. Not only were the initial two young men the officers saw the only people out and in the perimeter of the assault, one of them was shirtless which was unusual for the rainy weather, and they both turned away from the armored vehicle. Given the seriousness of the offense the officers were investigating and the uncertainty about who the boys were or the reasons they were outside, it was reasonable for the officers to draw their weapons, order the boys to drop down and approach, and then handcuff them and place each of them in separate patrol cars.

We understand this encounter took place shortly after 2:00 a.m. and the boys were not interviewed until approximately an hour to an hour-and-a-half later, while they remained handcuffed the entire time. But we agree with the juvenile court that this was not undue delay. The boys had to be transported to a safe zone outside the perimeter of the ongoing search, and there was still developing information about the nature of the assault on Officer Simon. There were three boys to be interviewed by two detectives who understandably spoke with officers on the scene and conferred between themselves regarding their approach to the minors. The detention lengthened when one of the boys responded inconsistently to Detective Todd’s inquiry, and it was reasonable at that point for the detective, who was aware of surveillance at the apartment building, to go there and review it as part of the police investigation.

The actions undertaken by the several officers involved were aggressive to be sure, especially the orders at gunpoint and the handcuffing, but they were the least intrusive means reasonably available to the officers to protect their personal safety in a dangerous situation and to investigate the serious crime against a fellow officer. Once the video surveillance footage revealed the boys lied about where they were prior to the assault, they were taken to the police station and Andrew was arrested. Before then, he was only detained.

Andrew contends he was subject to a de facto arrest due to the highly intrusive nature of the stop involving multiple weapons pointed at him and his friends, an aggressive canine, and orders that he drop to the ground and move backwards to the officers to get handcuffed. He contends police had no facts suggesting he was a safety threat or a flight risk which would warrant such tactics. We disagree.

We recognize the aggressiveness inherent in the display of weapons and that handcuffing a suspect increases the intrusiveness of a stop and is not typical to an investigatory detention. (See Washington v. Lambert (9th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3d 1181, 1188 (Lambert); People v. Stier (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 21, 27.) Nevertheless, the elements Andrew claims were highly intrusive did not transform the detention into an arrest requiring probable cause under the circumstances. (See, e.g., Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2002) 308 F.3d 987, 991–992 (Gallegos) [detention in which suspect was stopped at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car did not elevate into an arrest]; In re Antonio B. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 435, 441 [officer’s use of handcuffs does not necessarily transform a detention into an arrest].) “[A]n officer may take reasonably necessary steps to protect his or her safety and to maintain the status quo during a detention. [Citation.] The issue is whether the methods used during a detention were reasonably necessary under all the circumstances of the detention.” (In re K.J. (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1132.) We conclude they were.

Andrew also argues the police’s action in this case was almost identical to the de facto arrest found in Lambert, supra, 98 F.3d 1181. There, two individuals were detained for crimes that occurred in a different city—the most recent crime occurring more than six days before the detention. (Id. at pp. 1183–1184.) The physical characteristics of the detained individuals in Lambert conflicted with the description of the suspects. (Ibid.) Several police cruisers followed the arrestee’s vehicle before officers ordered them out at gunpoint, handcuffed them, and placed them in separate police vehicles. (Ibid.) Addressing whether the police engaged in a valid investigatory stop or whether the police arrested the plaintiffs without probable cause, Lambert explained: “In this nation, all people have a right to be free from the terrifying and humiliating experience of being pulled from their cars at gunpoint, handcuffed, or made to lie face down on the pavement when insufficient reason for such intrusive police conduct exists. . . . Under ordinary circumstances, when the police have only reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, drawing weapons and using handcuffs and other restraints will violate the Fourth Amendment.” (Id. at p. 1187.)

Lambert does not dictate reversal. Not only are the facts here materially different, the court in Lambert recognized that “[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest” and that courts “ ‘consider the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Lambert, supra, 98 F.3d at p. 1185.) The court stated, “[P]ointing a weapon at a suspect and handcuffing him, or ordering him to lie on the ground, or placing him in a police car will not automatically convert an investigatory stop into an arrest that requires probable cause.” (Id. at 1186, italics in original.) Lambert further explained that whether a detention has ripened into an arrest is a fact-specific inquiry and intrusive means may be used during a detention in certain circumstances. (Id. at 1189.) While Lambert recognized that if detained suspects “are cooperative and the officers do not have specific information that they are armed or specific information linking them to a recent or inchoate dangerous crime, the use of such aggressive and highly intrusive tactics is not warranted,” there were exceptions for “extraordinary circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1192.) These circumstances where especially intrusive means of effecting a detention have been allowed include: “1) where the suspect is uncooperative or takes action at the scene that raises a reasonable possibility of danger or flight; 2) where the police have information that the suspect is currently armed; 3) where the stop closely follows a violent crime; and 4) where the police have information that a crime that may involve violence is about to occur.” (Id. at p. 1189, fns. omitted.) The aggressive manner in which Andrew was detained followed minutes after a serious assault against a police officer. The officers’ stop of Andrew in this case was not an impermissible arrest.

