Filed 4/30/18 In re B.C. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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In re B.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C084955


SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD, FAMILY AND ADULT SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. JD237923)



R.C. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order denying reunification services as to minor B.C. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subds. (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7), (c).) Mother does not contest the juvenile court’s finding that statutory grounds existed to justify bypassing services, but contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding that it would not be in the minor’s best interest to reunify with mother. Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the juvenile court order.
BACKGROUND
The Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), as to six-year-old B.C., alleging: (1) The minor and her one-year-old half sibling S.M. were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm inflicted by the mother, in that on February 9, 2017, mother attempted to drown the minor’s infant half sibling J.M. in the bathtub, claiming God had instructed her to see if J.M. could swim. (2) Both mother and the minor’s stepfather (R.M.) had failed to protect the minors from mother’s psychiatric and/or emotional problems, evinced by the facts that mother not only put J.M. at risk of drowning, but told the stepfather that the Holy Spirit had taught mother how to dance and was speaking through mother advising them to move from city to city. (3) When brought into UC Davis Medical Center on February 9, 2017, and examined by a child abuse specialist, J.M. was found to have difficulty breathing, was intermittently vomiting bloody and greenish sputum and coughing for five hours, and was admitted into the Intensive Care Unit with an unknown discharge date.
A separate section 300 petition was filed as to S.M. and J.M. They are the subjects of a related appeal filed by mother and R.M. in case No. C085803. They and R.M. are not parties to this appeal.
The department filed an amended petition which fleshed out the alleged injuries to J.M. based on the child abuse specialist’s report, added allegations of J.M.’s failure to thrive in mother’s and R.M.’s care, and further alleged mother’s mental health problems, noting that a firm diagnosis had not yet been made.
The family had a prior record with Child Protective Services (CPS) in Sacramento and San Joaquin Counties. In October 2013, the department initiated a referral because mother left three-year-old B.C. unattended while mother went to the store. In January 2014, a referral alleged that B.C. was taken into protective custody after mother ingested contaminated marijuana; despite mother’s subsequent positive drug tests, the referral was closed after mother moved to Stockton. A general neglect referral to San Joaquin County CPS alleged that in October 2016, when the newborn J.M. was transferred to UC Davis Medical Center for surgery for a gastrointestinal feeding tube, mother and J.M.’s father threatened hospital staff and were escorted out of the hospital; when told that additional medical issues prevented J.M.’s immediate discharge, the parents verbally abused J.M.’s doctors, and mother accused them of trying to kill J.M. After that time, mother allegedly canceled medical specialist meetings concerning J.M., and the parents failed to administer her prescribed medications.
On February 9, 2017, mother took a bath with J.M., now four months old. J.M. was submerged for three to four minutes, during which she urinated, defecated, and spat up a white substance. Mother claimed God had spoken to her and told her to let the infant swim; she laughed as she watched. Thinking the infant was fine, mother did not take her to the hospital. The infant was brought in several hours later, after B.C.’s stepfather R.M. observed that the infant was having trouble breathing and had coughed up bloody greenish sputum three times. The infant did not suffer life-threatening injuries, but may have incurred brain damage.
When law enforcement came to the home to check on older minors B.C. and S.M., mother would not let the officers in; they entered by going through the garage and kicking open the bedroom door. B.C. and S.M. were placed in protective custody. Mother was arrested for attempted murder and felony child endangerment.
According to B.C., when she and her stepfather walked into the bathroom, the infant was floating in the bathtub and had defecated in the water. Mother was not holding the infant, who was crying and coughing up blood. Mother tried to keep R.M. from taking the infant to the hospital.
B.C. said God talked to her parents all the time, telling them what to do or not to do. Even though she was frightened by domestic violence between mother and R.M., B.C. did not want to go to a foster home because she had already been in at least three in Sacramento.
The paternal grandmother called the hospital and expressed fear for the safety of the older minors, mentioning a time when mother threatened to stab them, then took a butcher knife and stabbed a couch in their presence. The paternal grandmother also said mother was becoming increasingly crazy. Mother had recently moved from Stockton to Sacramento, and there was no record that she had received mental health services in Sacramento County. B.C.’s maternal grandmother said mother and R.M. were crazy and were always talking about God.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered all of the minors detained. The juvenile court found provisionally that R.M. was the father of J.M. and S.M., but deferred a paternity finding as to B.C.
