In re Ashton Y.
Filed 6/18/08 In re Ashton Y. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re ASHTON Y., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ASHTON Y., Defendant and Appellant. | G038685 (Super. Ct. No. DL023521) O P I N I O N |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Donna L. Crandall, Judge. Affirmed.
Lisa Holder, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Eric A. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Ashton Y., a 12-year-old 7th grader in a special education class, and a ward of the court, was adjudged to have committed vandalism and ordered to spend 163 days in an appropriate juvenile institution. His adjudication was based on his having set fire to a flag in his classroom. We discuss the relevant facts in connection with the issues he raises on appeal.
Defendant first contends that there was not substantial evidence that he burned the flag rather than making an incomplete attempt to do so. We disagree. Defendant himself testified that the flag started on fire. When asked, Ashton, did the flag start on fire? he responded, When it started to burn, I put it out. Officer Pinvidic also testified that the flag appeared to have been burned as one of the corners was brown and fringed.
Defendant next asserts that there was no substantial evidence he knew his conduct was wrongful. Again, we disagree; defendants own testimony contradicts the contention. He testified he started to burn the flag cause I wanted to express my hate toward the system. And another reason was because I wanted to get suspended. Defendants awareness that his conduct might cause him to be suspended constitutes evidence of his knowledge the conduct was wrongful.
Defendant also maintains the court erred in not allowing evidence he lacked capacity. Defendant testified that he was bothered by the other students in the class. The other students pick[ed] on him and that made him feel like he was not normal. He did not want to be in a special education class. When defense counsel asked, this feeling that you had not feeling normal, can you explain why that made you want to be suspended, the court sustained the prosecutors objection on grounds of relevancy. The objection was properly sustained because any answer to the question would not tend to show lack of capacity.
The court also sustained the prosecutors objection to the question, was any part of the system trying to do anything to you? The objection was made on grounds of vagueness and sustained on that ground and also that it called for speculation. The ruling was proper. Defendant answered the next question was anyone trying to put you into educational placement? in the affirmative. Then his lawyer asked [h]ow did that make you feel? The prosecutor objected on grounds of relevance and the objection was sustained. And, again, an answer to this question would not tend to show a lack of capacity. After two or three more questions to which the court sustained objections, counsel stated the question is directed at the element of whether or not he was in fear for his psychological harm at the time when he did this. None of these questions related to defendants capacity. His testimony is intelligent and does not in any manner suggest he lacked capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Defendants final claim is that the court erred in admitting evidence of a statement he made without having been given an instruction under Mirandav. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]. Officer Pinvidic found defendant on a street near the school with another officer. Defendant was handcuffed and then returned to the school where the handcuffs were removed. Pinvidic questioned him in the presence of the assistant principal and in his office. Defendant was cooperative and calm. There were no threats or promises, nor was the doorway blocked. The court admitted statements made by defendant to Pinvidic over objection.
Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. [Citation.] When reviewing a trial courts determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must apply a deferential substantial evidence standard [citation] to the trial courts factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, a reasonable person in [the] defendants position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave [citation]. (People v. Leonard 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400.) Considering the circumstance of the interview, there was substantial evidence defendant was not in custody. The trial court did not err; the evidence showed that this was not a custodial interrogation. A Miranda warning is not required under these circumstances.
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
ARONSON, J.
FYBEL, J.
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