Andrew further contends that leaving him handcuffed in a patrol car for nearly an hour or more before interrogating him was a prolonged detention converting the encounter to an arrest. He says this is especially so “considering there was no evidence justifying the length of the detention or the continued restraint.” Andrew says there was no evidence establishing he was seized only as long as necessary for him to be interviewed. We disagree. “There is no fixed time limit for establishing the constitutionality of an investigatory detention. Rather, such a detention will be deemed unconstitutional ‘when extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances that made its initiation permissible. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The issue then ‘is whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.’ ” (People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 537–538.) As we have discussed, Andrew’s detention was no more protracted than reasonably necessary in light of the ongoing search, the need to transport him outside the police perimeter, the multiple suspects, officers and detectives involved, and the existence of relevant video surveillance. The trial court’s conclusion that there was no undue delay was supported by the evidence and not erroneous. (See Gallegos, supra, 308 F.3d at pp. 991–993 [detention for 45-minutes-to-an-hour reasonable where officers diligently investigated crime]; People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1520 [30-minute detention reasonable to allow police to obtain more information needed for investigation].)

Finally, the fact that Detective Bloom Mirandized Andrew does not require us to conclude that his detention was a de facto arrest, as Andrew contends. Given Andrew was subject to questioning while handcuffed, we understand why the detectives elected to issue Miranda warnings. (See People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403 (Pilster) [“Miranda warnings are required ‘as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree associated with a formal arrest.” ’ ”]) However, Miranda does not necessarily mean he was arrested for purposes of his Fourth Amendment claim. (See id. at p. 1406 [analysis under Fourth Amendment is a “distinct analytical concept[]” from Fifth Amendment Miranda custody claims and “may produce different outcomes”]; see also, United States v. Henley (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 1040, 1042 [handcuffed suspect entitled to Miranda warnings even though agents informed suspect he was not under arrest]. Given the hectic circumstances, the uncertainty of who the boys were, the concern over officer safety in light of the assault on Officer Simon, and the need to protect the status quo during the ongoing investigation, the Miranda warnings were not dispositive.

Accordingly, we conclude that from the time Andrew was stopped at the apartment building until he was transported to the police station, Andrew was in investigative detention and not under de facto arrest. Because we conclude Andrew was only detained up to that point, we need not address his argument that officers lacked probable cause to arrest him.

B. The Officers’ Detention of Andrew Was Reasonable.

Andrew contends that even if he was merely detained, and not arrested, his detention was unconstitutional as the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he had assaulted an officer or committed any other crime. Again, we disagree.

“A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that . . . provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 (Souza).) “ ‘[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is “innocent” or “guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’ ” (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 10.) “[T]he totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 230.) A detention predicated upon mere curiosity or an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27.)

Two cases are instructive. In People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968 (Brown), a caller reported a fight in the alley behind his house after 10:30 p.m. which involved a possible loaded gun. (Id. at p. 972.) No description of any of the fighters was given. (Id. at p. 983.) Within three minutes of the call, a sheriff’s deputy arrived and saw Brown—the only person in the alley—drive away. (Id. at pp. 973, 986.) The deputy asked Brown if he had seen a fight, but Brown did not respond and kept driving. (Id. at p. 973.) Because he had come from the location of the fight and did not acknowledge the deputy’s question, the deputy followed Brown and subsequently detained him. (Ibid.) Noting the seriousness of the reported crime, the Supreme Court stated that the “very recent report of a crime in progress, Brown’s close proximity to the crime scene, and the lack of other vehicle or pedestrian traffic in the residential alley [were]all significant factors” giving rise to a reasonable inference that a crime had occurred and that Brown was involved. (Id. at pp. 984–985.) The Supreme Court upheld the deputy’s detention of Brown, deeming it “reasonable . . . to suspect the sole occupant of the alley may have been involved in the fight.” (Id. at p. 987.)

In People v. Conway (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 385 (Conway), a man saw two men leave his garage around 3:00 a.m. (Id. at p. 387.) His wife called the police, but did not provide a description of the men and did not say whether they had a car. (Id. at pp. 387, 390.) Two minutes after receiving the report, a sheriff’s deputy saw a car leaving the area of the reported burglary. He detained its two occupants, the only people in the area. (Id. at p. 390.) The detention was upheld as reasonable under the circumstances. (Ibid.)

Similarly, the Newark officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Andrew. As in Brown and in Conway, Andrew had similar spatial and temporal proximity to the alleged crime. Andrew was present within the perimeter officers established near the scene minutes after the crime against Officer Simon. It was late at night, and besides Andrew and his friends, the street was deserted. Even though it was a rainy December night, Andrew was wearing only a light t-shirt and two of his companions were shirtless. These circumstances provide specific articulable facts which provided officers some objective manifestation that Andrew was involved in criminal activity and made their detention of Andrew reasonable.