Mother told the social worker that she now knew what she had done with the infant was risky and she would not have done it had she realized the risk; however, at the time she believed she was following God’s instruction to put the infant in the water and see if she could swim. God’s voice told mother that letting the infant swim would heal her.
Mother said she had been diagnosed with anxiety disorder and depression as a teenager and had been prescribed medication, but stopped taking it when she became pregnant. Lately, however, she had felt as if something more serious was going on. A week before the bathtub incident, she went looking for gold in the garage ceiling; she did not understand why she had done that. She had recently filled six shopping carts at Target with supplies for videos of herself dancing that she was planning to post to YouTube. She had experienced a burst of energy after Christmas and had committed herself to waking up at 4:00 a.m. every day to spend time with God, with whom she had been speaking for the last two or three weeks. She acknowledged that the voices she heard had been so distracting at one point that she could not care for her children.
R.M. said that on February 9, 2017, he heard J.M. scream and found her coughing up blood and mucus, but waited to take her to the emergency room until mother returned. According to R.M., mother had been talking to God every day, and God replied to her.
In a forensic interview, B.C. said that on the day of the bathtub incident, she had heard mother and R.M. arguing, with mother threatening to kill him; she had seen five similar arguments between them before. R.M. went into the garage. B.C. went to check on the infant and saw four stains from vomited mucus and blood on the bedsheets; when she told R.M. about this, he took the infant to the hospital. Mother put on Christian music while B.C. danced with S.M. The two children then went into a walk-in closet, from which B.C. heard the cops breaking in and ordering mother to get up, while she pleaded with them not to take her to jail or to take her child away from her. B.C. told the social worker she cried when mother was taken into custody. B.C. cared about her family more than herself. Before she was placed in foster care, she had acted like a little mother to S.M. B.C. had seen mother and R.M. arguing, and had repeatedly seen R.M. drunk.
B.C.’s biological father, who lived in Pennsylvania, was interested in obtaining custody. An Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children evaluation is pending. The maternal grandmother, who lived in Philadelphia, told the social worker that she had begged mother not to move to California. Mother changed a lot after meeting R.M., a controlling person who cut off her telephone every few months. The paternal grandmother told the social worker that mother’s mental problems rendered her unable to take care of her children.
The social worker recommended bypassing reunification services to mother under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (b)(6), and opined that it would not be in the minors’ best interest to offer services to mother (§ 361.5, subd. (c)) because “further services will not prevent reabuse, given the severity of the crime and mother’s severe mental health problems”; “services to the mother would delay permanency for the children”; and “[t]he mother is currently incarcerated without a projected release[] date, and, if convicted, will be serving a sentence that is not within the reunification time frame.” The social worker acknowledged that B.C. “talks positively about the mother and desires to reunify with the mother.”
According to child abuse specialist Dr. Julia Magana, J.M. was found to have incurred injuries consistent with severe physical abuse, including compression fractures at the neck vertebrae and a trace dorsal epidural hematoma. These injuries could have resulted from shaking or other trauma; J.M. was not old enough to have sustained them on her own.
Mother and R.M. admitted the allegations in part and denied them in part. The social worker continued to assess the risks of returning the minors to the parents’ care as high and to recommend bypassing services to mother.
According to B.C.’s interview the day after the bathtub incident, mother had actively tried to prevent R.M. from taking the infant to the hospital. Mother had told the police that she intended to remove the infant’s gastrostomy tube but was stopped by R.M. and B.C.
The foster parents of B.C. and S.M. sought to terminate the placement. The minors were doing well in placement, but mother was demanding that someone else supervise her visits. Due to mother’s unreasonable demands and apparent mental health issues, the foster parents felt they had to terminate the placement.
Mother denied the allegations of the petition and objected to the recommendation to bypass reunification services. She alleged that when she was in jail, a psychiatrist, Dr. Greg Sokolov, had diagnosed her with bipolar disorder and had prescribed medication, with which she was compliant. She further alleged that psychiatrist Dr. Christina Park, who was currently treating mother, had diagnosed bipolar disorder plus postpartum depression, probably predating February 9, 2017. Mother said she was participating in all recommended services, including group counseling, parenting classes, and mental health treatment. Mother now believed that she had received proper diagnosis and medication, she could live a stable life and the minors would not be at risk in her care.
Mother and R.M.’s visitation with the minors had generally gone well, but on one occasion mother blew up and yelled at the visitation monitor. The parents continued to insist that visitation schedules should be based only on their own availability, though the foster family agency had explained to them that other contingencies also must be considered. In addition to the reasons previously stated for B.C. and S.M.’s change of placement, they had also been moved because the parents had taught B.C. to “monitor” the former foster home.