Andrew takes a divide and conquer approach to each of these factors and attempts to preclude giving any of them any weight. He argues that none of the reasons the officers seized him gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Andrew had assaulted an officer, or was involved in a crime.

He contends that the fact that two of the boys turned away from the street when police arrived did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion. He further points out that the two boys Officer Lee saw did not run away or attempt to conceal themselves from the police, and he notes there was no testimony that Andrew was one of the boys who walked away or acted evasively. The juvenile court was entitled to give “some weight” to the fact that two of the boys walked away from the officers. Evasive conduct other than sudden flight, is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. (Florida v. Rodriguez (1984) 469 U.S. 1, 6; In re Stephen L. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 257, 259–260.) Moreover, evasive conduct by a suspect’s companions may also be considered in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion. (People v. Holloway (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 150, 155.)

People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117 (Loewen), which Andrew relies on, is distinguishable. During the course of his patrol duty, a sheriff’s deputy detained the defendant for “identification purposes” in part because he failed to look at the deputy, since “ ‘[m]ost people have a habit of looking at a patrol car when they pass it.’ ” (Id. at pp. 126, 122, 124.) The Supreme Court determined that looking away from the deputy was a movement without consequence, especially since the defendant did not duck, hide, or make any other suspicious movements. (Id. at p. 127.) Unlike Loewen, the officers here had knowledge of a serious assault against a police officer to which Andrew was in close spatial and temporal proximity. (Id. at pp. 129–130.) The detention here was not made for vague “identification purposes” but to investigate a known assault in the immediate vicinity. The facts here are markedly different than in Loewen.

Andrew states that he could have been outdoors that night out of curiosity given all the noise from emergency vehicles. It is true he might have had a perfectly innocent reason for being outside, but that does not mean the officers’ decision to detain him was unconstitutional. “ ‘[T]he possibility that the circumstances are consistent with lawful activity does not render a detention invalid, where the circumstances also raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances; indeed, the principal function of the investigative stop is to resolve that ambiguity.’ ” (Conway, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) This was not a case where there were “far too many other possible explanations” for Andrew being outside near the scene of a serious crime in the middle of a rainy night, as Andrew contends. To secure the safety of the area, the officers who detained Andrew were reasonable for not shrugging their shoulders and allowing the only people they encountered in their perimeter to walk away. (See Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 145–146.) People v. Hester (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 376 (Hester) and Reid v. Georgia (1980) 448 U.S. 438 (Reid), which Andrew cites for the proposition that “facts so general” that would implicate a number of innocent people cannot be the basis for inferring criminal activity, do not help him. Andrew and his companions were the only ones out in the middle of a rainy night in the vicinity of a serious assault against an officer, shortly after the assault occurred. Such facts were not the general, widely applicable facts found inadequate in Hester or Reid, and they reasonably support an inference of criminal activity.

Andrew adds that the “nighttime factor”—that he and his companions were awake and outside late at night—also fails to establish reasonable suspicion. Andrew says that courts credit the nighttime factor with little weight where there are no facts linking a defendant to a crime. He also cites People v. Roth (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 211 (Roth), because the court there concluded Roth’s detention at 1:30 a.m. in a grocery store parking lot was illegal, reasoning that a person’s presence in an area late at night does not warrant an inference of his criminal activity. (Id. at p. 215.) Again, Andrew’s detention was not based solely on the fact that he was out in the middle of the night. Roth is not controlling.

Andrew further contends that the boys’ attire—“lightweight clothing”—fails to establish reasonable suspicion. Andrew asserts their lightweight dress supports an inference that they had just stepped out of the residence to see what the commotion was and had not been outside for a considerable period of time. We disagree. Given the bad weather and that it was the middle of the night, it was reasonable for the officers to infer from the boys’ attire that they may have discarded clothing, which added to the suspiciousness of their presence outside at that particular time.

Finally, Andrew suggests officers required a physical description to make detaining him reasonable. Not so. There is no blanket rule that a physical description of a suspect is a prerequisite to an investigative detention. As we have noted the court in Conway upheld the detention of the defendants there even when the deputy had no description of the suspects or their car based on the overall circumstances. (Conway, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) We do the same here.

Andrew’s divide-and-conquer, factor-by-factor analysis, disapproved by the Supreme Court (see United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274) fails. In making our determination as to the propriety of an investigatory detention, we examine the totality of the circumstances in each case. (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.) Under the totality of these circumstances here, the officers’ actions in detaining Andrew were more than reasonable.

Because we conclude Andrew was lawfully detained, we do not address whether the evidence officers subsequently obtained following his detention must be excluded. Such evidence was not fruit of the poisonous tree.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

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Siggins, P.J.

We concur:

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Pollak, J.

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Jenkins, J.

In re A.R., A152089