Mother had begun recommended services in late April 2017; her progress could not yet be determined. She had drug tested negative several times in May 2017.
Although the parents had participated in services and were willing to reunify with the minors, it was reported that the risks of returning the minors to their care remained high. The parents still failed to demonstrate the ability and judgment to protect the minors and meet their needs. Denial of reunification services to mother and R.M. was still recommended.
At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Etta Strickland-Ivey, who had monitored the parents’ visits since March 16, 2017, testified that they went very well. She had seen only positive and comforting behavior from both parents. Mother was teaching S.M. how to express her feelings appropriately. B.C. was always excited to see them; once she cried when they left, but she did not do that any more because she knew they would be back. She called them mom and dad.
Social worker Oxana Sinista, who had been assigned to the case in February 2017, testified that mother could be “pushy” and overly emotional; when excited, she would speak nonstop, take an accusatory tone, and not listen to any explanation from Sinista. When mother did not get what she wanted, she became “emotionally frustrated.” However, recently she and father had gotten better at listening and following directions.
B.C. and S.M.’s prior foster parents had asked for the minors to be moved because they did not feel comfortable working with mother and R.M. B.C. disclosed that R.M. had asked her to monitor the foster home.
The facilitator of mother’s parenting class had recently contacted Sinista and said mother was very engaged and doing “very great”; she had scored very high on tests. Sinista had received no negative feedback from mother’s service providers. However, it was too early to tell whether mother was benefiting from services, because she had just started them at the end of April. On May 17, 2017, B.C. told Sinista that she wanted to live with mother and R.M. and to visit with her biological father.
Dr. Magana, the child abuse specialist, testified that nothing in the history she had been given explained how J.M. had incurred the cervical spinal fractures shown by the MRI. They were probably caused by “significant hyperflexion and hyperextension,” such as could occur during shaking or a motor vehicle collision; it would take very significant trauma to produce these injuries. Although such injuries could not be dated precisely in a very young child, the presence of epidural blood suggested a relatively recent occurrence, not more than three weeks prior to the infant’s hospitalization. Nothing in the hospital’s records suggested the injury could have happened there.
Mouang Saephon, a social worker assigned to the case from its beginning testified that she had reviewed two documents from therapists concerning mother: a letter from Rhonda Love and a mental health assessment from Dr. Christina Park. The documents were introduced into evidence, but are not in the appellate record. The letter from Love, which Saephon had received just before trial, indicated that mother had been participating well in general group counseling. The assessment and cover letter from Dr. Park indicated that she was not yet sure of mother’s diagnosis, and was still experimenting with increasing mother’s medication to see how it would affect her. Neither document gave Saephon cause to think mother should receive reunification services.
According to Saephon, Love’s letter did not show that mother could benefit from services because mother had just started in counseling. If there were a later report that showed more, it could change Saephon’s opinion, but it was unknown how long it would take to produce such a report.
Dr. Park’s assessment increased Saephon’s concerns about mother. By her own account, mother had mental health symptoms as far back as 2012, had stopped taking medication when S.M. was born, and had experienced bizarre “episodes” she could not explain since 2013. The fact that Dr. Park had recommended an increase in mother’s medication showed that it could not yet be determined whether the medication was working. In addition, Dr. Park had still not made a specific diagnosis: her assessment showed only “unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder,” while ruling out “[b]rief psychotic disorder with post-partum onset” and “[u]nderlying bipolar 1 disorder.” Although it might indicate benefit from treatment if some of mother’s symptoms were improving or had resolved, this was not enough evidence to change Saephon’s recommendation.
The juvenile court ruled that as amended, the allegations of the section 300 petitions were found true with some amendments. There was no evidence that mother had ever been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Dr. Park was still not certain what mental health issues caused mother’s behavior. Though there was a working diagnosis and medication, evaluation and assessment were still going on, and differential diagnoses were being considered. Dr. Park had not opined that mother was currently able to parent the minors adequately.
As to disposition, the juvenile court ruled that the evidence supporting jurisdiction showed there was a substantial risk of detriment to the minors’ physical health, safety, protection, or emotional well-being if returned to the parents’ custody. The claim that mother, having been diagnosed and given medication, was well (as father had argued), was unconvincing: Dr. Park’s uncertainty about the origin of mother’s mental health issues (which had recently manifested as beliefs that she was a prophet of God, that there was gold in her ceiling, that her dancing was a form of spiritual battle, that there were cameras in the vents of her home, and that her neighbors were predators) made clear that no one could yet know whether mother was well.
The juvenile court said the case was not only about mother’s mental health issues and J.M.’s near-drowning. J.M. had also suffered unexplained fractures and general medical neglect. Since neither parent took responsibility for inflicting the fractures, there was no evidence they could protect any of the minors from similar injury, and J.M.’s medical neglect also showed an inability to protect the minors.
As for reunification services, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that severe physical harm was inflicted on J.M., the sibling of S.M. and half sibling of B.C., by the conduct of both parents, which was sufficient grounds to deny services. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(6), (b)(7) [providing for a bypass of reunification services if the parent is not receiving reunification services for a sibling or a half sibling of the child].) Furthermore, although the juvenile court was aware of B.C.’s statements that she would like to reunify with mother, the juvenile court found that pursuing reunification would not benefit the minors.
The juvenile court could not find by clear and convincing evidence that reunification would be in the minors’ best interests, as required in order to grant services where section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(7) applied, because it could not find that “based on competent testimony, [reunification] services are likely to prevent re-abuse or continued neglect of the child[,] or that failure to try reunification would be detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to the parent.” As to mother in particular, there was no competent evidence that services to address her mental health issues would be likely to prevent such reabuse of the minors as the near drowning, and no evidence at all that services would be likely to prevent such reabuse as J.M.’s fractures. In addition, both parents had engaged in behavior immediately after the near-drowning that indicated a consciousness of wrongdoing: mother, in particular, had refused to answer when law enforcement came to the door, and was found hiding in a closet with B.C. and S.M., having told them the officers were there to take them away.
According to the juvenile court, although the parents’ visitation had generally been positive and appropriate, this was a far cry from establishing that failure to attempt reunification would cause detriment to the minors. As to B.C., there was also evidence that the parents were inappropriate at visits: among other things, they had taught B.C. to monitor the former foster parents’ home. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the provision of reunification services was not in the minors’ best interests.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the denial of reunification services as to B.C. was an abuse of discretion under section 361.5, subdivision (c), because reunification was in B.C.’s best interest. We disagree.
“The juvenile court has broad discretion in determining whether offering [a parent] reunification services would have been in [the minor]’s best interests. [Citation.] As a reviewing court, we will reverse a juvenile court’s order denying services only if that discretion has been clearly abused. [Citation.]” (In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 523-524.) Although the department asserts there is a split of authority as to the standard of review, citing decisions which have applied a substantial evidence standard (In re Z.G. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705, 715; Raymond C. v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 159, 164; In re Rebekah R. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1638, 1652) (RB 27-28), any such distinction does not make a difference in this case. Broad deference must be shown to the juvenile court. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 (Jasmine D.).)
In determining whether reunification would be in the child’s best interest, the juvenile court could consider the parent’s current efforts, fitness, and history; the gravity of the problem that led to the dependency; the strength of the bonds between the parent and child and between the child and his or her caretakers; and the child’s need for stability and continuity. (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1228.) Here, the juvenile court found that the problem leading to the dependency could not have been graver: mother’s mental health problems had put the youngest minor’s life and safety at risk, including near-drowning, unexplained fractures, and chronic medical neglect. Mother’s condition had yet to be definitively diagnosed or shown to be treatable in the long term. And because mother’s problems were so far from being resolved, her “current efforts” and “fitness” did not count in her favor. Nor could the minor’s need for stability and continuity be served by postponing the decision about whether mother would be able to resolve her problems.
Mother fails to show that the juvenile court’s findings were erroneous. In describing the juvenile court’s holding, mother does not cite or summarize the detailed factual findings we have set out above. (See Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351; Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) Mother essentially restates her evidence and asks us to view it in the light most favorable to herself, without mention of contrary evidence the juvenile court found credible.
Mother stresses the strong bond she and B.C. shared, but positive visits are not enough to show a strong parent/child bond and here, the relationship was not always positive. B.C. had been frightened by domestic violence between mother and R.M. before the near-drowning of J.M. Moreover, mother tried to hide B.C. when the police came to check on her welfare after J.M.’s admission to the hospital.
Mother has shown no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order denying reunification services to mother is affirmed.



/S/
MAURO, J.



We concur:



/S/
HULL, Acting P. J.



/S/
HOCH, J.